Amended IN Assembly May 21, 2018 Amended IN Assembly March 15, 2018 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20172018 REGULAR SESSION Assembly Bill No. 2125Introduced by Assembly Member QuirkFebruary 08, 2018An act to amend and repeal Section 15360, and to add Article 5.5 (commencing with Section 15365) to Chapter 4 of Division 15, 15 of the Elections Code, relating to elections.LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGESTAB 2125, as amended, Quirk. Election results: risk-limiting audits.Existing law requires an elections official, during the official canvass of an election in which a voting system is used, to conduct a public manual tally of the ballots cast in 1% of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official, as specified.This bill would authorize the use of ballot images, as defined, in the 1% manual tally. The bill would repeal the 1% manual tally requirements on March 5, 2024.TheThis bill would require risk-limiting audits in lieu of the 1% manual tally for certain counties beginning with the March 5, 2024 8, 2022, statewide primary election, and would authorize the use of risk-limiting audits in lieu of the 1% manual tally beginning with the March 3, 2020 statewide primary election. The bill would require the Secretary of State to adopt regulations to implement and administer risk-limiting audits. By imposing new requirements on local elections officials, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.Digest Key Vote: MAJORITY Appropriation: NO Fiscal Committee: YES Local Program: YES Bill TextThe people of the State of California do enact as follows:SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(a) Transparent, publicly observable auditing of election results is necessary to ensure effective election administration and justifiable public confidence in elections.(b) Risk-limiting audits provide efficient and cost-effective scientific quality control for verification of election results.(c) By definition, a risk-limiting audit strictly limits the probability that an incorrect electoral outcome will pass the audit without being corrected.SEC. 2.Section 15360 of the Elections Code is amended to read:15360.(a)During the official canvass of every election in which a voting system is used, the official conducting the election shall conduct a public manual tally of the ballots tabulated by those devices, including vote by mail ballots, using either of the following methods:(1)(A)A public manual tally of the ballots canvassed in the semifinal official canvass, including vote by mail ballots but not including provisional ballots, cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official. If 1 percent of the precincts is less than one whole precinct, the tally shall be conducted in one precinct chosen at random by the elections official.(B)(i)In addition to the 1 percent manual tally, the elections official shall, for each race not included in the initial group of precincts, count one additional precinct. The manual tally shall apply only to the race not previously counted.(ii)The elections official may, at his or her discretion, select additional precincts for the manual tally, which may include vote by mail and provisional ballots.(2)A two-part public manual tally, which includes both of the following:(A)A public manual tally of the ballots canvassed in the semifinal official canvass, not including vote by mail or provisional ballots, cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official and conducted pursuant to paragraph (1).(B)(i)A public manual tally of not less than 1 percent of the vote by mail ballots canvassed in the semifinal official canvass. Batches of vote by mail ballots shall be chosen at random by the elections official.(ii)For purposes of this section, a batch means a set of ballots tabulated by the voting system devices, for which the voting system can produce a report of the votes cast.(iii)(I)In addition to the 1 percent manual tally of the vote by mail ballots, the elections official shall, for each race not included in the initial 1 percent manual tally of vote by mail ballots, count one additional batch of vote by mail ballots. The manual tally shall apply only to the race not previously counted.(II)The elections official may, at his or her discretion, select additional batches for the manual tally, which may include vote by mail and provisional ballots.(b)If vote by mail ballots are cast on a direct recording electronic voting system at the office of an elections official or at a satellite location of the office of an elections official pursuant to Section 3018, the official conducting the election shall either include those ballots in the manual tally conducted pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a), or conduct a public manual tally of those ballots cast on no fewer than 1 percent of all the direct recording electronic voting machines used in that election chosen at random by the elections official.(c)The elections official shall use either a random number generator or other method specified in regulations that shall be adopted by the Secretary of State to randomly choose the initial precincts, batches of vote by mail ballots, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public manual tally.(d)The elections official shall not randomly choose the initial precincts or select an additional precinct for the manual tally until after the close of the polls on election day.(e)The manual tally shall be a public process, with the official conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice of the time and place of the manual tally and of the time and place of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public manual tally before conducting the selection and tally.(f)The official conducting the election shall include a report on the results of the 1 percent manual tally in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any discrepancies between the machine count and the manual tally and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In resolving a discrepancy involving a vote recorded by means of a punchcard voting system or by electronic or electromechanical vote tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.(g)(1)Ballot images may be used in place of ballots for purposes of the manual tally required by this section. (2)The elections official shall choose at random a percentage of precincts to compare ballot images to paper ballots. The percentage shall be prescribed and publicly noticed by the Secretary of State.(3)As used in this section, ballot image means an electronic copy or digital representation of a voted ballot that is an image of the ballot scanned or created independent from the tally or ballot marking system and can be matched back to the original ballot.(h)This section shall remain in effect until March 5, 2024.SEC. 3.SEC. 2. Article 5.5 (commencing with Section 15365) is added to Chapter 4 of Division 15 of the Elections Code, to read: Article 5.5. Risk-Limiting Audits15365.As used in this article, risk-limiting audit means a procedure that ensures a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the voting system for an audited contest.15365. The purpose of this article is to provide elections officials with a method to conduct a comprehensive end-to-end verification of software used in the post-election audit process.15366. As used in this article, the following terms have the following meanings:(a) Ballot-level comparison audit means a type of risk-limiting audit that involves both of the following steps:(1) The elections official uses an independent system to verify that the cast vote records created by the voting system or ballots created independent from the tally or ballot marking system yield the same election results as those reported by the voting system.(2) The elections official compares some or all of those cast vote records to a hand-to-eye, human interpretation of voter markings from the corresponding ballot marked by the voter or the voter verified paper audit trail, as defined by Section 19271.(b) Cast vote record means an auditable document or electronic record that purports to reflect the selections a voter made on a ballot. It lists the contests on the ballot and the voter's selections in each of those contests.(c) Risk-limiting audit means a post-election process that involves hand-to-eye, human inspection of ballots and ensures that there is no more than a five-percent chance that a full manual tally of all the ballots cast in the contest would show a different winner or winners than the winner or winners reported by the voting system. If this post-election process does lead to a full manual tally, the winner or winners according to that full manual tally replace the winner or winners as reported by the voting system if they differ.15366.15367. (a) (1) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 3, 2020, the elections official conducting an election may conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally required by Section 15360 during the official canvass of any election in accordance with the requirements of this article.(2) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 5, 2024, 8, 2022, and each election thereafter, if a voting system is used that was purchased using state funds, the elections official conducting the election any elections official using a voting system that was purchased or partially purchased using state or federal funds on or after January 1, 2019, shall conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally.(3)An elections official conducting a risk-limiting audit shall conduct the audit on at least one countywide and at least one statewide contest, until all counties have transitioned to risk-limiting audits. For the purposes of this paragraph, countywide means an elective office wholly within the county that is voted on throughout the county.(3) A risk-limiting audit under this section shall include all contests and measures on the ballot. Selection of ballots for the audit shall not occur before the reporting of the results for the contests being audited. The Secretary of State shall define in regulations the vote totals to be used in the comparison audit.(4) An elections official is in compliance with this section if the elections official conducts a ballot-level comparison audit with a five percent risk limit or a risk-limiting audit with a five percent risk limit using another method for conducting risk-limiting audits as approved by the Secretary of State.(b) (1) The Secretary of State, in consultation with recognized statistical experts, equipment vendors, election verification and integrity stakeholders, voting system manufacturers, and local elections officials, shall adopt regulations to implement and administer this article.(2) The regulations shall do all of the following:(A)Establish threshold limits for risk-limiting audits.(B)(A) Require the creation of an audit board by the local elections official to govern elections officials to establish appropriate audit boards to conduct the risk-limiting audits.(C)(B) Establish criteria for public education on risk-limiting audits.(D)Ensure(C) Establish procedures to ensure the security of the ballots and documentation that those procedures were followed. ballots, the selection of ballots to be inspected during each audit, and the rules governing cast vote records and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(E)Ensure the accuracy of ballot manifests produced by counties.(F)Establish rules governing the format of ballot manifests, cast vote records, and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(G)Establish procedures for the random selection of ballots to be inspected manually during each audit.(H)(D) Establish the calculations and other methods to be used in the audit to determine whether or when the audit of any contest is required to include the examination of more ballots, and to establish calculations and methods to be used in such an escalation, and to determine whether and when the audit of each contest is complete.(I)(E) Establish procedures and requirements for testing and disclosing the algorithms and source code of any software used to by the Secretary of State for the selection of ballots to be included when elections officials conduct risk-limiting audits under this article, and for disclosing the source code of that software. article.(c)(1)Ballot images may be used in place of ballots for purposes of risk-limiting audits under this article.(2)The elections official shall choose at random a percentage of precincts to compare ballot images to paper ballots. The percentage shall be prescribed and publicly noticed by the Secretary of State.(3)As used in this section, ballot image means an electronic copy or digital representation of a voted ballot that is an image of the ballot scanned or created independent from the tally or ballot marking system and can be matched back to the original ballot. (d)(c) The risk-limiting audit shall be a public and observable process, with the elections official conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice of the time and place of both the risk-limiting audit and of the time and place of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public risk-limiting audit before conducting the selection and tally. As used in this subdivision, direct recording electronic voting machine means a system described in subdivision (d) of Section 301. ballots to be used when conducting the risk-limiting audit.(e)The official conducting the election (d) The elections official conducting the risk-limiting audit shall include a report on the results of the risk-limiting audit in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any discrepancies between the machine count and the risk-limiting audit and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In resolving a discrepancy involving a vote recorded by electronic or electromechanical vote tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.SEC. 4.SEC. 3. If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
Amended IN Assembly May 21, 2018 Amended IN Assembly March 15, 2018 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20172018 REGULAR SESSION Assembly Bill No. 2125Introduced by Assembly Member QuirkFebruary 08, 2018An act to amend and repeal Section 15360, and to add Article 5.5 (commencing with Section 15365) to Chapter 4 of Division 15, 15 of the Elections Code, relating to elections.LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGESTAB 2125, as amended, Quirk. Election results: risk-limiting audits.Existing law requires an elections official, during the official canvass of an election in which a voting system is used, to conduct a public manual tally of the ballots cast in 1% of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official, as specified.This bill would authorize the use of ballot images, as defined, in the 1% manual tally. The bill would repeal the 1% manual tally requirements on March 5, 2024.TheThis bill would require risk-limiting audits in lieu of the 1% manual tally for certain counties beginning with the March 5, 2024 8, 2022, statewide primary election, and would authorize the use of risk-limiting audits in lieu of the 1% manual tally beginning with the March 3, 2020 statewide primary election. The bill would require the Secretary of State to adopt regulations to implement and administer risk-limiting audits. By imposing new requirements on local elections officials, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.Digest Key Vote: MAJORITY Appropriation: NO Fiscal Committee: YES Local Program: YES
Amended IN Assembly May 21, 2018 Amended IN Assembly March 15, 2018
Amended IN Assembly May 21, 2018
Amended IN Assembly March 15, 2018
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20172018 REGULAR SESSION
Assembly Bill No. 2125
Introduced by Assembly Member QuirkFebruary 08, 2018
Introduced by Assembly Member Quirk
February 08, 2018
An act to amend and repeal Section 15360, and to add Article 5.5 (commencing with Section 15365) to Chapter 4 of Division 15, 15 of the Elections Code, relating to elections.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
## LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
AB 2125, as amended, Quirk. Election results: risk-limiting audits.
Existing law requires an elections official, during the official canvass of an election in which a voting system is used, to conduct a public manual tally of the ballots cast in 1% of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official, as specified.This bill would authorize the use of ballot images, as defined, in the 1% manual tally. The bill would repeal the 1% manual tally requirements on March 5, 2024.TheThis bill would require risk-limiting audits in lieu of the 1% manual tally for certain counties beginning with the March 5, 2024 8, 2022, statewide primary election, and would authorize the use of risk-limiting audits in lieu of the 1% manual tally beginning with the March 3, 2020 statewide primary election. The bill would require the Secretary of State to adopt regulations to implement and administer risk-limiting audits. By imposing new requirements on local elections officials, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
Existing law requires an elections official, during the official canvass of an election in which a voting system is used, to conduct a public manual tally of the ballots cast in 1% of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official, as specified.
This bill would authorize the use of ballot images, as defined, in the 1% manual tally. The bill would repeal the 1% manual tally requirements on March 5, 2024.
The
This bill would require risk-limiting audits in lieu of the 1% manual tally for certain counties beginning with the March 5, 2024 8, 2022, statewide primary election, and would authorize the use of risk-limiting audits in lieu of the 1% manual tally beginning with the March 3, 2020 statewide primary election. The bill would require the Secretary of State to adopt regulations to implement and administer risk-limiting audits. By imposing new requirements on local elections officials, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.
The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.
This bill would provide that, if the Commission on State Mandates determines that the bill contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement for those costs shall be made pursuant to the statutory provisions noted above.
## Digest Key
## Bill Text
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(a) Transparent, publicly observable auditing of election results is necessary to ensure effective election administration and justifiable public confidence in elections.(b) Risk-limiting audits provide efficient and cost-effective scientific quality control for verification of election results.(c) By definition, a risk-limiting audit strictly limits the probability that an incorrect electoral outcome will pass the audit without being corrected.SEC. 2.Section 15360 of the Elections Code is amended to read:15360.(a)During the official canvass of every election in which a voting system is used, the official conducting the election shall conduct a public manual tally of the ballots tabulated by those devices, including vote by mail ballots, using either of the following methods:(1)(A)A public manual tally of the ballots canvassed in the semifinal official canvass, including vote by mail ballots but not including provisional ballots, cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official. If 1 percent of the precincts is less than one whole precinct, the tally shall be conducted in one precinct chosen at random by the elections official.(B)(i)In addition to the 1 percent manual tally, the elections official shall, for each race not included in the initial group of precincts, count one additional precinct. The manual tally shall apply only to the race not previously counted.(ii)The elections official may, at his or her discretion, select additional precincts for the manual tally, which may include vote by mail and provisional ballots.(2)A two-part public manual tally, which includes both of the following:(A)A public manual tally of the ballots canvassed in the semifinal official canvass, not including vote by mail or provisional ballots, cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official and conducted pursuant to paragraph (1).(B)(i)A public manual tally of not less than 1 percent of the vote by mail ballots canvassed in the semifinal official canvass. Batches of vote by mail ballots shall be chosen at random by the elections official.(ii)For purposes of this section, a batch means a set of ballots tabulated by the voting system devices, for which the voting system can produce a report of the votes cast.(iii)(I)In addition to the 1 percent manual tally of the vote by mail ballots, the elections official shall, for each race not included in the initial 1 percent manual tally of vote by mail ballots, count one additional batch of vote by mail ballots. The manual tally shall apply only to the race not previously counted.(II)The elections official may, at his or her discretion, select additional batches for the manual tally, which may include vote by mail and provisional ballots.(b)If vote by mail ballots are cast on a direct recording electronic voting system at the office of an elections official or at a satellite location of the office of an elections official pursuant to Section 3018, the official conducting the election shall either include those ballots in the manual tally conducted pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a), or conduct a public manual tally of those ballots cast on no fewer than 1 percent of all the direct recording electronic voting machines used in that election chosen at random by the elections official.(c)The elections official shall use either a random number generator or other method specified in regulations that shall be adopted by the Secretary of State to randomly choose the initial precincts, batches of vote by mail ballots, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public manual tally.(d)The elections official shall not randomly choose the initial precincts or select an additional precinct for the manual tally until after the close of the polls on election day.(e)The manual tally shall be a public process, with the official conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice of the time and place of the manual tally and of the time and place of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public manual tally before conducting the selection and tally.(f)The official conducting the election shall include a report on the results of the 1 percent manual tally in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any discrepancies between the machine count and the manual tally and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In resolving a discrepancy involving a vote recorded by means of a punchcard voting system or by electronic or electromechanical vote tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.(g)(1)Ballot images may be used in place of ballots for purposes of the manual tally required by this section. (2)The elections official shall choose at random a percentage of precincts to compare ballot images to paper ballots. The percentage shall be prescribed and publicly noticed by the Secretary of State.(3)As used in this section, ballot image means an electronic copy or digital representation of a voted ballot that is an image of the ballot scanned or created independent from the tally or ballot marking system and can be matched back to the original ballot.(h)This section shall remain in effect until March 5, 2024.SEC. 3.SEC. 2. Article 5.5 (commencing with Section 15365) is added to Chapter 4 of Division 15 of the Elections Code, to read: Article 5.5. Risk-Limiting Audits15365.As used in this article, risk-limiting audit means a procedure that ensures a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the voting system for an audited contest.15365. The purpose of this article is to provide elections officials with a method to conduct a comprehensive end-to-end verification of software used in the post-election audit process.15366. As used in this article, the following terms have the following meanings:(a) Ballot-level comparison audit means a type of risk-limiting audit that involves both of the following steps:(1) The elections official uses an independent system to verify that the cast vote records created by the voting system or ballots created independent from the tally or ballot marking system yield the same election results as those reported by the voting system.(2) The elections official compares some or all of those cast vote records to a hand-to-eye, human interpretation of voter markings from the corresponding ballot marked by the voter or the voter verified paper audit trail, as defined by Section 19271.(b) Cast vote record means an auditable document or electronic record that purports to reflect the selections a voter made on a ballot. It lists the contests on the ballot and the voter's selections in each of those contests.(c) Risk-limiting audit means a post-election process that involves hand-to-eye, human inspection of ballots and ensures that there is no more than a five-percent chance that a full manual tally of all the ballots cast in the contest would show a different winner or winners than the winner or winners reported by the voting system. If this post-election process does lead to a full manual tally, the winner or winners according to that full manual tally replace the winner or winners as reported by the voting system if they differ.15366.15367. (a) (1) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 3, 2020, the elections official conducting an election may conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally required by Section 15360 during the official canvass of any election in accordance with the requirements of this article.(2) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 5, 2024, 8, 2022, and each election thereafter, if a voting system is used that was purchased using state funds, the elections official conducting the election any elections official using a voting system that was purchased or partially purchased using state or federal funds on or after January 1, 2019, shall conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally.(3)An elections official conducting a risk-limiting audit shall conduct the audit on at least one countywide and at least one statewide contest, until all counties have transitioned to risk-limiting audits. For the purposes of this paragraph, countywide means an elective office wholly within the county that is voted on throughout the county.(3) A risk-limiting audit under this section shall include all contests and measures on the ballot. Selection of ballots for the audit shall not occur before the reporting of the results for the contests being audited. The Secretary of State shall define in regulations the vote totals to be used in the comparison audit.(4) An elections official is in compliance with this section if the elections official conducts a ballot-level comparison audit with a five percent risk limit or a risk-limiting audit with a five percent risk limit using another method for conducting risk-limiting audits as approved by the Secretary of State.(b) (1) The Secretary of State, in consultation with recognized statistical experts, equipment vendors, election verification and integrity stakeholders, voting system manufacturers, and local elections officials, shall adopt regulations to implement and administer this article.(2) The regulations shall do all of the following:(A)Establish threshold limits for risk-limiting audits.(B)(A) Require the creation of an audit board by the local elections official to govern elections officials to establish appropriate audit boards to conduct the risk-limiting audits.(C)(B) Establish criteria for public education on risk-limiting audits.(D)Ensure(C) Establish procedures to ensure the security of the ballots and documentation that those procedures were followed. ballots, the selection of ballots to be inspected during each audit, and the rules governing cast vote records and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(E)Ensure the accuracy of ballot manifests produced by counties.(F)Establish rules governing the format of ballot manifests, cast vote records, and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(G)Establish procedures for the random selection of ballots to be inspected manually during each audit.(H)(D) Establish the calculations and other methods to be used in the audit to determine whether or when the audit of any contest is required to include the examination of more ballots, and to establish calculations and methods to be used in such an escalation, and to determine whether and when the audit of each contest is complete.(I)(E) Establish procedures and requirements for testing and disclosing the algorithms and source code of any software used to by the Secretary of State for the selection of ballots to be included when elections officials conduct risk-limiting audits under this article, and for disclosing the source code of that software. article.(c)(1)Ballot images may be used in place of ballots for purposes of risk-limiting audits under this article.(2)The elections official shall choose at random a percentage of precincts to compare ballot images to paper ballots. The percentage shall be prescribed and publicly noticed by the Secretary of State.(3)As used in this section, ballot image means an electronic copy or digital representation of a voted ballot that is an image of the ballot scanned or created independent from the tally or ballot marking system and can be matched back to the original ballot. (d)(c) The risk-limiting audit shall be a public and observable process, with the elections official conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice of the time and place of both the risk-limiting audit and of the time and place of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public risk-limiting audit before conducting the selection and tally. As used in this subdivision, direct recording electronic voting machine means a system described in subdivision (d) of Section 301. ballots to be used when conducting the risk-limiting audit.(e)The official conducting the election (d) The elections official conducting the risk-limiting audit shall include a report on the results of the risk-limiting audit in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any discrepancies between the machine count and the risk-limiting audit and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In resolving a discrepancy involving a vote recorded by electronic or electromechanical vote tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.SEC. 4.SEC. 3. If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
## The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(a) Transparent, publicly observable auditing of election results is necessary to ensure effective election administration and justifiable public confidence in elections.(b) Risk-limiting audits provide efficient and cost-effective scientific quality control for verification of election results.(c) By definition, a risk-limiting audit strictly limits the probability that an incorrect electoral outcome will pass the audit without being corrected.
SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(a) Transparent, publicly observable auditing of election results is necessary to ensure effective election administration and justifiable public confidence in elections.(b) Risk-limiting audits provide efficient and cost-effective scientific quality control for verification of election results.(c) By definition, a risk-limiting audit strictly limits the probability that an incorrect electoral outcome will pass the audit without being corrected.
SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
### SECTION 1.
(a) Transparent, publicly observable auditing of election results is necessary to ensure effective election administration and justifiable public confidence in elections.
(b) Risk-limiting audits provide efficient and cost-effective scientific quality control for verification of election results.
(c) By definition, a risk-limiting audit strictly limits the probability that an incorrect electoral outcome will pass the audit without being corrected.
(a)During the official canvass of every election in which a voting system is used, the official conducting the election shall conduct a public manual tally of the ballots tabulated by those devices, including vote by mail ballots, using either of the following methods:
(1)(A)A public manual tally of the ballots canvassed in the semifinal official canvass, including vote by mail ballots but not including provisional ballots, cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official. If 1 percent of the precincts is less than one whole precinct, the tally shall be conducted in one precinct chosen at random by the elections official.
(B)(i)In addition to the 1 percent manual tally, the elections official shall, for each race not included in the initial group of precincts, count one additional precinct. The manual tally shall apply only to the race not previously counted.
(ii)The elections official may, at his or her discretion, select additional precincts for the manual tally, which may include vote by mail and provisional ballots.
(2)A two-part public manual tally, which includes both of the following:
(A)A public manual tally of the ballots canvassed in the semifinal official canvass, not including vote by mail or provisional ballots, cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the elections official and conducted pursuant to paragraph (1).
(B)(i)A public manual tally of not less than 1 percent of the vote by mail ballots canvassed in the semifinal official canvass. Batches of vote by mail ballots shall be chosen at random by the elections official.
(ii)For purposes of this section, a batch means a set of ballots tabulated by the voting system devices, for which the voting system can produce a report of the votes cast.
(iii)(I)In addition to the 1 percent manual tally of the vote by mail ballots, the elections official shall, for each race not included in the initial 1 percent manual tally of vote by mail ballots, count one additional batch of vote by mail ballots. The manual tally shall apply only to the race not previously counted.
(II)The elections official may, at his or her discretion, select additional batches for the manual tally, which may include vote by mail and provisional ballots.
(b)If vote by mail ballots are cast on a direct recording electronic voting system at the office of an elections official or at a satellite location of the office of an elections official pursuant to Section 3018, the official conducting the election shall either include those ballots in the manual tally conducted pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a), or conduct a public manual tally of those ballots cast on no fewer than 1 percent of all the direct recording electronic voting machines used in that election chosen at random by the elections official.
(c)The elections official shall use either a random number generator or other method specified in regulations that shall be adopted by the Secretary of State to randomly choose the initial precincts, batches of vote by mail ballots, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public manual tally.
(d)The elections official shall not randomly choose the initial precincts or select an additional precinct for the manual tally until after the close of the polls on election day.
(e)The manual tally shall be a public process, with the official conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice of the time and place of the manual tally and of the time and place of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public manual tally before conducting the selection and tally.
(f)The official conducting the election shall include a report on the results of the 1 percent manual tally in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any discrepancies between the machine count and the manual tally and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In resolving a discrepancy involving a vote recorded by means of a punchcard voting system or by electronic or electromechanical vote tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.
(g)(1)Ballot images may be used in place of ballots for purposes of the manual tally required by this section.
(2)The elections official shall choose at random a percentage of precincts to compare ballot images to paper ballots. The percentage shall be prescribed and publicly noticed by the Secretary of State.
(3)As used in this section, ballot image means an electronic copy or digital representation of a voted ballot that is an image of the ballot scanned or created independent from the tally or ballot marking system and can be matched back to the original ballot.
(h)This section shall remain in effect until March 5, 2024.
SEC. 3.SEC. 2. Article 5.5 (commencing with Section 15365) is added to Chapter 4 of Division 15 of the Elections Code, to read: Article 5.5. Risk-Limiting Audits15365.As used in this article, risk-limiting audit means a procedure that ensures a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the voting system for an audited contest.15365. The purpose of this article is to provide elections officials with a method to conduct a comprehensive end-to-end verification of software used in the post-election audit process.15366. As used in this article, the following terms have the following meanings:(a) Ballot-level comparison audit means a type of risk-limiting audit that involves both of the following steps:(1) The elections official uses an independent system to verify that the cast vote records created by the voting system or ballots created independent from the tally or ballot marking system yield the same election results as those reported by the voting system.(2) The elections official compares some or all of those cast vote records to a hand-to-eye, human interpretation of voter markings from the corresponding ballot marked by the voter or the voter verified paper audit trail, as defined by Section 19271.(b) Cast vote record means an auditable document or electronic record that purports to reflect the selections a voter made on a ballot. It lists the contests on the ballot and the voter's selections in each of those contests.(c) Risk-limiting audit means a post-election process that involves hand-to-eye, human inspection of ballots and ensures that there is no more than a five-percent chance that a full manual tally of all the ballots cast in the contest would show a different winner or winners than the winner or winners reported by the voting system. If this post-election process does lead to a full manual tally, the winner or winners according to that full manual tally replace the winner or winners as reported by the voting system if they differ.15366.15367. (a) (1) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 3, 2020, the elections official conducting an election may conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally required by Section 15360 during the official canvass of any election in accordance with the requirements of this article.(2) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 5, 2024, 8, 2022, and each election thereafter, if a voting system is used that was purchased using state funds, the elections official conducting the election any elections official using a voting system that was purchased or partially purchased using state or federal funds on or after January 1, 2019, shall conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally.(3)An elections official conducting a risk-limiting audit shall conduct the audit on at least one countywide and at least one statewide contest, until all counties have transitioned to risk-limiting audits. For the purposes of this paragraph, countywide means an elective office wholly within the county that is voted on throughout the county.(3) A risk-limiting audit under this section shall include all contests and measures on the ballot. Selection of ballots for the audit shall not occur before the reporting of the results for the contests being audited. The Secretary of State shall define in regulations the vote totals to be used in the comparison audit.(4) An elections official is in compliance with this section if the elections official conducts a ballot-level comparison audit with a five percent risk limit or a risk-limiting audit with a five percent risk limit using another method for conducting risk-limiting audits as approved by the Secretary of State.(b) (1) The Secretary of State, in consultation with recognized statistical experts, equipment vendors, election verification and integrity stakeholders, voting system manufacturers, and local elections officials, shall adopt regulations to implement and administer this article.(2) The regulations shall do all of the following:(A)Establish threshold limits for risk-limiting audits.(B)(A) Require the creation of an audit board by the local elections official to govern elections officials to establish appropriate audit boards to conduct the risk-limiting audits.(C)(B) Establish criteria for public education on risk-limiting audits.(D)Ensure(C) Establish procedures to ensure the security of the ballots and documentation that those procedures were followed. ballots, the selection of ballots to be inspected during each audit, and the rules governing cast vote records and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(E)Ensure the accuracy of ballot manifests produced by counties.(F)Establish rules governing the format of ballot manifests, cast vote records, and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(G)Establish procedures for the random selection of ballots to be inspected manually during each audit.(H)(D) Establish the calculations and other methods to be used in the audit to determine whether or when the audit of any contest is required to include the examination of more ballots, and to establish calculations and methods to be used in such an escalation, and to determine whether and when the audit of each contest is complete.(I)(E) Establish procedures and requirements for testing and disclosing the algorithms and source code of any software used to by the Secretary of State for the selection of ballots to be included when elections officials conduct risk-limiting audits under this article, and for disclosing the source code of that software. article.(c)(1)Ballot images may be used in place of ballots for purposes of risk-limiting audits under this article.(2)The elections official shall choose at random a percentage of precincts to compare ballot images to paper ballots. The percentage shall be prescribed and publicly noticed by the Secretary of State.(3)As used in this section, ballot image means an electronic copy or digital representation of a voted ballot that is an image of the ballot scanned or created independent from the tally or ballot marking system and can be matched back to the original ballot. (d)(c) The risk-limiting audit shall be a public and observable process, with the elections official conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice of the time and place of both the risk-limiting audit and of the time and place of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public risk-limiting audit before conducting the selection and tally. As used in this subdivision, direct recording electronic voting machine means a system described in subdivision (d) of Section 301. ballots to be used when conducting the risk-limiting audit.(e)The official conducting the election (d) The elections official conducting the risk-limiting audit shall include a report on the results of the risk-limiting audit in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any discrepancies between the machine count and the risk-limiting audit and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In resolving a discrepancy involving a vote recorded by electronic or electromechanical vote tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.
SEC. 3.SEC. 2. Article 5.5 (commencing with Section 15365) is added to Chapter 4 of Division 15 of the Elections Code, to read:
### SEC. 3.SEC. 2.
Article 5.5. Risk-Limiting Audits15365.As used in this article, risk-limiting audit means a procedure that ensures a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the voting system for an audited contest.15365. The purpose of this article is to provide elections officials with a method to conduct a comprehensive end-to-end verification of software used in the post-election audit process.15366. As used in this article, the following terms have the following meanings:(a) Ballot-level comparison audit means a type of risk-limiting audit that involves both of the following steps:(1) The elections official uses an independent system to verify that the cast vote records created by the voting system or ballots created independent from the tally or ballot marking system yield the same election results as those reported by the voting system.(2) The elections official compares some or all of those cast vote records to a hand-to-eye, human interpretation of voter markings from the corresponding ballot marked by the voter or the voter verified paper audit trail, as defined by Section 19271.(b) Cast vote record means an auditable document or electronic record that purports to reflect the selections a voter made on a ballot. It lists the contests on the ballot and the voter's selections in each of those contests.(c) Risk-limiting audit means a post-election process that involves hand-to-eye, human inspection of ballots and ensures that there is no more than a five-percent chance that a full manual tally of all the ballots cast in the contest would show a different winner or winners than the winner or winners reported by the voting system. If this post-election process does lead to a full manual tally, the winner or winners according to that full manual tally replace the winner or winners as reported by the voting system if they differ.15366.15367. (a) (1) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 3, 2020, the elections official conducting an election may conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally required by Section 15360 during the official canvass of any election in accordance with the requirements of this article.(2) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 5, 2024, 8, 2022, and each election thereafter, if a voting system is used that was purchased using state funds, the elections official conducting the election any elections official using a voting system that was purchased or partially purchased using state or federal funds on or after January 1, 2019, shall conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally.(3)An elections official conducting a risk-limiting audit shall conduct the audit on at least one countywide and at least one statewide contest, until all counties have transitioned to risk-limiting audits. For the purposes of this paragraph, countywide means an elective office wholly within the county that is voted on throughout the county.(3) A risk-limiting audit under this section shall include all contests and measures on the ballot. Selection of ballots for the audit shall not occur before the reporting of the results for the contests being audited. The Secretary of State shall define in regulations the vote totals to be used in the comparison audit.(4) An elections official is in compliance with this section if the elections official conducts a ballot-level comparison audit with a five percent risk limit or a risk-limiting audit with a five percent risk limit using another method for conducting risk-limiting audits as approved by the Secretary of State.(b) (1) The Secretary of State, in consultation with recognized statistical experts, equipment vendors, election verification and integrity stakeholders, voting system manufacturers, and local elections officials, shall adopt regulations to implement and administer this article.(2) The regulations shall do all of the following:(A)Establish threshold limits for risk-limiting audits.(B)(A) Require the creation of an audit board by the local elections official to govern elections officials to establish appropriate audit boards to conduct the risk-limiting audits.(C)(B) Establish criteria for public education on risk-limiting audits.(D)Ensure(C) Establish procedures to ensure the security of the ballots and documentation that those procedures were followed. ballots, the selection of ballots to be inspected during each audit, and the rules governing cast vote records and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(E)Ensure the accuracy of ballot manifests produced by counties.(F)Establish rules governing the format of ballot manifests, cast vote records, and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(G)Establish procedures for the random selection of ballots to be inspected manually during each audit.(H)(D) Establish the calculations and other methods to be used in the audit to determine whether or when the audit of any contest is required to include the examination of more ballots, and to establish calculations and methods to be used in such an escalation, and to determine whether and when the audit of each contest is complete.(I)(E) Establish procedures and requirements for testing and disclosing the algorithms and source code of any software used to by the Secretary of State for the selection of ballots to be included when elections officials conduct risk-limiting audits under this article, and for disclosing the source code of that software. article.(c)(1)Ballot images may be used in place of ballots for purposes of risk-limiting audits under this article.(2)The elections official shall choose at random a percentage of precincts to compare ballot images to paper ballots. The percentage shall be prescribed and publicly noticed by the Secretary of State.(3)As used in this section, ballot image means an electronic copy or digital representation of a voted ballot that is an image of the ballot scanned or created independent from the tally or ballot marking system and can be matched back to the original ballot. (d)(c) The risk-limiting audit shall be a public and observable process, with the elections official conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice of the time and place of both the risk-limiting audit and of the time and place of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public risk-limiting audit before conducting the selection and tally. As used in this subdivision, direct recording electronic voting machine means a system described in subdivision (d) of Section 301. ballots to be used when conducting the risk-limiting audit.(e)The official conducting the election (d) The elections official conducting the risk-limiting audit shall include a report on the results of the risk-limiting audit in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any discrepancies between the machine count and the risk-limiting audit and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In resolving a discrepancy involving a vote recorded by electronic or electromechanical vote tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.
Article 5.5. Risk-Limiting Audits15365.As used in this article, risk-limiting audit means a procedure that ensures a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the voting system for an audited contest.15365. The purpose of this article is to provide elections officials with a method to conduct a comprehensive end-to-end verification of software used in the post-election audit process.15366. As used in this article, the following terms have the following meanings:(a) Ballot-level comparison audit means a type of risk-limiting audit that involves both of the following steps:(1) The elections official uses an independent system to verify that the cast vote records created by the voting system or ballots created independent from the tally or ballot marking system yield the same election results as those reported by the voting system.(2) The elections official compares some or all of those cast vote records to a hand-to-eye, human interpretation of voter markings from the corresponding ballot marked by the voter or the voter verified paper audit trail, as defined by Section 19271.(b) Cast vote record means an auditable document or electronic record that purports to reflect the selections a voter made on a ballot. It lists the contests on the ballot and the voter's selections in each of those contests.(c) Risk-limiting audit means a post-election process that involves hand-to-eye, human inspection of ballots and ensures that there is no more than a five-percent chance that a full manual tally of all the ballots cast in the contest would show a different winner or winners than the winner or winners reported by the voting system. If this post-election process does lead to a full manual tally, the winner or winners according to that full manual tally replace the winner or winners as reported by the voting system if they differ.15366.15367. (a) (1) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 3, 2020, the elections official conducting an election may conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally required by Section 15360 during the official canvass of any election in accordance with the requirements of this article.(2) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 5, 2024, 8, 2022, and each election thereafter, if a voting system is used that was purchased using state funds, the elections official conducting the election any elections official using a voting system that was purchased or partially purchased using state or federal funds on or after January 1, 2019, shall conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally.(3)An elections official conducting a risk-limiting audit shall conduct the audit on at least one countywide and at least one statewide contest, until all counties have transitioned to risk-limiting audits. For the purposes of this paragraph, countywide means an elective office wholly within the county that is voted on throughout the county.(3) A risk-limiting audit under this section shall include all contests and measures on the ballot. Selection of ballots for the audit shall not occur before the reporting of the results for the contests being audited. The Secretary of State shall define in regulations the vote totals to be used in the comparison audit.(4) An elections official is in compliance with this section if the elections official conducts a ballot-level comparison audit with a five percent risk limit or a risk-limiting audit with a five percent risk limit using another method for conducting risk-limiting audits as approved by the Secretary of State.(b) (1) The Secretary of State, in consultation with recognized statistical experts, equipment vendors, election verification and integrity stakeholders, voting system manufacturers, and local elections officials, shall adopt regulations to implement and administer this article.(2) The regulations shall do all of the following:(A)Establish threshold limits for risk-limiting audits.(B)(A) Require the creation of an audit board by the local elections official to govern elections officials to establish appropriate audit boards to conduct the risk-limiting audits.(C)(B) Establish criteria for public education on risk-limiting audits.(D)Ensure(C) Establish procedures to ensure the security of the ballots and documentation that those procedures were followed. ballots, the selection of ballots to be inspected during each audit, and the rules governing cast vote records and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(E)Ensure the accuracy of ballot manifests produced by counties.(F)Establish rules governing the format of ballot manifests, cast vote records, and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(G)Establish procedures for the random selection of ballots to be inspected manually during each audit.(H)(D) Establish the calculations and other methods to be used in the audit to determine whether or when the audit of any contest is required to include the examination of more ballots, and to establish calculations and methods to be used in such an escalation, and to determine whether and when the audit of each contest is complete.(I)(E) Establish procedures and requirements for testing and disclosing the algorithms and source code of any software used to by the Secretary of State for the selection of ballots to be included when elections officials conduct risk-limiting audits under this article, and for disclosing the source code of that software. article.(c)(1)Ballot images may be used in place of ballots for purposes of risk-limiting audits under this article.(2)The elections official shall choose at random a percentage of precincts to compare ballot images to paper ballots. The percentage shall be prescribed and publicly noticed by the Secretary of State.(3)As used in this section, ballot image means an electronic copy or digital representation of a voted ballot that is an image of the ballot scanned or created independent from the tally or ballot marking system and can be matched back to the original ballot. (d)(c) The risk-limiting audit shall be a public and observable process, with the elections official conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice of the time and place of both the risk-limiting audit and of the time and place of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public risk-limiting audit before conducting the selection and tally. As used in this subdivision, direct recording electronic voting machine means a system described in subdivision (d) of Section 301. ballots to be used when conducting the risk-limiting audit.(e)The official conducting the election (d) The elections official conducting the risk-limiting audit shall include a report on the results of the risk-limiting audit in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any discrepancies between the machine count and the risk-limiting audit and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In resolving a discrepancy involving a vote recorded by electronic or electromechanical vote tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.
Article 5.5. Risk-Limiting Audits
Article 5.5. Risk-Limiting Audits
As used in this article, risk-limiting audit means a procedure that ensures a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual tally whenever a full manual tally would show an electoral outcome that differs from the outcome reported by the voting system for an audited contest.
15365. The purpose of this article is to provide elections officials with a method to conduct a comprehensive end-to-end verification of software used in the post-election audit process.
15365. The purpose of this article is to provide elections officials with a method to conduct a comprehensive end-to-end verification of software used in the post-election audit process.
15366. As used in this article, the following terms have the following meanings:(a) Ballot-level comparison audit means a type of risk-limiting audit that involves both of the following steps:(1) The elections official uses an independent system to verify that the cast vote records created by the voting system or ballots created independent from the tally or ballot marking system yield the same election results as those reported by the voting system.(2) The elections official compares some or all of those cast vote records to a hand-to-eye, human interpretation of voter markings from the corresponding ballot marked by the voter or the voter verified paper audit trail, as defined by Section 19271.(b) Cast vote record means an auditable document or electronic record that purports to reflect the selections a voter made on a ballot. It lists the contests on the ballot and the voter's selections in each of those contests.(c) Risk-limiting audit means a post-election process that involves hand-to-eye, human inspection of ballots and ensures that there is no more than a five-percent chance that a full manual tally of all the ballots cast in the contest would show a different winner or winners than the winner or winners reported by the voting system. If this post-election process does lead to a full manual tally, the winner or winners according to that full manual tally replace the winner or winners as reported by the voting system if they differ.
15366. As used in this article, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a) Ballot-level comparison audit means a type of risk-limiting audit that involves both of the following steps:
(1) The elections official uses an independent system to verify that the cast vote records created by the voting system or ballots created independent from the tally or ballot marking system yield the same election results as those reported by the voting system.
(2) The elections official compares some or all of those cast vote records to a hand-to-eye, human interpretation of voter markings from the corresponding ballot marked by the voter or the voter verified paper audit trail, as defined by Section 19271.
(b) Cast vote record means an auditable document or electronic record that purports to reflect the selections a voter made on a ballot. It lists the contests on the ballot and the voter's selections in each of those contests.
(c) Risk-limiting audit means a post-election process that involves hand-to-eye, human inspection of ballots and ensures that there is no more than a five-percent chance that a full manual tally of all the ballots cast in the contest would show a different winner or winners than the winner or winners reported by the voting system. If this post-election process does lead to a full manual tally, the winner or winners according to that full manual tally replace the winner or winners as reported by the voting system if they differ.
15366.15367. (a) (1) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 3, 2020, the elections official conducting an election may conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally required by Section 15360 during the official canvass of any election in accordance with the requirements of this article.(2) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 5, 2024, 8, 2022, and each election thereafter, if a voting system is used that was purchased using state funds, the elections official conducting the election any elections official using a voting system that was purchased or partially purchased using state or federal funds on or after January 1, 2019, shall conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally.(3)An elections official conducting a risk-limiting audit shall conduct the audit on at least one countywide and at least one statewide contest, until all counties have transitioned to risk-limiting audits. For the purposes of this paragraph, countywide means an elective office wholly within the county that is voted on throughout the county.(3) A risk-limiting audit under this section shall include all contests and measures on the ballot. Selection of ballots for the audit shall not occur before the reporting of the results for the contests being audited. The Secretary of State shall define in regulations the vote totals to be used in the comparison audit.(4) An elections official is in compliance with this section if the elections official conducts a ballot-level comparison audit with a five percent risk limit or a risk-limiting audit with a five percent risk limit using another method for conducting risk-limiting audits as approved by the Secretary of State.(b) (1) The Secretary of State, in consultation with recognized statistical experts, equipment vendors, election verification and integrity stakeholders, voting system manufacturers, and local elections officials, shall adopt regulations to implement and administer this article.(2) The regulations shall do all of the following:(A)Establish threshold limits for risk-limiting audits.(B)(A) Require the creation of an audit board by the local elections official to govern elections officials to establish appropriate audit boards to conduct the risk-limiting audits.(C)(B) Establish criteria for public education on risk-limiting audits.(D)Ensure(C) Establish procedures to ensure the security of the ballots and documentation that those procedures were followed. ballots, the selection of ballots to be inspected during each audit, and the rules governing cast vote records and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(E)Ensure the accuracy of ballot manifests produced by counties.(F)Establish rules governing the format of ballot manifests, cast vote records, and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.(G)Establish procedures for the random selection of ballots to be inspected manually during each audit.(H)(D) Establish the calculations and other methods to be used in the audit to determine whether or when the audit of any contest is required to include the examination of more ballots, and to establish calculations and methods to be used in such an escalation, and to determine whether and when the audit of each contest is complete.(I)(E) Establish procedures and requirements for testing and disclosing the algorithms and source code of any software used to by the Secretary of State for the selection of ballots to be included when elections officials conduct risk-limiting audits under this article, and for disclosing the source code of that software. article.(c)(1)Ballot images may be used in place of ballots for purposes of risk-limiting audits under this article.(2)The elections official shall choose at random a percentage of precincts to compare ballot images to paper ballots. The percentage shall be prescribed and publicly noticed by the Secretary of State.(3)As used in this section, ballot image means an electronic copy or digital representation of a voted ballot that is an image of the ballot scanned or created independent from the tally or ballot marking system and can be matched back to the original ballot. (d)(c) The risk-limiting audit shall be a public and observable process, with the elections official conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice of the time and place of both the risk-limiting audit and of the time and place of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public risk-limiting audit before conducting the selection and tally. As used in this subdivision, direct recording electronic voting machine means a system described in subdivision (d) of Section 301. ballots to be used when conducting the risk-limiting audit.(e)The official conducting the election (d) The elections official conducting the risk-limiting audit shall include a report on the results of the risk-limiting audit in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any discrepancies between the machine count and the risk-limiting audit and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In resolving a discrepancy involving a vote recorded by electronic or electromechanical vote tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.
15366.15367. (a) (1) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 3, 2020, the elections official conducting an election may conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally required by Section 15360 during the official canvass of any election in accordance with the requirements of this article.
(2) Commencing with the statewide primary election held on March 5, 2024, 8, 2022, and each election thereafter, if a voting system is used that was purchased using state funds, the elections official conducting the election any elections official using a voting system that was purchased or partially purchased using state or federal funds on or after January 1, 2019, shall conduct a risk-limiting audit in place of the one percent manual tally.
(3)An elections official conducting a risk-limiting audit shall conduct the audit on at least one countywide and at least one statewide contest, until all counties have transitioned to risk-limiting audits. For the purposes of this paragraph, countywide means an elective office wholly within the county that is voted on throughout the county.
(3) A risk-limiting audit under this section shall include all contests and measures on the ballot. Selection of ballots for the audit shall not occur before the reporting of the results for the contests being audited. The Secretary of State shall define in regulations the vote totals to be used in the comparison audit.
(4) An elections official is in compliance with this section if the elections official conducts a ballot-level comparison audit with a five percent risk limit or a risk-limiting audit with a five percent risk limit using another method for conducting risk-limiting audits as approved by the Secretary of State.
(b) (1) The Secretary of State, in consultation with recognized statistical experts, equipment vendors, election verification and integrity stakeholders, voting system manufacturers, and local elections officials, shall adopt regulations to implement and administer this article.
(2) The regulations shall do all of the following:
(A)Establish threshold limits for risk-limiting audits.
(B)
(A) Require the creation of an audit board by the local elections official to govern elections officials to establish appropriate audit boards to conduct the risk-limiting audits.
(C)
(B) Establish criteria for public education on risk-limiting audits.
(D)Ensure
(C) Establish procedures to ensure the security of the ballots and documentation that those procedures were followed. ballots, the selection of ballots to be inspected during each audit, and the rules governing cast vote records and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.
(E)Ensure the accuracy of ballot manifests produced by counties.
(F)Establish rules governing the format of ballot manifests, cast vote records, and other data involved in risk-limiting audits.
(G)Establish procedures for the random selection of ballots to be inspected manually during each audit.
(H)
(D) Establish the calculations and other methods to be used in the audit to determine whether or when the audit of any contest is required to include the examination of more ballots, and to establish calculations and methods to be used in such an escalation, and to determine whether and when the audit of each contest is complete.
(I)
(E) Establish procedures and requirements for testing and disclosing the algorithms and source code of any software used to by the Secretary of State for the selection of ballots to be included when elections officials conduct risk-limiting audits under this article, and for disclosing the source code of that software. article.
(c)(1)Ballot images may be used in place of ballots for purposes of risk-limiting audits under this article.
(2)The elections official shall choose at random a percentage of precincts to compare ballot images to paper ballots. The percentage shall be prescribed and publicly noticed by the Secretary of State.
(3)As used in this section, ballot image means an electronic copy or digital representation of a voted ballot that is an image of the ballot scanned or created independent from the tally or ballot marking system and can be matched back to the original ballot.
(d)
(c) The risk-limiting audit shall be a public and observable process, with the elections official conducting the election providing at least a five-day public notice of the time and place of both the risk-limiting audit and of the time and place of the selection of the precincts, batches, or direct recording electronic voting machines subject to the public risk-limiting audit before conducting the selection and tally. As used in this subdivision, direct recording electronic voting machine means a system described in subdivision (d) of Section 301. ballots to be used when conducting the risk-limiting audit.
(e)The official conducting the election
(d) The elections official conducting the risk-limiting audit shall include a report on the results of the risk-limiting audit in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report shall identify any discrepancies between the machine count and the risk-limiting audit and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved. In resolving a discrepancy involving a vote recorded by electronic or electromechanical vote tabulating devices, the voter verified paper audit trail shall govern if there is a discrepancy between it and the electronic record.
SEC. 4.SEC. 3. If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
SEC. 4.SEC. 3. If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
SEC. 4.SEC. 3. If the Commission on State Mandates determines that this act contains costs mandated by the state, reimbursement to local agencies and school districts for those costs shall be made pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 17500) of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.
### SEC. 4.SEC. 3.