Amended IN Senate June 13, 2019 Amended IN Assembly April 11, 2019 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20192020 REGULAR SESSION Assembly Bill No. 1618Introduced by Assembly Member Jones-SawyerFebruary 22, 2019 An act to amend Section 1808 of, and to repeal Section 13202.6 of, the Vehicle Code, relating to driving privileges. An act to add Section 1016.8 to the Penal Code, relating to plea bargains.LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGESTAB 1618, as amended, Jones-Sawyer. Driving privileges: vandalism. Plea bargaining: benefits of later enactments.Existing law specifies the pleas that may be made to an indictment, information, or complaint charging a misdemeanor or infraction, including the pleas of guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere. Existing law defines plea bargaining as any bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or their counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant.This bill would make a provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea, void as against public policy.Existing law requires a court to suspend or delay a persons driving privilege if that person committed an act of vandalism while the person was 13 years of age or older. If driving privileges are delayed, and there are no further convictions in a 12-month period, existing law allows the court to modify the order imposing the delay of the privilege.This bill would repeal that law, and would require any court order to suspend, restrict, or delay a minors driving privilege issued prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to that law to remain in full effect in accordance with the terms of the order.Digest Key Vote: MAJORITY Appropriation: NO Fiscal Committee: YES Local Program: NO Bill TextThe people of the State of California do enact as follows:SECTION 1. Section 1016.8 is added to the Penal Code, to read:1016.8. (a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(1) The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.(2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendants guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.(3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464). Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists (Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19).(4) A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent.(b) A provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.(c) For purposes of this section, plea bargain has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7.SECTION 1.Section 1808 of the Vehicle Code is amended to read:1808.(a)Except where a specific provision of law prohibits the disclosure of records or information or provides for confidentiality, all records of the department relating to the registration of vehicles, other information contained on an application for a drivers license, abstracts of convictions, and abstracts of accident reports required to be sent to the department in Sacramento, except for abstracts of accidents where, in the opinion of a reporting officer, another individual was at fault, shall be open to public inspection during office hours. All abstracts of accident reports shall be available to law enforcement agencies and courts of competent jurisdiction.(b)The department shall make available or disclose abstracts of convictions and abstracts of accident reports required to be sent to the department in Sacramento, as described in subdivision (a), if the date of the occurrence is not later than the following:(1)Ten years for a violation pursuant to Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.(2)Seven years for a violation designated as two points pursuant to Section 12810, except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision.(3)Three years for accidents and all other violations.(c)The department shall make available or disclose suspensions and revocations of the driving privilege while the suspension or revocation is in effect and for three years following termination of the action or reinstatement of the privilege, except that drivers license suspension actions taken pursuant to former Sections 13202.6 and 13202.7, Section 17520 of the Family Code, or Section 256 or former Section 11350.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code shall be disclosed only during the actual time period in which the suspension is in effect.(d)The department shall not make available or disclose a suspension or revocation that has been judicially set aside or stayed.(e)The department shall not make available or disclose personal information about a person unless the disclosure is in compliance with the Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2721 et seq.). However, a disclosure is subject to the prohibition in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 12800.5.(f)The department shall make available or disclose to the courts and law enforcement agencies a conviction of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, or a conviction of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153, or Section 655 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, or paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 192 of the Penal Code for a period of 10 years from the date of the offense for the purpose of imposing penalties mandated by this code, or by other applicable provisions of California law.(g)The department shall make available or disclose to the courts and law enforcement agencies a conviction of Section 191.5, or subdivision (a) of Section 192.5 of the Penal Code, punished as a felony, for the purpose of imposing penalties mandated by Section 23550.5, or by other applicable provisions of California law.SEC. 2.Section 13202.6 of the Vehicle Code is repealed.SEC. 3.Any court order to suspend, restrict, or delay a minors driving privilege issued prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to former Section 13202.6 of the Vehicle Code shall remain in full effect in accordance with the terms of the order.
Amended IN Senate June 13, 2019 Amended IN Assembly April 11, 2019 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20192020 REGULAR SESSION Assembly Bill No. 1618Introduced by Assembly Member Jones-SawyerFebruary 22, 2019 An act to amend Section 1808 of, and to repeal Section 13202.6 of, the Vehicle Code, relating to driving privileges. An act to add Section 1016.8 to the Penal Code, relating to plea bargains.LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGESTAB 1618, as amended, Jones-Sawyer. Driving privileges: vandalism. Plea bargaining: benefits of later enactments.Existing law specifies the pleas that may be made to an indictment, information, or complaint charging a misdemeanor or infraction, including the pleas of guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere. Existing law defines plea bargaining as any bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or their counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant.This bill would make a provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea, void as against public policy.Existing law requires a court to suspend or delay a persons driving privilege if that person committed an act of vandalism while the person was 13 years of age or older. If driving privileges are delayed, and there are no further convictions in a 12-month period, existing law allows the court to modify the order imposing the delay of the privilege.This bill would repeal that law, and would require any court order to suspend, restrict, or delay a minors driving privilege issued prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to that law to remain in full effect in accordance with the terms of the order.Digest Key Vote: MAJORITY Appropriation: NO Fiscal Committee: YES Local Program: NO
Amended IN Senate June 13, 2019 Amended IN Assembly April 11, 2019
Amended IN Senate June 13, 2019
Amended IN Assembly April 11, 2019
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20192020 REGULAR SESSION
Assembly Bill No. 1618
Introduced by Assembly Member Jones-SawyerFebruary 22, 2019
Introduced by Assembly Member Jones-Sawyer
February 22, 2019
An act to amend Section 1808 of, and to repeal Section 13202.6 of, the Vehicle Code, relating to driving privileges. An act to add Section 1016.8 to the Penal Code, relating to plea bargains.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
## LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
AB 1618, as amended, Jones-Sawyer. Driving privileges: vandalism. Plea bargaining: benefits of later enactments.
Existing law specifies the pleas that may be made to an indictment, information, or complaint charging a misdemeanor or infraction, including the pleas of guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere. Existing law defines plea bargaining as any bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or their counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant.This bill would make a provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea, void as against public policy.Existing law requires a court to suspend or delay a persons driving privilege if that person committed an act of vandalism while the person was 13 years of age or older. If driving privileges are delayed, and there are no further convictions in a 12-month period, existing law allows the court to modify the order imposing the delay of the privilege.This bill would repeal that law, and would require any court order to suspend, restrict, or delay a minors driving privilege issued prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to that law to remain in full effect in accordance with the terms of the order.
Existing law specifies the pleas that may be made to an indictment, information, or complaint charging a misdemeanor or infraction, including the pleas of guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere. Existing law defines plea bargaining as any bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or their counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to the sentencing of the defendant.
This bill would make a provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea, void as against public policy.
Existing law requires a court to suspend or delay a persons driving privilege if that person committed an act of vandalism while the person was 13 years of age or older. If driving privileges are delayed, and there are no further convictions in a 12-month period, existing law allows the court to modify the order imposing the delay of the privilege.
This bill would repeal that law, and would require any court order to suspend, restrict, or delay a minors driving privilege issued prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to that law to remain in full effect in accordance with the terms of the order.
## Digest Key
## Bill Text
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:SECTION 1. Section 1016.8 is added to the Penal Code, to read:1016.8. (a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(1) The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.(2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendants guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.(3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464). Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists (Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19).(4) A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent.(b) A provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.(c) For purposes of this section, plea bargain has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7.SECTION 1.Section 1808 of the Vehicle Code is amended to read:1808.(a)Except where a specific provision of law prohibits the disclosure of records or information or provides for confidentiality, all records of the department relating to the registration of vehicles, other information contained on an application for a drivers license, abstracts of convictions, and abstracts of accident reports required to be sent to the department in Sacramento, except for abstracts of accidents where, in the opinion of a reporting officer, another individual was at fault, shall be open to public inspection during office hours. All abstracts of accident reports shall be available to law enforcement agencies and courts of competent jurisdiction.(b)The department shall make available or disclose abstracts of convictions and abstracts of accident reports required to be sent to the department in Sacramento, as described in subdivision (a), if the date of the occurrence is not later than the following:(1)Ten years for a violation pursuant to Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.(2)Seven years for a violation designated as two points pursuant to Section 12810, except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision.(3)Three years for accidents and all other violations.(c)The department shall make available or disclose suspensions and revocations of the driving privilege while the suspension or revocation is in effect and for three years following termination of the action or reinstatement of the privilege, except that drivers license suspension actions taken pursuant to former Sections 13202.6 and 13202.7, Section 17520 of the Family Code, or Section 256 or former Section 11350.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code shall be disclosed only during the actual time period in which the suspension is in effect.(d)The department shall not make available or disclose a suspension or revocation that has been judicially set aside or stayed.(e)The department shall not make available or disclose personal information about a person unless the disclosure is in compliance with the Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2721 et seq.). However, a disclosure is subject to the prohibition in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 12800.5.(f)The department shall make available or disclose to the courts and law enforcement agencies a conviction of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, or a conviction of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153, or Section 655 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, or paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 192 of the Penal Code for a period of 10 years from the date of the offense for the purpose of imposing penalties mandated by this code, or by other applicable provisions of California law.(g)The department shall make available or disclose to the courts and law enforcement agencies a conviction of Section 191.5, or subdivision (a) of Section 192.5 of the Penal Code, punished as a felony, for the purpose of imposing penalties mandated by Section 23550.5, or by other applicable provisions of California law.SEC. 2.Section 13202.6 of the Vehicle Code is repealed.SEC. 3.Any court order to suspend, restrict, or delay a minors driving privilege issued prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to former Section 13202.6 of the Vehicle Code shall remain in full effect in accordance with the terms of the order.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
## The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1016.8 is added to the Penal Code, to read:1016.8. (a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(1) The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.(2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendants guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.(3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464). Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists (Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19).(4) A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent.(b) A provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.(c) For purposes of this section, plea bargain has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7.
SECTION 1. Section 1016.8 is added to the Penal Code, to read:
### SECTION 1.
1016.8. (a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(1) The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.(2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendants guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.(3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464). Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists (Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19).(4) A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent.(b) A provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.(c) For purposes of this section, plea bargain has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7.
1016.8. (a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(1) The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.(2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendants guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.(3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464). Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists (Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19).(4) A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent.(b) A provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.(c) For purposes of this section, plea bargain has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7.
1016.8. (a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:(1) The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.(2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendants guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.(3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464). Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists (Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19).(4) A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent.(b) A provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.(c) For purposes of this section, plea bargain has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7.
1016.8. (a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(1) The California Supreme Court held in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal. 4th 64 that, as a general rule, plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. That the parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.
(2) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme Court held that because of the significant constitutional rights at stake in entering a guilty plea, due process requires that a defendants guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
(3) Waiver is the voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 471, fn. 16, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464). Waiver requires knowledge that the right exists (Taylor v. U.S. (1973) 414 U.S. 17, 19).
(4) A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent.
(b) A provision of a plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive future potential benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, judicial decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.
(c) For purposes of this section, plea bargain has the same meaning as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1192.7.
(a)Except where a specific provision of law prohibits the disclosure of records or information or provides for confidentiality, all records of the department relating to the registration of vehicles, other information contained on an application for a drivers license, abstracts of convictions, and abstracts of accident reports required to be sent to the department in Sacramento, except for abstracts of accidents where, in the opinion of a reporting officer, another individual was at fault, shall be open to public inspection during office hours. All abstracts of accident reports shall be available to law enforcement agencies and courts of competent jurisdiction.
(b)The department shall make available or disclose abstracts of convictions and abstracts of accident reports required to be sent to the department in Sacramento, as described in subdivision (a), if the date of the occurrence is not later than the following:
(1)Ten years for a violation pursuant to Section 23140, 23152, or 23153.
(2)Seven years for a violation designated as two points pursuant to Section 12810, except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision.
(3)Three years for accidents and all other violations.
(c)The department shall make available or disclose suspensions and revocations of the driving privilege while the suspension or revocation is in effect and for three years following termination of the action or reinstatement of the privilege, except that drivers license suspension actions taken pursuant to former Sections 13202.6 and 13202.7, Section 17520 of the Family Code, or Section 256 or former Section 11350.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code shall be disclosed only during the actual time period in which the suspension is in effect.
(d)The department shall not make available or disclose a suspension or revocation that has been judicially set aside or stayed.
(e)The department shall not make available or disclose personal information about a person unless the disclosure is in compliance with the Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2721 et seq.). However, a disclosure is subject to the prohibition in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 12800.5.
(f)The department shall make available or disclose to the courts and law enforcement agencies a conviction of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, or a conviction of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153, or Section 655 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, or paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 192 of the Penal Code for a period of 10 years from the date of the offense for the purpose of imposing penalties mandated by this code, or by other applicable provisions of California law.
(g)The department shall make available or disclose to the courts and law enforcement agencies a conviction of Section 191.5, or subdivision (a) of Section 192.5 of the Penal Code, punished as a felony, for the purpose of imposing penalties mandated by Section 23550.5, or by other applicable provisions of California law.
Any court order to suspend, restrict, or delay a minors driving privilege issued prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to former Section 13202.6 of the Vehicle Code shall remain in full effect in accordance with the terms of the order.