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OLR Bill Analysis
sSB 472
AN ACT CONCERNING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RISK -
LIMITING AUDITS WORKING GROUP.
SUMMARY
This bill implements risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for state elections
but generally maintains the existing post-election audit process for
federal and state primaries and municipal elections. RLAs are publicly
verifiable auditing procedures that manually examine a statistical
sample of paper ballots and guaranty a specified risk limit, which the
bill caps at 5%.
To accomplish this, the bill establishes the general scope and
procedures for RLAs, such as (1) outlining election officials’ duties and
the affected public offices, (2) creating ballot manifests, and (3) applying
existing provisions for post-election audits to RLAs (e.g., provisions on
using electronic equipment and voting tabulators and how to address
election contests). The bill requires the secretary of the state (SOTS) to
prescribe instructions and procedures for conducting the audits. It also
allows her to adopt associated regulations.
The bill also establishes a pilot program to conduct RLAs at
municipal elections in 2023. It requires SOTS to randomly select three
municipalities for the program, with one municipality for each of the
following population ranges (i.e., the estimated number from the most
recent State Register and Manual): (1) less than 20,000; (2) 20,000-89,999;
and (3) 90,000 or greater (§ 12).
Lastly, the bill makes minor, technical, and conforming changes.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1, 2024, except the provision establishing
the pilot program for the 2023 municipal election is effective October 1,
2022.
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RISK-LIMITING AUDIT SCOPE
Definitions
The bill requires registrars of voters to conduct RLAs for state
elections, instead of the current post-election audit process. Federal and
state primaries, as well as municipal elections, remain subject to existing
auditing requirements (see BACKGROUND). Under the bill, an RLA is
a publicly verifiable auditing procedure that (1) manually examines a
statistical sample of paper ballots, which reflect the intents of the voters
who cast the ballots; (2) produces an outcome of either “ACCEPTABLE”
or “INCONCLUSIVE”; and (3) guaranties a specified risk limit.
The “risk limit” is the maximum probability that an audit would
produce an outcome of “ACCEPTABLE” when there is a disagreement
between the person declared elected and the person who received the
most votes as determined by the paper ballots (i.e., the percentage
chance an RLA will fail to catch that the reported results are incorrect).
Under the bill, the risk limit for RLAs is capped at 5% (presumably, the
secretary will set the specific limit in her prescribed procedures or in
regulation, see below).
Covered Offices
Under the bill, an RLA must be conducted on the election outcomes
for the following offices:
1. presidential elector;
2. all applicable state offices (i.e., those for which all electors of the
state may vote, including Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Secretary, Treasurer, Comptroller, Attorney General, and senator
in Congress);
3. at least one representative in Congress, selected by random draw;
4. at least 5% of the General Assembly, selected by random draw;
and
5. any other office federal law requires to be audited.
If an office of a representative in Congress or state legislator is subject 2022SB-00472-R000480-BA.DOCX
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to recanvass or an election contest, the secretary must ensure that office
is selected for an RLA. The bill requires the random draws to be open to
the public.
RISK-LIMITING AUDIT PROCEDURES
Pre-Audit Ballot Manifests
The bill requires election officials to create ballot manifests for
subsequent use at RLAs following procedures established by SOTS and
open to public observation. Although not defined by the bill, a “ballot
manifest” is generally a detailed description of how the ballots are
stored and organized, listing at minimum the physical location of every
ballot cast in the election so that individual ballots or batches of ballot
cards can be found, retrieved, and examined manually.
Under the bill, a ballot manifest must be created by manually
verifying and recording the number of ballots cast that comprise the
result publicly announced by the moderator. The manifests must be
created by:
1. election officials in each polling place within 72 hours after the
polls close,
2. absentee ballot counters in each central counting location within
72 hours after the polls close, and
3. recanvass officials within 24 hours after completing any
recanvass in a voting district for a state election.
Under the bill, the moderator must submit a ballot manifest to the
registrars of voters immediately after creating it. The registrars must
then submit it to SOTS before the designated day to begin an RLA.
Designated Day
Similar to post-election audits, the bill requires the secretary to
designate a day for an RLA to begin, which must be at least (1) 15 days
after the state election but (2) two business days before the canvass of
votes. Each audit must have advance notice and be open to the public.
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Conducting an Audit
Under the bill, registrars of voters must conduct the RLAs and SOTS
must prescribe instructions and procedures for conducting them,
consistent for all offices. The bill also allows her to adopt necessary
regulations for the audits and to establish guidelines for expanded
audits when audit results cannot be reconciled with the outcome of the
person declared elected by having the greatest number of votes, as
determined by the paper ballots (i.e., the “reported results”).
If an RLA for a particular office is “INCONCLUSIVE,” the secretary
must order a manual recount of all ballots cast for that office. She may
also issue an order, as under current law, to correct any irregularity or
impropriety from an RLA.
Reporting Results
As under current law, all audit results, including RLAs, must be filed
with the secretary on a form she prescribes. The secretary must
immediately forward the results to UConn, which must analyze the
results and submit a written report describing any identified concerns
to the secretary. Instead of the secretary forwarding the original report
to the State Elections Enforcement Commission (SEEC), as currently
required, the bill requires her to transmit to SEEC a copy of UConn’s
written report, whether for RLAs or post-election audits.
Electronic Equipment and Voting Tabulators
The bill extends several of existing law’s provisions on using
electronic equipment and voting tabulators in post-election audits to
also cover RLAs (CGS §§ 9-320f & 9-320g). Principally, it:
1. allows the secretary, after consulting with UConn, to authorize
the use of electronic equipment;
2. requires her to have access to the code in any voting machine if a
problem is discovered due to an RLA;
3. directs her or her designee to examine and recertify a tabulator if
UConn’s written report indicates that it failed to record votes
accurately and in accordance with state law; 2022SB-00472-R000480-BA.DOCX
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4. requires preserving and returning paper ballots used in an RLA
to their designated receptacle (e.g., ballots must be returned to
the ballot box, securely sealed, and locked);
5. requires the secretary, if audit officials cannot reconcile the audit
results with the reported results, to investigate voting tabulators
as needed to determine if they must be (a) decertified or (b)
examined and recertified; and
6. authorizes the secretary or a court with competent jurisdiction to
issue an order to (a) keep a voting tabulator locked for a longer
period than prescribed by law and (b) have a tabulator audited
by a person they designate.
By law, if the secretary produces a report on the investigation it must
be filed with SEEC, which may investigate further to determine if there
was an election law violation. SEEC may also issue orders (see 6, above)
if they receive this report. If the machine in question is an optical scan
voting system, an order to lock it must include the tabulator, memory
card, and all other components and processes used in its programming.
ELECTION OFFICIALS
Compensation
Under the bill, municipalities must compensate election officials who
participate in administering and conducting an RLA at the
municipality’s standard rate of pay for elections.
Regional Election Monitors
As with post-election audits, the bill requires regional election
monitors to (1) represent, consult with, and act on the secretary’s behalf
for RLA preparation and operation and (2) communicate with and help
registrars of voters to prepare and implement the audits.
ELECTION COMPLAINTS AND EVIDENCE
Like post-election audits, the bill requires RLA reported results to be
open to public inspection and allows them to be used as prima facie
evidence of an irregularity for a contested election or other cause of
action from an election. It also specifies that an action or complaint may 2022SB-00472-R000480-BA.DOCX
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be brought in response to any state election audit, not just manual
tabulations of paper ballots.
The bill specifies that its RLA provisions do not preclude a candidate
or elector from seeking other existing remedies for contested elections.
BACKGROUND
Post-Election Audit Procedure
Under current law, the secretary must audit at least 5% of the state’s
voting districts (i.e., polling locations), selected at random after a
federal, state, or municipal regular election or primary. Audits must be
noticed in advance and open for public observation. Registrars of voters
must conduct the audits by hand unless the secretary, in consultation
with UConn, authorizes them to be conducted electronically (CGS § 9-
320f, as amended by PA 21-2, June Special Session).
During the post-election audit, registrars tally the paper ballots cast
by voters and counted by each optical scan voting tabulator subject to
the audit. Once complete, they compare their results with the reported
results. Registrars must report the audit results on a secretary-
prescribed form with the total number of ballots counted and the total
votes for each audited candidate, broken down by whether the ballot
was properly or improperly completed.
After a post-election audit, the secretary must order a recount (i.e.,
recanvass) for an office if there is a discrepancy that could affect its
outcome. (If the secretary is a candidate on the ballot that is subject to
an audit, SEEC orders the recount.) For this purpose, a “discrepancy” is
a difference between the voting tabulator and audit vote counts that
exceeds 0.5% of the lower total, where the difference cannot be resolved
through an accounting of ballots that were improperly marked (CGS §
9-320f(f) & (o)).
COMMITTEE ACTION
Government Administration and Elections Committee
Joint Favorable Substitute
Yea 19 Nay 0 (03/29/2022)