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OLR Bill Analysis
sSB 254
AN ACT CONCERNING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RISK -
LIMITING AUDITS WORKING GROUP.
SUMMARY
This bill implements risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for state elections
but generally maintains the existing post-election audit process for
federal and state primaries and municipal elections. RLAs are publicly
verifiable auditing procedures that manually examine a statistical
sample of paper ballots and guarantee a specified risk limit, which the
bill caps at 5%.
To accomplish this, the bill establishes the general scope and
procedures for RLAs, such as (1) outlining election officials’ duties and
the affected public offices; (2) requiring the creation of ballot manifests;
and (3) applying existing provisions for post-election audits to RLAs
(e.g., provisions on using electronic equipment and voting tabulators
and how to address election contests). The bill requires the secretary of
the state (SOTS) to prescribe instructions and procedures for doing the
audits. It allows her to adopt related regulations.
The bill also establishes a pilot program to do RLAs of municipal
elections in 2025. It requires SOTS to randomly select three
municipalities for the program, with one municipality for each of the
following population ranges (i.e., the estimated number from the most
recent State Register and Manual): (1) less than 20,000; (2) 20,000-89,999;
and (3) 90,000 or greater.
Lastly, the bill makes minor, technical, and conforming changes.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1, 2025
RISK-LIMITING AUDIT SCOPE
Definitions 2024SB-00254-R000248-BA.DOCX
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The bill requires registrars of voters to do RLAs for state elections,
instead of the current post-election audit process. Federal and state
primaries, as well as municipal elections and primaries, remain subject
to existing auditing requirements (see BACKGROUND). Under the bill,
an RLA is a publicly verifiable auditing procedure that (1) manually
examines a statistical sample of paper ballots, which reflect the intents
of the voters who cast the ballots; (2) produces an outcome of either
“ACCEPTABLE” or “INCONCLUSIVE”; and (3) guarantees a specified
risk limit.
The “risk limit” is the maximum probability that an audit would
produce an outcome of “ACCEPTABLE” when there is a disagreement
between the person declared elected and the person who got the most
votes as determined by the paper ballots (i.e., the percentage chance an
RLA will fail to catch that the reported results are incorrect). Under the
bill, the risk limit for RLAs is capped at 5% (presumably, the secretary
will set the specific limit in her prescribed procedures or in regulation,
see below).
Covered Offices
Under the bill, an RLA must be done on the election outcomes for the
following offices:
1. presidential elector;
2. all applicable state offices (i.e., those for which all electors of the
state may vote, including Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Secretary, Treasurer, Comptroller, Attorney General, and senator
in Congress);
3. at least one representative in Congress, selected by random draw;
4. at least 5% of the General Assembly, selected by random draw;
and
5. any other office federal law requires to be audited.
If an office for a Congressional representative or state legislator is
subject to recanvass or an election contest, the secretary must ensure that 2024SB-00254-R000248-BA.DOCX
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office is selected for an RLA. The bill requires the random draws to be
open to the public.
RISK-LIMITING AUDIT PROCEDURES
Pre-Audit Ballot Manifests
The bill requires election officials to create ballot manifests for
subsequent use at RLAs following procedures established by SOTS and
open to public observation. Although not defined by the bill, a “ballot
manifest” is generally a detailed description of how the ballots are
stored and organized, listing at minimum the physical location of every
ballot cast in the election so that individual ballots or batches of ballot
cards can be found, retrieved, and examined manually.
Under the bill, a ballot manifest must be created by manually
verifying and recording the number of ballots cast that comprise the
result publicly announced by the moderator. The manifests must be
created by:
1. election officials in each polling place within 72 hours after the
polls close,
2. absentee ballot counters in each central counting location within
72 hours after the polls close, and
3. recanvass officials within 24 hours after completing any
recanvass in a voting district for a state election.
Under the bill, the moderator must submit a ballot manifest to the
registrars of voters immediately after creating it. The registrars must
then submit it to SOTS before the designated day to begin an RLA.
Designated Day
Like post-election audits, the bill requires the secretary to designate a
day for an RLA to begin, which must be at least 15 days after a state
election but two business days before the canvass of votes. Each audit
must have advance notice and be open to the public.
Current law requires post-election audits to be completed no earlier 2024SB-00254-R000248-BA.DOCX
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than 15 days after an election and not later than two business days
before the secretary’s canvass for votes. Instead, under the bill, post-
election audits for municipal elections and primaries could occur at least
five days after the election or primary instead of 15.
Conducting an Audit
Under the bill, registrars of voters must do the RLAs and SOTS must
prescribe instructions and procedures for doing them by January 1,
2026, consistent for all offices. The bill also allows her to adopt necessary
regulations for the audits and to set guidelines for expanded audits
when audit results cannot be reconciled with the outcome of the person
declared elected by having the greatest number of votes, as determined
by the paper ballots (i.e., the “reported results”).
If an RLA for a particular office is “INCONCLUSIVE,” the secretary
must order a manual recount of all ballots cast for that office. She may
also issue an order, as under current law, to correct any irregularity or
impropriety from an RLA.
The bill also specifies that, for the purposes of post-election audits,
central counting locations include sites that count early voting and
same-day election registration ballots along with absentee ballots that
are already counted at these locations under existing law.
Reporting Results
As under current law, all audit results, including RLAs, must be filed
with the secretary on a form she prescribes. The secretary must
immediately forward the results to UConn, which must analyze them
and submit a written report describing any identified concerns to the
secretary. Instead of the secretary forwarding the original report to the
State Elections Enforcement Commission (SEEC), as currently required
for post-election audits, the bill requires her to transmit to SEEC a copy
of UConn’s written report, whether for RLAs or post-election audits.
Electronic Equipment and Voting Tabulators
The bill extends several of existing law’s provisions on using
electronic equipment and voting tabulators in post-election audits to 2024SB-00254-R000248-BA.DOCX
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also cover RLAs (CGS §§ 9-320f & 9-320g). Principally, it:
1. allows the secretary, after consulting with UConn, to authorize
the use of electronic equipment;
2. requires her to have access to the code in any voting machine if a
problem is discovered due to an RLA;
3. directs her or her designee to examine and recertify a tabulator if
UConn’s written report indicates that it failed to record votes
accurately and as required by state law;
4. requires carefully preserving and returning paper ballots used in
an RLA in their designated receptacle (e.g., ballots must be
returned to the ballot box, securely sealed, and locked);
5. requires the secretary, if audit officials cannot reconcile the audit
results with the reported results, to investigate voting tabulators
as needed to determine if they must be (a) decertified or (b)
examined and recertified; and
6. authorizes the secretary, SEEC, or a court with competent
jurisdiction to issue an order after a state election to keep a voting
tabulator locked for a longer period than prescribed by law.
The bill allows either the court or the secretary to order an audit of
the voting tabulator by people they designate, but SEEC may order an
audit if SOTS is the office in question. If the secretary produces a report
on the investigation, it must be filed with SEEC, which may investigate
further to determine if there was an election law violation.
Under the bill, if the machine in question is an optical scan voting
system, an order to lock it must include the tabulator, memory card, and
all other components and processes used in its programming.
ELECTION OFFICIALS
Compensation
Under the bill, municipalities must compensate election officials who
participate in implementing an RLA at the municipality’s standard rate 2024SB-00254-R000248-BA.DOCX
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of pay for elections.
Regional Election Monitors
As with post-election audits, the bill requires regional election
advisors to consult and coordinate with the secretary in the preparation
for and operation of RLAs.
ELECTION COMPLAINTS AND EVIDENCE
Like post-election audits, the bill requires RLA-reported results to be
open to public inspection and allows them to be used as prima facie
evidence of an irregularity for a contested election or other cause of
action from an election. It also specifies that an action or complaint may
be brought in response to any state election audit, not just the manual
tabulations of paper ballots.
The bill specifies that its RLA provisions do not preclude a candidate
or elector from seeking other existing remedies for contested elections.
BACKGROUND
Post-Election Audit Procedure
Under current law, the secretary must audit at least 5% of the state’s
voting districts (i.e., polling locations), selected at random after a
federal, state, or municipal regular election or primary. Audits must be
noticed in advance and open for public observation. Registrars of voters
must do the audits by hand unless the secretary, in consultation with
UConn, authorizes them to be done electronically (CGS § 9-320f).
During the post-election audit, registrars tally the paper ballots cast
by voters and counted by each optical scan voting tabulator subject to
the audit. Once complete, they compare their results to the reported
results. Registrars must report the audit results on a secretary-
prescribed form with the total number of ballots counted and the total
votes for each audited candidate, broken down by whether the ballot
was properly or improperly completed.
After a post-election audit, the secretary must order a recount (i.e.,
recanvass) for an office if there is a discrepancy that could affect its 2024SB-00254-R000248-BA.DOCX
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outcome. (If the secretary is a candidate on the ballot that is subject to
an audit, SEEC orders the recount.) For this purpose, a “discrepancy” is
a difference between the voting tabulator and audit vote counts that
exceeds 0.5% of the lower total, where the difference cannot be resolved
through an accounting of ballots that were improperly marked (CGS §
9-320f(f) & (o)).
COMMITTEE ACTION
Government Administration and Elections Committee
Joint Favorable Substitute
Yea 19 Nay 0 (03/15/2024)