The Florida Senate
BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT
(This document is based on the provisions contained in the legislation as of the latest date listed below.)
Prepared By: The Professional Staff of the Committee on Reapportionment
BILL: CS/SJR 100
INTRODUCER: Reapportionment Committee and Senator Rodrigues
SUBJECT: Joint Resolution of Apportionment
DATE: January 14, 2022
ANALYST STAFF DIRECTOR REFERENCE ACTION
1. Rojas Ferrin RE Fav/CS
Please see Section IX. for Additional Information:
COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE - Substantial Changes
I. Summary:
CS/SJR 100 apportions Florida into 40 single-member State Senate districts as required by state
and federal law. Representative districts may be added subsequently.
As originally filed, this bill was the vehicle for amendments in order to establish a complete
State Senate and State House redistricting map. As amended, this bill contains Redistricting Plan
S027S8058, a map of Florida’s state Senate districts.
II. Present Situation:
The 2020 Census revealed an unequal distribution of population growth across Florida’s state
legislative districts. Therefore, districts must be adjusted to comply with the “one person, one
vote” principle such that each district must be substantially equal in total population.
1
According to the 2020 Census, 21,538,187 people resided in Florida as of April 1, 2020. That
represents a population growth of 2,736,877 people from 2010 to 2020, approximately a 15
percent increase.
2
Table 1 below shows the changes in population for each of Florida’s current congressional and
state legislative districts and their respective ideal populations.
1
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
2
United States Census Bureau, 2020 Census Apportionment Results (April, 26, 2021),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/dec/2020-apportionment-data.html.
REVISED: BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 2
Table 1. Florida Congressional and State Legislative Districts Summary 2010 – 2020
According to the 2020 Census, the State Senate district with the largest population has 713,947
people (175,492 more than the ideal), and the State Senate district with the smallest population
has 486,331 people (52,124 less than ideal). The State House district with the largest population
has 237,134 people (57,689 more than the ideal), and the State House district with the smallest
population has 153,589 people (25,896 less than the ideal).
Background
The terms “redistricting” and “reapportionment” are often used interchangeably to describe the
process of redrawing Congressional and state legislative district boundaries after each decennial
census. Redrawing districts is necessary to accommodate population growth and shifts, ensuring
that each district contains equal or nearly equal populations in compliance with applicable state
and federal law.
The Florida Constitution requires the Legislature to apportion the state at its regular session in
the second year following each decennial census into not less 30 nor more than 40 State Senate
districts and into not less than 80 nor more than 120 State House districts.
3
The 2020 Census
Established by the U.S. Constitution, the census has been conducted every 10 years by the
United States Census Bureau since 1790 to determine the number of people living in the United
States. Article I, s. 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that “The actual enumeration shall be made
within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every
subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct.”
4
3
Art. III, s. 16(a), Fla. Const.
4
Art. I, s. 2, U.S. Const. BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 3
Florida is one of 21 states that explicitly requires the use of census data for redistricting.
5
Article
X, s. 8 of the Florida Constitution designates each decennial census of the state taken by the
United States as the official census of the state.
6
Florida Statutes also designate the most recent
federally conducted decennial census as the official census for redistricting.
7
Public Law (P.L.) 94-171 requires the Census Bureau to provide states the opportunity to
identify the small area geography for which data is needed to conduct legislative and
congressional redistricting. The law also requires the U.S. Census Bureau to furnish these
tabulations of population to each state, at the county, tract, block group, and block levels, within
one year of Census Day.
8
Title 13, U.S. Code requires that the state-level apportionment population counts be delivered to
the President of the United States within 9 months of the census date. In the 2020, 2010, and
most 20th century censuses, the census date has been April 1, meaning that the statutory deadline
for delivering the counts to the President is December 31 of the census year.
9
The delivery of 2020 Census results was delayed due to several factors affecting the Census
Bureau’s collection and processing, including the COVID-19 pandemic, natural disasters that
included hurricanes and wildfires, civil unrest, and legal challenges.
10
The state population counts for apportionment were delivered to the President on April 26, 2021
(originally due December 31, 2020). The U.S. Census Bureau provided redistricting data as
legacy format summary files, which is tabular data, for all states on August 12, 2021 (originally
due April 1, 2021). The full redistricting data toolkit was delivered to all 50 states and the public
on September 16, 2021 (originally due April 1, 2021).
Redistricting Criteria and Concepts
Florida follows various criteria and standards as it relates to drawing state legislative districts,
including the United States (U.S.) Constitution, Federal Voting Rights Act, Florida Constitution,
and applicable court decisions.
The United States Constitution
In addition to state specific requirements to redistrict, states are obligated to redistrict based on
provisions within the United States Constitution. In Reynolds v. Sims, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment required that seats in state legislature be
reapportioned on a population basis. This principle is commonly referred to as “one person, one
vote.” The Supreme Court concluded:
5
National Conference of State Legislatures Redistricting Law 2020, Appendix B: Redistricting and Use of Census Data
6
Art. X, s. 8, Fla. Const.
7
Section 11.031, F.S. (2021).
8
United States Census Bureau, Decennial Census P.L. 94-171 Redistricting Data (Aug. 12, 2021),
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/about/rdo/summary-files.html.
9
United States Census Bureau, About Congressional Reapportionment (Nov. 22, 2021),
https://www.census.gov/topics/public-sector/congressional-apportionment/about.html.
10
Styles, Kathleen, 2020 Census: Overview (2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Redistricting/NCSL_Census_Update_KathleenStyles.pdf. BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 4
…“the basic principle of representative government remains, and must remain, unchanged – the
weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives. Population is, of
necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for judgment in
legislative apportionment controversies…The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than
substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all
races. We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that
the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis.”
11
The Court went on to state that decennial reapportionment was a rational approach to readjust
legislative representation to take into consideration population shifts and growth.
12
In practice, Congressional districting has strictly adhered to the requirement of exact
mathematical equality and in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, the Court rejected several justifications for
violating this principle. For state legislative districts, the courts have permitted a greater
population deviation amongst districts. The populations of state legislative districts must instead
be “substantially equal.”
13
Substantial equality of population has come to generally mean that a legislative plan will not be
held to violate the Equal Protection Clause if the difference between the smallest and largest
district is less than ten percent.
14
Nevertheless, any significant deviation (even within the 10
percent overall deviation margin) must be “based on legitimate considerations incident to the
effectuation of a rational state policy,”
15
including “the integrity of political subdivisions, the
maintenance of compactness and contiguity in legislative districts, or the recognition of natural
or historical boundary lines.
16
The Fourteenth Amendment has also been interpreted to prohibit racial predominance.
17
The
U.S. Supreme Court has stated: “The equal protection clause prohibits a state, without sufficient
justification, from separating its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.” A
redistricting plan “that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race [must] be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.” Such strict scrutiny review
applies not only to redistricting plans that expressly distinguish citizens because of race, but also
those plans “that, although race neutral, are, on their face unexplainable on grounds other than
race.”
18
11
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
12
See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969).
13
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964).
14
See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977).
15
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964).
16
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967).
17
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
18
Id. BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 5
The Federal Voting Rights Act
The Federal Voting Rights Act (VRA) prohibits any state or political subdivision from enacting a
map that results in the denial or abridgement of any U.S. citizen’s right to vote on account of
race, color, or status as a member of a language minority group and purposeful discrimination.
19
The VRA also protects against retrogression—or backsliding—in the ability of racial and
language minorities to elect representatives of their choice.
20
Section 2 of the VRA requires the creation of a district that performs for racial and language
minorities where a minority population is geographically compact and sufficiently numerous to
be a majority in a single-member district, the minority population is politically cohesive, the
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority-preferred
candidate, and under all of the circumstances, the minority population has less opportunity than
others to participate in the political process and elect representatives of its choice.
21
Section 5 of the VRA prohibits purposeful discrimination and protects against retrogression—or
backsliding—in the ability of racial and language minorities to elect representatives of their
choice.
22
Section 5 contains a coverage formula that was applied to “covered jurisdictions” to
determine if there was a history of discrimination against racial or language minorities.
23
Such
jurisdictions had to be “precleared” before any of the changes could take effect, meaning that any
substantial changes made to voting laws, including redistricting plans, in these “covered
jurisdictions” could not be implemented without first obtaining federal permission.
24
In Florida,
Collier, Hardee, Hendry, Hillsborough, and Monroe counties were subject to Department of
Justice preclearance in regards to redistricting until the coverage formula was invalidated in 2013
in Shelby County v. Holder.
25
However, as Apportionment I states, “Florida's new constitutional
provision, codified the non-retrogression principle of Section 5 (VRA) and has now extended it
statewide. In other words, Florida now has a statewide non-retrogression requirement
independent of Section 5.”
26
The Florida Constitution
Article III, s. 16(a) of the Florida Constitution requires that “the legislature at its regular session
in the second year following each decennial census,” apportion the state by joint resolution “in
accordance with the constitution of the state and the United States into not less than thirty nor
more than forty consecutively numbered senatorial districts of either contiguous, overlapping or
identical territory, and into not less than eighty nor more than one hundred twenty consecutively
numbered representative districts of either contiguous, overlapping or identical territory.”
27
Once
19
52 U.S.C.A. s. 10301.
20
52 U.S.C.A. s. 10303.
21
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S. Ct. 2752, 92 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1986).
22
52 U.S.C.A. s. 10303.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 186 L. Ed. 2d 651 (2013).
26
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 624 (Fla. 2012).
27
Art. III, s. 16(a), Fla. Const. BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 6
the joint resolution is adopted, the state legislative plans are then subject to review by the Florida
Supreme Court determining the validity of the apportionment.
28
A district is contiguous if no part of the district is isolated from the rest of the district by another
district.
29
In a contiguous district, a person can travel from any point within the district to any
other point without departing from the district.
30
A district is not contiguous if its parts touch
only at a common corner, such as a right angle.
31
The Florida Supreme Court has also held that
the presence in a district of a body of water without a connecting bridge, even if it requires land
travel outside the district in order to reach other parts of the district, does not violate contiguity.
32
Districts must be consecutively numbered, but it is not necessary that adjacent districts receive
consecutive numbers.
33
For example, districts in a 40-district redistricting plan may be numbered
from 1 to 40, but District 1 and District 2 need not be adjacent to one another.
34
Ordinarily, senators are elected to four-year terms.
35
The terms are staggered with elections for
odd-numbered districts held in years the number of which are multiples of four, and even-
numbered districts in years the number of which is an even number not divisible by four.
36
At the
general election that follows the decennial reapportionment, terms that are not scheduled
naturally to expire will be truncated, and all seats in the Senate will be subject to election in the
new districts.
37
The Florida Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception to the rule that
requires the terms of senators to be truncated at the general election following redistricting. If the
term of a senator is not scheduled naturally to expire at the general election, and the redistricting
plan does not alter the boundaries of the district, the senator would continue to serve the
remainder of the term until its natural expiration.
38
To preserve staggered terms in a decennial
reapportionment, voters will, at the 2022 General Election, elect candidates to two-year terms in
Senate districts designated by odd numbers, while voters in Senate districts designated by even
numbers will elect candidates to four-year terms.
39
In 2010, voters amended the Florida Constitution to create additional standards for establishing
state legislative district boundaries.
40
The standards are set forth in two tiers.
28
Art. III, s. 16(c), Fla. Const.
29
In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session;
Constitutionality Vel Non, 414 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1982).
30
In re Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992, 597 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1992), amended sub nom. In
re Constitutionality of Senate Joint Resolution 2G, Special Apportionment Session 1992, 601 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1992).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Art. III, s. 16(a), Fla. Const.; In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special
Apportionment Session; Constitutionality Vel Non, 414 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1982).
34
Id.
35
Art. III, s. 15(a), Fla. Const.
36
Id.
37
In re Apportionment Law, Senate Joint Resolution 1E, 414 So. 2d at 1047-48.
38
Id.
39
Art. III, s. 15(a), Fla. Const.
40
Art. III, s. 21, Fla. Const. BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 7
Tier – One Standards
Article III, s. 21(a) of the Florida Constitution prohibits line-drawing that intentionally favors or
disfavors a political party or an incumbent. It also affords protection to racial and language
minorities. Districts may not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal
opportunity of racial or language minorities to participate in the political process; or to diminish
their ability to elect representatives of their choice. Finally it reiterates that districts must be
contiguous. The order in which the tier-one standards are set out in the Constitution does not
establish any priority among those standards within the tier.
41
The tier-one standards provide that “[n]o apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the
intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.”
42
The Florida Supreme Court has
held that Florida’s constitutional provision “prohibits intent, not effect” because “any redrawing
of lines, regardless of intent, will inevitably have an effect on the political composition of a
district and likely whether a political party or incumbent is advantaged or disadvantaged.”
43
Nonetheless, there is no acceptable level of improper intent.
44
The tier-one standards also provide protections for racial and language minorities. Districts may
“not be drawn with the intent or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or
language minorities to participate in the political process”; or to “diminish their ability to elect
representatives of their choice.”
45
The Court has interpreted the tier-one constitutional provisions that relate to racial or language
minorities’ ability to participate in the political process or elect a candidate of their choice to
mean that “the Legislature cannot eliminate majority-minority districts or weaken other
historically performing minority districts where doing so would actually diminish a minority
group's ability to elect its preferred candidates…in addition to majority-minority districts,
coalition or crossover districts that previously provided minority groups with the ability to elect a
preferred candidate under the benchmark plan must also be recognized.”
46
The Court went on to say, “that under Florida's provision, a slight change in percentage of the
minority group's population in a given district does not necessarily have a cognizable effect on a
minority group's ability to elect its preferred candidate of choice. This is because a minority
group's ability to elect a candidate of choice depends upon more than just population figures.”
47
In order to draw districts that comply with the tier-one standards, a functional analysis is required
to be performed.
A “functional analysis,” as it has been termed, is an inquiry into a racial or language minority
group’s ability to elect a candidate of choice that requires “consideration not only of the minority
population in the districts, or even the minority voting-age population in those districts, but of
41
Art. III, s. 21(c), Fla. Const.
42
Art. III, s. 21(a), Fla. Const.
43
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597 (Fla. 2012).
44
Id.
45
Art. III, s. 21(a), Fla. Const.
46
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 625 (Fla. 2012).
47
Id. BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 8
political data and how a minority population group has voted in the past.
48
The map drawing
application in use for the 2022 Redistricting Cycle includes 231 data points in the following
categories to enable users to perform this type of analysis:
49
2012 – 2020 General Election Voter Registration Information;
Registration by Party
Registration by Race or Ethnicity
Registration by Race or Ethnicity and Party
Registration by Party and Race or Ethnicity
2012 – 2020 General Election Voter Turnout Information;
Turnout by Party
Turnout by Party and Race or Ethnicity
Turnout by Race or Ethnicity and Party
2012 – 2020 Primary Election Voter Turnout Information;
Turnout by Party and Race or Ethnicity
2012 – 2020 Elections Results;
General Elections results by candidate
Primary Elections results by candidate
The last tier-one standard requires that all districts “consist of contiguous territory”. The premise
is similar to that in Article III, s. 16 of the Florida Constitution.
Tier – Two Standards
The tier-two standards of the Florida Constitution encompass what are often called “traditional
redistricting criteria,” but make it clear these standards are subordinated to the tier-one standards.
Article III, s. 21(b) states that unless compliance with these standards conflicts with tier-one
standards or with federal law, districts shall be as nearly equal in population as practicable,
districts shall be compact, and districts shall, where feasible, utilize existing political and
geographical boundaries.
50
As with tier-one, the order in which the tier-two standards are set out
in the Constitution does not establish any priority among those standards within the tier.
51
The first tier-two standard set forth by the Florida Constitution states that districts shall be as
nearly equal in population as is practicable. As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that “state legislatures be
apportioned in such a way that each person's vote carries the same weight—that is, each
legislator represents the same number of voters.”
52
48
Id.
49
See Florida Senate Committee on Reapportionment, Functional Analysis (October, 2021) , available
at:https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/Show/RE/MeetingPacket/5264/9438_MeetingPacket_5264_3.pdf.
50
Art. III, s. 21(b), Fla. Const.
51
Art. III, s. 21(c), Fla. Const.
52
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597 (2012). BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 9
The courts have allowed reasonable deviations for mathematical equality for state legislative
districts to accommodate traditional redistricting objectives, such as compactness, contiguity and
respect to the boundaries of political subdivisions.
53
In Apportionment I, the court stated that
“Because obtaining equal population “if practicable” is an explicit and important constitutional
mandate under the Florida Constitution, any deviation from that goal of mathematical precision
must be based upon compliance with other constitutional standards.”
54
The second tier-two requirement established by Section 21 of the Florida Constitution is
compactness. The constitutional amendments adopted in Florida in 2010 state that districts “shall
be compact.”
55
The Florida Supreme Court held that “compactness is a standard that refers to the shape of the
district. The goal is to ensure that districts are logically drawn and that bizarrely shaped districts
are avoided. Compactness can be evaluated both visually and by employing standard
mathematical measurements.”
56
Florida has historically used three scores to gauge compactness mathematically, all of which fall
within a range of 0-1, where a score closer to one indicates a more compact district.
57
The first
score used is the Convex Hull score, which tests for concavities or indentations in district
boundaries by calculating the ratio of the area of the district to the area of the minimum convex
polygon that can enclose the district’s geometry.
58
The second score used is the Polsby-Popper
score, which tests for jagged or squiggly district boundaries by calculating the ratio of the area of
the district to the area of a circle whose circumference is equal to the perimeter of the district.
The third score used is the Reock score, which indicates a district’s similarity to a circle by
calculating the ratio of the area of the district to the area of the smallest circle that can be drawn
around the district.
59
The Court also held that “Since compactness is set forth in section 21(b), the criteria of section
21(a) must predominate to the extent that they conflict with drawing a district that is compact.
However, if a district can be drawn more compactly while utilizing political and geographical
boundaries and without intentionally favoring a political party or incumbent, compactness must
be a yardstick by which to evaluate those other factors.”
60
The final tier-two standard established by the Florida Constitution is that districts shall, “where
feasible, utilize existing political and geographical boundaries.”
61
The Florida Supreme court has
defined geographic boundaries as features that are “easily ascertainable and commonly
53
Art. III, s. 21(b), Fla. Const.
54
Id.
55
Art. III, s. 21 (b), Fla. Const.
56
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597 (2012).
57
See Florida Senate Committee on Reapportionment, Compactness (October, 2021) , available
at:https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/Show/RE/MeetingPacket/5264/9438_MeetingPacket_5264_3.pdf.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597 (2012).
61
Art. III, s. 21(b), Fla. Const. BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 10
understood” such as “rivers, railways, interstates, and state roads.”
62
Moreover, political
boundaries primarily consist of county and municipal boundaries.
63
The boundaries of Florida’s municipalities are not static. Between January 1, 2010 and
December 31, 2019, 200 cities annexed or deannexed parcels, changing their boundaries 3,552
times.
64
Additionally, while Florida Statutes
65
permit municipalities to annex contiguous and
compact unincorporated territory, many of Florida’s cities are not contiguous, neither visually
nor mathematically compact, and contain holes or enclaves.
66
Of Florida’s 412 cities, 136 are
discontiguous, and 170 have holes or enclaves.
67
Unlike other objective tier-two standards in the Florida Constitution, there is no widely accepted
measurement for compliance with the requirement to, where feasible, utilize existing political
and geographic boundaries.
68
Simply counting the cities or counties kept whole, meaning they have either all geographic
territory or all population in a single district
69
, fails to account for the degree of usage of existing
county or municipal boundaries. It also disregards the co-equal constitutional mandate to, where
feasible, use political and geographical boundaries.
70
Professional staff of the Florida House of Representatives and the Florida Senate worked to
develop a set of quantitative metrics that measure the coincidence of a district’s border with
easily ascertainable and commonly understood political and geographic features, and make it
publicly available to all users in the redistricting application. This Boundary Analysis
independently measures the extent to which district boundaries overlap city boundaries, county
boundaries, primary and secondary roads (interstates, U.S. highways, and State highways),
railroads, and significant water bodies (contiguous area hydrography features greater than 10
acres) as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau’s TIGER/Line files. Districts’ coincidence with
these existing political and geographic boundaries is independently calculated and presented
along with the extent to which district boundaries do not follow any of the specified features.
In this way, users are presented with a Boundary Analysis that shows the degree of utilization for
each type of existing political or geographic boundary as specified by the Florida Constitution
and interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court. To facilitate the utilization of existing political
62
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597 (2012).
63
Id.
64
Boundary change data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau: https://www.census.gov/geographies/reference-
files/timeseries/geo/bas/annex.html As noted, The U.S. Census Bureau makes no claims to the completeness of the
annexation data in the boundary change files. The data in these files were collected through programs in which state, county,
and local governments voluntarily participated.
65
Section 171.0413(1), F.S. (2021).
66
Compactness scores, parts, and holes based on 2020 U.S. Census TIGER geometry for the places layer available at:
https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files/time-series/geo/tiger-line-file.2020.html.
67
See Florida Senate Committee on Reapportionment, Municipal Boundaries (October, 2021) , available
at:https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/Show/RE/MeetingPacket/5264/9438_MeetingPacket_5264_3.pdf.
68
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597 (2012).
69
In Apportionment VIII, the Court held that unpopulated county splits are “not considered to include part of the county for
the purpose of counting splits. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 179 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 2015).
70
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597 (2012). BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 11
and geographic boundaries, each of the feature layers used in the computation of the Boundary
Analysis is provided in the map-drawing application.
Judicial Review of State Legislative Districts
During the regular session of the Legislature in the second year following the decennial census,
the Legislature is required to adopt a joint resolution that apportions the state into State Senate
and State House districts. The Legislature is directed to apportion the state into no fewer than 30,
nor more than 40 State Senate districts, and into no fewer than 80, nor more than 120 State
House districts. Because the Legislature adopts a joint resolution, rather than passing a general
bill, the measure does not require the Governor's approval, nor is it subject to a veto.
71
The state constitution prescribes a mandated review process for state legislative redistricting
plans by the Florida Supreme Court.
72
During a constitutionally mandated review, the Florida
Supreme Court determines if the newly created State Senate and State House districts are valid.
When the Florida Supreme Court enters a judgment that the plan is valid, the plan becomes
binding upon all citizens of the state.
73
If the Legislature Adopts a Joint Resolution of Apportionment during Regular Session
Within fifteen days after the Legislature passes a joint resolution to apportion state legislative
districts, the Attorney General must petition the Florida Supreme Court for a declaratory
judgment that determines the validity of the apportionment.
74
The Court must allow adversary
interests to present their views challenging the validity of the apportionment,
75
and must enter its
judgment within thirty days after the Attorney General submits the petition.
If the Court finds the apportionment valid, the Court’s judgment is binding on all citizens of the
state.
76
If the Court finds the apportionment invalid, the Governor must reconvene the Legislature, by
proclamation, within 5 days, in an extraordinary apportionment session that may not exceed
fifteen days.
77
The Legislature must then adopt a joint resolution of apportionment that conforms
to the Court’s judgment.
78
If the Legislature adopts a joint resolution during the extraordinary apportionment session, the
Attorney General must petition the Court and provide the apportionment resolution within fifteen
days after adjournment of the session. The Court must then consider the validity of the resolution
as though adopted at a regular or special apportionment session.
79
Again, the Court must allow
adversary interests to present their views and render its judgment within thirty days after the
71
Art. III, s. 16(a), Fla. Const.
72
Art. III, s. 16(c), Fla. Const.
73
Art. III, s. 16(d), Fla. Const.
74
Art. III, s. 16(c), Fla. Const.
75
Id.
76
Art. III, s. 16(d), Fla. Const.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Art. III, s. 16(e), Fla. Const. BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 12
Attorney General submits the petition.
80
If the Legislature did not adopt a joint resolution during
the extraordinary apportionment session, the Attorney General must so inform the Court.
81
If the Legislature did not adopt an apportionment resolution during an extraordinary
apportionment session, or if the Court declares an apportionment resolution adopted during an
extraordinary apportionment session invalid, the Court must, within sixty days after receiving the
Attorney General’s petition, file an order with the custodian of state records making an
apportionment.
82
If the Legislature does not Adopt a Joint Resolution of Apportionment during Regular Session
If the regular session of the Legislature in the second year following the decennial census is
adjourned without adoption of a joint resolution apportioning the state into the necessary
legislative districts, the Governor must, within thirty days, issue a proclamation reconvening the
Legislature in a special apportionment session.
83
That session may not exceed thirty consecutive
days and no other business may be transacted.
84
The state constitution specifies that, “[i]t is the
Legislature’s mandatory duty to adopt a joint resolution of apportionment during that session.”
85
If the Legislature adjourns the special apportionment session without adopting a joint resolution
of apportionment, the Attorney General must, within five days, petition the Court to make the
apportionment.
86
Within sixty days after the Attorney General files the petition, the Court must
file an order with the state custodian of records making the apportionment.
87
III. Effect of Proposed Changes:
Consistent with the United States (U.S.) Constitution, Federal Voting Rights Act, Florida
Constitution, and applicable court decisions, the Joint Resolution apportions the state into 40
single-member State Senate districts and 120 single-member State House districts.
Section 1 of the Joint Resolution provides definitions regarding Census geography and the
electronic versions of districts. Additionally, it designates the United States Decennial Census of
2020 as the official census of the state for the purposes of legislative redistricting as provided by
Art. X of the Florida Constitution.
Section 2 of the Joint Resolution describes the state's 120 State House districts using Census
geography.
Section 3 of the Joint Resolution describes the state's 40 State Senate districts using Census
geography.
80
Art. III, s. 16(c), Fla. Const.
81
Art. III, s. 16(e), Fla. Const.
82
Art. III, s. 16(f), Fla. Const.
83
Art. III, s. 16(a), Fla. Const.
84
Id
85
Id
86
Art. III, s. 16(b), Fla. Const.
87
Id BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 13
Section 4 of the Joint Resolution designates the process for territory not specified for inclusion in
any district.
Section 5 of the Joint Resolution designates the process for assigned territory that is
noncontiguous.
Section 6 of the Joint Resolution establishes the districts described in Sections 2 and 3 as the
official State House and State Senate districts of the state.
Section 7 of the Joint Resolution designates electronic maps as the authoritative representation of
the state's legislative districts. Additionally, it establishes the Office of Economic and
Demographic Research as the official custodian of electronic maps representing the legislative
districts described in Sections 2 and 3.
Section 8 provides severability if any provision of the Joint Resolution is invalidated.
Section 9 of the Joint Resolution changes the applicable starting date for the qualification,
nomination, and election of the new districts from 2012 to 2022.
IV. Constitutional Issues:
A. Municipality/County Mandates Restrictions:
None.
B. Public Records/Open Meetings Issues:
None.
C. Trust Funds Restrictions:
None.
D. State Tax or Fee Increases:
None.
E. Other Constitutional Issues:
None.
V. Fiscal Impact Statement:
A. Tax/Fee Issues:
None. BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 14
B. Private Sector Impact:
None.
C. Government Sector Impact:
The 2022 reapportionment will have an undetermined fiscal impact on Florida's election
officials, including 67 Supervisor of Elections offices and the Department of State,
Division of Elections. Local supervisors will incur the cost of data processing and labor
to change each of Florida's approximately 14 million voter records to reflect new
districts. As precincts are reconfigured for new districts, postage and printing will be
required to provide each eligible voter whose precinct has changed with official
notification.
VI. Technical Deficiencies:
None.
VII. Related Issues:
None.
VIII. Statutes Affected:
None.
IX. Additional Information:
A. Committee Substitute – Statement of Substantial Changes:
(Summarizing differences between the Committee Substitute and the prior version of the bill.)
CS by Reapportionment on January 13, 2022:
The committee substitute adopts Redistricting Plan S027S8058, apportioning the state
into 40 single-member State Senate districts. As adopted by the Senate Committee on
Reapportionment, CS/SJR 100 apportions each district as first established in Senate
Redistricting Plan S027S8056, but renumbers the districts using the results of a tactile
and random process conducted during the meeting. The process established districts
within the plan as “even-numbered” or “odd-numbered”. Beginning in the Panhandle of
Florida, moving West to East and North to South, the districts were assigned numbers
from 1 to 40 based upon the random assignment determination of whether the district is
even or odd.
The joint resolution contains only senate districts. Representative districts may be added
subsequently.
BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 15
BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 16
Plan S027S8058
Deviation Voting Age Population:AreaPerim.ConvexPolsby-ReockCounties: Cities: Political and Geographic Boundaries:
Dist. Total % Black Hisp.(sq.mi.)(mi.)HullPopperRatioWholePartsWholePartsCityCountyRoadWaterRailNon-Pol/Geo
10,3621.92% 15.54% 24.99%1,785.1198.30.820.460.4651 4836410315% 59% 24% 38% 2% 4%
1 8080.15% 15.63% 5.69% 2,6922970.810.380.422 1 6 1 4% 82% 9% 55% 0% 0%
2 3140.06% 11.28% 7.12% 6,4134230.780.450.506 1 40 1 3% 87% 6% 61% 0% 0% Overall numbers
3 2,6870.50% 27.43% 7.06%10,9095740.800.420.4413 0 27 0 2% 100%0% 58% 0% 0% of county and city splits:
4 4,0530.75% 13.54% 9.18% 1,3962700.740.240.521 1 7 1 28% 77% 21% 45% 0% 0%
5 4,9560.92% 41.62% 10.43% 248 69 0.870.660.600 1 0 1 14% 14% 80% 10% 0% 0%
6 3660.07% 14.64% 8.79% 3,4333350.830.380.506 1 21 3 14% 87% 13% 20% 0% 0%
7 3,1510.59% 7.81% 7.85% 2,5332820.790.400.493 1 14 2 15% 85% 12% 53% 0% 0%
8 4,7210.88% 11.48% 13.21%1,4862310.830.350.370 2 13 2 12% 62% 22% 64% 6% 0%
9 -1,469-0.27%13.85% 12.39%3,7283270.890.440.442 1 15 3 7% 87% 13% 45% 0% 0%
10 -3,020-0.56%12.53% 20.15% 366 1090.810.390.501 1 7 3 20% 83% 7% 57% 0% 2%
11 840.02% 4.88% 8.19% 2,4032780.750.390.393 1 9 0 9% 88% 11% 48% 0% 0%
12 -1,981-0.37%16.13% 24.29% 999 2080.780.290.320 1 7 4 6% 70% 27% 24% 1% 2%
13 -1,821-0.34%9.89% 15.73%1,2902260.720.320.361 1 17 3 12% 89% 10% 34% 0% 2%
14 -2,463-0.46%9.42% 32.62% 281 89 0.780.440.470 1 0 1 45% 48% 19% 41% 1% 7%
15 -4,248-0.79%37.48% 25.35% 288 89 0.820.460.450 1 2 7 15% 53% 27% 25% 6% 6%
16 -3,007-0.56%33.20% 21.78% 351 1110.690.360.360 2 0 3 19% 6% 39% 31% 1% 18%
17 -4,667-0.87%11.80% 38.03% 489 1120.940.490.520 1 0 3 12% 74% 7% 27% 5% 7%
18 4,2670.79% 6.40% 9.70% 453 1040.860.530.630 1 17 3 24% 52% 16% 71% 0% 8%
19 -958-0.18%10.08% 10.15%1,1891940.770.400.420 1 15 0 4% 77% 9% 52% 7% 0%
20 -3,388-0.63%10.97% 17.22%1,2651940.720.420.410 2 5 1 1% 53% 33% 33% 0% 9%
21 -3,250-0.60%5.22% 10.61% 655 1140.890.640.550 2 6 2 12% 45% 28% 54% 0% 1%
22 -4,979-0.92%4.33% 9.59% 1,1431470.920.670.491 1 3 1 19% 73% 24% 46% 0% 2%
23 -2,318-0.43%11.89% 21.41% 854 1400.860.550.560 2 5 2 5% 58% 46% 3% 0% 7%
24 5,0800.94% 25.10% 32.22% 197 63 0.910.630.530 1 18 2 22% 30% 33% 46% 0% 14%
25 -5,143-0.96%12.77% 52.56%1,5782330.840.370.431 1 2 2 5% 89% 9% 29% 0% 2%
26 1,6870.31% 15.81% 14.53%1,3201760.880.540.450 1 10 2 11% 48% 30% 24% 0% 8%
27 -3,910-0.73%9.05% 16.04%3,4273650.600.320.403 2 11 5 10% 73% 19% 21% 1% 4%
28 -960-0.18%7.68% 26.59%4,0273260.830.480.482 1 5 3 2% 89% 6% 43% 0% 3%
29 -2,706-0.50%13.34% 15.46%4,2033070.830.560.494 1 12 1 2% 92% 2% 31% 4% 1%
30 9730.18% 21.29% 22.81% 122 50 0.910.600.530 2 4 3 52% 7% 39% 14% 0% 16%
31 2,4450.45% 11.02% 15.57%1,6741820.900.630.601 2 12 4 8% 47% 31% 48% 6% 5%
32 3,5960.67% 46.15% 23.13% 88 48 0.880.480.590 1 6 3 59% 0% 41% 0% 3% 3%
33 4200.08% 6.26% 17.18%1,0921420.940.680.460 1 3 3 5% 71% 29% 60% 0% 0%
34 -4,884-0.91%50.07% 37.96% 144 69 0.810.370.460 1 9 6 24% 37% 38% 47% 0% 4%
35 3,7950.70% 20.79% 45.26% 955 1360.940.650.540 1 4 4 20% 76% 16% 0% 0% 1%
36 2,2300.41% 6.23% 78.49% 60 42 0.820.430.280 1 1 4 12% 0% 64% 27% 1% 9%
37 4,1630.77% 15.12% 29.79% 186 87 0.790.310.290 2 12 9 26% 42% 39% 44% 2% 0%
38 5,2190.97% 13.01% 66.39% 343 91 0.850.520.430 1 5 2 13% 17% 18% 51% 15% 6%
39 -3,933-0.73%5.40% 90.13% 170 58 0.900.630.580 1 7 3 30% 17% 72% 4% 0% 5%
40 4,0770.76% 8.23% 71.50%6,9536370.540.220.221 1 7 0 1% 88% 5% 80% 2% 0%
94
District lines and
City and County Boundaries
Number of Counties Counties with only one district Districts with only one county Counties split into more than one district Counties with all population in a single district Aggregate number of county splits Aggregate number of splits with population Number of Cities Cities with only one district Cities split into more than one district Cities with all population in only one district Aggregate number of city splits Aggregate number of splits with population
51
In Plan
S027S8058
67 51 16 16 48 373 10348 48 412 364 BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 17
Plan S027S8058 Plan S027S8058
Counties included in more than one district Counties included in more than one district Counties included in more than one district Counties included in more than one district Cities included in more than one district
County Dist.Total PopPop%Total AreaArea% County Dist.Total PopPop%Total AreaArea% County Dist.Total PopPop%Total AreaArea% County Dist.Total PopPop%Total AreaArea%
Alachua 6160,30557.6% 494.051.0%
Alachua 9118,16342.4% 474.849.0%
Brevard 8 69,11511.4% 367.523.6%
Brevard 19537,49788.6%1,189.576.4%
Broward 30407,11320.9% 89.0 6.8%
Broward 32542,05127.9% 88.5 6.8%
Broward 35542,25027.9% 955.073.0%
Broward 37452,96123.3% 175.913.4%
Duval 4452,15645.4% 670.473.0%
Duval 5543,41154.6% 248.127.0%
Hillsborough 14535,99236.7% 280.821.1%
Hillsborough 16422,94329.0% 281.421.1%
Hillsborough 20234,82716.1% 468.235.2%
Hillsborough 23266,00018.2% 301.622.6%
Lee 27 99,82313.1% 191.112.6%
Lee 28122,12416.1% 232.015.3%
Lee 33538,87570.8%1,091.772.1%
Manatee 20300,24075.1% 796.982.7%
Manatee 22 99,47024.9% 167.217.3%
Miami-Dade 34533,57119.8% 143.56.0%
Miami-Dade 36540,68520.0% 59.9 2.5%
Miami-Dade 37 89,6573.3% 10.1 0.4%
Miami-Dade 38543,67420.1% 342.814.4%
Miami-Dade 39534,52219.8% 169.67.1%
Miami-Dade 40459,65817.0%1,663.569.6%
Okaloosa 1 29,35813.9% 344.127.6%
Okaloosa 2182,31086.1% 902.672.4%
Orange 10 64,5794.5% 20.9 2.1%
Orange 13152,67810.7% 133.613.3%
Orange 15534,20737.4% 288.128.7%
Orange 17533,78837.3% 489.048.7%
Orange 25144,65610.1% 71.8 7.2%
Palm Beach 24543,53536.4% 196.88.3%
Palm Beach 26540,14236.2%1,319.655.4%
Palm Beach 30132,3158.9% 32.8 1.4%
Palm Beach 31276,19918.5% 834.135.0%
Pasco 11 60,42910.8% 146.814.5%
Pasco 21231,32541.2% 315.531.1%
Pasco 23270,13748.1% 552.454.4%
Pinellas 16112,50511.7% 69.2 8.0%
Pinellas 18542,72256.6% 453.552.6%
Pinellas 21303,88031.7% 339.939.4%
Polk 12536,47474.0% 999.449.7%
Polk 27188,57226.0%1,011.050.3%
St. Lucie 29222,95667.7% 600.587.3%
St. Lucie 31106,27032.3% 87.312.7%
Volusia 7 79,48214.4% 313.921.9%
Volusia 8474,06185.6%1,118.578.1% BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 18
Plan S027S8058 Plan S027S8058
Cities included in more than one district Cities included in more than one district Cities included in more than one district Cities included in more than one district Cities included in more than one district
City Dist.Total PopPop%Total AreaArea% City Dist.Total PopPop%Total AreaArea% City Dist.Total PopPop%Total AreaArea% City Dist.Total PopPop%Total AreaArea%
Aventura 34 0 0.0% 0.0 0.8%Miramar 37 17,58613.1% 2.2 7.0%
Aventura 37 40,242100.0% 3.599.2%Newberry 6 3,64749.7% 23.239.6%
Belle Isle 17 7,032100.0% 5.097.0%Newberry 9 3,69550.3% 35.460.4%
Belle Isle 25 0 0.0% 0.2 3.0%North Miami 34 60,191100.0% 10.0100.0%
Boca Raton 26 50,01351.3% 19.260.8%North Miami 37 0 0.0% 0.0 0.0%
Boca Raton 30 47,40948.7% 12.439.2%North Miami Beach 34 35,30080.8% 4.379.9%
Bonita Springs 28 10,53019.6% 14.130.3%North Miami Beach 37 8,37619.2% 1.120.1%
Bonita Springs 33 43,11480.4% 32.469.7%Oakland 13 0 0.0% 0.0 0.9%
Clearwater 18 33,47328.5% 6.418.0%Oakland 15 3,516100.0% 2.399.1%
Clearwater 21 83,81971.5% 29.482.0%Ocoee 13 7,68616.3% 1.810.8%
Coral Gables 36 25,01850.8% 3.910.3%Ocoee 15 39,60983.8% 14.989.2%
Coral Gables 38 24,23049.2% 33.589.7%Oldsmar 18 11 0.1% 0.0 0.0%
Crestview 1 10,21437.6% 8.751.9%Oldsmar 21 14,88799.9% 10.1100.0%
Crestview 2 16,92062.4% 8.148.1%Opa-locka 34 16,463100.0% 4.294.6%
Davie 32 1,148 1.1% 0.3 0.9%Opa-locka 39 0 0.0% 0.2 5.4%
Davie 35 103,27297.7% 33.493.4%Orlando 10 3,8351.3% 1.7 1.4%
Davie 37 1,271 1.2% 2.1 5.7%Orlando 15141,20145.9% 36.730.9%
Daytona Beach 7 7,058 9.7% 2.4 3.6%Orlando 17159,41651.8% 75.863.7%
Daytona Beach 8 65,58990.3% 65.896.4%Orlando 25 3,1211.0% 4.7 4.0%
Deerfield Beach 30 71,09481.9% 13.281.6%Ormond Beach 7 36,55784.9% 36.293.2%
Deerfield Beach 37 15,76518.2% 3.018.4%Ormond Beach 8 6,52315.1% 2.7 6.8%
Eagle Lake 12 0 0.0% 0.0 0.3%Palm Beach Gardens 24 16,34527.6% 5.910.0%
Eagle Lake 27 3,008100.0% 3.799.8%Palm Beach Gardens 31 42,83772.4% 53.490.0%
Edgewood 15 1,48255.2% 0.855.9%Pompano Beach 30 49,81544.5% 13.554.7%
Edgewood 17 1,20344.8% 0.744.1%Pompano Beach 37 62,23155.5% 11.245.3%
Estero 28 9,84426.7% 6.927.2%Port St. Lucie 29 99,88448.8% 50.741.9%
Estero 33 27,09573.4% 18.572.8%Port St. Lucie 31104,96751.2% 70.258.1%
Fanning Springs 6 47840.4% 1.938.4%Royal Palm Beach 26 4,66412.0% 1.1 8.9%
Fanning Springs 9 70459.6% 3.161.6%Royal Palm Beach 31 34,26888.0% 10.791.1%
Fort Lauderdale 32 84,22246.1% 15.843.5%St. Petersburg 16112,50543.6% 69.252.7%
Fort Lauderdale 37 98,53853.9% 20.556.5%St. Petersburg 18145,80356.5% 62.147.3%
Fort Myers 27 4,870 5.6% 5.911.9%Sunrise 32 86,39688.8% 11.965.7%
Fort Myers 28 12,52914.5% 7.816.0%Sunrise 35 10,93911.2% 6.234.3%
Fort Myers 33 68,99679.9% 35.472.1%Sweetwater 36 1,7629.1% 0.311.1%
Gainesville 6 93,66266.4% 48.375.1%Sweetwater 39 17,60190.9% 2.088.9%
Gainesville 9 47,42333.6% 16.024.9%Tampa 14201,03552.2% 120.768.7%
Hollywood 35 28,64918.7% 3.511.3%Tampa 16147,95938.4% 39.922.7%
Hollywood 37 124,41881.3% 27.388.7%Tampa 23 35,9659.3% 15.3 8.7%
Jacksonville 4 406,20042.8% 626.471.6%Temple Terrace 16 26,690100.0% 7.699.0%
Jacksonville 5 543,41157.2% 248.128.4%Temple Terrace 23 0 0.0% 0.1 1.0%
Lake Wales 12 12,92179.0% 14.873.8%West Palm Beach 24101,19686.2% 25.543.9%
Lake Wales 27 3,44021.0% 5.326.2%West Palm Beach 31 16,21913.8% 32.556.1%
Lakeland 12 100,63889.3% 64.085.2%Winter Garden 13 23,07649.1% 10.357.7%
Lakeland 27 12,00310.7% 11.114.8%Winter Garden 15 23,88850.9% 7.642.3%
Longboat Key 20 2,74636.6% 8.351.7%Winter Haven 12 49,219100.0% 40.297.8%
Longboat Key 22 4,75963.4% 7.748.3%Winter Haven 27 0 0.0% 0.9 2.2%
Maitland 10 19,543100.0% 6.5100.0%Winter Park 10 29,77499.9% 10.499.7%
Maitland 15 0 0.0% 0.0 0.0%Winter Park 15 21 0.1% 0.0 0.3%
Miami 34 67,84415.3% 11.320.1%
Miami 36 343,41577.7% 32.557.9%
Miami 38 30,281 6.9% 12.321.9%
Miami 39 701 0.2% 0.1 0.1%
Miami Beach 34 40,30648.6% 8.253.8%
Miami Beach 36 42,58451.4% 7.046.2%
Miramar 35 117,13587.0% 28.993.0% BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 19
Plan S027S8058
2020 Census Average Primary Election Turnout Average General Election Turnout General Election Performance in Statewide Elections 2012-2020
Dist. VAP who are: DEM who are: REP who are: Voters who are: DEM who are: REP who are:NPAOth who are:Black Voters who are:Hisp. Voters who are: Avg. Perf. Wins Margins
Black Hisp Black Hisp.BlackHisp.DEM REPNPAOthBlackHisp.BlackHisp.BlackHisp.DEM REPNPAOthDEM REPNPAOthDEM REP DEM REP MAX MIN AVG
5 41.62%10.43%66.82%1.43%2.70%1.63%52.83%32.61%14.56%66.63%2.81%3.34%2.85%24.16%6.72%88.40%2.73%8.84%42.91%27.68%28.81%56.2%42.2% 13 1 D +27.2%D +0.4%D +14.5%
15 37.48%25.35%60.48%7.46%2.94%5.14%52.13%26.69%21.17%55.33%12.57%3.36%7.75%19.61%18.67%85.04%2.63%12.29%51.96%16.44%31.42%63.3%35.1% 14 0 D +41.3%D +12.7%D +28.6%
16 33.20%21.78%52.82%5.31%3.13%5.36%56.51%22.22%21.26%52.65%9.14%3.75%7.97%18.23%14.45%86.24%2.41%11.30%51.24%17.80%30.65%67.6%30.6% 14 0 D +52.7%D +19.5%D +37.5%
25 12.77%52.56%18.29%37.57%1.02%14.65%44.99%27.64%27.36%16.96%46.05%1.37%20.76%5.86%43.99%79.34%3.93%16.72%53.93%14.78%31.27%58.4%39.9% 13 1 D +38.2%D +1.1%D +18.7%
32 46.15%23.13%55.29%5.24%5.38%10.12%64.77%15.71%19.52%54.88%9.76%5.72%14.99%24.39%19.63%86.22%2.18%11.55%50.28%18.88%30.68%76.9%22.2% 14 0 D +60.6%D +47.9%D +55%
34 50.07%37.96%74.75%9.43%9.44%50.99%70.89%10.21%18.90%70.39%14.09%10.24%48.79%30.56%35.03%88.00%1.84%10.14%45.89%23.41%30.66%83.8%15.4% 14 0 D +74.5%D +56.6%D +68.6%
36 6.23%78.49%9.97%55.82%0.30%86.37%34.80%36.94%28.26%9.21%60.20%0.41%81.23%2.22%69.24%80.06%3.81%15.85%29.72%42.55%27.73%50.9%47.9% 8 6 D +21.8%R +0%D +3.4%
38 13.01%66.39%30.07%24.28%0.83%63.61%41.51%33.34%25.15%27.43%33.28%1.03%62.79%6.34%55.25%85.41%2.57%11.93%28.15%43.29%28.56%56.0%42.9% 14 0 D +24.4%D +0.5%D +13.5%
39 5.40%90.13%21.46%59.84%0.29%88.68%30.75%40.89%28.35%14.62%69.19%0.39%86.57%2.10%82.07%85.44%3.08%11.42%26.61%44.32%29.07%45.3%53.6% 3 11R +21.6%D +2.3%R +8.1%
40 8.23%71.50%13.98%36.47%0.39%61.88%33.26%39.06%27.68%13.99%48.49%0.55%63.25%3.38%62.33%80.02%3.68%16.05%27.67%42.63%29.68%48.1%50.6% 7 7 R +13.8%D +0.8%R +2.1% Plan S027S8058 Plan S027S8058
2020 Census 2020 General Election Registered Voters
Dist. VAP who are: RV who are: RV who are: Black Voters who are: Hisp. Voters who are: DEM who are: REP who are: NPAOth who are:
Black Hisp.DEM REP OTH BlackHisp. DEM REP NPAOth DEM REP NPAOth Black Hisp. Black Hisp. Black Hisp.
5 41.62%10.43%51.25%27.56%21.20%41.17%5.42%82.43% 3.25% 14.31%41.41%21.57%36.92%66.22% 4.38% 4.85% 4.24% 27.80%9.44%
15 37.48%25.35%50.09%21.58%28.34%33.81%17.44%78.45% 3.10% 18.41%46.99%13.95%39.06%52.96%16.36%4.85% 11.27%21.97%24.03%
16 33.20%21.78%52.29%19.77%27.94%32.95%14.48%79.63% 2.88% 17.47%45.79%15.30%38.81%50.18%12.68%4.80% 11.21%20.61%20.12%
25 12.77%52.56%42.72%22.11%35.18%9.20%47.32%72.17% 4.02% 23.79%47.05%13.47%39.49%15.54%52.12%1.67% 28.83%6.22%53.12%
32 46.15%23.13%60.44%14.57%24.98%41.35%16.05%81.34% 2.51% 16.14%46.69%17.51%35.81%55.65%12.40%7.12% 19.28%26.71%23.01%
34 50.07%37.96%64.26%10.65%25.08%52.03%26.16%83.07% 2.42% 14.51%43.17%20.66%36.17%67.25%17.58%11.81%50.73%30.10%37.72%
36 6.23%78.49%34.79%30.95%34.26%4.50%69.00%74.44% 4.24% 21.19%30.87%35.55%33.58%9.62% 61.23%0.62% 79.26%2.78%67.64%
38 13.01%66.39%38.82%29.94%31.23%12.33%54.54%80.56% 3.05% 16.36%28.87%36.81%34.32%25.58%40.56%1.25% 67.05%6.46%59.93%
39 5.40%90.13%29.59%35.46%34.95%4.32%80.65%80.10% 3.86% 15.94%26.82%38.01%35.16%11.70%73.10%0.47% 86.45%1.97%81.13%
40 8.23%71.50%31.79%34.84%33.37%5.85%62.89%74.85% 3.99% 20.99%27.85%36.89%35.26%13.77%55.11%0.67% 66.59%3.68%66.45% BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 20
5 15 16 25 32 34 36 38 39 40
Plan S027S8058 BVAP41.62%37.48%33.20%12.77%46.15%50.07%6.23%13.01%5.40%8.23%
Primary Elections HVAP10.43%25.35%21.78%52.56%23.13%37.96%78.49%66.39%90.13%71.50%
R_Baldauf 0.77%0.85%0.68%0.90%1.45%2.21%2.03%1.25%2.60%1.73%
R_DeSantis 57.78%50.22%44.19%51.86%67.41%64.39%66.97%67.60%67.84%68.13%
R_Devine 1.28%1.60%1.40%2.03%2.16%3.75%3.81%2.69%3.98%3.15%
R_Langford 1.04%1.69%1.16%1.30%2.07%1.99%1.52%1.60%1.41%1.75%
R_Mercadante 0.48%0.78%0.92%1.39%1.67%2.91%2.61%1.86%2.87%1.87%
R_Nathan 0.82%0.89%0.93%1.04%1.47%2.44%1.61%1.33%1.37%1.43%
R_Putnam 35.94%41.61%48.05%38.76%19.33%17.61%17.35%20.19%16.75%18.07%
R_White 1.64%2.14%2.15%2.70%3.44%4.38%3.88%3.21%3.21%3.50%
D_Gillum 55.30%49.62%50.55%27.89%48.67%53.41%25.09%35.23%30.91%26.44%
D_Graham 20.91%24.50%25.83%29.03%14.03%10.18%20.22%20.92%19.67%23.87%
D_Greene 6.84%9.38%6.46%15.05%11.20%9.99%8.84%7.25%10.03%11.04%
D_King 1.62%3.34%2.04%4.31%0.83%0.79%2.08%1.19%2.35%2.24%
D_Levine 13.96%11.96%14.21%20.50%24.55%24.83%41.22%34.00%34.22%33.88%
D_Lundmark 0.46%0.47%0.33%1.26%0.28%0.41%1.24%0.53%1.58%0.91%
D_Wetherbee 0.76%0.66%0.43%1.94%0.36%0.33%0.90%0.57%1.15%1.03%
R_Moody 57.69%54.40%60.10%53.73%53.68%53.31%53.78%55.08%53.90%55.28%
R_White 42.33%45.63%39.83%46.26%46.06%46.69%46.18%44.94%46.02%44.63%
D_Shaw 76.42%74.97%80.12%59.28%80.84%82.74%66.05%78.69%65.34%67.89%
D_Torrens 23.57%25.08%19.90%40.72%19.16%17.25%34.01%21.27%34.60%32.00%
R_Caldwell 31.90%35.81%24.01%36.73%42.37%40.22%38.20%41.92%40.66%42.11%
R_Grimsley 16.70%30.51%25.11%32.77%27.39%31.08%34.76%30.92%34.15%31.11%
R_McCalister 7.91%15.43%11.20%15.92%20.93%16.56%16.27%16.94%14.63%16.69%
R_Troutman 43.41%18.25%39.09%14.58%8.46%11.85%10.59%9.87%10.47%9.68%
D_Fried 62.93%54.91%63.01%54.45%65.85%57.95%57.07%59.01%52.44%54.30%
D_Porter 20.56%19.28%15.78%19.74%14.49%18.43%15.86%16.92%20.24%18.83%
D_Walker 16.49%25.81%21.15%25.81%19.62%23.63%27.04%23.94%27.19%26.58%
R_De La Fuente 10.23%11.30%13.76%9.66%16.28%17.21%11.79%13.40%10.63%12.40%
R_Scott 89.70%88.69%86.08%90.32%83.48%82.64%88.14%86.52%89.33%87.48%
R_Beruff 23.96%19.03%24.85%17.45%15.17%7.97%4.71%6.71%4.19%6.66%
R_Rivera 3.38%2.73%3.80%3.23%4.57%3.52%1.93%2.17%2.00%2.97%
R_Rubio 67.37%72.47%64.29%70.85%69.70%80.09%90.92%86.01%91.88%84.98%
R_Young 5.17%5.56%6.52%8.43%9.80%8.09%2.38%4.95%1.92%5.15%
D_De La Fuente 3.36%4.07%4.71%16.91%3.48%5.49%21.33%7.50%25.49%13.16%
D_Grayson 11.29%43.04%10.34%46.55%10.14%10.28%11.27%11.16%10.29%11.17%
D_Keith 15.35%12.36%17.17%9.25%15.68%13.92%14.45%18.85%12.60%15.45%
D_Luster 18.18%2.60%2.15%1.30%1.99%3.02%1.67%1.70%2.05%1.43%
D_Murphy 51.70%37.81%65.32%25.94%68.49%67.16%50.86%60.38%49.37%58.18%
R_Adeshina 1.00%1.93%2.19%1.74%2.54%3.23%1.56%2.24%1.58%1.74%
R_Cuevas-Neunder7.10%10.27%13.78%12.08%13.93%16.59%12.98%14.43%12.30%14.83%
R_Scott 91.82%87.71%83.60%86.16%82.85%79.86%85.31%83.15%86.02%83.17%
D_Crist 70.51%81.59%84.23%76.66%79.62%85.35%73.67%76.16%77.33%77.27%
D_Rich 29.39%18.39%15.73%23.28%20.26%14.63%26.10%23.65%22.55%22.27%
D_Sheldon 58.74%48.19%61.25%61.64%35.94%44.72%69.45%59.92%60.88%65.48%
D_Thurston 41.22%51.82%38.66%38.35%64.02%55.28%30.18%39.96%38.96%33.94%
R_Mack 63.23%56.92%53.43%45.39%69.24%71.73%77.16%75.85%76.65%73.56%
R_McCalister 16.46%11.35%12.49%11.68%10.08%6.59%4.57%6.35%4.21%7.50%
R_Stuart 5.63%5.26%8.22%6.92%6.39%13.73%14.91%11.12%16.06%12.83%
R_Weldon 14.43%26.25%24.93%35.94%13.22%7.75%3.15%6.21%3.01%5.81%
D_Burkett 20.09%13.16%14.24%20.62%13.69%14.59%16.24%15.85%16.93%16.71%
D_Nelson 79.92%86.73%85.57%79.37%86.18%85.40%83.74%84.02%82.97%83.05%
2012
US Senate (REP)
US Senate (DEM)
2016
US Senate (REP)
US Senate (DEM)
2014
Governor (REP)
Governor (DEM)
Attorney General (DEM)
Governor (REP)
2018
Governor (DEM)
Attorney General (REP)
Attorney General (DEM)
Agriculture Commissioner (REP)
Agriculture Commissioner (DEM)
US Senate (REP) BILL: CS/SJR 100 Page 21
B. Amendments:
None.
This Senate Bill Analysis does not reflect the intent or official position of the bill’s introducer or the Florida Senate. 5 15 16 25 32 34 36 38 39 40
Plan S027S8058 BVAP41.62%37.48%33.20%12.77%46.15%50.07%6.23%13.01%5.40%8.23%
General Elections HVAP10.43%25.35%21.78%52.56%23.13%37.96%78.49%66.39%90.13%71.50%
D_Biden 60.46%65.93%68.01%58.69%75.13%78.01%49.58%53.23%39.91%44.58%
R_Trump 38.21%33.12%30.72%40.36%24.31%21.43%49.85%46.22%59.62%54.83%
D_Gillum 61.82%67.52%71.52%62.28%78.59%85.22%54.14%57.99%46.91%49.83%
R_DeSantis 37.24%31.46%27.34%36.34%20.80%14.11%44.54%41.08%51.71%49.00%
D_Shaw 58.02%63.91%66.61%59.18%77.45%83.59%52.77%56.79%45.47%48.24%
R_Moody 40.34%34.52%31.65%38.89%21.23%14.96%45.03%41.45%52.21%49.55%
D_Ring 59.38%65.96%70.03%61.67%78.50%85.21%53.58%57.43%46.53%49.27%
R_Patronis 40.62%34.04%29.98%38.32%21.50%14.78%46.42%42.58%53.46%50.73%
D_Fried 60.12%67.33%72.40%62.88%79.26%85.31%55.44%59.29%47.96%50.95%
R_Caldwell 39.89%32.67%27.59%37.11%20.74%14.69%44.58%40.71%52.03%49.04%
D_Nelson 60.67%67.05%71.22%60.89%79.18%84.80%54.84%59.19%47.38%51.15%
R_Scott 39.33%32.95%28.77%39.11%20.82%15.20%45.15%40.82%52.61%48.85%
D_Clinton 57.58%65.34%68.26%63.18%76.38%84.48%59.69%60.94%54.86%53.71%
R_Trump 39.25%31.48%28.01%33.59%21.75%13.94%37.91%36.50%42.88%43.49%
D_Murphy 49.36%60.34%64.47%56.29%74.63%79.47%48.89%52.71%43.17%45.19%
R_Rubio 47.15%35.74%31.14%39.63%23.43%18.44%48.93%45.14%54.88%52.44%
D_Crist 51.10%60.74%68.10%53.72%78.36%85.52%47.33%57.29%42.78%48.96%
R_Scott 44.72%34.73%26.90%41.21%19.46%12.98%50.29%40.23%54.86%48.01%
D_Sheldon 48.83%57.52%62.16%50.03%75.08%83.15%43.60%53.33%38.29%43.25%
R_Bondi 48.41%39.76%34.83%47.18%23.36%15.49%54.14%44.76%59.50%54.25%
D_Rankin 49.72%56.42%60.34%50.56%73.97%82.82%42.94%50.25%39.80%43.08%
R_Atwater 50.28%43.58%39.66%49.44%26.02%17.18%57.07%49.75%60.19%56.90%
D_Hamilton 52.86%56.35%59.77%48.97%75.08%83.42%43.13%51.30%39.21%43.38%
R_Putnam 47.14%43.65%40.23%51.03%24.93%16.57%56.85%48.70%60.76%56.61%
D_Obama 58.61%65.92%72.29%63.43%78.11%86.93%54.44%57.68%50.94%51.70%
R_Romney 40.60%33.37%26.69%35.78%21.43%12.78%45.05%41.82%48.65%47.69%
D_Nelson 62.25%69.71%75.23%67.79%79.68%86.78%55.87%59.92%52.52%53.42%
R_Mack 35.08%28.45%22.52%29.62%19.07%12.23%42.46%38.84%45.63%44.93%
President
2016
2014
2012
President
Governor
Attorney General
Chief Financial Officer
Agriculture Commissioner
US Senate
President
US Senate
US Senate
Governor
Attorney General
Chief Financial Officer
Agriculture Commissioner
2020
2018