STORAGE NAME : h6517c.JDC
DATE: 4/8/2025
Special Master’s Final Report
The Honorable Daniel Perez
Speaker, The Florida House of Representatives
Suite 420, The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
Re: HB 6517 - Representative Busatta
Relief/Jose Correa/Miami Dade County
SUMMARY
This is a settled claim for $4,100,000 by Jose Correa (“Mr. Correa”) against Miami-Dade County
(“the County”) for injuries and damages Mr. Correa suffered when a Miami-Dade County
passenger bus, driven by a Miami-Dade County employee, made a left-hand turn at an
intersection and struck Mr. Correa with its left-side mirror while he was in a crosswalk; the force
knocked Mr. Correa to the ground and, though the bus operator applied the brakes, the bus’s
back left tires ran over and dragged Mr. Correa’s left leg before coming to a stop. Mr. Correa
ultimately suffered a below-the-knee amputation and other related damages.
Mr. Correa and the County settled the claim for $4,300,000, and the County has since paid Mr.
Correa the $200,000 maximum authorized under Florida’s sovereign immunity law; as part of
the settlement agreement, the County agreed to support the passage of this claim bill. However,
the record reveals that the traffic homicide detective in charge of the crash investigation cited no
one for the crash, as he found both the County’s employee and Mr. Correa to be at fault; as for
the County employee, the detective found that she failed to look ahead in her direction of travel
while she turned the bus, while, as for Mr. Correa, the detective found that he entered the
crosswalk in violation of the pedestrian signal device’s directive not to walk, and that Mr. Correa
was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Thus, as set out in more detail below, the
undersigned recommends that HB 6517 be reported UNFAVORABLY.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Incident Overview
Shortly before noon on December 16, 2021, 60-year-old Jose Correa (“Mr. Correa”) set out to
walk from his home in Coral Gables, Florida to a nearby 7-Eleven convenience store, located on
Bird Road,
1
as he did nearly every day.
2
Upon leaving the 7-Eleven, Mr. Correa attempted to
1
Bird Road is an east/west divided seven-lane roadway in Coral Gables, Florida. It is straight, level, asphalt-paved,
and in traveled condition, with a posted speed limit of 40 miles per hour. On the date in question, the roadway was
dry and there were no obvious defects or obstructions. Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25, 2023).
2
Mr. Correa testified that he walked to the 7-Eleven nearly every day to purchase something for lunch, as he resided
in a one-room, studio-type dwelling without a kitchen. Claimant’s Exhibit 4, Deposition of Jose Correa (Apr. 20, 2023). STORAGE NAME : h6517c.JDC
DATE: 4/8/2025
return to his home along a route that took him to the intersection of Bird Road and Lejeune
Road
3
; this intersection is controlled by a series of traffic signal lights and has a marked
crosswalk controlled by a pedestrian signal device.
4
On that same date, Miami-Dade County (“the County”) bus operator Traci Constant (“Ms.
Constant”) drove a County passenger bus south along Lejeune Road, proceeding into the left
turn lane at the intersection of Lejeune Road and Bird Road in anticipation of turning eastbound
onto Bird Road.
5
While the controlling traffic light was green, Ms. Constant pulled the bus
forward past the stop bar on Lejeune Road, so that it was partially in the intersection, but was
unable to immediately complete the turn do to oncoming traffic; however, as the traffic light
changed to yellow, Ms. Constant started turning the bus onto Bird Road.
6
At the same time, Mr. Correa stepped into the crosswalk to cross Bird Road.
7
The record
reveals that, as Mr. Correa entered the crosswalk, the pedestrian signal device controlling the
crosswalk displayed a red hand, directing pedestrians not to cross at that time.
8
However, Mr.
Correa continued through the crosswalk; unfortunately, the bus driven by Ms. Constant also
continued forward along its route until the bus’s left side mirror struck Mr. Correa at
approximately 12:02 p.m., causing him to fall to the ground.
9
Ms. Constant testified that she did
not see Mr. Correa before the impact, but that she immediately tried to stop the bus upon
realizing that the bus had hit someone; unfortunately, the bus’s left rear tires rolled over Mr.
Correa’s left leg, dragging and pinching it until the bus came to a controlled stop in the inside
lane of Bird Road.
10
Coral Gables Fire Rescue responded to the scene and administered first aid to Mr. Correa,
ultimately transporting him to the emergency department at Jackson Memorial Hospital, where
the treating physicians discovered that Mr. Correa had a “near total left leg degloving” injury
from his “mid foot to upper thigh” and a left forearm laceration.
11
Ultimately, Mr. Correa
underwent multiple skin graft procedures before finally consenting to a below-the-knee
amputation of his left leg, after which he was discharged to Fountain Manor Rehabilitation
Center on April 15, 2022.
12
Mr. Correa remained at Fountain Manor for more than one year, until
his discharge to an assisted living facility, where he resides to this day.
13
Damages
At the time of the accident, Mr. Correa was unemployed and receiving Social Security Disability
benefits; thus, he is not claiming lost wages or lost future earnings.
14
However, Mr. Correa
3
Lejeune Road is a north/south, undivided, five-lane roadway in Coral Gables, Florida. It is straight, level, asphalt-
paved, and in traveled condition, with a posted speed limit of 40 miles per hour. On the date in question, the roadway
was dry and there were no obvious defects or obstructions. Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25,
2023).
4
Id.
5
At all times pertinent to the instant matter, Ms. Constant operated the bus at the direction of her employer, during
her scheduled shift, and along the route assigned to her by her employer. Id.; Claimant’s Exhibit 4, Deposition of
Traci Constant (Feb. 27, 2023); Claimant’s Exhibit 4, Deposition of Laticia Snipes (Feb. 28, 2023).
6
Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25, 2023); Claimant’s Exhibit 4, Deposition of Traci Constant
(Feb. 27, 2023).
7
Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25, 2023).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.; Claimant’s Exhibit 4, Deposition of Traci Constant (Feb. 27, 2023).
11
Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25, 2023); Claimant’s Exhibit 7, Coral Gables Fire Department
Patient Care Record (Dec. 16, 2021); Claimant’s Exhibit 7, Emergency Department Records (Dec. 16, 2021).
12
Claimant’s Exhibit 7, Jackson Health System Medical Records of Jose Correa (Aug. 8, 2022); Claimant’s Exhibit 7,
JMH Bills (Sept. 29, 2022); Claimant’s Exhibit 7, Fountain Manor Resident Account Details (Sept. 16, 2022).
13
At the Special Master hearing held in this matter, Mr. Correa testified that he continues to reside at the assisted
living facility as he feels he is unable to reside on his own without the assistance of a home health aide, which he
cannot presently afford; however, Mr. Correa also testified that he receives Medicaid benefits but has not explored
the possibility of obtaining a home health aide through Medicaid. Recording of the Special Master Hearing (Jan. 30,
2025).
14
According to the testimony presented at the Special Master Hearing held in this matter, Mr. Correa received, and
continues to receive, Social Security Disability benefits due to either a Bipolar Disorder or schizophrenia diagnosis. STORAGE NAME : h6517c.JDC
DATE: 4/8/2025
testified that Medicaid has a lien for past accident-related medical expenses against any
recovery he might receive, totaling approximately $339,000, and he also presented a summary
of his estimated future economic losses prepared by an economist; according to this summary,
Mr. Correa can, over the course of his remaining life,
15
expect to spend approximately
$3,917,544
16
for future accident-related medical and living costs and $133,717 for future
services necessitated by the accident, for a total economic loss of $4,051,261.
Mr. Correa also testified to non-economic damages, including persistent pain in his left leg for
which he takes pain medication.
17
According to his testimony, Mr. Correa struggles with his
balance and is always worried about falling, which has made simple tasks like getting out of bed
or bathing a challenge; he also has PTSD and suffers nightmares.
18
Further, Mr. Correa testified
that, although he was once a very active figure in the lives of his sister’s children, he is no
longer able to participate in many of the family activities that he used to enjoy due to his
accident-related physical limitations; he is, according to his testimony, also unable to enjoy
camping, biking, sports, and other activities with which he used to fill his days.
19
Indeed, Mr.
Correa’s sister testified that Mr. Correa, whom she described as very independent and active
before the accident, is not the same person now that he was before.
20
Traffic Investigation
Following the accident, Coral Gables Police Department officers quickly responded to and
cordoned off the scene; the Miami-Dade Police Department also sent Detective Michael
Quinones (“Det. Quinones”) to the scene to begin a traffic homicide investigation in case Mr.
Correa succumbed to his injuries.
21
As part of this investigation, Det. Quinones observed the
pedestrian signal controlling the crosswalk in which the bus struck Mr. Correa; according to his
testimony, this pedestrian signal worked properly on December 16, 2021, cycling between a
white humanoid figure (directing pedestrians to walk) and a red hand (directing pedestrians not
to walk).
22
Det. Quinones also concluded, after a review of the evidence, that Mr. Correa had
entered the marked crosswalk when the pedestrian signal displayed the red hand, violating the
signal’s directive not to walk.
23
Det. Quinones also interviewed Coral Gables Police Department Traffic Homicide Detective
Danny Smith (Det. Smith), who responded to the accident shortly after the bus struck Mr.
Correa.
24
According to Det. Smith, he saw Mr. Correa at the 7-Eleven on December 16, 2021,
just a few minutes before the accident; indeed, Det. Smith stated that he had seen Mr. Correa at
the 7-Eleven before, as they both frequented the store.
25
However, on this particular day, while
Det. Smith was already inside the 7-Eleven, Mr. Correa entered the store and drew Dr. Smith’s
attention; Det. Smith then watched as Mr. Correa proceeded to the coolers in the back and,
apparently not finding what he was looking for, approached the store’s owner, after which the
owner handed Mr. Correa four cans of beer.
26
Det. Smith stated that, in watching Mr. Correa, he
Mr. Correa testified to a Bipolar Disorder diagnosis, while a schizophrenia diagnosis is noted in Mr. Correa’s medical
records. Recording of the Special Master Hearing (Jan. 30, 2025).
15
According to the record, Mr. Correa had an estimated life expectancy of 18.9 years as of May 30, 2023. Claimant’s
Exhibit 8, Report by Gary A. Anderson, Ph.D., Summary of the Past and Present Value of Future Economic Loss to
Jose Correa (May 30, 2023).
16
Note that approximately $271,180 of this amount is for “incremental residence expenditures,” while $82,490 is for
“home modifications.” However, the record reveals that Mr. Correa does not presently own a home. Further, although
the Life Care Plan which Mr. Correa presented at the hearing held in this matter calls for Mr. Correa’s purchase of a
three-bedroom, two-bathroom home, the record reveals that Mr. Correa did not own a home before the accident, and
that he instead rented a studio-style room, as described above; the necessity for the lifestyle upgrade is unclear. Id.;
Claimant’s Exhibit 8, Continuum of Care for Jose Correa (Oct. 16, 2023).
17
Recording of the Special Master Hearing (Jan. 30, 2025).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Claimant’s Exhibit 4, Deposition of Detective Michael Quinones (Aug. 10, 2023).
22
Id.
23
Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25, 2023).
24
Respondent’s Exhibit 1, Statement of Detective Danny Smith (Dec. 16, 2021).
25
Id.
26
Id. STORAGE NAME : h6517c.JDC
DATE: 4/8/2025
observed that Mr. Correa exhibited a “noticeable sway” and was having difficulties standing
upright; Det. Smith also stated that he identified immediately that Mr. Correa was intoxicated.
27
At that point, Det. Smith said, he told the store’s owner that if Mr. Correa was driving, the owner
was not to sell Mr. Correa beer.
28
However, the owner apparently told Det. Smith that Mr.
Correa always walks to the store, after which Det. Smith informed him that if Mr. Correa were to
try to get into a car, he would not allow him to drive away and reiterated that the owner should
not sell him beer if he was driving.
29
When the store’s owner again insisted that Mr. Correa
always walks to the 7-Eleven, Det. Smith then relented on the issue of the sale but indicated
that he was going to follow Mr. Correa out of the store to ensure that he did not attempt to
drive.
30
At that point, according to Det. Smith, Mr. Correa paid for his beers and then exited the
store; Det. Smith stated that he immediately thereafter walked to the store’s exit and watched
until Mr. Correa walked off of the store’s property, ensuring that he did not at any point attempt
to get into a vehicle.
31
Within minutes, Det. Smith stated, he was dispatched to the crash
involving Mr. Correa and the bus, and he confirmed to Det. Quinones that an unopened beer
can photographed at the scene of the accident was the same kind of beer that he had just seen
Mr. Correa purchase at the 7-Eleven.
32
Thus, Det. Quinones concluded that Mr. Correa had
been, in the minutes before the accident, “extremely intoxicated”; he also noted that Mr.
Correa’s sister, with whom he spoke that afternoon, acknowledged that Mr. Correa was an
alcoholic who was known to walk to the 7-Eleven to purchase beer.
33
After reviewing the remaining evidence and taking additional statements, Det. Quinones
determined that the factors which contributed to the crash included Mr. Correa’s violation of the
pedestrian signal’s directive and his intoxication; Det. Quinones also considered Ms. Constant’s
failure to notice Mr. Correa in the crosswalk to be a contributing factor but did not, apparently,
take any issue with the turn itself.
34
Ultimately, Det. Quinones issued no charges or citations to
either Ms. Constant or Mr. Correa, categorizing the crash as an accident and finding that both
Ms. Constant and Mr. Correa had fault.
35
Litigation
On July 21, 2022, Mr. Correa filed a lawsuit against the County in connection to the crash,
alleging that the County was negligent through the actions of its employee, Ms. Constant.
36
On
September 8, 2022, the County filed an answer to Mr. Correa’s lawsuit; therein, the County
raised as affirmative defenses the arguments that:
Section 768.36, F.S., barred Mr. Correa from recovering damages, as he was
intoxicated at the time of the crash and that, because of such intoxication, Mr. Correa
was more than 50 percent at fault for his own harm; and
Mr. Correa’s injuries and damages were primarily caused by his own negligence such
that his recoverable damages should be reduced or barred entirely under the
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.; the photograph in question is part of Claimant’s Exhibit 2 (Photo 2252).
33
The undersigned acknowledges that at no point in his investigation did Det. Quinones speak to Mr. Correa directly,
as Coral Gables Fire Rescue had already removed Mr. Correa from the scene when Det. Quinones arrived.
Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25, 2023); Claimant’s Exhibit 4, Deposition of Detective Michael
Quinones (Aug. 10, 2023).
34
The other factors which Det. Quinones considered were the time of occurrence (daytime); the weather (warm,
clear, and dry); the roadway’s condition (free of obvious defects or obstructions); the traffic control devices
(functional); the bus’s condition (good operating condition with no obvious defects); and Ms. Constant’s condition (no
obvious impairments). Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25, 2023); Claimant’s Exhibit 4, Deposition
of Detective Michael Quinones (Aug. 10, 2023).
35
Ms. Constant did receive a ten-day suspension as part of the County’s own investigation into the crash due to her
violation of Miami-Dade Transit Authority bus operator policies requiring bus operators to generally treat yellow lights
as red lights, to not pull up past the stop bar, and to yield to pedestrians. Id.; Claimant’s Exhibit 6, Central Division
Disciplinary Action Report (Jan. 13, 2022); Claimant’s Exhibit 4, Deposition of Laticia Snipes (Feb. 28, 2023).
36
Claimants Exhibit 9, Complaint (July 21, 2022). STORAGE NAME : h6517c.JDC
DATE: 4/8/2025
comparative negligence doctrine.
37
However, the County ultimately agreed to settle the lawsuit with Mr. Correa for $4,300,000, after
which the County paid the $200,000 it was statutorily authorized to pay under Florida’s
sovereign immunity law, codified in s. 768.28, F.S.; as part of this settlement, the County agreed
to support a claim bill through which Mr. Correa could recover the excess settlement amount.
38
This leaves in question the remaining settlement balance of $4,100,000.
Special Master Hearing
On January 28, 2025, the undersigned conducted a joint Special Master Hearing with the
Senate’s appointed Special Master.
39
During this hearing, the undersigned questioned Mr.
Correa about his reason for violating the pedestrian signal’s directive not to walk. In response,
Mr. Correa testified that he entered the crosswalk in violation of the pedestrian’s signal’s
directive as the pedestrian signal was not working on the date of the accident and in fact had
never worked in the years since he had lived in the area, as, according to Mr. Correa, it always
displayed the red hand (directing pedestrians not to walk); however, as mentioned above, Det.
Quinones’s investigation revealed that the pedestrian signal functioned properly on the date of
the accident, cycling with the traffic lights.
40
Additionally, the testimony presented at the hearing suggested that Mr. Correa had walked to
the 7-Eleven to buy a salad for his lunch; however, Det. Smith stated to Det. Quinones that he
observed Mr. Correa buying not a salad but four cans of beer, one of which the investigating
officers recovered and photographed at the scene and which Det. Smith later identified as being
of the type he saw Mr. Correa purchase.
41
This discrepancy was never explained. Mr. Correa
also testified that he had not consumed alcohol on the date of the accident, and denied being
intoxicated when the crash occurred; however, this contradicts the observations of Det. Smith,
who, in his own words, “immediately identified” that Mr. Correa was intoxicated while at the 7-
Eleven.
42
In an attempt to clear up this matter, the undersigned requested that Mr. Correa provide the
Special Masters with documentation showing Mr. Correa’s blood alcohol content at the time of
his admission to Jackson Memorial Hospital’s emergency department; however, Mr. Correa’s
counsel informed the undersigned that he requested such a document many times but did not
receive it, and now believes that the hospital never tested Mr. Correa’s blood alcohol content.
Thus, Mr. Correa’s medical records are of no use in determining whether Mr. Correa was
intoxicated or not at the time of the crash.
Mr. Correa’s counsel also made much of the Coral Gables Fire Department’s Patient Care
Record created in connection to Mr. Correa’s emergency medical treatment at the scene of the
crash and his transportation to Jackson Memorial Hospital; therein, in the field in which alcohol
consumption is to be noted, the Patient Care Record states “alcohol reported: none.”
43
However, this notation indicates nothing more than what it states: that no one reported to Coral
Gables Fire Department’s EMTs that Mr. Correa had consumed alcohol; this is not surprising,
as the Patient Care Record also indicates that Mr. Correa was initially unconscious when the
EMTs first arrived on the scene, and that as he started to regain consciousness in the
37
Claimant’s Exhibit 9, Miami-Dade County’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint (Sept. 8, 2022).
38
As evidence of the settlement, the parties provided only a release signed by the Claimant to memorialize their
agreement; the undersigned, in conjunction with the Senate’s Special Master, requested but never received a copy of
a settlement agreement signed by both parties. However, there is sufficient evidence in the record for the
undersigned to believe that the matter was settled; it is only the exact terms of the settlement that remain unclear.
Claimant’s Settlement Documents (Unnumbered Exhibit), Release (March 25, 2024).
39
Recording of the Special Master Hearing (Jan. 30, 2025).
40
Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25, 2023); Claimant’s Exhibit 4, Deposition of Detective Michael
Quinones (Aug. 10, 2023).
41
Respondent’s Exhibit 1, Statement of Detective Danny Smith (Dec. 16, 2021).
42
Id.
43
Claimant’s Exhibit 7, Coral Gables Fire Department Patient Care Record (Dec. 16, 2021). STORAGE NAME : h6517c.JDC
DATE: 4/8/2025
ambulance on the way to the hospital he was in shock and confused.
44
Indeed, the Patient Care
Record includes so little information, other than the nature of the accident and the treatment
rendered, that it does not even include Mr. Correa’s name; where his name should be, the
relevant fields say “unable to obtain.”
45
Thus, the Patient Care Record is also of no use in
determining whether or not Mr. Correa was intoxicated at the time of the crash.
On the issue of Mr. Correa’s alleged intoxication, then, all that the undersigned is left with is the
statement of Mr. Correa that he was not intoxicated at the time of the crash, and the statement
of Det. Smith that he was.
46
However, certain other evidence in the record seemingly
corroborates at least that portion of Det. Smith’s statement that he observed Mr. Correa
purchasing beer – that is, the unopened beer can photographed at the scene, which Det. Smith
identified as being of the type he observed Mr. Correa purchasing at the 7-Eleven minutes
before the crash, and the statement of Mr. Correa’s sister to Det. Quinones that Mr. Correa was
an alcoholic who often walked to the 7-Eleven to purchase beer.
Finally, during the hearing, the undersigned asked Mr. Correa about a certain note that appears
frequently in his medical records – that is, a note indicating that Mr. Correa had a history of
alcohol use disorder; indeed, as previously mentioned, Mr. Correa’s sister asserted as much in
her statement to Det. Quinones after the crash.
47
Mr. Correa also testified at the Special Master
hearing to a prior conviction for Driving Under the Influence, and the record reveals that he had
his driver license permanently revoked.
48
However, Mr. Correa denied having a history of
alcohol use disorder or knowing how a note indicating otherwise came to be in his medical
records.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
House Rule 5.6(b)
Pursuant to House Rule 5.6(b), settlement agreements are not binding on the Special Master or
the House or any of its committees of reference. Thus, each claim is heard de novo, and the
claimant has the burden to prove each element of the claim by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Negligence
In the instant matter, Mr. Correa raises a negligence claim, the elements of which are duty,
breach, causation, and damages. Mr. Correa further asserts that the County is negligent
through the actions of its employee, Ms. Constant, under the respondeat superior doctrine.
Duty
For a defendant to be liable for negligence, there must be either an underlying statutory or
common law duty of care with respect to the conduct at issue; this is true whether the defendant
is an individual, a private business, or a government entity.
49
For purposes of a negligence
claim, a legal duty exists if a defendant's conduct creates a foreseeable zone of risk that poses
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Curiously, Det. Smith’s statement was not included in the exhibits produced in response to the Special Masters’
request that the parties produce all materials relevant to the claim ahead of the Special Master hearing; indeed, it was
only after the undersigned started asking questions about a reference to the statement in the Traffic Homicide Report
that counsel for the County produced a recording of the statement. It then came to light that, for reasons unknown to
the undersigned, counsel for Mr. Correa and for the County had agreed not to introduce this recording into evidence.
47
Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25, 2023); Claimant’s Exhibit 7, Jackson Health System Medical
Records of Jose Correa (Aug. 8, 2022).
48
According to Mr. Correa’s testimony, this conviction occurred in the late 1980s. It is unclear from the record
whether the revocation of his driver license occurred in connection with this conviction (Mr. Correa testified in his
deposition that it may have had to do with a bad traffic crash, which may or may not have been related). However, the
record does show that the last driver license issued to Mr. Correa had a 1990 expiration date. Claimant’s Exhibit 4,
Deposition of Jose Correa (Apr. 20, 2023); Claimant’s Exhibit 3, Traffic Homicide Report (Jan. 25, 2023).
49
Trianon Park v. Condo Assoc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985). STORAGE NAME : h6517c.JDC
DATE: 4/8/2025
a general threat of harm to others; more specifically, in the case of a motor vehicle’s operation,
a motorist has a duty to use reasonable care on the roadways to avoid accidents, including by
entering intersections only after determining that it is safe to do so under prevailing conditions.
50
In the instant matter, the record shows that Ms. Constant undertook to operate a passenger bus
on the roadways of Coral Gables, Florida. In doing so, Ms. Constant owed a duty of care to
persons on or in the roadways, including Mr. Correa, to operate the bus in such a way as to
avoid accidents. Thus, the undersigned finds that the first element of negligence is proven.
Breach
The existence of a duty of care is alone insufficient to sustain a negligence claim.
51
Once the
existence of a duty has been established, it merely “opens the courthouse doors”; a plaintiff
must still prove the remaining elements of negligence, the next of which is a breach of the duty
of care.
52
In the instant matter, Ms. Constant testified that she pulled forward past the stop bar in
anticipation of turning, and that, as the light turned yellow, she had to complete the turn so as to
clear the intersection; according to Det. Quinones’s testimony, she did indeed have to complete
the turn, and he did not cite her for this decision.
53
However, Ms. Constant further testified that,
as she made the turn, she was looking towards oncoming traffic rather than ahead of her in her
direction of travel; because of this, Ms. Constant did not see Mr. Correa in the crosswalk before
the bus struck him, and the undersigned finds that Ms. Constant failed to use reasonable care in
operating the bus in such a way as to avoid accidents. Thus, the undersigned finds that Ms.
Constant breached the duty of care she owed to Mr. Correa.
Causation
Once a duty and a breach thereof are established, causation must be determined. In making
this determination, Florida courts follow the “more likely than not” standard, requiring proof that
the negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, which in turn requires the factfinder to
analyze whether the injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the danger created by
the defendant’s negligent conduct.
54
In the instant matter, Mr. Correa suffered a degloving injury when the bus’s left rear tires ran
over his leg, dragging and pinching it until the bus came to a stop; Mr. Correa ultimately had his
leg amputated below the knee, and underwent many related skin grafts and other treatments.
The undersigned find that such an injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
danger created by Ms. Constant’s negligent conduct – that is, the danger of injury to a
pedestrian struck by a passenger bus – and thus, the undersigned finds that Ms. Constant’s
negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Damages
To sustain a negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove actual loss or damages resulting from the
injury, and the amount awarded must be precisely commensurate with the injury suffered.
55
Actual damages may be “economic damages” (that is, financial losses that would not have
occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, such as lost wages and costs of
medical care) or “non-economic damages” (that is, nonfinancial losses that would not have
50
Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 2007), citing Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So. 2d 619, 621 (Fla. 1959) and
Nelson v. Ziegler, 89 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1956).
51
Whitt v. Silverman, 788 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2001).
52
Id. at 221.
53
The undersigned acknowledges that this conduct may have violated Miami-Dade County’s internal policies and
procedures; however, the courts have found that internal policies and procedures do not, by themselves, establish a
negligence standard, the violation of which necessarily constitutes a breach of a legal duty of care. Metropolitan Dade
County v. Zapata, 601 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
54
Gooding v University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984); Ruiz v. Tenet Hialeah Healthsystem, Inc., 260
So. 3d 977 (Fla. 2018).
55
McKinley v. Gualtieri, 338 So. 3d 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022); Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64 (1876). STORAGE NAME : h6517c.JDC
DATE: 4/8/2025
occurred but for the injury giving rise to the cause of action, such as pain and suffering, physical
impairment, and other nonfinancial losses authorized under general law).
56
In the instant matter, Mr. Correa presented evidence that he suffered a total economic loss of
$4,051,261. While the undersigned is uncertain whether such a dollar value is precisely
commensurate with his injury,
57
the undersigned finds that Mr. Correa did prove some economic
loss connected to the accident, which includes the cost of future accident-related medical care
and living expenses and future services necessitated by his accident-related injuries. Mr. Correa
also presented evidence that he suffered non-economic damages, including pain and suffering,
PTSD, nightmares, and a reduced quality of life. Thus, the undersigned finds that Mr. Correa
suffered actual damages as a result of Ms. Constant’s negligence.
Respondeat Superior
Under the common law respondeat superior doctrine, an employer is liable for the negligence of
its employee when:
The individual was an employee when the negligence occurred;
The employee was acting within the course and scope of his or her employment; and
The employee’s activities were of a benefit to the employer.
58
For conduct to be considered within the course and scope of the employee’s employment, such
conduct must have:
Been of the kind for which the employee was employed to perform;
Occurred within the time and space limits of his employment; and
Been due at least in part to a purpose serving the employment.
59
In the instant matter, the record reveals that the County employed Ms. Constant as a bus
operator on December 16, 2021. The record further reveals that Ms. Constant’s operation of the
passenger bus which struck Mr. Correa was conduct which she was employed to perform, that
she drove the bus within the time and space limits of her employment, and that the bus’s
operation was due at least in part to a purpose serving her employment; in other words, the
record reveals that Ms. Constant was acting within the course and scope of her employment
with the County when the accident occurred. Finally, the record reveals that Ms. Constant’s
operation of the bus benefitted her employer. Thus, the undersigned finds that the County is
liable for any negligence attributable to Ms. Constant through the respondeat superior doctrine.
Affirmative Defenses
The question of the County’s liability does not stop with an analysis of Ms. Constant’s
negligence; instead, the undersigned must also consider the affirmative defenses the County
would have raised had the matter gone to trial – namely, that:
Section 768.36, F.S., barred Mr. Correa’s damages claim, as he was intoxicated at the
time of the crash and that, because of such intoxication, Mr. Correa was more than 50
percent at fault for his own harm; and
Mr. Correa’s injuries and damages were primarily caused by his own negligence such
that his recoverable damages should be reduced or barred entirely under the
comparative negligence doctrine.
Intoxication Defense
56
FLJUR MEDMALP § 107.
57
This uncertainty stems in part from the increased standard of living which the economic analysis and Life Care Plan
apparently call for, the necessity of which is unclear, and Mr. Correa’s receipt of uninterrupted Social Security
Disability and Medicaid benefits that cover his living and medical expenses.
58
Iglesia Cristiana La Casa Del Senor, Inc. v. L.M., 783 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
59
Spencer v. Assurance Co. of Am., 39 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994) (applying Florida law). STORAGE NAME : h6517c.JDC
DATE: 4/8/2025
Section 768.36, F.S., provides that, in any civil action, a plaintiff may not recover any damages
for loss or injury to his or her person or property if the trier of fact finds that, at the time the
plaintiff was injured:
The plaintiff was under the influence of any alcoholic beverage or drug to the extent that
the plaintiff’s normal faculties were impaired or the plaintiff had a blood or breath alcohol
level of 0.08 percent or higher; and
As a result of the influence of such alcoholic beverage or drug the plaintiff was more
than 50 percent at fault for his or her own harm.
In the instant matter, the record is clear that, due to the parties’ decision to settle this matter
rather than proceed to trial, neither a court nor a jury ever considered whether the County had a
valid intoxication defense under s. 768.36, F.S., such that would bar Mr. Correa’s claim for
damages. However, the undersigned notes that the record contains evidence of Mr. Correa’s
intoxication in the form of Det. Smith’s observations that Mr. Correa was so intoxicated before
the accident that he had a “noticeable sway” and would not have been permitted to drive had he
attempted to do so. Further, the undersigned also notes that Det. Quinones determined that
both Ms. Constant and Mr. Correa were at fault in the accident, and that Mr. Correa’s fault
came, in part, from his intoxication. Thus, the undersigned finds that a court or jury could
reasonably have concluded that Mr. Correa was under the influence of alcohol such that his
normal faculties were impaired and that, as a result of this impairment, Mr. Correa was at least
50 percent at fault for his own harm; upon reaching such a conclusion, the court or jury could
then have barred Mr. Correa from recovering any damages from the County.
Comparative Negligence
Negligence liability in Florida is governed by the “comparative negligence doctrine;” under this
doctrine, as it stands today, a defendant sued for negligence can generally diminish or even
eliminate his or her liability to the plaintiff based on the comparative fault of others, including the
plaintiff.
60
Specifically, under current s. 768.81, F.S., in an ordinary negligence action, a jury
determines each party’s percentage of fault and, where a party’s percentage of fault is 50
percent or less, he or she may recover damages commensurate with such percentage;
meanwhile, any party found to be greater than 50 percent at fault for his or her own harm may
not recover any damages.
61
In 2021, however, the comparative negligence doctrine instead
allowed the court, after a jury determined each party’s percentage of fault, to apportion
damages according to each party’s respective fault regardless of any party’s specific degree of
culpability.
62
In the instant matter, the record is clear that no jury ever determined Mr. Correa’s percentage of
fault in the accident as the parties chose to settle the matter before it went to trial. However, the
record is also clear that Det. Quinones determined that both Ms. Constant and Mr. Correa were
at fault for the accident; in reaching this determination, Det. Quinones attributed one contributing
factor to Ms. Constant (that is, that she was not looking ahead as she drove forward and thus
did not see Mr. Correa before the bus struck him) and attributed two contributing factors to Mr.
Correa (that is, that he violated the pedestrian signal’s directive not to walk, and that he was
intoxicated). While the undersigned will not presume to assign a percentage of fault to either Mr.
Correa or Ms. Constant, the undersigned finds that a jury could reasonably have concluded that
Mr. Correa was at least 50 percent at fault for his own harm and reduced the damages award to
which he was entitled accordingly.
60
Birge v. Charron, 107 So. 3d 350 (Fla. 2012).
61
For example, under current law, if the plaintiff in a negligence suit is found to be 40 percent at fault for his or her
own harm and the defendant is found to be 60 percent at fault for the plaintiff’s harm, the plaintiff may recover 60
percent of his or her damages from the defendant. However, if those numbers are reversed, such that the plaintiff is
found to be 60 percent at fault for his or her own harm and the defendant is found to be 40 percent at fault for the
plaintiff’s harm, the plaintiff recovers nothing. S. 768.81, F.S. (2025).
62
For example, in 2021, if the plaintiff in a negligence suit was found to be 40 percent at fault for his or her own harm
and the defendant was found to be 60 percent at fault, the plaintiff could recover 60 percent of his or her damages
from the defendant. However, if those numbers were reversed, such that the plaintiff was found to be 60 percent at
fault for his or her own harm and the defendant was found to be 40 percent at fault for the plaintiff’s harm, the plaintiff
could recover 40 percent of his or her damages from the defendant. S. 768.81, F.S. (2021). STORAGE NAME : h6517c.JDC
DATE: 4/8/2025
Preponderance of the Evidence
As stated above, Mr. Correa had the burden to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the
evidence.” This legal standard, which is, traditionally, the burden of proof applicable in most civil
lawsuits, requires the plaintiff to prove that the allegations he or she raises are more likely than
not to be true (in other words, that there is a greater than 50 percent chance of veracity).
63
In the instant matter, the undersigned finds that Mr. Correa proved that the County was
negligent through the actions of its employee, Ms. Constant. However, the undersigned also
finds that questions remain as to whether or not Mr. Correa’s damages should be reduced to
reflect his own degree of comparative negligence, and as to whether or not his claim for
damages should be entirely barred due a valid intoxication defense. Thus, the undersigned finds
that Mr. Correa has not proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to the
$4,100,000 settlement balance requested in the claim bill.
POSITIONS OF CLAIMANT AND RESPONDENT
Claimant’s Position: The Claimant asserts that the County was negligent through the actions
of its employee, Ms. Constant, and that, thus, he is entitled to the $4,100,000 remaining
settlement balance.
County’s Position: The County settled this matter for $4,300,000 and has paid $200,000 of
this amount to Mr. Correa. As part of the settlement agreement, the County agreed to support
the passage of a claim bill awarding the remaining $4,100,000 settlement balance to Mr.
Correa. However, counsel for the County indicated during the Special Master hearing held in
this matter that, had the matter proceeded to trial, the County would have raised the two
affirmative defenses discussed in detail above.
ATTORNEY AND LOBBYING FEES
Pursuant to the terms of the claim bill, the amount paid for both attorney and lobbying fees may
not exceed 25 percent of the amount awarded. Thus, attorney and lobbying fees may not jointly
exceed $1,025,000.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that HB 6517, as currently written, be
reported UNFAVORABLY. Should the claim bill pass, the undersigned also recommends that
any money awarded to Mr. Correa in connection with this claim bill be placed into a trust for Mr.
Correa’s benefit rather than awarded to him directly.
Respectfully submitted,
CAITLIN R. MAWN
House Special Master
63
South Florida Water Management Dist. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC, 139 So.3d 869 (Fla. 2014).