THE FLORIDA SENATE
SPECIAL MASTER ON CLAIM BILLS
Location
409 The Capitol
Mailing Address
404 South Monroe Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1100
(850) 487-5229
DATE COMM ACTION
03/27/2025 SM Favorable
JU
AHS
AP
March 27, 2025
The Honorable Ben Albritton
President, The Florida Senate
Suite 409, The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1100
Re: SB 12 – Senator Gruters
HB 6511 – Representative Busatta
Relief of L.P. by the Department of Children and Families
SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT
THIS IS A CLAIM FOR $28 MILLION BASED ON A JURY
VERDICT AGAINST THE DEP ARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES (“DEPARTMENT”) FOR INJURIES AND
DAMAGES ARISI NG FROM THE DEPARTMENT’S
NEGLIGENCE THAT RESULTED IN L.P.’S MOTHER
STABBING HER 14 TIMES ON JUNE 26, 2015.
Background
L.P. is the biological daughter of Ashely Parker.
1
The two
lived together in Sarasota in a home owned by Ms. Parker’s
mother, Valerie Carey (V.D.C), up until June 26, 2015.
Records indicate that L.P. does not have a relationship with
her biological father.
2
V.D.C. and Sidney Carey (S.C.),
V.D.C.’s husband, adopted L.X.C. with a name change from
L.X.P. to L.X.C. on March 30, 2017.
3
L.P. is 15 years old and lives with her adoptive parents, her
grandparents, where she enjoys living. She is in 9
th
grade and
1
Claim Bill Hearing 2:28:30-2:28:57 (Jan. 31, 2025) (hereinafter referred to as “Hearing”).
2
Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 110, Shahnasarian, M. Vocational Rehabilitation Evaluation of L.X.C., 12 (Aug. 30, 2021)
(hereinafter referred to as “Evaluation”).
3
Hearing at 4:52:47-4:52:50; Evaluation at 9. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 2
attends high school.
4
After school, she practices gymnastics
and attends therapy every Monday.
5
On the weekends, she
hangs out with her friends. She wants to attend the University
of South Florida (USF) and become a marine biologist.
6
History of Interactions with Police Department
V.D.C. denied any knowledge of Ms. Parker having a juvenile
record. However, she testified that Ms. Parker got into a fight
with S.C. and V.D.C. called the police. She does not recall
how old Ms. Parker was when the incident occurred. She also
testified about a fight that happened at school.
7
March 9, 2015: Ms. Parker contacted Sarasota Police
Department (SPD) alleging that her ex-boyfriend, Mr.
Mattson, wanted her dead and was trying to kill her. She
reported not knowing why or how he was going to hurt her but
suggested that Parker (sic) cuts her brakes on her truck every
night. SPD saw no evidence of any signs that Ms. Parker’s
brakes had been cut and advised her to call 911 if Mattson
came over. No action was taken.
8
March 11, 2009: Ms. Parker was charged with making a false
report to the law enforcement authorities which she pled guilty
to on March 3, 2010.
9
March 11, 2009: Ms. Parker was charged with neglect of a
child-with great harm, a second-degree felony. On February
16, 2010, Ms. Parker entered into a plea agreement and was
given five (5) years of probation.
10
September 14, 2009: Ms. Parker was charged with four (4)
counts of making false reports of commission of crime which
she pled guilty to on March 3, 2010.
11
4
Hearing at 1:58:00-2:06:24.
5
Id. at 5:34:00-5:34:35.
6
Id. at 1:58:00-2:06:24.
7
Id. at 4:56:30-4:59:48.
8
Department’s Composite Exhibit, Callouts to AP’s home (unredacted), 5 (June 26, 2015) (hereinafter referred to
as “Callouts”).
9
State of Florida v. Ashley Yvonne Parker, case no. 2009MM012141 (Mar. 3, 2010).
10
Lopez T-IV 1065: 19-20; State of Florida v. Ashley Yvonne Parker, 2009CF003576 (Mar. 11, 2009). The
Department reports that an investigation was conducted in connection with this case. The child victim was a foster
child who was placed with Ms. Parker before L.P. was born. The case closed with “Some Indicators of Inadequate
Supervision and Some Indicators of Threatened Harm.”
11
State of Florida v. Ashley Yvonne Parker, case no. 2009MM013313 (Sept. 14, 2009). SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 3
March 26, 2015: Ms. Parker contacted SPD alleging that
someone was threatening to kidnap her and L.P. Ms. Parker
reported hearing a “suspicious noise” near her home.
12
April 17, 2015: Ms. Parker sent a suicide note to SPD. Officer
Luciano spoke with Ms. Parker and V.D.C. at Ms. Parker’s
home and both denied that Ms. Parker was suicidal. Ms.
Parker denied writing any such note. Ms. Parker was highly
agitated and expressed that she was “scared of police.”
V.D.C. declined to give her name or any other information.
13
May 13, 2015: SPD responded to Ms. Parker’s home at 11:21
p.m. where she reported that she could not come outside due
to a man holding a gun to her head which SPD noted that
“clearly there was no one around her.” Ms. Parker exited the
home and began making statements, for instance, that people
were going to kill her and that her cousin had sent her a video
of her daughter, L.P., being molested. SPD took Ms. Parker
into custody under a Baker Act and transported her to
Sarasota Memorial Hospital for evaluation. SPD spoke to L.P.
who appeared fine and not in any distress or danger. Based
on this limited observation, the SDP determined that, “It did
not appear the allegations of L.P. being molested to be true
due to the deranged state Parker was in when she alleged
such.”
14
There was no corresponding abuse report made on
this date.
Note: Ms. Parker was evaluated at Sarasota Memorial
Hospital which resulted in clinical impressions/a problem list
of psychosis and medical clearance. Ms. Parker’s disposition
was reported as stable, and her status was reported as
transfer. She was transported to Coastal for psychiatric
evaluation. The evaluation determined that there was no
psychosis present, and she was discharged by 9:00 a.m. on
May 14, 2015, less than ten hours after arrival.
15
12
Claimant’s Exhibit 13, 15-015709 Incident Report, 2 (Mar. 26, 2015).
13
Callouts at 9.
14
Claimant’s Exhibit 16, 15-024631 Incident Report, 3 (May 13, 2015).
15
Department’s Exhibit 9, Coastal Behavioral Healthcare (May 14, 2015). Ms. Parker was Baker Acted once
before this Baker Act in May 2015 because of her fight with S.C. She was in a facility for months. Ms. Parker was
a teenager living with V.D.C. in Bradenton. V.D.C. testified that Ms. Parker was Baker Acted a total of two times.
Hearing at 4:56:55-5:59:48. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 4
May 15, 2015: SPD attempted to contact Ms. Parker at her
home in Sarasota, in reference to a suspicious incident but no
one was home.
16
May 29, 2015: Ms. Parker walked into SPD to report multiple
suspicious incidents over a span of several months. Officers
asked her if the threats/harassment calls had been previously
reported and Ms. Parker confirmed that she had. SPD asked
Ms. Parker to write a statement. The officer noted that there
were reports in March, April, and May and she was Baker
Acted on May 13, 2015 (reference case number: 15-024631).
SPD described her statement as “piece meal and some claims
appeared to reveal her to be of special interest.”
Ms. Parker prepared a lengthy five-and-a-half page written
statement that, in part, made allegations against the police,
neighbors, and relatives. Allegations against the police
included suggestions that: (a) they were flooding Ms. Parker’s
home with gas and carbon monoxide, (b) they were planning
to kidnap her, (c) they would kill her entire family because she
is a snitch, and (d) the KKK within the police department
ordered her dead.
17
June 25, 2015: Ms. Parker’s cousin, Jesse Ashford, received
a video from Ms. Parker that he thought was suspicious and
possibly pointing to Ms. Parker being suicidal. He requested
a well check on Ms. Parker and L.P. The video received by
Mr. Ashford was sent to SPD. The video was Ms. Parker
giving a basic will advising what she wanted done with her
house and with the care of her daughter if she died.
SPD made repeated attempts to get Ms. Parker to come to
the door after which she stated that she had sent the video to
numerous family members stating her wishes in case
something happened to her. SPD reported that Ms. Parker
and L.P. appeared fine.
18
June 26, 2015: regarding the stabbing incident that gave rise
to this claim bill and is described below, Ms. Parker was found
guilty on September 23, 2016 of attempted murder and
aggravated battery of L.P., and resisting an officer with
violence. She is sentenced to 40 years in prison followed by
16
Claimant’s Exhibit 17, 15-024905 Incident Report, 2 (May 15, 2015).
17
Claimant’s Exhibit 18, 15-027448 Incident Report, 2 (May 29, 2015).
18
Claimant’s Exhibit 19, 15-032701 Incident Report, 2 (June 25, 2015). SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 5
probation for life with respect to the attempted murder and
resisting an officer with violence. She is sentenced to 125.7
months in prison for cruelty toward child-aggravated battery to
run concurrent with the 40-year sentence. The court ordered
Ms. Parker to have no contact with L.P.
19
Ms. Parker calls and speaks with S.C. or V.D.C. to ask for
money. When she asks about L.P., V.D.C. tells her that L.P.
is fine. V.D.C. sends Ms. Parker $30 per month.
20
History of Abuse Reports with the Department
2009-098932 (June 14, 2009): On June 14, 2009, Ms. Parker
filed a police report alleging the paternal aunt intentionally
pushed a stroller twice causing the stroller to topple over while
L.P. was inside. Hospital records show that Ms. Parker went
to the hospital on June 11, 2009, but left a couple of hours
after arriving. The hospital reported that Ms. Parker brought
L.P. to the hospital on June 9, 2009, with allegations that L.P.
rolled off of a chest and hit her head on the concrete floor,
causing no known injuries.
21
2010-016983 (January 29, 2010): The allegations were that
about a year ago, Ms. Parker had another child removed from
her care and the child was not returned. She now has L.P. in
her care and seems to be displaying behaviors that suggest
she may be mentally unstable, and it may not be a safe
environment for L.P. Ms. Parker reportedly displays erratic
behavior. There is an injunction against L.P.’s father for
unknown reasons and he is not allowed to have contact with
her.
The case closed with “No Indicators of Threatened Harm,” it
was assessed as “Low to Moderate Risk.” It was noted that
Ms. Parker and L.P. lived with the maternal grandmother,
V.D.C., and there were no safety concerns for the child in the
care of Ms. Parker and V.D.C.
22
2010-210977 (October 13, 2010): The allegations were
against the daycare for leaving L.P. and 13 other children
unsupervised allowing another child to bite L.P., causing a
19
State of Florida v. Ashley Yvonne Parker, case no. 2015CF10327 (June 29, 2015).
20
Hearing at 5:23:41-5:24:33.
21
Department’s Composite Exhibit 7, Intake Report with Reporter Narrative, (June 14, 2009).
22
Department’s Composite Exhibit 6, Intake Report with Reporter Narrative, 3, 7-8 (Jan. 29, 2010). SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 6
deep bite to her cheek. The case was closed with “No
Indicators.”
23
2013-177775 (June 27, 2013): The allegations were that Ms.
Parker refused to allow L.P. to attend a field trip with the
daycare and was advised not to bring the child to school but
brought her anyway. The mother pushes and screams at L.P.
sometimes. The case was closed with “No Indicators of
Inadequate Supervision.” It was noted that Ms. Parker was
uncooperative with the Department.
24
2015-135492 (May 18, 2015): The allegations in this report
are that a child at L.P.’s school had touched her
inappropriately. L.P. had been crying and not wanting to go to
school. She was examined and “nothing abnormal” had been
identified. CPI Munoz was assigned to the case and it was
closed with no services with the notation that Ms. Parker has
a history with the Department of making false allegations and
not cooperating with investigations. It should be noted that
besides this report, there was no mention of any other “false
allegations” made by Ms. Parker to the Department.
25
Unreported Abuse
Therapy records indicate that, before the stabbing incident
described below, L.P. reported to her therapist that Ms. Parker
killed her seven bunnies, tried to drown her in a toilet and
bathtub, and tried to poison her with pills. L.P. reported being
put in the bathtub and Ms. Parker attempting to drown her two
or three times.
26
On November 30, 2018, L.P. Reported to Dr.
Forrest that she is afraid of swimming because her mother
tried to drown her in the toilet.
27
The Department Investigation at Issue
On June 25, 2015, at 4:31 p.m., the Department received
report number 2015-172495-01 (the “June 2015 report”). A
decision was made regarding the intake report on June 25,
23
Department’s Composite Exhibit 5, Intake Report with Reporter Narrative, 2, 9 (Oct. 13, 2010).
24
Department’s Composite Exhibit 4, Intake Report with Reporter Narrative, 2, 8 (June 27, 2013).
25
Department’s Exhibit 2, Confidential Assessment Summary Child-on-Child Assessment (without Reporter
Information), 1-2 (May 18, 2015).
26
Evaluation at pp. 42-43; Hearing at 2:55:00-2:55:25.
27
Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 1-6, Psychotherapy Notes, Office of Dr. Sharon D. Forrest Ed. D, LMFT #2750, 3 (Feb.
15, 2019); Hearing at 2:55:00-2:55:25. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 7
2015, at 4:48 pm. The reporter was a deputy from SPD.
The
Hotline assigned the case as an immediate response time.
28
Allegation Narrative:
On June 25, 2015, law enforcement responded to the home
due to a suicide threat. The mother sent a video of her last will
and testament stating:
“…Ashley Yvonne Parker being of sound mind do
hereby leave the trust of this house [] to my
daughter [L.P.] and the executor of the estate to
my mother [V.D.C.] to raise [L.P.] with [S.C.]. In
case they can’t do it, Kenneth Adams. I leave the
house to [L.P.] if and when she does turn 30 years
old. I also leave custody to Kenneth if anything was
to happen to [V.D.C.] or [S.C.]. Next would be
Jessie Ashford Junior, my uncle. And if they can’t
take care of [L.P.] next would be [Mr. Adams] of
West Palm Beach, Florida.”
29
The June 2015 report explained efforts law enforcement had
to make to have contact with Ms. Parker, raised concerns
about her truthfulness, and raised issues about her mental
health and past Baker Act. Law enforcement left L.P. in the
care of Ms. Parker and reported they felt that it was a safe
environment.
Pre-Commencement Supervisor Consultation
Child Protective Investigator (CPI) Supervisor Tucker and CPI
Cheree Lopez completed the required pre-commencement
consultation at 7:00 p.m. on June 25, 2015. Notes from the
meeting highlight some of the following relevant points:
30
• Ms. Parker has a history of mental health, and additional
information is required on this issue.
• Prior Department reports were reviewed and prior charges
for false reports and neglect were known.
• Concerns raised regarding Ms. Parker’s willingness to
cooperate with child protective services and other
agencies.
28
The Department’s Exhibit, Intake Report with Reporter Narrative, 1-3 (June 25, 2015) (hereinafter referred to as
“June report”).
29
Claimant’s Trial Exhibit 74, Suicide Video 6-25-2015 (June 25, 2025).
30
Claimant’s Trial Exhibit 53, Pre-Commencement 6-25-2015 (June 25, 2015). SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 8
Home Visit on June 25, 2015
CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez arrived for a home visit
at 7:44 p.m. on June 25, 2015, at Ms. Parker’s residence.
31
They were wearing badges and had on shirts that identified
them as working for the Department.
32
They approached the
residence, knocked on the door, and were greeted by Ms.
Parker who stayed behind the door. The door was cracked but
it was dark so she could not see inside. Ms. Parker
misidentified herself as L.P.’s godmother named Valencia
Dubois, so CPI Lopez was asking her questions about Ms.
Parker and L.P. all of which were answered positively.
33
CPI
Lopez asked Ms. Parker to go inside the house but Ms. Parker
refused because she reported she was not dressed.
34
Ms.
Parker was laughing and joking around so her tone was not
concerning to CPI Lopez.
35
V.D.C. walked up to the residence after CPI Supervisor
Tucker and CPI Lopez arrived when they had been speaking
with Ms. Parker.
36
CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez were
a few feet from the front door.
37
V.D.C. was agitated and
reported being in a car accident that day.
38
CPI Supervisor
Tucker informed Ms. Parker and V.D.C. who they were and
that they were there for an investigation.
39
V.D.C. claimed the
report was false.
40
V.D.C. was present when CPI Lopez was
speaking with Ms. Parker,
41
but given her hearing deficits it is
reasonable to infer that she did not hear the conversation.
V.D.C. indicated that she had power of attorney because Ms.
Parker travels back and forth to Orlando, and she showed CPI
Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez a copy of the power of
attorney. CPI Tucker did not read the power of attorney in
totality.
42
31
June Report at 3-4.
32
Hearing at 6:49:40-6:49
33
Id. at 6:44:30-6:45:25; Tucker T-VII 1929: 2-5.
34
Id. at 6:45:45-6:46:11.
35
Id. at 7:32:15-7:33:00.
36
Hearing at 6:46:11-6:46:32; Tucker T-VII 1983:20-25; 1984: 1-5.
37
Id. at 5:05:07-5:05:21.
38
Id. at 6:45:15-6:45:31.
39
Id. at 6:49:50-6:50:08.
40
Hearing at 7:35:25-7:35:58; 2015-172495 Chronological Notes Report, 4 (June 26, 2015) (hereinafter referred
to as “Chronological Notes”).
41
Hearing at 6:46:32-6:46:59. 5:05:39-5:05:53.
42
Tucker T-VII 1923: 22-25; 1925: 21-25; 1926: 1-7; Lopez T-IV 1035: 14-21; V.D.C. T-VI 1691: 11-13. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 9
Conflicting testimony and evidence regarding where Ms.
Parker reportedly was located when CPI Supervisor Tucker
and CPI Lopez were at Ms. Parker’s residence was offered in
discovery and hearing testimony. CPI Supervisor Tucker and
CPI Lopez suggested that V.D.C. informed them that Ms.
Parker was in Orlando and V.D.C.’s testimony that she
informed them Ms. Parker was in the house.
43
However,
Chronological Notes entered the day after the home visit on
June 26, 2015, at 3:17 p.m., which the undersigned finds more
credible, suggests that “CPI [Lopez] was unable to get contact
and whereabouts information regarding the mother from
either the maternal grandmother [V.D.C.] or the Godmother
[Ms. Parker].”
44
CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez asked to speak with
L.P.
45
V.D.C. went inside to get L.P. and they went back
outside together.
46
L.P. presented very well cared for and
clean with her hair done and wearing matching clothes.
47
The
CPI Supervisor asked about several topics: school, activities,
her appearance, and living at home
48
for approximately 30
minutes.
49
L.P. did not express any concerns about Ms.
Parker and did not appear scared.
50
When CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez were leaving,
V.D.C. and L.P. went to the door to go inside but it was locked.
V.D.C. knocked on the door three times and she said, “Ashley
open the door, Ashley open the door, open the door Ashley.”
51
They were in the yard but starting to go down the road
52
so
they would not have heard her call Ms. Parker’s name.
After CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez left and V.D.C.
went inside, she asked Ms. Parker what if anything she told
them. Ms. Parker told V.D.C. that she used a different name
and V.D.C. yelled at her for not using her correct name.
53
V.D.C. and S.C. testified that Ms. Parker was reportedly acting
43
Hearing at 5:06:07-5:06:34; 6:47:00-6:47:20; 6:49:05-6:49:24; Tucker T-VII 1920: 19-25.
44
Chronological Notes at 4.
45
Hearing at 5:03:00-5:03:16.
46
Id. at 5:05:21-5:05:39.
47
Id. 6:48:22-6:49:00.
48
Id. at 5:05:39-5:05:53; 7:34:30-7:35:25.
49
Hearing at 5:07:55-5:08:00.
50
Id. at 5:07:20-5:07:36.
51
Id. at 5:11:35-5:12:03.
52
Id. at 5:12:07-5:12:24.
53
Hearing at 5:17:00-5:18:00. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 10
normal on this night,
54
and Ms. Parker gave them no indication
that she was going to stab L.P. the next day.
55
Stabbing Incident on June 26, 2015
On the morning of June 26, 2015, V.D.C., S.C., Ms. Parker,
and L.P. ran errands.
56
Then, V.D.C. and S.C. dropped off Ms.
Parker and L.P. at the house.
57
S.C. had no concerns for
L.P.’s safety when leaving her with Ms. Parker.
58
Ms. Parker
wouldn’t let L.P. go to the store with V.D.C. and S.C.
59
S.C.
did not see a knife and denies that L.P. asked him not to leave
the house.
60
L.P. reported to her therapist that, while V.D.C. and S.C. were
gone, she was placed fully clothed in a filled bathtub, inverted,
and that she could not breathe and reported feeling “my heart
stop.”
61
She also reported having an unknown substance in
her mouth.
62
According to police reports who later responded
to the scene, there was a strong odor of chemicals and the
bathtub was half full of water.
63
After Ms. Parker attempted to drown L.P., Ms. Parker was
pacing back and forth and speaking out loud. She laid L.P. on
the bed, started scratching L.P.’s back with her nails and then
began to stab her. L.P. described to Dr. Forrest the pain she
felt when she was being stabbed and how she tried to stop
Ms. Parker from stabbing her in the shoulder which resulted
in her stabbing the bed. Then Ms. Parker turned L.P. over and
cut open her stomach which resulted in her intestines coming
out (the “stabbing incident”). L.P. reports “slithering” down the
hallway to get away from Ms. Parker.
64
V.D.C. and S.C. were gone for about an hour.
65
When V.D.C.
and S.C. arrived back at the house, they could not get inside
54
Id. at 5:18:10-5:18:25.
55
Id. at 2:22:00-2:22:20; 2:23:45-2:24:00; 2:26:55-2:27:15.
56
Id. at 2:24:00-2:24:50; 2:22:35-2:22:45.
57
Hearing at 2:24:50-2:25:13.
58
Id. at 2:27:42-2:28:02.
59
Id. at 2:49:17-2:49:28.
60
Id. at 2:49:30-2:50:22.
61
Evaluation at 30.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 14.
64
Id. at 42.
65
Hearing at 2:54:00-2:54:21. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 11
because V.D.C.’s key would not open the door.
66
This was
unusual because the key usually worked, and she had been
able to use it recently.
67
V.D.C. knocked on the front and back
doors yelling for Ms. Parker to open the door.
68
When Ms.
Parker opened the door, she had a long butcher knife in her
hand and told them that somebody broke in the house.
69
S.C.
looked at the lock and saw that there was no damage. He said
“If somebody broke in the house, where is the baby?”
70
S.C. went looking for L.P. and found her cuddled up under a
blanket.
71
S.C. said, “Baby, let’s go” and L.P. said “Pop,
pop.”
72
S.C. looked down, said, “Oh my God.” He called 911.
73
He asked L.P. who hurt her, and she replied, “Mommy.”
74
Sarasota County Fire Department arrived on scene,
administered emergency care, and transported L.P. to
Sarasota Memorial Hospital.
75
Dr. Ali Al-Rawi is a trauma and
critical care surgeon and Dr. Russell Jaicks is a trauma
surgeon at Sarasota Memorial Hospital.
76
Both surgeons
treated L.P. on June 25, 2015.
77
L.P. was intubated, and a CT
scan was performed.
78
L.P. was put under general
anesthetic.
79
She had a total of 14 stab wounds,
80
including a
laceration to the bowl and colon and contamination of the
abdomen.
81
Dr. Al-Rawi and Dr. Jaicks performed
procedures, such as stapling the lacerations, to stop the
bleeding and leakage.
82
L.P. was transported to Johns
Hopkins All Children’s Hospital (JHACH) once she was stable
on June 26, 2015, where she received care until July 6, 2015,
when she was discharged.
83
66
Id. at 2:25:20-2:25:48.
67
Id. at 2:54:00-2:54:21.
68
Id. at 2:25:50-2:26:06.
69
Hearing at 2:26:07-2:26:28.
70
Id. at 2:26:28-2:26:41.
71
Id. at 2:56:00-2:56:32.
72
Id. at 2:56:32-2:56:50.
73
Hearing at 2:56:50-2:56:56.
74
S.C. T-V 1404: 4-7.
75
Claimant’s Exhibit 1-8, Sarasota County Fire Department-19993, 4-5 (June 25, 2015).
76
Al-Rawi T-III 693:2-3; Jaicks T-III 626: 11-12.
77
Al-Rawi T-III 697: 13-18.
78
Id. at 701: 15-16; 702: 3.
79
Id. at 703:2-4.
80
Id. at 703: 21.
81
Al-Rawi T-III 705: 2-5.
82
Id. at 704: 6-22; 706: 3-25; 707: 1-15.
83
Id. at 697: 8-12; Claimant’s Exhibit 1-7, Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital, 1 (June 26, 2015). SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 12
Damages
V.D.C. testified that L.P.’s mind reverted to an infant after the
stabbing incident, and she still does things that a three- or
four-year-old does,
84
such as playing with toys in the
bathtub.
85
L.P. sees a psychiatrist every three months.
86
L.P.
has anxiety and she takes Adderall.
87
Dr. Forrest, L.P.’s
treating licensed marriage and family counselor, reported L.P.
has post-traumatic stress disorder from the stabbing
incident.
88
In the past, S.C. has witnessed L.P. awake in the
middle of the night appearing to “make believe talking to
someone,”
89
and expressed concern because Ms. Parker,
who is diagnosed with multiple personality disorder, started
acting the same way on ADHD medication around the same
age.
90
On April 12, 2019, V.D.C. and S.C. informed Dr. Forrest
that L.P. has angry conversations out loud with Ms. Parker
while Ms. Parker is not actually present.
91
L.P. was practicing gymnastics for eight years, but she
stopped this year because she reports that sometimes her
stomach hurts.
92
L.P. cries often, has nightmares
93
and does
not like her hair washed because Ms. Parker tried to drown
her.
94
She is very frightened of the bathtub and afraid of
drowning.
95
L.P. struggles to take responsibility for things,
such as chores, but V.D.C. acknowledged that this may be
L.P. being a normal teenager.
96
On January 14, 2021, Dr.
Sheshani quoted, “She does something, and then blames it
on ‘Little [].’”
97
84
Hearing at 4:46:05-4:46:20.
85
Id. at 5:27:00-5:27:50.
86
Id. at 2:19:15-2:19:29.
87
Id. at 2:42:30-2:43:00.
88
Evaluation at 14.
89
Id. at 44.
90
Id. at 50.
91
Id. at 40.
92
Hearing at 4:49:30-4:49:39; 2:13:30-2:14:10.
93
Id. at 2:14:10-2:15:15.
94
Id. at 2:15:30-2:15:48.
95
Evaluation at 44.
96
Hearing at 5:34:00-5:35:00.
97
Evaluation at 54. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 13
Evaluation
Dr. Michael Shahnasarian
98
prepared a Vocational
Rehabilitation Evaluation of L.P. dated August 30, 2021 (the
“evaluation”). The Careys reported L.P. experiences the
following problems that Ms. Carey reported she did not
experience before her attempted murder in June 2015:
99
• Scarring on abdomen, lower extremities, and back
secondary to stabbing injuries
• Complaints of abdominal pain
• Complaints of nightmares
• Apprehensive/fear reaction to being touched and to
receiving medical care
• Attentional difficulties and hypervigilance
• Emotional lability
• Trouble with organization and initiation
• Impaired social relations
• Impaired scholastic performance
• Impaired self-care and independence skills
• Impaired memory
Dr. Shahnasarian conducted several tests with respect to the
evaluation of L.P. which are summarized below:
100
• Test of cognitive ability of her intellectual skills and abilities
- scored in the 39
th
percentile for her age group.
• Test of basic skills:
o Reading – Grade 4.4
o Spelling – Grade 3.9
o Arithmetic – Grade 5.1
• Test measuring levels of her self-esteem resulted in her
general and global being low, and her social self-esteem
being very low.
• Children’s Depression Inventory – total score was 16
(Slightly above average range)
L.P. was in the sixth grade, after having repeated the third
grade, at the time of the test.
98
Id. at 2-4 (Aug. 30, 2021) (Dr. Michael Shahnasarian, who founded and works for Career Consultants of America,
Inc., is a licensed psychologist who has three degrees in psychology, including a Ph.D. in counseling psychology
from Florida State University. He specializes in rehabilitation psychology and subspeciality in life care planning and
vocational rehabilitation. Dr. Shahnasarian has a lengthy resume of credentials that support his expertise in these
areas).
99
Id. at 2.
100
Id. at 57-58. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 14
Dr. Shahnasarian’s opinions are based on a reasonable
degree of vocational assessment and rehabilitation
certainty.
101
When he interviewed L.P., she was in a special
school for children with special needs. She had an
individualized education plan which extended several
accommodations for her, such as three days to take a test.
102
She was having a lot of issues at that time including mental
health issues, such as having anxiety and disability
adjustment issues in many areas. She was delayed socially
which was evident in his testing.
103
L.P. had difficulty making
friends at school and she does not form social bonds.
104
When questioned about how the life plan may be impacted
given L.P.’s testimony that she hangs out with friends on the
weekend signifying some ability to form bonds, Dr.
Shahnasarian explained that he would expect there to be
some changes/minor variances (e.g. change in medication or
child forming friendships) but the life care plan in total provides
a very good blueprint of what Dr. Shahnasarian expects to see
with respect to L.P.’s needs.
105
Despite this opinion, the life
care plan provides for several updated life care plans at
various intervals of L.P.'s life.
106
In summary, Dr. Shahnasarian’s opinion regarding L.P.’s
vocational capacity are that, without intensive intervention,
she would not be able to pursue even unskilled employment
that offers the minimum wage rate. She has a number of
vocational handicaps that would likely further erode her
earning capacity by 70 percent to 80 percent that she would
have under a best case scenario, such as diminished access
to work opportunities, need for accommodations, likelihood of
absences from the workplace during periods of symptom
exacerbation, employer bias, and vulnerabilities to reductions
in force.
107
Dr. Shahnasarian noted that L.P. is receiving
extraordinary accommodations in school that might not be
extended to her in the workplace.
108
Dr. Shahnasarian opined
that the social, emotional, and psychological problems she
101
Hearing at 3:22:26-3:22:50.
102
Id. at 2:34:30-2:35:00; 4:46:48-4:47:30.
103
Id. at 3:11:42-3:14:51.
104
Id. at 3:52:00-3:54:10.
105
Hearing 3:52:00-3:54:10.
106
Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 78, Shahnasarian, M. 1
st
Update Life Care Plan Prepared for L.X.C., 6 (Feb. 14, 2022)
(hereinafter referred to as “Life Care Plan”)
107
Hearing at 3:11:42-3:14:51.
108
Id. at 3:19:30-3:19:51. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 15
was experiencing at the time are likely to persist as they had
been to date.
109
Life Plan
Dr. Shahnasarian prepared a life care plan for L.P. dated
February 14, 2022 (the “life care plan”).
110
A life care plan
identifies current and future rehabilitation interventions that
are probable given the trauma that L.P. has acquired.
111
The
life care plan consists of several costs that L.P. is expected to
or may incur throughout her life as a result of the stabbing
incident,
112
including: residential care options, evaluations,
therapeutic needs, aids for independent living, drug and
supply needs, home/facility care, educational needs,
procedures, and potential complications.
113
Dr.
Shahnasarian’s opinions set forth in the life care plan are held
within a reasonable degree of life care plan certainty.
114
Life care plans are created based on fair market value. There
are no discounts or negotiated collateral offsets to the life care
costs, such as health insurance.
115
They do not take into
account any potential outside sources for programs that may
be available to L.P., such as state paid tuition.
116
The life care plan sets out three residency options:
117
1. Option A: Live in attendant from age 18 – 21 to life, 7 days
per week, 365 days per year.
2. Option B: Attendant care/companion services from age
18-21 to life, the frequency is to be determined.
3. Option C: Independent living with case management from
age 18-21 to life.
109
Id. at 3:20:00-3:20:46.
110
Id. at 3:45:45-3:47:17 (Dr. Shahnasarian noting that the last time he saw L.P. face-to-face was in August 2021.
He has not received any updated recommendations and reports on L.P.’s progress since that time except for
consultations with contributors to the life care plan noted on page 3 of the report in September 2021. Dr.
Shahnasarian would not be surprised if there are any changes either for the better or the worse but, materially in
terms of her overall level of damages and vocational ability, he would be very surprised if there are any changes).
111
Hearing at 3:22:00-3:22:26; 3:22:50- 3:23:11.
112
Id. at 3:43:08-3:43:29.
113
Life Care Plan at 5-14. The life care plan notes that, “Year 1 in the duration section of this life care plan begins
on the date this life care plan is published.” Id. at 3.
114
Hearing at 3:43:29-3:43:39.
115
Id. at 3:47:48-3:48:03.
116
Id. at 3:48:03-3:48:13.
117
Life Care Plan at 5. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 16
Dr. Shahnasarian’s report notes that “Per Dr. Forrest, it is
unlikely L.X.C. will be capable of independent living.” Dr.
Shahnasarian testified that L.P. is most likely to require option
A with a live in attendant.
118
He reached this opinion based
upon standards required of certified life care plan
specialists.
119
When questioned about the kind of activities Dr.
Shahnasarian thinks L.P. is unable to do to take care of
herself, he relied on her activities of daily living in his report,
such as concerns she needs prompting to tie her shoes or
comb her hair requiring supervision,
120
and an gave example
about L.P. experiencing a lot of anxiety so things like her going
out in public and being able to shop for her anticipated grocery
needs on her own.
121
Dr. Shahnasarian testified that option C
is the least likely scenario.
122
He does not consider option C
is likely at all but he included it for consideration.
123
Three types of evaluations are recommended as follows:
124
• A cosmetic surgeon evaluation to determine whether the
remaining scars on her legs and abdomen can be revised
and what would be the nature of the procedure.
125
• A neuropsychological evaluation to address her cognitive
status.
126
• Updated life care plans with a cost of $7,000 for each
update. Updated life care plans are recommended
including one between the ages of 17 and 22 as she nears
or enters adulthood, and three between the age of 30 and
the remainder of her life at 10 year intervals.
127
Several therapeutic needs are anticipated, including:
128
• Psychiatrist follow up for one session per month for the
first year, followed by one session every three months for
the remainder of her life.
129
• Psychological counseling required to supplement
psychiatric treatment on a graduated schedule.
118
Hearing 3:26:15-3:28:05.
119
Id.
120
Evaluation at 11-12.
121
Hearing at 4:02:30-
122
Id. at 3:28:05-3:28:35.
123
Id. at 3:54:10-3:56:00.
124
Life Care Plan at 6.
125
Hearing at 3:30:00-3:30:32.
126
Id. at 3:30:32-3:30:50.
127
Life Care Plan at 6.
128
Id. at 3.
129
Hearing at 3:33:00-3:33:54. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 17
• Group counseling: to be determined.
130
• Family counseling from year one to age 21 for six to 12
sessions per year.
131
L.P. is not currently engaged in any
family counseling.
132
• Hairdresser from years one to five once every two weeks
at a cost of $55-$130 each visit.
133
Dr. Shahnasarian
testified that the cost for a hairdresser included in the life
plan is not a luxury item. Ms. Carey described the extreme
difficulty Ms. Carey has had getting L.P. to wash her own
hair or even worse when Ms. Carey attempts to wash
L.P.’s hair. L.P. was responding to a hairdresser washing
and fixing her hair.
Aids for independent living included in the life care plan are:
134
• Emotional support animal, which is of no charge.
135
• Miscellaneous adaptive aids/patient education from year
one for life at a cost of $1,200 per year for items such as
security system/devices and topical creams for scars.
With respect to drug and supply needs, Dr. Sheshani
recommended Folcalin XR (Dexmethylphenidate ER) 10 mg,
which has been replaced with an Adderall prescription.
136
The
life care plan anticipates L.P. taking one tablet per day at a
cost of $408.59-$567.99 per 30 tablets.
137
L.P. currently has
medical insurance through the Department.
138
The life care
plan includes SSRI medications to address anxiety that is to
be determined.
139
Three home/facility care services are recommended in the life
care plan, including:
140
• Housekeeper with a cost of $125-$150 per visit but the
duration and frequency is to be determined.
• Option A and B: Case manager beginning year one for life
for two to three hours per month at a cost of $110 per hour.
130
Id.
131
Life Care Plan at 7.
132
Hearing at 3:48:13-3:49:21.
133
Life Care Plan at 7.
134
Life Care Plan at 9.
135
Hearing at 3:36:50-3:37:21.
136
Evaluation at 10.
137
Life Care Plan at 10.
138
Hearing at 3:48:17-3:48:40.
139
Life Care Plan at 10.
140
Id. at 11. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 18
• Guardian beginning age 18-21 for life for one to two hours
per month at a cost of $95 per hour.
Several recommendations were made with respect to L.P.’s
educational needs, including:
141
• Private school placement from year one to grade eight at
$15,750 per year and grade nine to grade 12 at $14,000
per year. The life care plan does not take into
consideration sources for children who have been in out of
home placement such as scholarships that might be
available for use at private schools.
142
• Tutorial assistance at a cost of $60 per hour from year one
to year eight at five-eight hours per week and year nine to
12 at 10-12 hours per week. V.D.C. testified that L.P.
received tutoring when she was younger, but she is not
receiving it now.
143
• Vocational guide services one time between age 17 to 22
at a cost of $5,000 to $7,000.
• Life skills coach for four to six hours per week at a cost of
$60 per hour from year one to age 21. Dr. Shahnasarian
testified that a life skills coach would facilitate her ability to
perform self-care activities and develop more adaptive
activities of daily living skills but not to the point where she
would be able to completely live independently.
144
L.P. has
not begun receiving these services.
145
Dr. Shahnasarian opined it is not within a reasonable degree
of vocational rehabilitation certainty that L.P. could attend a
mainstream college like the University of South Florida (USF)
without any accommodations.
He thinks L.P. is lacking insight
into her deficits if her testimony is that she wants to attend
USF.
146
Dr. Patti, a plastic surgeon, recommends procedures that
include laser regimens, scar revisions between age 18 to 21
as needed at a minimum cost of $25,000.
147
141
Id. at 12.
142
Hearing at 3:47:17-3:48:16.
143
Id. at 4:45:40-4:46:05.
144
Id. at 4:02:50-4:04:50.
145
Hearing at 4:08:10-4:09:01.
146
Id. at 3:58:05-3:59:28.
147
Life Care Plan at 12. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 19
Dr. Shahnasarian and Dr. Forrest opine that L.P. is at a
greater risk of multiple inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations
given, for instance, her trauma, impaired growth, and issues
establishing bonds.
148
Economic Damages
Brenda Mulder and Kristi Kirby prepared an Analysis of
Economic Damages re: L.X.C. (Minor) dated February 15,
2022 (the “economic damages report”).
149
Their conclusions
are summarized below:
• Total economic damages June 26, 2015, to February 28,
2022: $30,248.33
Time Period of Future Economic Damages
Ms. L.X.C.’s Work Life to Age 67: 49 years (from 6/1/27:
Age 18)
Ms. L.X.C.’s Work Life to Age 67 45 years (from 5/21/34:
Age 25)
Ms. L.X.C. Life Expectancy 66.9 years (2018 Data –
B. Female)
• Present value of lifetime earning capacity: high school
graduate: $30,325 annual basis; present value to age 67:
$1,170,184 to $1,905,466.
• Present value of lifetime earning capacity: associate
degree: $36,950 annual basis; present value to age 67:
$1,262,142 to $1,916,929.
• Potential offset for residual earning capacity: minimum
wage: present value to age 67: ($300,987) to ($490,112).
• Present value of future medical expenses: $7,932,170 to
$14,002,766. A significant portion of the future medical
expenses is the live-in attendant for life beginning at age
18 to 21 which totals $6,579,413 to $11,976,608 with an
average annual cost of $146,000.
148
Hearing at 4:18:11-4:22:59.
149
Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 79, Mulder & Kirby Economists, Inc., Analysis of Economic Damages Re: L.X.C. (Minor)
(February 15, 2022) (hereinafter referred to as “Economic Damages Report”). SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 20
Civil Jury Verdict
On March 11, 2022, the jury rendered the following verdict on
damages:
150
What is the total amount of Plaintiff, L.X.C.’s
damages incurred in the past as a result of the
June 26, 2015, incident for medical expenses?
$30,248.33
What is the total amount of Plaintiff, L.X.C.’s future
medical expenses to be incurred over future years
as a result of the June 26, 2015, incident reduced
to present value? $14,002,766
What is the total amount of Plaintiff, L.X.C.’s future
loss of earnings capacity to be incurred over future
years as a result of the June 26, 2015, incident
reduced to present value? $1,500,000
Please state the amount of damages incurred by
Plaintiff, L.X.C. as a result of the June 26, 2015
incident for pain, suffering, disability,
disfigurement, mental anguish, inconvenience
and/or loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life:
In the past? $4,155,661.60
In the future? $8,311,323.87
What are the total damages of Plaintiff, L.X.C.?
$28,000,000
LITIGATION HISTORY:
On May 15, 2017, V.D.C. and S.C. filed a complaint against
the Department in the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial
Circuit on behalf of the minor L.X.C. (referred to in the claim
bill as L.P.). The complaint alleged negligence on the part of
the Department through its CPIs when they conducted a Pre-
Commencement Meeting at the Department’s Sarasota
Offices and subsequent home visit/investigation into L.P.’s
mother on June 25, 2015, and failed to implement a safety
plan thereby causing L.P.’s mother to stab her 14 times the
following morning. A jury verdict was rendered on March 11,
150
V.D.C. and S.C., on behalf of L.X.C., a minor v. Department of Children and Families, 2017 CA 2405 NC (Mar.
11, 2022). SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 21
2022, which was 100% in favor of the claimant in the amount
of $28,000,000.00.
A final judgment was entered in favor of Claimants on April 7,
2022. The Department then appealed to the Second District
Court of Appeal. The decision for the claimant was affirmed
by the appellate court per curiam on September 15, 2023.
Thus, all administrative and/or other remedies have been
exhausted. The Department has since paid the statutory cap
of $200,000 all of which has gone to Claimant’s counsel.
151
Limones v. School Dist. of Lee County, 161 So. 3d 384, 389 (Fla. 2015).
152
McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992).
153
Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Svcs. v. Yamuni, 498 So. 2d 441, 442-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (noting that
the child was a member of the class protected under a specific statute and the [Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services] owed a statutory duty to protect him from abuse and neglect) (affirmed by Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Svcs v. Yamuni, 529 So.2d 258 (Fla. 1988)).
154
Section 39.201, F.S.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: The claim bill hearing was a de novo proceeding for the
purpose of determining, based on the evidence presented to
the special master, whether the Department is liable in
negligence for the injuries suffered by L.P.
The claimant must prove four elements for a negligence claim
under Florida law, namely: (1) duty of care, (2) breach of care,
(3) proximate causation, and (4) damages.
151
Duty of Care
Whether a duty of care exists is a matter of law.
152
Where the
“express intention of the legislature is to protect a class of
individuals from a particularized harm, the governmental
entity entrusted with the protection owes a duty to individuals
within the class.”
153
Section 39.001(1)(a), of the Florida
Statutes, provides that one purpose of the chapter is “[t]o
prevent the occurrence of child abuse, neglect and
abandonment.” Thus, chapter 39, of the Florida Statutes,
designates children as a protected class of individuals from
abuse, neglect and abandonment, and the Department as the
entity entrusted with the protection of such children owes
them a duty of care. The Florida Legislature reinforced the
Department’s duty in the provisions that: (a) require reporting
child abuse to protect children,
154
and (b) in part III, chapter SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 22
155
See s. 39.301(8), F.S.
156
Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Svcs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258, 261 (Fla. 1988).
157
Dept. of Children and Family Svcs. v. Amora, 944 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
158
McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503.
159
Id. at 502.
160
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
161
Russel v. Jacksonville Gas Corp., 117 So. 2d 29, 32 (Fla 1st DCA 1960) (defining negligence as, “the doing of
something that a reasonable and prudent person would not ordinarily have done under the same or similar
39, of the Florida Statutes, that set out the Department’s
requirements for protective investigations.
155
“HRS [the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,
a precursor to the Department] is not merely a police agency
and its relationship with an abused child is far more than that
of a police agency to the victim of a crime…[T]he primary duty
of HRS is to immediately prevent any further harm to the child
and that the relationship established between HRS and the
abused child is a very special one.”
156
The Department has a
duty to adequately and reasonably investigate complaints of
child abuse, abandonment or neglect.
157
The Florida Supreme Court opined that “as the risk grows
greater, so does the duty, because the risk to be perceived
defines the duty that must be undertaken…each defendant
who creates a risk is required to exercise prudent foresight
whenever others may be injured as a result. This requirement
of reasonable, general foresight is the core of the duty
element.”
158
The Court held that the defendant had “a duty to
take reasonable actions to prevent the general type of injury
that occurred” in the case.
159
Therefore, the Department had a duty to protect L.P. from
abuse, abandonment, neglect, including any future harm, and
a duty to adequately and reasonably investigate the
allegations of inadequate supervision.
Breach of Duty
The U.S. Supreme Court held “[w]hat usually is done may be
evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done
is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it
usually is complied with or not.”
160
A fact finder must decide
whether a defendant exercised the degree of care that an
ordinarily prudent person, or CPI in this instance, would have
under the same or similar circumstances.
161
While any SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 23
circumstances, or the failure to do that which a reasonable and prudent person would have done under the same
or similar circumstances”).
162
McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503 (noting that foreseeability of harm determines the scope of the duty); The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (Judge Learned Hand held a tugboat owner negligent for failing to equip
a vessel with radios, even though there were no legal requirements to do so, because a reasonable operator
would have taken that precaution.).
163
Sections 39.301(6), and (9)(a)1., F.S.; Rule 65C-29.009(1), F.A.C.
164
Tucker T-VII 1884: 18-20.
165
Chronological Notes at 1-3.
166
Tschetter T-II 363: 20-22.
applicable laws set baseline requirements, the reasonably
prudent CPI standard can impose a higher duty so a party who
complies with a regulation, if any, does not automatically
absolve a party from liability if additional precautions would
have been reasonable.
162
The Claimant submits that the Department has breached its
duties in this case, such as duties to:
• Check for local law enforcement call outs before the home
visit,
• Speak to the mandatory reporter before the home visit,
• Respond to Ms. Parker’s home within two hours for the
initial home visit,
• Properly assess present and impending danger, and
• Implement a safety plan, including supervised visitation
with the mother.
The Department responds by arguing that it was either not
required by law (e.g. to obtain local police reports or contact
the reporter before the home visit)
163
or not authorized by law
to perform the duties (e.g. implement a safety plan without
present or impending danger) for which the Claimant alleges
it has breached. However, case law establishes a reasonably
prudent CPI standard, not solely whether the law has been
complied with, that determines whether a defendant has
breached its duty.
Pre-commencement Phase
For the reasons summarized below, a reasonably prudent CPI
would have taken additional reasonable efforts to obtain the
call outs and contact the reporter. The Department faxed a
request for prior police reports to the SPD after L.P. was
stabbed.
164
Although CPI Lopez testified and evidence
suggests that she contacted Officer Tschetter, Officer
Kennedy, and Mr. Ashford at 6:21 pm, 6:22 p.m., and 6:24
p.m., respectively,
165
Officer Tschetter testified at the trial,
166
SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 24
167
Hearing at 23:30-24:50; 36:00-36:50.
168
Id. at 43:30-43:43.
169
Id. 52:00-53:34.
170
Id. at 53.34-53:57; 1:03:40-1:04:03.
171
Callouts at 9 (V.D.C. averring Ms. Parker was not suicidal).
and he and Officer Kennedy testified at the claim bill
hearing,
167
that they did not receive calls or voicemails from
CPI Lopez. Officer Kennedy testified that there were several
ways that CPI Lopez could have contacted him on June 25,
2015, such as calling dispatch or the front desk.
168
If CPI Lopez had spoken with Officer Tschetter, he could have
provided her with a copy of the video and concerns that Ms.
Parker’s cousin, Mr. Ashford, had presented to him. With
respect to the Baker Act that occurred in May 2015, Officer
Tschetter could have informed CPI Lopez about the fact that
Ms. Parker had been Baker Acted. Also, he could have pulled
up the report to explain why Ms. Parker had been contacted
and why she had been Baker Acted but he did not have
access to the Baker Act form. He would not have been able
to inform CPI Lopez of the Baker Act’s disposition but simply
that she had been Baker Acted and what facility she was
taken to if that information was in the report.
169
He also could
have retrieved the prior police reports that had been uploaded
to the reporting system and informed CPI Lopez of their
content.
170
The Department failed to gather adequate collateral
information and instead relied on: (a) Ms. Parker’s lies when
CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez received information
from Ms. Parker as L.P.’s purported godmother and (b)
representations made by V.D.C., who had a history of denying
Ms. Parker’s suicidal ideations.
171
Had CPI Supervisor Tucker
or CPI Lopez requested the police reports or made contact
with the reporter, they would have relevant and important
information regarding Ms. Parker’s mental health issues, such
as the information contained in the letter attached to the police
report dated May 29, 2015, and Officer Tschetter’s
explanation of his previous encounter with Ms. Parker. In
these circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would
have obtained additional collateral information before
conducting the home visit.
SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 25
172
Rule 65C-30.001(65), F.A.C. (2015); This Rule was amended effective February 25, 2016, after the date of the
June 2015 report, to change the maximum response time from two (2) hours to four (4) hours.
173
Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 92, Safety Methodology Practice Guidelines, Investigations, p. 9 (Aug. 8, 2014).
174
Lopez T-IV 830: 1-3.
Home Visit
For the reasons summarized below, a reasonable prudent
CPI would have taken the following steps:
• Responded to the home within two (2) hours,
• Confirmed Ms. Parker’s identity,
• Requested law enforcement assistance,
• Conducted adequate interviews, and
• Implemented a safety plan with supervised visitation.
Response Time
On the date of the June 2015 report, the Florida Administrative
Code defined “immediate” or “immediately” to mean as soon
as possible, but no later than two (2) hour timeframe.
172
However, the Department relies on its Safety Methodology
Practice Guidelines, Investigations (the “Guidelines”), which
was in effect on June 25, 2015, that provides a report requiring
an immediate response time “requires the investigator to
attempt to make the initial face-to-face contact with the
alleged child victim as soon as possible but no later than four
(4) hours following assignment by the Hotline.
173
The Florida
Administrative Code contains rules which are binding
whereas the Department’s Guidelines are not.
The Department received the June 2015 report at 4:31 pm
and the decision time was 4:48 pm. CPI Lopez testified that
the response time is calculated from the time the decision has
been made.
174
which means that the CPI would have to be at
the home visit no later than 6:48 pm under the two (2) hour
maximum time limit in Rule 65c-30.001(65), of the Florida
Administrative Code. According to Chronological Notes, the
home visit began at 7:44 pm, which is almost three (3) hours
after the June 2015 decision time and approximately one (1)
hour after the maximum time for which the home visit was
required to begin.
If CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez had arrived at Ms.
Parker’s residence within two (2) hour, V.D.C. would not have
been present and they would not have been able to rely on
her representations as a collateral source in the first instance. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 26
175
Munoz T-II 452:18-25; 453: 1-15.
176
Callouts at 9 (V.D.C. averring Ms. Parker was not suicidal). Similarly, on Jun. 25, 2015, V.D.C. reported to the
Department that the report made earlier that day was false. Hearing at 7:35:25-7:35:58; 2015-172495;
Chronological Notes at 4.
177
Id. at 24:50-25:35.
Evidence suggests that V.D.C. had to go inside of the house
to get L.P. to meet CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez
outside. If V.D.C. was not there at the time of the home visit
and Ms. Parker refused to open the door, as she had done on
June 25, 2015, a reasonably prudent CPI would have called
law enforcement to be able to observe and speak with L.P.
and, if Officer Tschetter and Kennedy responded as they
testified they would, then law enforcement would have been
able to identify Ms. Parker.
Identifying Ms. Parker
Regardless of whether CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez
had responded within two (2) hours, a reasonably prudent CPI
would have taken additional steps to confirm Ms. Parker’s
identity. Indeed, on a prior occasion, CPI Munoz relied upon
a Driver and Vehicle Identification Database (DAVID) image
of Ms. Parker when she reported to her residence for an
earlier abuse report.
175
A reasonably prudent CPI would take
this or a similar step, such as asking L.P. where her mother is
located, given Ms. Parker’s history of false reports.
176
Request Law Enforcement Assistance
A reasonably prudent CPI would have called law enforcement
for assistance, especially if V.D.C. had not been present if the
CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez had arrived within two
(2) hours. Given Ms. Parker’s history of lies and
uncooperativeness and that the police were there hours
earlier and met with her, there should have been a suspicion
the person behind the door was Ms. Parker. Officer Tschetter
testified that law enforcement is available to assist the
Department if a person in the home would not identify herself
and would have done so in this case if he had received a
call.
177
All the Department had to do was make the call to
request the assistance and it should have done so in these
circumstances.
Adequate Interviews
A reasonably prudent CPI would have interviewed V.D.C. and
L.P. separately and asked additional relevant questions to
gain a greater understanding of the totality of the SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 27
178
The Department, CFOP 170-5 Child Protective Investigations, 14-1 (Apr. 8, 2024).
179
Hearing at 7:18:55-7:19:10; Tucker T-VII 1922: 16-21.
180
Hearing at 7:24:15-7:24:55.
181
Id. at 7:36:00-7:36:11.
182
Chronological Notes at 4 (With respect to the face-to-face with L.P, indicating “no disclosures of harm or being
scared.”).
circumstances. The Department’s policy is “[W]ith few
exceptions, household members should be interviewed
separately in the home when possible, in the following order,
using information gathered from one interview to assist in the
development of questions for the next interview:
(1) Identified child victim.
(2) Siblings or other children in the household.
(3) Non-maltreating parents and caregivers, including all
adult household members.
(4) Other parent (as a collateral contact when parent no
longer lives in the same household).
(5) Maltreating parent/caregiver.
178
The facts of this claim bill are not one of the exceptions that
would warrant interviewing witnesses in front of each other.
V.D.C. was claiming the report was false, which may have
influenced L.P.’s willingness to report any harm caused by Ms.
Parker. For these reasons, CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI
Lopez should have interviewed L.P. separately.
Further, the evidence presented suggests that the
Department should have asked additional questions on the
following topics:
• Question all witnesses as to where Ms. Parker was on
June 25, 2015.
179
To the extent V.D.C. may have
suggested Ms. Parker was in Orlando, details regarding
her trip should have been sought since law enforcement
was at the home and met with Ms. Parker several hours
earlier (e.g. questions like: when did she leave to go to
Orlando, how long she would be there, and when she
would be home?).
180
• V.D.C. and Valencia Dubois (i.e. Ms. Parker) regarding
Ms. Parker’s mental health history (e.g. prior Baker Acts
and suicide threats).
181
• L.P. regarding whether Ms. Parker ever tried to hurt her.
182
Safety Plan
A reasonably prudent CPI would have implemented a safety
plan with L.P. cared for by V.D.C. and S.C. with supervised
visitation between Ms. Parker and L.P. Safety plan is defined SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 28
183
Section 39.01(78), F.S.
184
See s. 39.301(9)(a)6., F.S.
185
Claimant’s Exhibit 56. at 1.
186
Id. at 1-2.
187
Rule 65C-30.002(3)(a), F.A.C.; Section 39.401, F.S. (providing that a child may only be taken into custody in
specified circumstances). Section 39.01(88), F.S. defines “taken into custody” as the status of a child immediately
when temporary physical control over the child is attained by a person authorized by law, pending the child’s release
or placement.
188
Section 39.301(9)(a)6., F.S., requires the CPI to implement a safety plan as soon as necessary to protect the
child or take the child into custody if impending danger is identified.
as “a plan created to control present or impending danger
using the least intrusive means appropriate to protect a child
when a parent, caregiver, or legal custodian is unavailable,
unwilling, or unable to do so.”
183
A safety plan is required if “present or impending danger is
identified.”
184
Impending danger is defined as a “state of
danger in which family behaviors, attitudes, motives, emotions
or situations pose a threat that may not be currently active but
can be anticipated to have severe effect on a child at any
time.”
185
Impending danger requires five criteria to be present:
(1) imminence; (2) severity; (3) observability; (4) out-of-control
of the family; and (5) vulnerability.
186
Parental consent is
required to implement a safety plan.
187
Ms. Parker’s mental health issues, prior Baker Acts, previous
suicidal notes, and suicide video are sufficient evidence that
Ms. Parker was suicidal when she sent the video on June 25,
2015. The video was of Ms. Parker putting her affairs in order,
suggesting further actions compounding her previous suicide
threats, and establishing that a suicide attempt may have
been imminent. Her erratic behavior and misleading
statements did not dispel this evidence. The Department did
not know Ms. Parker’s whereabouts or when she would be
home, which, it turns out, she was there when CPI Supervisor
Tucker and CPI Lopez were conducting the home visit. If Ms.
Parker had committed suicide with only L.P. present, L.P. may
have experienced harm by witnessing it and she would have
been at risk of harm for being unsupervised at such a young
age – the reason for which the June 2015 report was received.
For these reasons, the five criteria for impending danger are
met in these specific circumstances.
188
V.D.C.’s power of attorney for L.P. did not eliminate the need
for a safety plan. “Power of attorney” is defined as “[a]n
instrument granting someone authority to act as agent or SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 29
189
Garner, B., Definition of Power of Attorney, Black’s Law Dictionary (12
th
ed. 2024), available at POWER OF
ATTORNEY | Secondary Sources | FE | Westlaw Edge (last visited Feb. 27, 2025).
190
Stahl v. Metro Dade Cnty., 438 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 1983).
191
Amora, 944 So. 2d at 435 (quoting Goldberg v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 899 So.2d 1105, 116 (Fla. 2005)
(quoting McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992).
192
Id. at 436.
193
McCain, 593 So. 2d at 504.
attorney-in-fact for the grantor.”
189
V.D.C.’s power of attorney
for L.P. gave her legal authority to take certain actions or
make decisions but did not provide her with custody of L.P.
Without a clear understanding of the Department’s
expectations, V.D.C. could have, and indeed did, leave L.P.
with Ms. Parker unsupervised. In other words, the power of
attorney authorizing V.D.C. to make decisions, for instance,
about L.P.’s medical issues did not mean, standing alone, that
V.D.C. was not going to leave Ms. Parker alone with L.P. or
that she would ensure Ms. Parker would not harm her. If the
Department expected V.D.C. to undertake this role, the
Department ought to have memorialized this understanding in
a written safety plan with supervised visitation in these specific
circumstances.
Accordingly, the Department failed to take steps that an
ordinary prudent CPI would have taken in this instance. For
these reasons, the undersigned finds that the Department
breached the foregoing duties when conducting its
investigation of L.P.’s potential inadequate supervision.
Proximate Cause
In order to prove negligence, the claimant must show that the
breach of duty caused the specific injury or damage to the
plaintiff.
190
Proximate cause is generally concerned with
“whether and to what extent the defendant’s conduct
foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that
actually occurred.”
191
To prove proximate cause, the plaintiff
generally must submit evidence that “there is a natural, direct,
and continuous sequence between the [Department’s]
negligence and [the children’s] injuries such that it can
reasonably be said that but for the [Department’s] negligence,
the abuse [or neglect] to [L.P.] would not have occurred.”
192
In the proximate cause context, “foreseeability is concerned
with the specific, narrow factual details of the case, not with
the broader zone of risk the defendant created.”
193
Harm is
proximate “if prudent human foresight would lead one to SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 30
194
Id. (citing Cone v. Inter County Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 So.2d 148, 149 (Fla. 1949)).
195
Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts s. 435 (1965)).
196
McCain, 593 So.2d, at 504
197
Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Supply, 445 So.2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 2013).
expect that similar harm is likely to be substantially caused by
the specific act or omission in question. In other words, human
experience teaches that the same harm can be expected to
recur if the same act or omission is repeated in a similar
context.”
194
The Florida Supreme Court held “…it is immaterial
that the defendant could not foresee the precise manner in
which the injury occurred or its exact extent
195
…an injury
caused by a freakish and improbable chain of events would
not be ‘proximate’ precisely because it is unquestionably
unforeseeable, even where the injury may have arisen from a
zone of risk.”
196
(emphasis added). The Florida Supreme
Court held:
“On the issue of the fact of causation, as on other
issues essential to his cause of action for
negligence, the plaintiff, in general, has the burden
of proof. He must introduce evidence which affords
a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more
likely than not that the conduct of the defendant
was a substantial factor in bringing about the
result. A mere possibility of such causation is not
enough; and when the matter remains one of pure
speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are
at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the
court to direct a verdict for the defendant.”
197
Florida Standard Jury Instruction 401.12 on legal
cause (causation), which is the standard applicable to
claimant’s negligence claim provides in Part A of the
Instruction:
Negligence is a legal cause of injury if it
directly and in natural and continuous sequence
produces or contributes substantially to producing
such injury so that it can reasonably be said that,
but for the negligence, the injury would not have
occurred. (Emphasis added).
Importantly, Part B of the instruction reads:
SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 31
198
Amora, 944 So. 2d at 437.
199
Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Scherer, 558 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1990).
200
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tompkins, 651 So. 2d 89, 91 (Fla. 1995).
201
Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (Fla. 1977).
202
ACandS, Inc. v. Redd, 703 So.2d 492, 495 (Fla. 3
rd
DCA 1997) (finding a jury award for $7.2 million for five
and a half years of loss of consortium to be excessive).
In order to be regarded as a legal cause of an injury
or damage, negligence need not be the only cause.
Negligence may be a legal cause of injury or
damages even though it operates in combination
with the act of another, (such as A.P.) some natural
cause, or some other cause if the negligence
contributes substantially to producing such loss,
injury, or damage. (Emphasis added).
In Amora, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
“Although not specifically addressed in Yamuni, implicit in the
supreme court’s opinion affirming the verdict is that [the
Department’s] negligent failure to place the infant in protective
supervision was the proximate cause of his injuries.”
198
The Department’s failure to implement the safety plan with
supervised visitation left L.P. at a foreseeable risk of harm.
Like Amora, but for the Department’s failure to implement a
safety plan with supervised visits, Ms. Parker would not have
attempted to murder L.P. Based on the totality of the
circumstances set out above, the Department’s breaches are
the proximate cause of L.P.’s injuries. This finding is
supported by the jury verdict in the underlying civil case.
For these reasons, the undersigned finds that there is
sufficient evidence to hold that the Department’s breach of
duty was the proximate cause of L.P.’s injuries.
Damages
Florida law allows recovery for both economic (e.g. medical
expenses) and non-economic (e.g. pain and suffering)
damages.
199
Future economic damages may be awarded
“when such damages are established with reasonable
certainty.”
200
“In tort cases damages are to be measured by
the jury’s discretion.”
201
However, Florida courts have
considered whether awards are excessive.
202
The claimant presented evidence of economic damages and
non-economic damages. The damages explained above in SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 32
203
Economic Damages Report at 2-9.
the factual findings detail the jury verdict in the underlying civil
case for which the amount of damages is sought, and which
is supported by the expert reports in this claim bill. The
undersigned did not have the benefit of hearing evidence from
experts from both parties but relied upon the totality of the
evidence to make the findings set out below.
Economic damages (present value) based on the economic
damages report are summarized as follows:
203
Past medical expenses: $30,248.33
Lifetime earning capacity: $1,170,184 to $1,916,929
Potential offset for earning capacity: ($300,987) to ($490,112)
Future Medical Expenses: $7,932,170 to $14,002,766
Subtotal $8,831,615.33 to 15,459,831.33
Total economic damages: $8,304,351.33 to $14,651,891.33
Future Medical Costs
There is little to no evidence to support awarding the high-end
($14,002,766) versus the low-end ($7,932,170) future medical
costs. The difference between the two totals is a significant
amount totaling $6,070,596, most of which is attributable to
the live in attendant residential option discussed below. The
economic damages report suggests the remaining differences
are based on, for instance, a range of costs, number of hours,
or number of sessions per service. The range of frequency
and costs were presented but choosing the higher range,
rather than the lower range, was not substantiated. The
burden of proof is on the claimant and the claimant has
presented insufficient evidence to support the high-end costs.
Residential Option
Dr. Shahnasarian’s recommendation of a live-in attendant
beginning at age 18 to 21 for life is supported by his
competent testimony. During the claim bill hearing issues
were raised about whether the following may impact the life
care plan and, in particular, the live-in attendant
recommendation, such as (a) Dr. Shahnasarian’s last
interview or updates he has received about L.P. was in
August and September 2021, respectively, over three (3)
years ago, (b) L.P. has made progress since he interviewed
her, such as forming social bonds with friends, and (c) L.P.
has not been engaging in all of the recommended services in
the life care plan that are supposed to serve as interventions SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 33
204
Id.
205
Hearing at 4:53:44-4:53:50.
206
Id. at 4:53:55-4:54:15.
to improve her prospects of requiring such an intensive
intervention as a live-in attendant. However, Dr.
Shahnasarian addressed these issues and confirmed that his
life care plan conclusions have not changed.
In light of the issues raised, the undersigned considered the
other residential options B and C set out in the life care plan.
These other options recommend less frequent attendant
services, but the economists did not include a present value
or calculate an average annual base cost for these possible
options.
204
Although the life care plan sets out a duration,
frequency and estimated cost for Option C so a cost for this
intervention could be estimated, given Dr. Shahnasarian’s
testimony that Option C is unlikely, there is insufficient
evidence to award damages under options B or C as
presented for consideration.
Offsets and Services Not Received for Other Future Medical
Recommended Services
The life care plan does not account for L.P.’s current Medicaid
coverage, future insurance coverages, scholarships that may
be available to assist with the private school tuition and the
potential and actual cessation of services as indicated at the
claim bill hearing where it was discovered that her only
services currently are the weekly sessions with Dr. Cortman,
psychiatric services, private school tuition, and medications
that are likely covered by Medicaid. Further, V.D.C. and S.C.
receive an adoption subsidy from the Department
205
and
could apply for an enhanced subsidy based on L.P.’s special
needs.
206
The claim bill also fails to take into account existing
medical liens by Simply Health and Optum totaling
$30,248.33 which will need to be satisfied should the bill pass.
Based on this, the undersigned recommends reducing the
low-end economic damages sought by the following
adjustments:
Family counseling: ($12,873)
Tutoring Year 1 to Grade 8: ($44,899)
Life skills (Year 1 to 3) cost of $15,600 per year: ($46,800)
Prescription drugs: ($288,777) SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 34
207
Economic Damages Report at 2-9.
208
The lifetime earning capacity is based on the jury verdict which the undersigned has determined to be
reasonable.
209
Knight v. Merhige, 133 So. 3d 1140 (2014).
Totals: ($393,349)
Based on the foregoing, the recommended economic
damages are summarized as follows:
Economic damages (present value) based on the economic
damages report are summarized as follows:
207
Past medical expenses (medical liens): $30,248.33
Lifetime earning capacity:
208
$1,500,000
Future Medical Expenses: $7,538,821
Total economic damages: $9,069,069.33
Non-economic Damages
The jury in the underlying civil claim awarded $12,466,985.47
in non-economic damages. The Second District Court of
Appeal affirmed per curiam the final judgment in the
underlying civil claim. However, the amount of non-economic
damages awarded by the jury of $12,466,985.47 exceed the
amount of economic damages supported by the record and
recommended by the undersigned of $9,069,069.33.
Precedence for claim bills regarding child welfare is limited
and the undersigned did not identify any that are sufficiently
analogous to the nature of this claim to be able to recommend
a comparable amount of non-economic damages. The
Legislature may wish to determine, as a matter of grace, an
amount of non-economic damages, if any, that should be
awarded in this claim bill.
COMPARATIVE FAULT : Although the Department denies being negligent in its June
2015 report investigation, the Department submits that should
SB 12 be reported favorably that V.D.C. is liable for a
percentage of fault under the doctrine of comparative fault.
Claimant’s Position
The Claimant submits that under the Knight
209
case V.D.C.
had no duty to protect L.P. and therefore she is not
comparatively negligent. The Knight case sets out the general
rule that “there is no duty to control the conduct of a third SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 35
210
Id. at 1145 (citing Carney v. Gambel, 751 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 4
th
DCA 1999; see also Boynton v. Burglass,
590 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)).
211
Id. at 1144.
212
Id.
213
Koenig v. London, 968 N.W. 2d 646, 656 (2021).
214
Email from Damian Mallard, Attorney at Mallard Perez for the claimant, to Jacqueline Moody, Florida Senate
Special Master, RE: SB 12 – LXC (LP) v. DCF, (Feb. 15, 2025) (on file with Senate Special Master).
215
Email from Cheryl Westmoreland, Attorney for the Department, to Jacqueline Moody, Florida Senate Special
Master, RE: SB 12 – LXC (LP) v. DCF, (Feb. 17, 20215) (on file with Senate Special Master).
216
Limited documents were provided to support these assertions.
person to prevent [that person] from causing physical harm to
another.”
210
However, a legal duty may be imposed when:
• There is a special relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant,
211
• The defendant controls the premises, instrumentality or
person causing the injury,
212
or
• The defendant’s “affirmative acts or omissions create a
foreseeable high risk of harm.”
213
In the Knight case parents failed to prevent their adult child
from killing other family members at a Thanksgiving dinner.
The court declined to impose a duty on a parent for their adult
child’s criminal actions. The Department stipulates that V.D.C.
did not have a legal duty to speak with the Department. The
undersigned finds that the facts of this claim bill are analogous
to the Knight case to the extent that none of the three tests for
imposing a legal duty in the Knight case apply in this claim bill.
The Department’s Position
The Department submits that V.D.C. is liable under
comparable fault based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts
ss. 324A and 311 (1965). The Claimant submits these
provisions do not apply; the Knight case is controlling law that
establishes a “lack of duty and the inapplicability of the
undertaker doctrine.” Although the Legislature is not bound by
the findings of the courts in this matter, it should be noted the
claimant represented that the trial court granted the claimant’s
Motion in Liminie “…precluding comparative negligence
arguments against V.D.C.”
214
and, although the Department
represented that the issue was argued on appeal,
215
the
Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the
civil case per curiam.
216
The Department submits, however that, even if V.D.C. has no
duty to provide information to the investigators, V.D.C. had an
“undertaker duty”; once she decided to answer questions for SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 36
217
Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So.2d 1182, 1186 (Fla. 2003)
218
See Roe ex rel. Roe v. Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services, 278 Kan. 584 (2004) (holding that the
Department of Social & Rehabilitative Services did not owe a duty under the Restatement (Second) of Torts s.
324A given the facts of the case).
219
See Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2009) (holding the Restatement (Second) of Torts s. 324A applied
where a law enforcement officer who responded to a 911 call and undertook a safety check on an individual
assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care).
the Department she was required to do that voluntary act in a
non-negligent manner.
“Whenever one undertakes to provide a service to
others, whether one does so gratuitously or by
contract, the individual who undertakes to provide
the service—i.e., the ‘undertaker’—thereby
assumes a duty to act carefully and not to put
others at an undue risk of harm.”
217
The undertaker’s doctrine, as set out in The Restatement
(Second) of Torts s. 324A (“Section 324A”) states:
“One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to another which
he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of a third person or his things, is subject
to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to protect his undertaking, if:
(a) His failure to exercise reasonable care
increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) He has undertaken to perform a duty owed by
the other to the third person, or
(c) The harm is suffered because of reliance of the
other or the third person upon the undertaking.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts is not binding. No Florida
cases have been identified that directly apply section 324A to
situations where a third party provides information to child
protective services. There are limited cases in other states
that have considered the doctrine – but found no duty owed -
involving child welfare
218
and at least one Florida court applied
the doctrine involving the protection of third parties by
another.
219
SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 37
220
See Union Park Memorial Chapel v. Hutt, 670 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1996) (holding the Restatement (Second) of Tort
s. 324A applied where a funeral home that voluntarily organized and led a funeral procession owed a duty of
reasonable care to the participants, noting that the funeral home’s undertaking created a foreseeable zone of risk
for those involved.)
However, in such instances, an entity provided the services,
not an individual. Section 324A has been applied to other
types of cases where individuals have rendered services.
220
But no Florida case has been identified directly applying
Section 324A to situations where an individual, in a non-
official capacity, provides information that is deemed a
service.
The Department simply argues that V.D.C. undertook a duty
to act carefully when she voluntarily went out to meet and
provided information to the investigators. With respect to
applying section 324A, this submission falls short of the
requirement of (b) [V.D.C.] undertook to perform a duty owed
by the other person [Ms. Parker or the Department] to a third
person [L.P.]. Providing information was not a duty of the
Department or Ms. Parker. Applying section 24 to the
evidence in this claim bill:
(a) V.D.C.’s failure to exercise reasonable care increased
the risk of harm to L.P. by leaving Ms. Parker alone
with L.P.
(b) V.D.C. may have undertaken responsibility that
another (the Department or Ms. Parker) originally had
toward L.P. by presenting the power of attorney and
suggesting that she was caring for her, but she did not
give any undertaking for how long she planned to care
for her, that she would keep custody of her, or that she
would protect L.P. from Ms. Parker.
(c) The Department did rely on V.D.C.’s representation
that she had power of attorney and was caring for L.P.
Based on the above analysis, Section 324A would fall short
and not apply to the facts of this claim bill.
Additionally, Restatement (Second) of Torts s. 311 (1965)
(“section 311) states: “one who negligently gives false
information to another is subject to liability for physical harm
caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance
upon such information, where such harm results…to such
third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by
the action taken.”
SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 38
221
See In re: Zantac (Ranitidine) Products Liability Litigation, 546 F.Supp. 3d 1192, 1199 (S.D. Fla. 2021)
(acknowledging that the defendant, pharmaceutical manufacturer, could be held liable for claims that are on
based on negligent representation articulated in Section 311); Belik v. Carlson Travel Group, Inc., 26 F.Supp. 3d
1267, 1273 (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens a Section 311 claim, amongst
others, brought by a cruise ship passenger who was injured at a restaurant in a cruise ship terminal in Mexico);
Klein v. Receivable Management Group, Inc., 595 F.Supp.3d 1183, 1191 (M.D. Fla. 2022) (holding a consumer’s
Section 311 claim against a debt collector alleged insufficient damages).
222
See M.B. v. Schuylkill County, 375 F.Supp. 3d 574, 602-603 (E.D. Penn. 2019) (holding that Pennsylvania
adopted Section 311 and a private foster-placement organization, caseworker, and employees could be held
liable under Section 311 for failing to disclose a foster child’s sexual history that resulted in another child in the
home being sexually abused).
223
Section 311.
No Florida state case has been identified directly applying
section 311, but a few federal cases in Florida have
considered the provision.
221
Other states’ cases have
considered section 311 in abuse cases when organizations
(such as a private foster-placement organization or school
board) and their employees have been alleged to provide
false information.
222
No analogous cases were identified
where an individual made false statements to child protection
services that were relied upon and resulted in harm; section
311 comments provide that “the rule is not, however, limited
to information given in a business or professional capacity, or
to those engaged in a business or profession.”
223
Applying the provision to the facts in this case:
• Undertaking a duty: V.D.C. undertook to provide
information to the Department, recognizing it was
necessary for L.P.’s protection.
• Negligent misrepresentation: V.D.C. provided false
information without exercising reasonable care. On June
25, 2015, V.D.C.:
o Informed CPI Supervisor and CPI Supervisor
Tucker that Ms. Parker was not there when in fact
Ms. Parker was present and misidentifying herself
as Valencia Dubois. Had Ms. Carey in fact informed
them that Ms. Parker was inside the house, as she
testified to during the claim bill hearing, the
undersigned is confident that the Department would
have taken additional steps to confront Ms. Parker
about her lies and the allegations.
o Misled the CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez to
believe that Ms. Parker gave her power of attorney
because Ms. Parker reportedly did hair in Orlando.
However, V.D.C.’s own statements to CPI
Supervisor Tucker on June 26, 2015, the day after SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 39
224
Video Interview of V.D.C. 13:45:27-13:47:47 (June 26, 2015).
225
Reliance is measured by an objective standard. In re Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Shooting FTCA
Litigation, 482 F.Supp. 3d 1273, 1297 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
the home visit, made clear that the purpose of the
power of attorney was to prevent the Department
from taking L.P. if an abuse report was made
against Ms. Parker. The information Ms. Parker and
V.D.C. told CPI Supervisor Tucker and CPI Lopez
on June 25, 2015, did just that – kept L.P. in Ms.
Parker’s custody. On June 26, 2015, when CPI
Supervisor Tucker interviewed V.D.C. after the
stabbing incident, the following conversation took
place:
“CPI Supervisor Tucker: So how – how did you end
up with power of attorney?
Ms. Carry (sic): I can’t answer about that because I
don’t remember right off hand.
CPI Supervisor Tucker: But it was back in 2009?
Ms. Carry (sic): Uh-huh
CPI Supervisor Tucker: Okay.
Ms. Carry (sic): I think what it was when someone
had called DCF on her, and I said before I let
anybody else take my baby from me,
CPI Supervisor Tucker: Okay.
Ms. Carry (sic): -- sign her over to me.
CPI Supervisor Tucker: Okay. Okay.
Ms. Carry (sic): Yeah. That’s all I can remember to
tell you.
CPI Supervisor Tucker: Okay. So who –
Ms. Carry (sic): People used to call (indiscernible)
every week.
CPI Supervisor Tucker: And why was that?
Ms. Carry (sic): I have no idea.
CPI Supervisor Tucker: Okay.
Ms. Carry (sic): Okay. And so I told her to make
sure she signs her over to me because I will take
care of her.”
224
• Reasonable reliance: The Department reasonably
relied
225
upon information provided by V.D.C. when
deciding to leave L.P. in Ms. Parker’s care based on the
information corroborated by V.D.C. at the time. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 40
ATTORNEY FEES: In compliance with section 768.28(8), of the Florida Statutes,
Claimant’s attorneys acknowledged that attorney fees,
lobbying fees, and other similar expenses relating to this claim
may not exceed 25 percent of any amount awarded by the
Legislature as is reflected in the language of the bill.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Recommended Amendments
Lines 3-8 of the claim bill should be amended to remove the
appropriation to Sidney and Valeria Carey and reflect the
award going to L.P. directly paid to the Special Needs Trust
created for her benefit. Lines 12 and 21 of the claim bill should
be amended to reflect the date of the incident was June 25,
2015.
Recommendation on the Merits
The greater weight of the evidence in this matter
demonstrates that the negligence of the Department is the
legal proximate cause of the injuries and damage suffered by
L.P.
Based on the evidence supported by the record, the
undersigned recommends economic damages in the amount
of $9,069,069.33. The Legislature may wish to exercise its
discretion by awarding non-economic damages as a matter of
grace.
226
Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 728, 734 (Cal. 1990) (apply a standard of reasonable care suggesting an
objective standard should apply).
• Foreseeable harm: It was foreseeable that such
information could lead to L.P.’s physical harm. If the
Department relied on V.D.C.’s false statements and
decided not to take protective measures, it is foreseeable
that L.P. would be at risk of harm if left unsupervised with
Ms. Parker.
226
Despite the lack of precedence, should the Legislature decide
to apply section 311, there are sufficient facts to support a
finding that V.D.C. undertook a duty to exercise reasonable
care and is liable under the doctrine of comparative fault for
providing false information to the Department in these
circumstances.
SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 12
March 27, 2025
Page 41
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that SB 12 be
reported FAVORABLY, with recommended amendments, the
funds allocated for the benefit of L.P. being paid into a Special
Needs trust established for L.P., and any reduction in amount
deemed appropriate by the Legislature.
Respectfully submitted,
Jacqueline M. Moody
Senate Special Master
cc: Secretary of the Senate