THE FLORIDA SENATE
SPECIAL MASTER ON CLAIM BILLS
Location
409 The Capitol
Mailing Address
404 South Monroe Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1100
(850) 487-5229
DATE COMM ACTION
3/20/25 SM Favorable
3/25/35 JU Pre-meeting
CA
RC
March 20, 2025
The Honorable Ben Albritton
President, The Florida Senate
Suite 409, The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1100
Re: SB 96 – Senator Bernard
HB 6521 – Representative Weinberger
Relief of Jacob Rodgers by the City of Gainesville
SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT
THIS IS A CONTESTED EXCESS JUDGMENT CLAIM FOR
LOCAL FUNDS IN THE AMOUNT OF $10,800,000.00. THIS
AMOUNT IS THE REMAINING UNPAID BALANCE OF A
$11,000,000.00 JURY VERDICT REGARDING THE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE CITY OF GAINESVILLE, WHICH
RESULTED IN THE INJURY OF JAC OB RODGERS.
FINDINGS OF FACT: The Accident on October 7, 2015
On the evening of October 7, 2015, Jacob Rodgers was riding
in a truck with his two friends, Hank Blackwell and Chantz
Thomas. During the day, the trio worked as electrical helpers;
during the evening, they were enrolled in Santa Fe
Community College’s training program to become certified
electricians and attended night classes. On that particular
evening, the three friends had carpooled from work to night
school and were returning to retrieve their vehicles from work
around 8 pm. The truck belonged to Mr. Blackwell, and Mr.
Blackwell was driving. Mr. Thomas was in the passenger seat
and Mr. Rodgers was in the back seat. Notably, Mr. Rodgers
was not wearing his seatbelt.
SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 2
Around the same time, William Stormant, a City of
Gainesville
1
employee, was traveling home from work in his
city-owned vehicle that was provided to him by his employer.
Just before leaving, Mr. Stormant went to the on-site gym for
the first time, and by the time he left, it was dark outside. On
his way home, Mr. Stormant was going to drive by a
substation
2
that he managed to check if the gate was closed.
That particular site had a history of having construction
materials stolen, so a gate was installed to curtail the thefts.
Because it was so dark, Mr. Stormant could not see the gate
from where he was driving, so he took a detour to drive close
enough to see it. As he approached the gate, he saw it was
locked and closed. Once he concluded his inspection, he
turned around and left. While driving, Mr. Stormant took an
interest in the LED lighting in the area
3
and ended up taking
his focus off the road. Since he was not paying attention to his
driving, he did not see the upcoming stop sign and he failed
to stop.
Mr. Stormant was already in the middle of the intersection
when he realized he missed the stop sign. Before he knew it,
he collided with the truck being driven by Mr. Blackwell and
caused it to flip. As a result, Mr. Rodgers was ejected from the
vehicle. According to the accident report, the truck overturned
an unknown number of times and landed upright on the grass
shoulder.
4
LITIGATION HISTORY: A lawsuit was filed in February of 2016 with a claim of
vicarious liability negligence on behalf of Jacob Rodgers
against the City of Gainesville (“the City”). The Third Amended
Complaint alleged that the City’s employee, William
Stormant—in the course and scope of his employment—
negligently failed to obey a stop sign and caused his vehicle
to collide with Hank Blackwell’s truck, which led to Mr.
1
Mr. Stormant works for the Gainesville Regional Utilities, which is under the City of Gainesville. See Day 1 part 2
(PM) Trial Testimony, 294.
2
Mr. Stormant’s working title was “Energy Measurement and Regulation Manager,” which meant he was a
“manager over the substation group, the relay group, the gas and electric metering group.” See Day 1 part 2 (PM)
Trial Testimony, 301.
3
Mr. Stormant attended a meeting earlier in the day in which a participant discussed the new LED lights that were
being installed, which is why he diverted his attention from the road to the lights. Id.
4
See Crash Report Update 10-13-2015, 3. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 3
Rodgers suffering “serious, life threatening and permanent
physical and emotional injuries.”
Pre-trial
The City argued that sovereign immunity barred Mr.
Rodgers’s claim because Mr. Stormant was not acting within
the course and scope of his employment when he detoured to
check the substation gate. It reasoned that Mr. Stormant was
on his way home and had already concluded his workday, so
he was not acting on behalf of his employer. The City filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting this position and
argued that it was not responsible for Mr. Stormant’s negligent
driving. In October of 2018, the trial court denied the City’s
motion, concluding that Mr. Stormant was acting within the
course and scope of his duties at the time of the accident.
5,6
Trial
Mr. Rodgers testified that, at the time of the accident, he was
riding in the back seat of Mr. Blackwell’s truck and was not
wearing his seatbelt.
7
After he was ejected from the vehicle,
he lost all memory from the moment of impact to when he
awoke.
8
Upon regaining consciousness, he could no longer
feel his lower body; it was completely and permanently
paralyzed.
9
He also sustained a skull fracture; his ear was
hanging off and had to be restitched to his head;
10
and his
broken spine had to be stabilized with the surgical installation
of a bar.
11
As a result of the accident, Mr. Rodgers was bound
to a wheelchair.
5
See Order Denying COG’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment, 2-3. The trial court acknowledged the City’s
assertion of the “going and coming rule” set forth in section 440.092 of the Florida Statutes. However, the court
also applied the dual-purpose doctrine, an exception to that rule which allows for waiver of sovereign immunity
when the employee’s travel is serving a dual purpose, one of which being business in nature. In this case, Mr.
Stormant was serving a business purpose when he detoured to check the substation and a personal purpose
when he was returning to his drive home, so the trial court concluded that he was acting within the course and
scope of his work duties.
6
The City appealed the trial court’s decision to the First District Court of Appeal. That court per curiam affirmed
the trial court’s decision.
7
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 181.
8
See Id.
9
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 185.
10
See Id.
11
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 187. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 4
Mr. Rodgers also testified that he had to relearn how to do
basic tasks, such as going to the bathroom; getting himself
from a chair to a toilet seat; wheeling himself around for
movement; getting dressed; and putting on shoes.
12
Mr.
Rodgers also testified that he has to use a catheter to urinate
because he cannot urinate normally.
13
This makes him
susceptible to urinary tract infections, which requires medical
treatment.
14
In order to perform a bowel movement, Mr.
Rodgers explained that because he has no sensation in his
lower body, he has to manually dig his waste out of his body.
15
Additionally, Mr. Rodgers testified that, because of the
paralysis, the change in his circulation has made him
susceptible to blood clots.
16
In order to prevent these, he has
to physically massage his legs to push blood through his
veins, keep his legs propped up, and constantly check them
for heat or red spots; if he does not, any undetected blood clot
could prove fatal.
17
Mr. Rodgers testified that he was attending school to become
an electrician, but he can no longer do that job because of his
disability.
18
William Stormant, the employee of the City, testified that he
was on his way home from work when he detoured to check
if a substation gate was locked, as he could not see it from the
road because it was too dark.
19
After he confirmed the gate
was closed, he resumed his drive home from his detour.
Shortly after he resumed his drive, he noticed the new LED
lights, which caught his attention and distracted him from the
road.
20
Before he knew it, he had run a stop sign and entered
the middle of an intersection.
21
He testified that he impacted
the truck that Mr. Rodgers was a passenger in.
22
The City presented the testimony of an accident
reconstruction expert, who testified that, had Mr. Blackwell
12
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 188.
13
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 193.
14
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 198.
15
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 200-201.
16
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 213.
17
Id.
18
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 171.
19
See Day 1 part 2 (PM) Trial Testimony, 297.
20
See Day 1 part 2 (PM) Trial Testimony, 301.
21
Id.
22
Id. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 5
been going the speed limit, the accident would not have
occurred.
23
He presented a simulation that he relied on to
come to this conclusion.
24
The City also presented the testimony of a biomechanics
expert, who testified that, had Mr. Rodgers been wearing his
seatbelt, he would not have been ejected from the truck and
would have sustained only light injuries.
25
The City maintained its position that sovereign immunity
barred Mr. Rodgers’s claim and argued that the amount he
was asking for should be reduced by the fact that Mr. Rodgers
was not wearing his seatbelt and that Mr. Blackwell was going
approximately 10 mph in excess of the speed limit at the time
of the accident.
26
The jury deliberated and entered a verdict in favor of Mr.
Rodgers. The jury found that Mr. Stormant was “a legal cause
of loss, injury, or damage to” Mr. Rodgers.
27
Due to confusion
with the jury instructions,
28
the jury awarded Mr. Rodgers
$120,000,000.00.
The City filed two post-trial motions in response to this verdict:
a motion for new trial and alternative motion for remittitur, and
a motion to set aside the verdict. The trial court denied both,
but granted the motion for remittitur, reducing Mr. Rodgers’s
overall award to $18,319,181.20. Both parties appealed the
final judgment. The appellate court affirmed the issue of
damages and expressly rejected the City’s argument that Mr.
Stormant was not acting in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident but remanded the case
to the trial court to conduct a new trial on the jury instruction
issue and the allocation of fault.
29
23
Trial Transcript – Day 4 AM Session, 12 (39).
24
Id.
25
Trial Transcript – Day 4 AM Session, 22 (78).
26
Mr. Blackwell estimated that he was going 50 miles an hour at the time of the accident. However, the computer
in his car showed he was going nine or ten miles an hour over the 45-mph speed limit. See Trial Transcript – Day
2 AM Session, 42.
27
See 2021-05-06 - Verdict.
28
The jury determined that Mr. Rodgers was not a legal cause of his injuries because not wearing a seatbelt in
the back seat is not a crime in Florida. Therefore, it concluded that Mr. Rodgers not wearing a seatbelt was not a
legal cause of his injury because he was doing nothing illegal that contributed to his damages.
29
The appellate court ordered a new trial and directed the trial court to instruct the jury that “Stormant was
negligent and the City is liable for Stormant’s actions.” See City of Gainesville v. Rodgers, 377 So. 3d 626, 634
(Fla. 1st DCA 2023); 2023-11-19 Opinion-Disposition, 11. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 6
In lieu of a new trial, the parties agreed to settle the case.
30
Both parties agreed to a judgment in the amount of
$11,000,000.00, but both parties reserved all rights with
respect to a legislative claim bill.
31
The City included, and Mr.
Rodgers agreed to, the provision that: “The City/GRU does
not waive any defenses of sovereign immunity and does not
agree to execution of judgment beyond the statutory cap
provided in FS 768.28.”
32
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: The claim bill held on February 28, 2025, was a de novo
proceeding to determine whether the City of Gainesville is
liable in negligence for damages caused by its employee,
William Stormant, acting within the scope of his employment,
to the claimant, and, if so, whether the amount of the claim is
reasonable. This report is based on evidence presented to the
special master prior to, during, and after the hearing. The
Legislature is not bound by settlements or jury verdicts when
considering a claim bill, the passage of which is an act of
legislative grace.
Under the legal doctrine of respondeat superior, Sarasota
County is responsible for the wrongful acts of its employees
when the acts are committed within the scope of their
employment. Being that Ms. Parnell was operating a parks-
and-recreation vehicle in the course and scope of her
employment at the time of the collision, and because the
vehicle was owned by Sarasota County, the County is
responsible for negligence committed by Ms. Parnell.
Negligence
There are four elements to a negligence claim: (1) duty –
where the defendant has a legal obligation to protect others
against unreasonable risks; (2) breach – which occurs when
the defendant has failed to conform to the required standard
of conduct; (3) causation – where the defendant’s conduct is
foreseeably and substantially the cause of the resulting
damages; and (4) – damages – actual harm.
33
30
See Settlement Agreement with Plaintiff’s Signature.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003). SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 7
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by the greater weight
of the evidence, that the defendant’s action was a breach of
the duty that the defendant owed to the plaintiff.
34
The “greater
weight of the evidence” burden of proof means the more
persuasive and convincing force and effect of the entire
evidence in the case.
In this case, the City of Gainesville’s liability depends on
whether Mr. Stormant negligently operated his city-owned
vehicle and whether that negligent operation caused Mr.
Rodgers’s resulting injuries.
Duty
A legal duty may arise from statutes or regulations; common
law interpretations of statutes of regulations; other common
law precedent; and the general facts of the case.
In this case, Mr. Stormant was responsible for exercising the
duty of reasonable care to others while driving his city-owned
vehicle.
35
Any person operating a vehicle within the state
“shall drive the same in a careful and prudent manner, having
regard for the width, grade, curves, corners, traffic, and all
other attendant circumstances, so as not to endanger the life,
limb, or property of any person. Failure to drive in such
manner shall constitute careless driving and a violation of this
section.”
36
Breach
The undersigned finds that Mr. Stormant breached the duty of
care owed to Mr. Rodgers.
Mr. Stormant testified that he was distracted by the LED lights
and was lost in thought while driving. As a result, he failed to
adhere to the stop sign and drove into the middle of the
intersection.
Causation
Mr. Rodgers’s injuries were the natural and direct
consequence of Mr. Stormant’s breach of his duty. He was
34
Alachua Lake Corp. v. Jacobs, 9 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1942).
35
Gowdy v. Bell 993 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“The operator of a motor vehicle has a duty to use
reasonable care, in light of the attendant circumstances, to prevent injury to persons within the vehicle’s path.”).
36
Mr. Stormant was cited for violating section 316.123(2)(a), of the Florida Statutes, which provides that “every
driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop
line.” See Exhibit #38 (Deposition Exhibits), 2; see section 316.123(2)(a), F.S. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 8
ejected from the vehicle and sustained major injuries as a
result of Mr. Stormant running the stop sign and colliding with
Mr. Blackwell’s truck. The City of Gainesville argues that Mr.
Stormant was not acting within the course and scope of his
employment because he was driving home, but the
undersigned finds that the employee was returning to his
route home from his detour, which he took solely for a
business purpose. Therefore, he was acting within the course
and scope of his duties, and the City of Gainesville, as the
employer, is liable for damages caused by its employee’s
negligent act.
Damages
A plaintiff’s damages are computed by adding these elements
together:
Economic Damages
• Past medical expenses
• Future medical expenses
Non-Economic Damages
• Past pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life
• Future pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life
As a result of the accident, Mr. Rodgers can no longer feel his
lower body; it is completely and permanently paralyzed.
37
He
also sustained a skull fracture; his ear was hanging off and
had to be restitched to his head;
38
and his broken spine had
to be stabilized with the surgical installation of a bar.
39
Mr.
Rodgers is also bound to a wheelchair. Mr. Rodgers’s attorney
provided a breakdown of what the claim bill award would be
used for, should this bill pass.
40
$4,814.57 would be used to
pay for past medical visits, and $285,683.88 would be used to
pay off medical liens.
41
$3,210,355.62 would be used to pay
for attorney fees and costs.
42
37
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 185.
38
See Id.
39
See Trial Transcript Day 2 PM Session, 187.
40
See Rodgers Cost Breakdown, 1.
41
Id., 2.
42
Id. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 9
Mr. Rodgers would net $7,789,644.38.
43
The claimant’s
attorney explained that $3,900,000.00
44
would be used to
“fund a medical annuity that will provide lifetime medical
health benefits for his future medical expenses (mostly for
home health care and hospitalization expenses),”
$1,950,000.00 would purchase “tax free municipal bonds to
supplement his income moving forward in case of future job
loss
45
(future loss earnings),” and $1,000,000.00 would
“establish an investment portfolio to pay for loss of household
services and equipment.”
46
The claimant’s attorney classified
these expenses as past and future economic losses.
47
For
non-economic damages, his attorney stated that $950,000.00
would be invested in a “general investment fund managed for
vacations and enjoyment of life.”
48
The City contests these damages in the entirety, arguing that
Mr. Stormant was not acting within the course and scope of
his employment. In the alternative, the City argues that Mr.
Rodgers was not wearing his seatbelt and more fault should
be assigned to him. Specifically, the City believes the “most
fair allocation of fault for the spinal cord injury is 10% to Mr.
Stormant, 10% to Mr. Blackwell, and 80% to Mr. Rodgers.”
49
Comparative Fault
Florida’s comparative fault statute, section 768.81, F.S.,
applies to this case because Mr. Rodgers, Mr. Blackwell, and
Mr. Stormant were all three at fault for Mr. Rodgers’s injuries.
Mr. Rodgers was at fault for:
• Failing to wear his seat belt.
Mr. Blackwell was at fault for:
• Excessive speeding.
43
Id.
44
See Amended Catastrophic Life Care Plan, 40. Mr. Rodgers submitted a life care plan, in which Dr. Christopher
Leber estimated Mr. Rodgers’s future medical costs to be $4,759,035.37. These costs included physician
services, routine diagnostics, medications, laboratory studies, rehabilitation services, equipment and supplies,
nursing and attendant care, and acute care services.
45
Mr. Rodgers also presented the report of Andrea Bradford, an Associate Vocational Specialist, in which she
explained that Mr. Rodgers’s lost wages are valued somewhere between $392,040 and $576,840. See Amended
Vocational Assessment – J. Rodgers, 36-37.
46
See SB 96 Post-Hearing Follow-up Email (March 11, 2025).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. (March 3, 2025). SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 10
Mr. Stormant was at fault for:
• Violating section 316.123(2)(a), F.S., by failing to stop
at a clearly marked stop sign;
• Failure to operate his vehicle with reasonable care.
While all three were partially at fault in this matter, Mr.
Stormant’s negligence far outweighs that of Mr. Rodgers and
Mr. Blackwell; the undersigned finds there was sufficient
evidence presented to prove the collision ultimately happened
because Mr. Stormant ran the stop sign.
The City believes the “most fair allocation of fault for the spinal
cord injury is 10% to Mr. Stormant, 10% to Mr. Blackwell, and
80% to Mr. Rodgers.”
50
The City argues that 80% of fault
should be allocated to Mr. Rodgers because he was not
wearing his seatbelt, and his injuries were worsened by his
negligent act. However, the undersigned finds that the City’s
suggested allocation fails to take into account that the mere
fact that Mr. Rodgers was not wearing a seatbelt, alone, did
not cause him to be ejected from the vehicle.
51
The collision,
caused by Mr. Stormant’s negligence, was the cause.
52
As
such, the undersigned finds that assigning 80% of fault to Mr.
Rodgers for his failure to wear a seatbelt would be
unreasonable.
The settlement agreement, which was entered into by both
parties, reduced the original award of $18,319,181.20 to
$11,000,000.00
53
in order to avoid a retrial. While the
Legislature is not bound by any settlement agreement, it is
worthy of note that it reduced the original award amount by
50
Id.
51
In support of his position, Mr. Rodgers testified that he habitually does not wear his seatbelt in the back seat,
and he has never been in an accident before. See Day 2 part 2 (PM), 209.
52
The City presented the testimony of an accident reconstructionist. See Day 4 part 1 (AM), 4 (7). Counsel for the
City listed three “ingredients” in the case to him: that Mr. Stormant ran a stop sign, Mr. Blackwell was speeding,
and Mr. Rodgers was not wearing his seatbelt. Id., 18 (63). The witness was asked “if you take out any of those
ingredients, does Mr. Rodgers get ejected from the vehicle?” Id. The witness replied “I don’t think the ejection
happens.” Id. He continued by stating “his occupant space, by and large, is intact after the crash. He’s going to
stay in the truck, that much I think is true.” Id. The undersigned finds this testimony unpersuasive, as he
erroneously assumes the crash would have happened regardless of whether Mr. Rodgers wore a seatbelt. To this
point, the witness was previously asked “It took somebody to blow through a stop sign and hit him to cause the
forces and the flipping of the truck for him to be ejected, correct?” Id., 14 (49). The witness replied “Correct.” Id. It
is undisputed that Mr. Rodgers’s choice to not wear his seatbelt worsened his injuries, but him not wearing a
seatbelt—that fact by itself—did not eject him from the truck, the collision did.
53
This is also the same amount asked for in the claim bill. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 11
40%. This agreement, in effect, assigns 40% of fault to Mr.
Rodgers in exchange for both parties avoiding a retrial. The
undersigned finds that assigning 40% of fault to Mr. Rodgers
is reasonable, and, based on the above discussion of
damages, the $11,000,000.00 request reflects that
appropriate allocation of fault.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds:
• That Mr. Rodgers presented evidence that was
sufficient to prove he suffers from a spinal cord injury
and requires current and future treatment for that
injury;
• The $11,000,000.00 requested in the claim bill is
reasonable and represents a reasonable allocation of
fault to Mr. Rodgers.
IMPACT ON BUDGET :
ATTORNEY FEES:
The undersigned asked for the impact on the budget and the
City responded: “GRU can pull together up to $10.8 million in
cash for a claim bill, but GRU has not budgeted any money
for a claim bill. If the Legislature passes a bill for the $10.8
million amount requested by Claimant, that would equal
roughly one-third of the electric system’s operating cash, and
would hinder the system’s ability to pay its bills. Thus, GRU
would need to make up the money by pulling from its reserves,
cutting the amount budgeted for paying on existing debt and
for its capital improvement plan, or taking on new debt.”
54
Attorney fees may not exceed 25 percent of the amount
awarded, and lobbying fees will be limited to 5 percent of any
amount awarded by the Legislature.
55
Counsel for Rodgers
totaled his attorney fees to $2,612,500.00 and the lobbyist
fees to $137,500.00, both of which fall within the statutory
limits.
56
RECOMMENDATIONS: Based on the reasons above, the undersigned recommends
that Senate Bill 96 be reported FAVORABLY.
54
See SB 96 Post-Hearing Follow-up Email (March 6, 2025).
55
Section 768.28, F.S.
56
See Rodgers Cost Breakdown, 1. SPECIAL MASTER’S FINAL REPORT – SB 96
March 20, 2025
Page 12
Respectfully submitted,
Oliver Thomas
Senate Special Master
cc: Secretary of the Senate