RÉSUMÉ DIGEST
ACT 351 (SB 70) 2018 Regular Session Mizell
Prior law provided that when the court places a defendant on probation, it is to require the
defendant to refrain from criminal conduct and to pay a supervision fee, and it may impose
any specific conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation, including that the defendant
agrees to searches of his person, his property, his place of residence, his vehicle, or his
personal effects, or any or all of them, at any time, by the probation officer or the parole
officer assigned to him, with or without a warrant of arrest or with or without a search
warrant, when the probation officer or the parole officer has reasonable suspicion to believe
that the person who is on probation is engaged in or has been engaged in criminal activity.
New law provides that these searches may also be conducted by any probation or parole
officer who is subsequently assigned or directed by the Department of Public Safety and
Corrections (DPS&C) to supervise the person, whether the assignment or directive is
temporary or permanent.
Prior law provided relative to decisions of the committee on parole and the nature, order, and
conditions of parole. Prior law further provided that one condition that the committee on
parole may impose is that the parolee must agree to visits at his residence or place of
employment by the probation and parole officer at any time, and to searches of his person,
property, residence, or vehicle, when reasonable suspicion exists that criminal activity has
been engaged in while on parole.
New law defines "probation and parole officer" as either the probation and parole officer
originally assigned to the parolee or any probation and parole officer who is subsequently
assigned or directed by DPS&C to supervise the parolee, whether or not such assignment is
temporary or permanent.
New law otherwise retains prior law.
New law provides that the provisions of new law are intended to legislatively overrule the
La. Supreme Court's decision in State of Louisiana v. Brignac, 17-448, (La. 10/18/17), 234
So.3d 46, to the extent that the court held that a warrantless search of a probationer's
residence violates the provisions of prior law (C.Cr.P. Art. 895(A)(13)(a)) relative to a
warrantless search of a probationer's residence when the search is not conducted by the
probation officer assigned to the probationer by the Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections.
Effective August 1, 2018.
(Amends C.Cr.P. Art. 895(A)(13)(a); adds R.S. 15:574.4.2(I))