Renames the judicial nominating commission as the commission on judicial nominations and qualifications. Provides that one commission member is selected by attorneys licensed in Indiana, one commission member is appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, and one commission member is appointed by the president pro tempore of the senate. Requires that, of the three members appointed by the governor, at least one commission member must be an attorney. Prohibits a person who is a lobbyist from serving on the commission. Provides for the governor to fill a vacancy on the supreme court or the court of appeals
One significant change introduced by this resolution is the requirement for justices and judges to apply for retention in office after ten years through the House of Representatives. Retention is contingent on receiving at least 60% approval from the members of the House. This shift in approach emphasizes legislative oversight over judicial appointments, potentially increasing accountability but raising questions about the separation of powers. Furthermore, the bill prescribes a process for filling vacancies, shifting some authority from the executive branch (the Governor) to the legislative body. This could alter the balance of power between these branches of government in terms of judicial appointments.
SJR0015 proposes an amendment to Article 7 of the Indiana Constitution concerning the selection and tenure of justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the Court of Appeals. The bill aims to rename the existing judicial nominating commission to the Commission on Judicial Nominations and Qualifications. The proposed structure of the commission includes representatives selected by attorneys licensed in Indiana, the Speaker of the House, and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, along with appointments made by the Governor, ensuring that at least one commission member must be an attorney. Additionally, it prohibits lobbyists from serving on the Commission, aiming to create a more impartial selection process for judicial nominees.
There may be notable points of contention surrounding SJR0015, particularly regarding concerns that this increased legislative involvement in judicial appointments could undermine the independence of the judiciary. Critics may argue that requiring judges and justices to seek legislative approval for retention creates political pressures that could influence judicial decisions and diminish impartiality in court rulings. Proponents, on the other hand, may argue that this measure enhances accountability and aligns judicial practices with legislative review standards. The debate may center on ensuring judicial integrity while maintaining necessary checks and balances within state governance.