REPORT of the SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE on INITIATIVE PETITIONS on the INITIATIVE PETITION of DIANA DIZOGLIO AND OTHERS FOR THE PASSAGE OF AN ACT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZING THE AUDITOR TO AUDIT THE LEGISLATURE (see House, No. 4251)
The initiative's potential impact on state laws is profound, as it challenges the longstanding tradition of the legislative branch governing its own affairs without external oversight. Proponents believe this transparency is necessary for accountability, while opponents argue it could undermine the legislature’s autonomy and dilute the influence of elected representatives. The legislation, if enacted, would create a precedent for executive oversight over legislative processes, which could lead to conflicts regarding authority between branches of government.
House Bill H4603 proposes an Initiative Petition which aims to grant the Auditor of Massachusetts the authority to audit the state legislature. This bill, presented by Diana DiZoglio, raises significant constitutional questions regarding the separation of powers within the Massachusetts government. The legislation seeks to empower the Executive Branch over the Legislative Branch by allowing the Auditor to conduct reviews of legislative functions, which many experts argue could compromise the checks and balances integral to the state’s democratic framework.
The majority of the Special Joint Committee on Initiative Petitions has recommended against enacting the Initiative Petition in its current form, highlighting the potential risks associated with too much executive authority over legislative accountability. By reframing the role and authority of the state auditor, the bill could inadvertently disrupt the carefully balanced powers that define Massachusetts’ government system.
The discussions surrounding H4603 reveal deep divisions among lawmakers and constitutional experts. Critics, including former Auditor Suzanne Bump and legal scholars, contend that the bill represents an overreach of power that violates the principle of separation of powers as established by both federal and state constitutions. They caution that allowing audits of the legislature by the executive might result in subjective evaluations that could be influenced by political biases, thereby threatening the strategic independence necessary for effective governance. Assertions from the Attorney General's office further highlight concerns regarding the appropriateness of such audits, suggesting they infringe upon powers uniquely granted to the legislature.