Massachusetts 2025-2026 Regular Session

Massachusetts House Bill H1982 Compare Versions

Only one version of the bill is available at this time.

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1	1	1 of 1
2	2	HOUSE DOCKET, NO. 4047 FILED ON: 1/17/2025
3	3	HOUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No. 1982
4	4	The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
5	5	_________________
6	6	PRESENTED BY:
7	7	Lindsay N. Sabadosa
8	8	_________________
9	9	To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in General
10	10	Court assembled:
11	11	The undersigned legislators and/or citizens respectfully petition for the adoption of the accompanying bill:
12	12	An Act relative to the protection of small businesses and workers.
13	13	_______________
14	14	PETITION OF:
15	15	NAME:DISTRICT/ADDRESS :DATE ADDED:Lindsay N. Sabadosa1st Hampshire1/17/2025 1 of 7
16	16	HOUSE DOCKET, NO. 4047 FILED ON: 1/17/2025
17	17	HOUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No. 1982
18	18	By Representative Sabadosa of Northampton, a petition (accompanied by bill, House, No. 1982)
19	19	of Lindsay N. Sabadosa relative to the Massachusetts Antitrust Act. The Judiciary.
20	20	The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
21	21	_______________
22	22	In the One Hundred and Ninety-Fourth General Court
23	23	(2025-2026)
24	24	_______________
25	25	An Act relative to the protection of small businesses and workers.
26	26	Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court assembled, and by the authority
27	27	of the same, as follows:
28	28	1 SECTION 1. Section 2 of chapter 93 of the General Laws, as appearing in the 2022
29	29	2Official Edition, is hereby amended by inserting after the definition of “Demand” the following 3
30	30	3definitions:-
31	31	4 "Monopoly power", the power to control prices or exclude competition. A firm has
32	32	5monopoly power if the firm is able to profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive
33	33	6level for a significant period of time. A firm also has monopoly power if the firm can exclude
34	34	7competitors.
35	35	8 "Monopsony", a market condition where only one buyer exists.
36	36	9 "Monopsony power", where an individual buyer is able to influence demand and price for
37	37	10a good or service.
38	38	11 SECTION 2. Said section 2 of said chapter 93, as so appearing, is hereby further
39	39	12amended by striking out the definition of “New England”. 2 of 7
40	40	13 SECTION 3. Said section 2 of said chapter 93, as so appearing, is hereby further
41	41	14amended by striking out, in lines 17 and 18, the words “; provided, however, that trade or
42	42	15commerce shall not include the conveyance, transfer or use of real property”.
43	43	16 SECTION 4. Section 4 of said chapter 93, as so appearing, is hereby amended by adding
44	44	17the following paragraph:-
45	45	18 Every contract, agreement, arrangement or combination shall be against public policy and
46	46	19unlawful if:
47	47	20 (i) it establishes or maintains a monopoly or monopsony in the conduct of any business,
48	48	21trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in the commonwealth;
49	49	22 (ii) it restrains or may restrain competition or the free exercise of any activity in the
50	50	23conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in the
51	51	24commonwealth; or
52	52	25 (iii) it restrains or may restrain, for the purpose of establishing or maintaining a
53	53	26monopoly or monopsony or unlawfully interfering with the free exercise of any activity in the
54	54	27conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in the
55	55	28commonwealth, any business, trade or commerce or the furnishing of any service.
56	56	29 SECTION 5. Said chapter 93 is hereby further amended by striking out section 5, as so
57	57	30appearing, and inserting in place the following section:-
58	58	31 Section 5. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to monopolize or
59	59	32monopsonize, or attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, or combine or conspire with any other 3 of 7
60	60	33person or persons to monopolize or monopsonize any business, trade or commerce or the
61	61	34furnishing of any service in the commonwealth.
62	62	35 (b)(1) It is unlawful for any person or persons with a dominant position in the conduct of
63	63	36any business, trade or commerce, in any labor market, or in the furnishing of any service in this
64	64	37commonwealth, to abuse the dominant position.
65	65	38 (2) In any action brought under this subsection, a person's dominant position may be
66	66	39established by direct evidence, indirect evidence, or a combination of the two. Examples of
67	67	40direct evidence include, but are not limited to, reduction in output or in quality of goods or
68	68	41services, the imposition of supracompetitive prices, or the ability to force, induce or otherwise
69	69	42coerce a supplier to offer a lower price, discount, advertising allowance or other service than
70	70	43what the supplier offers others. In labor markets, examples of direct evidence of a dominant
71	71	44position include, but are not limited to, the imposition of subcompetitive wages or working
72	72	45conditions; the repeated violation of laws protecting workers such as labor laws, wage-and-hour
73	73	46laws and workplace health and safety laws; or the interference with, restraint of or coercion of
74	74	47workers in the exercise of their full freedom of association to obtain acceptable terms and
75	75	48conditions of employment, including through self-organization, designation of workplace
76	76	49representatives and engagement in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining
77	77	50or other mutual aid or protection. Direct evidence of dominant position includes conduct that is
78	78	51carried out directly or indirectly through another entity or person such as an independent
79	79	52contractor or other intermediary.
80	80	53 (3) A person's dominant position may also be established by indirect evidence such as the
81	81	54person's share of a relevant market. A person who has a share of 40 per cent or greater of a 4 of 7
82	82	55relevant market as a seller shall be presumed to have a dominant position in that market under
83	83	56this subsection. A person who has a share of 30 per cent or greater of a relevant market as a
84	84	57buyer shall be presumed to have a dominant position in that market under this subsection. When
85	85	58determining a relevant market, courts shall examine factors including, but not limited to, industry
86	86	59or public recognition of the market as separate and distinct, the product's peculiar characteristics
87	87	60and uses, unique protection facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price
88	88	61changes and specialized vendors.
89	89	62 (4) If direct evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that a person has a dominant position or
90	90	63has abused such a dominant position, no court shall require definition of a relevant market in
91	91	64order to evaluate the evidence, find liability or find that a claim has been stated under this
92	92	65subsection.
93	93	66 (5) In any action brought under this subsection, abuse of a dominant position may
94	94	67include, but is not limited to, conduct that tends to foreclose or limit the ability or incentive of
95	95	68one or more actual or potential competitors to compete, such as leveraging a dominant position
96	96	69in one market to limit competition in a separate market; refusing to deal with another person with
97	97	70the effect of unnecessarily excluding or handicapping actual or potential competitors; coercing
98	98	71the purchaser of one product, service or contract into purchasing or obtaining a separate and
99	99	72distinct product, service or contract; or engaging in, or coercing a third party into, an exclusive
100	100	73agreement or contract that serves to foreclose or increase costs for a competitor. In labor
101	101	74markets, abuse may include, but is not limited to, imposing restraints, direct or indirect, on the
102	102	75mobility of workers between employers or on the ability of workers to seek employment from
103	103	76multiple employers; restricting the freedom of workers and independent contractors to disclose 5 of 7
104	104	77wage and benefit information; and wage discrimination based on any undisclosed or hidden
105	105	78considerations.
106	106	79 (c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the following restraints are
107	107	80presumed to be illegal when engaged in by a firm in a dominant position :
108	108	81 (i) any restraint that requires another person to deal exclusively or primarily with the firm
109	109	82imposing the restraint or another person specified by that firm or any restraint that has the
110	110	83necessary effect of requiring another person to deal exclusively or primarily with the firm
111	111	84imposing the restraint or another person specified by that firm;
112	112	85 (ii) any restraint that conditions the sale or purchase of any product or services on an
113	113	86agreement to sell or purchase another product or service;
114	114	87 (iii) any restraint on a person's ability to engage in a profession, trade or business of any
115	115	88kind, including any restraint on a person's ability to employ another person;
116	116	89 (iv) any restraint on the prices or wages offered by another firm;
117	117	90 (v) any restraint on another firm's right to independently decide whether to recognize a
118	118	91union of its employees or to otherwise agree to negotiate with its employees collectively over
119	119	92terms and conditions of employment;
120	120	93 (vi) any restraint that the attorney general, through regulation or rulemaking, determines
121	121	94poses a substantial risk of harming competition that is not already presumed illegal; and
122	122	95 (vii) any additional restraint that the attorney general determines, through rulemaking,
123	123	96generally serves no legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive
124	124	97way. 6 of 7
125	125	98 (2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply if the defendant establishes, by clear
126	126	99and convincing evidence, that the pro-competitive benefits of the challenged conduct: (i) are
127	127	100achievable only through that conduct; and (ii) outweigh that conduct's harm to competition. The
128	128	101harm to competition in one market from the challenged conduct may not be offset by purported
129	129	102benefits in a separate market; and the harm to a person or persons from the challenged conduct
130	130	103may not be offset by purported benefits to another person or persons.
131	131	104 (d)(1) The attorney general shall issue guidance on how it will achieve the purposes of
132	132	105subsection (b). The attorney general may issue other guidance with respect to subsection (b).
133	133	106 (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to diminish the jurisdiction of the department
134	134	107of public utilities.
135	135	108 SECTION 6. Section 10 of said chapter 93, as so appearing, is hereby amended by
136	136	109striking out the first paragraph and inserting in place thereof the following paragraph:-
137	137	110 Any person who knowingly violates sections 4 or 5 with specific intent to injure any
138	138	111person, or knowingly aids or participates in such violation with specific intent to injure any
139	139	112person, is guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
140	140	113$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, by a fine not exceeding $100,000 or by
141	141	114imprisonment not exceeding 1 year, or both.
142	142	115 SECTION 7. Said chapter 93 is hereby further amended by inserting after section 13, as
143	143	116so appearing, the following section:- 7 of 7
144	144	117 Section 13A. In any action alleging a violation of a provision of this Act, the attorney
145	145	118general and private litigants shall recover reasonable fees and costs for its expert witnesses and
146	146	119consultants if the attorney general or private litigants prevail in such action.