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3 | 3 | | *hj0007* |
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5 | 5 | | HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 7 |
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6 | 6 | | P1 5lr2834 |
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7 | 7 | | |
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8 | 8 | | By: Delegates Szeliga and Nawrocki |
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9 | 9 | | Introduced and read first time: February 7, 2025 |
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10 | 10 | | Assigned to: Rules and Executive Nominations |
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11 | 11 | | |
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12 | 12 | | HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION |
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13 | 13 | | |
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14 | 14 | | A House Joint Resolution concerning 1 |
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15 | 15 | | |
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16 | 16 | | Opposition to the People’s Republic of China’s Misuse of United Nations 2 |
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17 | 17 | | Resolution 2758 to Delegitimize Taiwan 3 |
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18 | 18 | | |
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19 | 19 | | FOR the purpose of opposing the People’s Republic of China’s misuse of United Nations 4 |
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20 | 20 | | Resolution 2758 to delegitimize Taiwan; and generally relating to support of Taiwan. 5 |
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21 | 21 | | |
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22 | 22 | | WHEREAS, The Republic of China (Taiwan) was one of the 51 original member 6 |
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23 | 23 | | states of the United Nations (UN) at its inception in 1945; and 7 |
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24 | 24 | | |
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25 | 25 | | WHEREAS, On October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 8 |
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26 | 26 | | adopted Resolution 2758, which recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the 9 |
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27 | 27 | | representative of the member state “China” in the UN; and 10 |
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28 | 28 | | |
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29 | 29 | | WHEREAS, The sole purpose of Resolution 2758 was to address the question of 11 |
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30 | 30 | | which government would represent the seat in the UN for China and was never intended 12 |
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31 | 31 | | to address any other topic including those related to Taiwan’s ultimate political status; and 13 |
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32 | 32 | | |
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33 | 33 | | WHEREAS, The PRC frequently conflates Resolution 2758 with its “One China 14 |
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34 | 34 | | Principle” (OCP), which is a policy held by the Chinese Communist Party alleging that the 15 |
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35 | 35 | | PRC is the only sovereign nation using the name “China” and that Taiwan is an inalienable 16 |
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36 | 36 | | part of China; and 17 |
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37 | 37 | | |
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38 | 38 | | WHEREAS, PRC officials misrepresent Resolution 2758, claiming that the adoption 18 |
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39 | 39 | | of the resolution implies acceptance of the PRC’s OCP including the PRC claims to Taiwan 19 |
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40 | 40 | | despite the fact that Resolution 2758 does not and was never meant to represent an 20 |
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41 | 41 | | international consensus regarding Taiwan and whether or not it is a part of the PRC; and 21 |
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42 | 42 | | |
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43 | 43 | | WHEREAS, The PRC misleadingly claims that countries with a “One China Policy” 22 |
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44 | 44 | | have accepted and abide by the PRC OCP and has misused Resolution 2758 to influence 10 23 |
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45 | 45 | | countries since 2016 to change their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC; and 24 |
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46 | 46 | | 2 HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 7 |
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47 | 47 | | |
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48 | 48 | | |
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49 | 49 | | WHEREAS, The One China Policy of the United States does acknowledge the PRC’s 1 |
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50 | 50 | | OCP; however, it affirms that: (1) the United States does not take a position on Taiwan’s 2 |
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51 | 51 | | status and (2) this issue should be resolved peacefully by the people on both sides of the 3 |
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52 | 52 | | Taiwan Strait; and 4 |
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53 | 53 | | |
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54 | 54 | | WHEREAS, In 1982, the United States conveyed the Six Assurances to the Republic 5 |
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55 | 55 | | of China President Chiang Ching–kuo, including that the United States had not changed 6 |
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56 | 56 | | its stance on Taiwan’s sovereignty, and with each successive presidential administration 7 |
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57 | 57 | | the Six Assurances have been reaffirmed; and 8 |
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58 | 58 | | |
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59 | 59 | | WHEREAS, The PRC has weaponized Resolution 2758 and the OCP to isolate and 9 |
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60 | 60 | | delegitimize Taiwan globally and to prevent its participation at the UN, UN–affiliated 10 |
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61 | 61 | | agencies, and other international organizations, including the International Civil Aviation 11 |
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62 | 62 | | Organization and Interpol; and 12 |
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63 | 63 | | |
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64 | 64 | | WHEREAS, Former U.S. officials have observed that the PRC manipulates 13 |
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65 | 65 | | Resolution 2758 to make false claims regarding Taiwan’s status in order to undermine the 14 |
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66 | 66 | | international order and the international system; and 15 |
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67 | 67 | | |
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68 | 68 | | WHEREAS, The PRC’s strategy of disseminating disinformation about the scope and 16 |
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69 | 69 | | purpose of Resolution 2758 is succeeding with some UN members refusing to support 17 |
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70 | 70 | | Taiwan’s participation in UN entities, including the expulsion of Taiwan from the Central 18 |
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71 | 71 | | American Parliament after 20 years as a permanent observer and the routing of 19 |
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72 | 72 | | communications to Taiwan through the PRC; and 20 |
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73 | 73 | | |
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74 | 74 | | WHEREAS, U.S. Department of State officials have made statements making the 21 |
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75 | 75 | | following observations: (1) Resolution 2758 did not endorse, is not equivalent to, and does 22 |
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76 | 76 | | not reflect a consensus for China’s OCP, a term that refers to the PRC’s own position on 23 |
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77 | 77 | | Taiwan; (2) Resolution 2758 has no bearing on countries’ sovereign choices with respect to 24 |
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78 | 78 | | their relationships with Taiwan; (3) Resolution 2758 did not constitute a UN institutional 25 |
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79 | 79 | | position on the ultimate political status of Taiwan; and (4) Resolution 2758 does not 26 |
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80 | 80 | | preclude Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the UN system and other multilateral 27 |
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81 | 81 | | forums; and 28 |
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82 | 82 | | |
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83 | 83 | | WHEREAS, For the third time and for 2 consecutive years, most recently in October 29 |
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84 | 84 | | 2024, the U.S. Department of State sent a letter to state officials, city mayors, and Fortune 30 |
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85 | 85 | | 500 CEOs urging them to deepen their relationship with Taiwan in areas such as trade, 31 |
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86 | 86 | | education, investment, and tourism; and 32 |
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87 | 87 | | |
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88 | 88 | | WHEREAS, U.S. allies including Australia, Canada, the European Parliament, the 33 |
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89 | 89 | | Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have rejected the PRC’s attempt to distort 34 |
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90 | 90 | | Resolution 2758 to exclude Taiwan from UN participation; and 35 |
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91 | 91 | | |
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92 | 92 | | WHEREAS, The PRC’s weaponization of Resolution 2758 includes threats to Taipei 36 |
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93 | 93 | | that if Taiwan does not clarify UN member states’ understanding of the resolution, Beijing 37 |
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94 | 94 | | might overturn the cross–Strait status quo; and 38 |
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95 | 95 | | HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 7 3 |
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96 | 96 | | |
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97 | 97 | | |
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98 | 98 | | WHEREAS, The government of Taiwan appealed to the UNGA for greater inclusion 1 |
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99 | 99 | | at the 79th UNGA in September 2024 which featured the theme “Leaving no one behind: 2 |
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100 | 100 | | acting together for the advancement of peace, sustainable development and human dignity 3 |
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101 | 101 | | for present and future generations”; and 4 |
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102 | 102 | | |
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103 | 103 | | WHEREAS, The PRC’s weaponization of Resolution 2758 has left behind Taiwan’s 5 |
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104 | 104 | | 23.5 million people since 1971; now, therefore, be it 6 |
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105 | 105 | | |
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106 | 106 | | RESOLVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, That the General 7 |
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107 | 107 | | Assembly calls on the UN to oppose the misuse of Resolution 2758 by the PRC and for the 8 |
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108 | 108 | | UN to cease using Resolution 2758 to deny Taiwan participation in UN institutions; and be 9 |
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109 | 109 | | it further 10 |
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110 | 110 | | |
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111 | 111 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly calls on the UN Secretariat to remain 11 |
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112 | 112 | | neutral and to cease citing Resolution 2758 to prevent Taiwanese nationals and news media 12 |
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113 | 113 | | from visiting UN buildings or attending or covering UN conferences and events; and be it 13 |
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114 | 114 | | further 14 |
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115 | 115 | | |
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116 | 116 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly reaffirms that the longstanding One China 15 |
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117 | 117 | | Policy of the United States does not recognize the PRC’s claim of control over Taiwan and 16 |
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118 | 118 | | its outlying islands and reaffirms the interest of the United States in a peaceful resolution 17 |
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119 | 119 | | of cross–Strait issues; and be it further 18 |
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120 | 120 | | |
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121 | 121 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly has not agreed to take any position 19 |
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122 | 122 | | regarding sovereignty over Taiwan and will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into 20 |
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123 | 123 | | negotiations with the PRC; and be it further 21 |
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124 | 124 | | |
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125 | 125 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly reaffirms that the One China Policy of the 22 |
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126 | 126 | | United States and similar policies of its partners are not equivalent to the OCP of the 23 |
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127 | 127 | | Chinese Communist Party; and be it further 24 |
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128 | 128 | | |
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129 | 129 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly emphasizes that Resolution 2758 is not 25 |
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130 | 130 | | equivalent to, and does not endorse or reflect, the PRC’s OCP; and be it further 26 |
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131 | 131 | | |
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132 | 132 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly emphasizes further that Resolution 2758 27 |
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133 | 133 | | does not take a position on Taiwan’s ultimate political status, as explicitly recognized by 28 |
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134 | 134 | | the PRC leaders at the time and does not represent a UN consensus on Taiwan’s status; 29 |
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135 | 135 | | and be it further 30 |
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136 | 136 | | |
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137 | 137 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly opposes China’s distortion of Resolution 31 |
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138 | 138 | | 2758, which is wrongfully conflated with the so–called OCP; and be it further 32 |
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139 | 139 | | |
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140 | 140 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly supports Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in 33 |
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141 | 141 | | continuing official relationships with Taiwan and other nations across the world in 34 |
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142 | 142 | | strengthening their partnership with Taiwan; and be it further 35 |
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143 | 143 | | 4 HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 7 |
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144 | 144 | | |
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145 | 145 | | |
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146 | 146 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly reaffirms support for Taiwan’s 1 |
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147 | 147 | | membership in international organizations for which statehood is not a requirement for 2 |
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148 | 148 | | membership and encourages participation for Taiwan in organizations in which its 3 |
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149 | 149 | | membership is not possible; and be it further 4 |
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150 | 150 | | |
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151 | 151 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly encourages the U.S. government to work 5 |
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152 | 152 | | with partners on joint efforts to counter China’s false narratives about Resolution 2758; 6 |
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153 | 153 | | and be it further 7 |
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154 | 154 | | |
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155 | 155 | | RESOLVED, That the General Assembly supports the efforts of other countries to 8 |
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156 | 156 | | differentiate between their policies and the OCP to counter PRC propaganda about 9 |
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157 | 157 | | international views of Taiwan; and be it further 10 |
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158 | 158 | | |
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159 | 159 | | RESOLVED, That a copy of this Resolution be forwarded by the Department of 11 |
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160 | 160 | | Legislative Services to the Honorable Wes Moore, Governor of Maryland; the Honorable 12 |
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161 | 161 | | William C. Ferguson, IV, President of the Senate of Maryland; the Honorable Adrienne A. 13 |
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162 | 162 | | Jones, Speaker of the House of Delegates; and the Honorable Alexander Yui, representative 14 |
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163 | 163 | | of Taiwan to the United States, 4201 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20016. 15 |
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164 | 164 | | |
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