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4 | 4 | | |
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5 | 5 | | 2023 -- H 5402 |
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6 | 6 | | ======== |
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7 | 7 | | LC001115 |
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8 | 8 | | ======== |
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9 | 9 | | S TATE OF RHODE IS LAND |
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10 | 10 | | IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY |
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11 | 11 | | JANUARY SESSION, A.D. 2023 |
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12 | 12 | | ____________ |
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13 | 13 | | |
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14 | 14 | | A N A C T |
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15 | 15 | | RELATING TO HUMAN SE RVICES -- MEDICAL ASSISTANCE |
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16 | 16 | | Introduced By: Representatives Casimiro, Noret, Bennett, Potter, Morales, McGaw, |
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17 | 17 | | Cotter, and Stewart |
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18 | 18 | | Date Introduced: February 03, 2023 |
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19 | 19 | | Referred To: House Finance |
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20 | 20 | | |
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21 | 21 | | |
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22 | 22 | | It is enacted by the General Assembly as follows: |
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23 | 23 | | SECTION 1. Legislative findings. 1 |
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24 | 24 | | The general assembly finds and declares the following: 2 |
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25 | 25 | | (1) Medicaid covers approximately one in four (4) Rhode Islanders, including: one in five 3 |
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26 | 26 | | (5) adults, three (3) in eight (8) children, three (3) in five (5) nursing home residents, four (4) in 4 |
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27 | 27 | | nine (9) individuals with disabilities, and one in five (5) Medicare beneficiaries. 5 |
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28 | 28 | | (2) Prior to 1994, Rhode Island managed its own Medicaid programs; directly reimbursing 6 |
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29 | 29 | | healthcare providers by paying fee-for-service ("FFS"). 7 |
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30 | 30 | | (3) Currently, the state pays about $1.7 billion to three (3) private health insurance 8 |
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31 | 31 | | companies, Neighborhood Health Plan of Rhode Island, Tufts Health Plan and United Healthcare 9 |
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32 | 32 | | Community Plan (Managed Care Organizations - "MCOs"), to “manage” Medicaid benefits for 10 |
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33 | 33 | | about ninety percent (90%) of all Rhode Island Medicaid recipients (approximately three hundred 11 |
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34 | 34 | | thousand (300,000)); the other ten percent (10%) remains FFS. 12 |
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35 | 35 | | (4) MCOs are not actual health care providers - they are middlemen who take set per-13 |
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36 | 36 | | person per-month fees from the state, pass some of that money to actual health care providers, and 14 |
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37 | 37 | | keep the rest as MCO profit. 15 |
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38 | 38 | | (5) MCOs increase their profits by limiting health care goods and services for Medicaid 16 |
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39 | 39 | | patients. 17 |
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40 | 40 | | (6) Theoretically, MCOs are supposed to help states control Medicaid costs and improve 18 |
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41 | 41 | | access and health care outcomes; however, there is no significant evidence of these objectives. 19 |
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42 | 42 | | |
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43 | 43 | | |
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44 | 44 | | LC001115 - Page 2 of 5 |
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45 | 45 | | (7) Peer-reviewed research, including two (2) separate literature reviews done in 2012 and 1 |
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46 | 46 | | 2020, concluded: "While there are incidences of success, research evaluating managed-care 2 |
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47 | 47 | | programs show that these initial hopes [for improved costs, access and outcomes] were largely 3 |
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48 | 48 | | unfounded.” 4 |
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49 | 49 | | (8) Since 2009, every annual Single Audit Report by the Rhode Island Office of the Auditor 5 |
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50 | 50 | | General has found that the state lacks adequate oversight of MCOs. 6 |
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51 | 51 | | (9) In 2009, Connecticut conducted an audit which found it was overpaying its three (3) 7 |
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52 | 52 | | MCOs (United Healthcare Group, Aetna, and Community Health Network of Connecticut) nearly 8 |
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53 | 53 | | fifty million dollars ($50,000,000) per year. 9 |
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54 | 54 | | (10) In 2012, Connecticut returned to a state-run fee-for-service Medicaid program and 10 |
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55 | 55 | | subsequently saved hundreds of millions of dollars and achieved the lowest Medicaid cost increases 11 |
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56 | 56 | | in the country and improved access to care. 12 |
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57 | 57 | | (11) In 2015, the Rhode Island Auditor General found that Rhode Island overpaid MCOs 13 |
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58 | 58 | | more than two hundred million dollars ($200,000,000) and could not recoup overpayments until 14 |
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59 | 59 | | 2017. 15 |
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60 | 60 | | (12) In 2015, Governor Raimondo began efforts to “Reinvent Medicaid” that led to 16 |
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61 | 61 | | increased Medicaid privatization, including the UHIP/RI Bridges project and MCO five (5) year 17 |
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62 | 62 | | contracts. 18 |
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63 | 63 | | (13) In the FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019 Single Audit Reports, the Rhode Island 19 |
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64 | 64 | | Auditor General bluntly concluded, "The State lacks effective auditing and monitoring of MCO 20 |
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65 | 65 | | financial activity.” 21 |
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66 | 66 | | (14) In its latest FY 2020 Single Audit Report, the Auditor General notes that EOHHS 22 |
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67 | 67 | | failures to collect adequate information from MCOs has had the “effect” of, “Inaccurate 23 |
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68 | 68 | | reimbursements to MCOs for contract services provided to Medicaid enrollees.” 24 |
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69 | 69 | | (15) The federal Center for Medicaid and CHIP Services (CMCS) determined that in 2019, 25 |
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70 | 70 | | Rhode Island spent the second highest amount per capita for Medicaid patients out of all states and 26 |
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71 | 71 | | had a, “High overall level of data quality concern.” 27 |
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72 | 72 | | (16) The Rhode Island executive office of health and human services (EOHHS) has not 28 |
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73 | 73 | | taken sufficient actions to address problems with MCO oversight, for example: 29 |
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74 | 74 | | (i) Until 2021, EOHHS made Rhode Island one of only six (6) states with MCO contracts 30 |
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75 | 75 | | that had not required MCOs to spend at least eighty-five percent (85%) of their Medicaid revenues 31 |
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76 | 76 | | on covered services and quality improvement (i.e., have a Medical Loss Ratio, MLR, of 85%); 32 |
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77 | 77 | | (ii) Unlike thirty (30) other states, EOHHS failed to require MCOs to remit to the state 33 |
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78 | 78 | | Medicaid program excess capitation revenues not adequately applied to the costs of medical 34 |
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79 | 79 | | |
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80 | 80 | | |
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81 | 81 | | LC001115 - Page 3 of 5 |
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82 | 82 | | services; 1 |
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83 | 83 | | (iii) EOHHS failed to file annual Medicaid reports; publishing FY 2019 data in a report 2 |
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84 | 84 | | dated May 2021; and 3 |
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85 | 85 | | (iv) EOHHS failed to ensure that FY2021 MCO quarterly reports were made in a 4 |
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86 | 86 | | “Financial Data Reporting System,” as set forth in a response to criticisms raised by the Rhode 5 |
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87 | 87 | | Island Auditor General. 6 |
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88 | 88 | | (17) Other states that more recently adopted Medicaid MCO managed care, such as Iowa 7 |
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89 | 89 | | and Kansas, have suffered cuts in health care, far less than expected savings, and sacrificed 8 |
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90 | 90 | | oversight and transparency. 9 |
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91 | 91 | | (18) During the COVID-19 pandemic, Rhode Island Medicaid enrollments increased about 10 |
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92 | 92 | | twelve percent (12%) as people lost their jobs and health insurance. 11 |
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93 | 93 | | (19) During the pandemic, MCO private insurance companies earned record profits while 12 |
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94 | 94 | | health care providers such as hospitals suffered severe financial losses from deferred elective 13 |
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95 | 95 | | medical procedures. 14 |
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96 | 96 | | (20) Rhode Island EOHHS wants to continue to help private MCO insurance companies 15 |
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97 | 97 | | by giving a set per person per month fee to health care providers in order that health care providers 16 |
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98 | 98 | | assume “full risk capitation.” 17 |
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99 | 99 | | (21) Rhode Island is the only state in the country that has an “Office of Health Insurance 18 |
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100 | 100 | | Commissioner” whose top listed priority is to, “Guard the solvency of health insurers.” 19 |
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101 | 101 | | (22) Private health insurance companies have more government funding and support than 20 |
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102 | 102 | | any other type of business in Rhode Island. 21 |
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103 | 103 | | (23) The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has issued guidance intended 22 |
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104 | 104 | | to help states monitor and audit Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) 23 |
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105 | 105 | | managed care plans to address spread pricing and appropriately incorporate administrative costs of 24 |
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106 | 106 | | the Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) when calculating their medical loss ratio (MLR). 25 |
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107 | 107 | | (24) States that chose to establish minimum MCO MLRs with requirements to return 26 |
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108 | 108 | | monies may recoup millions of Medicaid dollars from plans that failed to meet the State-set 27 |
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109 | 109 | | minimum MLR thresholds. 28 |
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110 | 110 | | (25) Given the $1.7 billion taxpayer dollars given to MCOs and the current lack of adequate 29 |
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111 | 111 | | monitoring and oversight, the costs of audits set forth by this legislation are justified and necessary. 30 |
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112 | 112 | | (26) The executive office proposes to begin Medicaid billing for inpatient substance use 31 |
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113 | 113 | | disorder recovery facilities, pursuant to the previously issued waiver of the Institute of Mental 32 |
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114 | 114 | | Disease exclusion rule, facilitating the raising of rates in a budget-neutral manner. 33 |
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115 | 115 | | SECTION 2. Chapter 40-8 of the General Laws entitled "Medical Assistance" is hereby 34 |
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116 | 116 | | |
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117 | 117 | | |
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118 | 118 | | LC001115 - Page 4 of 5 |
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119 | 119 | | amended by adding thereto the following section: 1 |
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120 | 120 | | 40-8-33. Medicaid programs audit, assessment and improvement. 2 |
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121 | 121 | | (a) The auditor general, in consultation with the executive office of health and human 3 |
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122 | 122 | | services, shall hire and supervise an outside contractor or contractors to audit the state's managed 4 |
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123 | 123 | | care entities in order to determine whether managed care entities are providing savings, access and 5 |
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124 | 124 | | outcomes that are better than what could be obtained under a fee-for-service program managed by 6 |
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125 | 125 | | the state. 7 |
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126 | 126 | | (b) Managed care entities shall provide information necessary to conduct this audit, as well 8 |
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127 | 127 | | as all legally required audits, in a timely manner as requested by the outside contractors. 9 |
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128 | 128 | | (c) Failure of a managed care entity to provide such information in a timely manner shall 10 |
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129 | 129 | | permit the state to seek penalties and terminate the managed care entity’s Medicaid contract. 11 |
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130 | 130 | | (d) Staff and outside contractors working on the audit shall not have relevant financial 12 |
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131 | 131 | | connections to managed care entities or the outcome of the audit. 13 |
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132 | 132 | | (e) The auditor general shall present the results of the audit to the public and general 14 |
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133 | 133 | | assembly within six (6) months after the effective date of this section. 15 |
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134 | 134 | | (f) If the audit concludes that a fee-for-service state-run Medicaid program could provide 16 |
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135 | 135 | | better savings, access and outcomes than the current managed care system, the office of health and 17 |
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136 | 136 | | human services and the auditor general shall develop a plan for the state to transition to a state-run 18 |
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137 | 137 | | fee-for-service program within two (2) years from the effective date of this section. 19 |
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138 | 138 | | (g) Contracts with managed care entities shall include terms that: 20 |
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139 | 139 | | (1) Allow the state to transition to a fee-for-service state-run Medicaid program within two 21 |
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140 | 140 | | (2) years from the effective date of this section; 22 |
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141 | 141 | | (2) Require managed care entities to meet a medical loss ratio (MLR) of greater than ninety 23 |
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142 | 142 | | percent (90%), net of pharmacy benefit manager costs related to spread pricing; 24 |
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143 | 143 | | (3) Require managed care entities to remit to the state Medicaid program excess capitation 25 |
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144 | 144 | | revenues that fail to meet the ninety percent (90%) MLR; and 26 |
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145 | 145 | | (4) Set forth penalties for failure to meet contract terms. 27 |
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146 | 146 | | (h) The attorney general shall have authority to pursue civil and criminal actions against 28 |
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147 | 147 | | managed care entities to enforce state contractual obligations and other legal requirements. 29 |
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148 | 148 | | SECTION 3. This act shall take effect upon passage. 30 |
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149 | 149 | | ======== |
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150 | 150 | | LC001115 |
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151 | 151 | | ======== |
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152 | 152 | | |
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153 | 153 | | |
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154 | 154 | | LC001115 - Page 5 of 5 |
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155 | 155 | | EXPLANATION |
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156 | 156 | | BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL |
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157 | 157 | | OF |
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158 | 158 | | A N A C T |
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159 | 159 | | RELATING TO HUMAN SE RVICES -- MEDICAL ASSISTANCE |
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160 | 160 | | *** |
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161 | 161 | | This act would require the auditor general to oversee an audit of Medicaid programs 1 |
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162 | 162 | | administered by managed care organizations. The auditor general would report findings to the 2 |
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163 | 163 | | general assembly and the director of the executive office of health and human services (EOHHS) 3 |
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164 | 164 | | within six (6) months of the passage of this act. The director of EOHHS would provide the general 4 |
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165 | 165 | | assembly with a plan within two (2) years of the passage of this act to end privatized managed care 5 |
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166 | 166 | | and transition to a fee-for-service state-run program if the audit demonstrates the plan would result 6 |
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167 | 167 | | in savings and better access and healthcare outcomes. 7 |
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168 | 168 | | This act would take effect upon passage. 8 |
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169 | 169 | | ======== |
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170 | 170 | | LC001115 |
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171 | 171 | | ======== |
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