1 | 1 | | 88R25766 JXC-D |
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2 | 2 | | By: Schwertner, et al. S.B. No. 2012 |
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3 | 3 | | (Hunter) |
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4 | 4 | | Substitute the following for S.B. No. 2012: No. |
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5 | 5 | | |
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6 | 6 | | |
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7 | 7 | | A BILL TO BE ENTITLED |
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8 | 8 | | AN ACT |
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9 | 9 | | relating to the implementation of a program to meet the reliability |
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10 | 10 | | needs of the ERCOT power region. |
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11 | 11 | | BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: |
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12 | 12 | | SECTION 1. Subchapter D, Chapter 39, Utilities Code, is |
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13 | 13 | | amended by adding Section 39.166 to read as follows: |
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14 | 14 | | Sec. 39.166. RELIABILITY PROGRAM. (a) The commission may |
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15 | 15 | | not require retail customers or load-serving entities in the ERCOT |
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16 | 16 | | power region to purchase credits designed to support a required |
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17 | 17 | | reserve margin or other capacity or reliability requirement until: |
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18 | 18 | | (1) the independent organization certified under |
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19 | 19 | | Section 39.151 for the ERCOT power region and the wholesale |
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20 | 20 | | electric market monitor complete an updated assessment on the cost |
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21 | 21 | | to and effects on the ERCOT market of the proposed reliability |
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22 | 22 | | program; and |
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23 | 23 | | (2) the independent organization certified under |
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24 | 24 | | Section 39.151 for the ERCOT power region begins implementing real |
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25 | 25 | | time co-optimization of energy and ancillary services in the ERCOT |
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26 | 26 | | wholesale market. |
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27 | 27 | | (b) The assessment required under Subsection (a) must |
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28 | 28 | | include: |
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29 | 29 | | (1) an evaluation of the cost of new entry and the |
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30 | 30 | | effects of the proposed reliability program on consumer costs and |
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31 | 31 | | the competitive retail market; |
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32 | 32 | | (2) a compilation of detailed information regarding |
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33 | 33 | | cost offsets realized through a reduction in costs in the energy and |
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34 | 34 | | ancillary services markets and use of reliability unit commitments; |
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35 | 35 | | (3) a set of metrics to measure the effects of the |
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36 | 36 | | proposed reliability program on system reliability; |
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37 | 37 | | (4) an evaluation of the cost to retain existing |
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38 | 38 | | dispatchable resources in the ERCOT power region; |
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39 | 39 | | (5) an evaluation of the planned timeline for |
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40 | 40 | | implementation of real time co-optimization for energy and |
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41 | 41 | | ancillary services in the ERCOT power region; and |
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42 | 42 | | (6) anticipated market and reliability effects of new |
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43 | 43 | | and updated ancillary service products. |
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44 | 44 | | (c) The commission may not implement a reliability program |
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45 | 45 | | described by Subsection (a) unless the commission by rule |
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46 | 46 | | establishes the essential features of the program, including |
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47 | 47 | | requirements to meet the reliability needs of the power region, and |
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48 | 48 | | the program: |
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49 | 49 | | (1) requires the independent organization certified |
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50 | 50 | | under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT power region to procure the |
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51 | 51 | | credits centrally in a manner designed to prevent market |
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52 | 52 | | manipulation by affiliated generation and retail companies; |
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53 | 53 | | (2) limits participation in the program to |
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54 | 54 | | dispatchable resources with the specific attributes necessary to |
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55 | 55 | | meet operational needs of the ERCOT power region; |
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56 | 56 | | (3) ensures that a generator cannot receive credits |
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57 | 57 | | that exceed the amount of generation bid into the forward market by |
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58 | 58 | | that generator; |
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59 | 59 | | (4) ensures that an electric generating unit can |
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60 | 60 | | receive a credit only for being available to perform in real time |
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61 | 61 | | during the tightest intervals of low supply and high demand on the |
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62 | 62 | | grid, as defined by the commission on a seasonal basis; |
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63 | 63 | | (5) establishes a penalty structure, resulting in a |
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64 | 64 | | net benefit to load, for generators that bid into the forward market |
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65 | 65 | | but do not meet the full obligation; |
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66 | 66 | | (6) provides the wholesale electric market monitor |
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67 | 67 | | with the authority and resources necessary to investigate potential |
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68 | 68 | | instances of market manipulation by any means, including by |
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69 | 69 | | financial or physical actions; |
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70 | 70 | | (7) ensures that the net cost imposed on the ERCOT |
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71 | 71 | | market for the credits does not exceed $500 million annually; |
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72 | 72 | | (8) ensures that any program reliability standard |
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73 | 73 | | reasonably balances the incremental reliability benefits to |
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74 | 74 | | customers against the incremental costs of the program based on an |
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75 | 75 | | evaluation by the wholesale electric market monitor; |
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76 | 76 | | (9) establishes a single ERCOT-wide clearing price for |
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77 | 77 | | the program and does not differentiate payments or credit values |
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78 | 78 | | based on locational constraints; |
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79 | 79 | | (10) does not assign costs, credit, or collateral for |
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80 | 80 | | the program in a manner that provides a cost advantage to |
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81 | 81 | | load-serving entities who own, or whose affiliates own, generation |
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82 | 82 | | facilities; |
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83 | 83 | | (11) requires sufficient secured collateral so that |
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84 | 84 | | other market participants do not bear the risk of non-performance |
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85 | 85 | | or non-payment; |
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86 | 86 | | (12) ensures that the cost of all credits paid to |
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87 | 87 | | dispatchable resources is allocated to loads based on an hourly |
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88 | 88 | | load ratio share; and |
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89 | 89 | | (13) removes any market changes implemented as a |
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90 | 90 | | bridge solution for the program not later than the first |
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91 | 91 | | anniversary of the date the program was implemented. |
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92 | 92 | | (d) The commission and the independent organization |
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93 | 93 | | certified under Section 39.151 for the ERCOT power region may not |
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94 | 94 | | adopt a market rule for the ERCOT power region associated with the |
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95 | 95 | | implementation of a reliability program described by Subsection (a) |
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96 | 96 | | that provides a cost advantage to load-serving entities who own, or |
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97 | 97 | | whose affiliates own, generation facilities. |
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98 | 98 | | (e) The wholesale electric market monitor biennially shall: |
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99 | 99 | | (1) evaluate the incremental reliability benefits of |
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100 | 100 | | the program for consumers compared to the costs to consumers of the |
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101 | 101 | | program and the costs in the energy and ancillary services markets; |
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102 | 102 | | and |
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103 | 103 | | (2) report the results of each evaluation to the |
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104 | 104 | | legislature. |
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105 | 105 | | SECTION 2. This Act takes effect immediately if it receives |
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106 | 106 | | a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, as |
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107 | 107 | | provided by Section 39, Article III, Texas Constitution. If this |
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108 | 108 | | Act does not receive the vote necessary for immediate effect, this |
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109 | 109 | | Act takes effect September 1, 2023. |
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