Us Congress 2025-2026 Regular Session

Us Congress House Bill HB2352 Compare Versions

Only one version of the bill is available at this time.

Old	New	Differences
1	1	I
2	2	119THCONGRESS
3	3	1
4	4	STSESSION H. R. 2352
5	5	To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to place reasonable
6	6	limits on contributions to Super PACs which make independent expendi-
7	7	tures, and for other purposes.
8	8	IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
9	9	MARCH26, 2025
10	10	Ms. L
11	11	EEof Pennsylvania (for herself, Mr. KHANNA, Mr. MCGOVERN, Ms.
12	12	J
13	13	AYAPAL, Ms. TLAIB, Mr. DELUZIO, and Mrs. RAMIREZ) introduced the
14	14	following bill; which was referred to the Committee on House Administra-
15	15	tion
16	16	A BILL
17	17	To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to
18	18	place reasonable limits on contributions to Super PACs
19	19	which make independent expenditures, and for other pur-
20	20	poses.
21	21	Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1
22	22	tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2
23	23	SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3
24	24	This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Abolish Super PACs 4
25	25	Act’’. 5
26	26	SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE. 6
27	27	(a) F
28	28	INDINGS.—Congress finds as follows: 7
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31	31	•HR 2352 IH
32	32	(1) Contribution limits to political action com-1
33	33	mittees (PACs), including those that make inde-2
34	34	pendent expenditures, help secure elections by lim-3
35	35	iting both the risk of corruption and the risk that 4
36	36	significant contributions will create the appearance 5
37	37	of corruption. 6
38	38	(2) Since contribution limits on super PACs 7
39	39	were lifted in 2010, the number, influence, and 8
40	40	wealth of super PACs have exploded. Obtaining mil-9
41	41	lions or billions of dollars in contributions to super 10
42	42	PACs is now critical to the success of Federal can-11
43	43	didates’ campaigns. 12
44	44	(3) As the influence of super PACs grows, so 13
45	45	does the likelihood that they will serve as a conduit 14
46	46	for corrupt agreements between contributor and can-15
47	47	didate, whose communications are not subject to co-16
48	48	ordination limitations. 17
49	49	(4) Between 2008 and 2020, the amount of 18
50	50	independent expenditures increased more than 700 19
51	51	percent, and in 2024, more than $4.48 billion in 20
52	52	independent expenditures were spent on United 21
53	53	States elections. The money for these expenditures 22
54	54	largely came from contributions to 2,459 registered 23
55	55	super PACs. 24
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58	58	•HR 2352 IH
59	59	(5) In 2012, the first modern elections for Fed-1
60	60	eral office held without contribution limits to super 2
61	61	PACs, the top 1 percent of all individual super PAC 3
62	62	contributors contributed 76.76 percent of all indi-4
63	63	vidual super PAC contributions, and that percentage 5
64	64	rose to 96.94 percent in 2024. Recent elections have 6
65	65	been influenced by individual contributors who gave 7
66	66	more than $100 million to super PACs. 8
67	67	(6) As bribery laws have long recognized, un-9
68	68	lawful quid pro quo exchanges can occur where the 10
69	69	bribe is funneled into a third party, such as a super 11
70	70	PAC. See, e.g., section 201 of title 18, United States 12
71	71	Code; U.S. v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 606, 621–23 13
72	72	(D. N.J. 2018). Law enforcement in several States 14
73	73	have prosecuted cases that involve bribes directed to 15
74	74	super PACs. However, bribery is notoriously difficult 16
75	75	to prosecute, and these laws do not adequately pro-17
76	76	tect American voters from corruption. 18
77	77	(7) Without reasonable limitations on contribu-19
78	78	tions, super PACs create an appearance of corrup-20
79	79	tion. A bipartisan majority of Americans believe that 21
80	80	large super PAC contributions are made in exchange 22
81	81	for political favors, and that corruption is pervasive 23
82	82	in the Federal Government. This is, as the Supreme 24
83	83	Court recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, ‘‘disastrous’’ 25
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86	86	•HR 2352 IH
87	87	to ‘‘confidence in the system of representative gov-1
88	88	ernment’’ 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976). 2
89	89	(8) Placing limits on super PAC contributions 3
90	90	will also lessen the risk of foreign interference in 4
91	91	United States elections, making it more difficult for 5
92	92	foreign entities to funnel contributions to super 6
93	93	PACs via third-party contributors. 7
94	94	(9) SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 8
95	95	(D.C. Cir. 2010), the appellate court case that void-9
96	96	ed existing contribution limits to super PACs, 10
97	97	wrongly treated contributions as expenditures and 11
98	98	wrongly assumed that because uncoordinated inde-12
99	99	pendent expenditures cannot give rise to quid pro 13
100	100	quo corruption, that contributions to independent 14
101	101	expenditure committees similarly cannot give rise to 15
102	102	corruption. But they can and do. 16
103	103	(10) In the 14 years since SpeechNow un-17
104	104	leashed billions of dollars in unregulated contribu-18
105	105	tions, super PACs have obtained unprecedented 19
106	106	wealth and value to candidate campaigns and can fa-20
107	107	cilitate vast, nearly untraceable corrupt transactions. 21
108	108	(11) Because Super PACs have become unique-22
109	109	ly important to candidate campaigns and can accept 23
110	110	millions and even hundreds of millions of dollars 24
111	111	from single entities, candidates and contributors 25
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114	114	•HR 2352 IH
115	115	have reason and opportunity to guide corrupt con-1
116	116	tributions into super PACs, establishing a significant 2
117	117	risk of corruption and creating an appearance of 3
118	118	corruption that undermines the public’s faith in 4
119	119	their representatives and our political system. 5
120	120	(12) Reasonable limits on contributions to 6
121	121	super PACs are lawful and necessary to protect 7
122	122	American democracy and American voters. 8
123	123	(b) P
124	124	URPOSE.—It is the purpose of this Act— 9
125	125	(1) to limit the risk of corrupt agreements be-10
126	126	tween candidates and contributors by placing rea-11
127	127	sonable limits on contributions to political action 12
128	128	committees that make independent expenditures; 13
129	129	(2) to limit the appearance of corruption cre-14
130	130	ated by uncapped contributions to political action 15
131	131	committees that make independent expenditures; 16
132	132	and 17
133	133	(3) to restore the public’s faith in our elections. 18
134	134	SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDEPENDENT 19
135	135	EXPENDITURE COMMITTEES. 20
136	136	(a) L
137	137	IMITATIONS.—Section 315(a)(1)(C) of the Fed-21
138	138	eral Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 22
139	139	30116(a)(1)(C)) is amended by striking ‘‘to any other po-23
140	140	litical committee’’ and inserting ‘‘to an independent ex-24
141	141	penditure committee or any other political committee’’. 25
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144	144	•HR 2352 IH
145	145	(b) DEFINITION.—Section 301 of such Act (52 1
146	146	U.S.C. 30101) is amended by adding at the end the fol-2
147	147	lowing: 3
148	148	‘‘(27) I
149	149	NDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE COM -4
150	150	MITTEE.— 5
151	151	‘‘(A) I
152	152	N GENERAL.—The term ‘inde-6
153	153	pendent expenditure committee’ means a polit-7
154	154	ical committee which— 8
155	155	‘‘(i) makes independent expenditures 9
156	156	aggregating $5,000 or more during a cal-10
157	157	endar year; or 11
158	158	‘‘(ii) makes contributions to other 12
159	159	independent expenditure committees aggre-13
160	160	gating $5,000 or more during a calendar 14
161	161	year. 15
162	162	‘‘(B) T
163	163	REATMENT OF SEPARATE AC -16
164	164	COUNTS.—The term ‘independent expenditure 17
165	165	committee’ includes an account of a political 18
166	166	committee which is established for the purpose 19
167	167	of making independent expenditures or con-20
168	168	tributions to other committees making inde-21
169	169	pendent expenditures.’’. 22
170	170	(c) E
171	171	FFECTIVEDATE.—The amendments made by 23
172	172	this section shall apply with respect to contributions and 24
173	173	independent expenditures made during the first calendar 25
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176	176	•HR 2352 IH
177	177	year which begins after the date of the enactment of this 1
178	178	Act and each succeeding calendar year. 2
179	179	Æ
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