1 | 1 | | I |
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2 | 2 | | 119THCONGRESS |
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3 | 3 | | 1 |
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4 | 4 | | STSESSION H. R. 2633 |
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5 | 5 | | To require a full review of the bilateral relationship between the United |
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6 | 6 | | States and South Africa and identify South African government officials |
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7 | 7 | | and ANC leaders eligible for the imposition of sanctions, and for other |
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8 | 8 | | purposes. |
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9 | 9 | | IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES |
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10 | 10 | | APRIL3, 2025 |
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11 | 11 | | Mr. J |
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12 | 12 | | ACKSONof Texas (for himself and Mr. JAMES) introduced the following |
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13 | 13 | | bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in ad- |
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14 | 14 | | dition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently |
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15 | 15 | | determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provi- |
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16 | 16 | | sions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned |
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17 | 17 | | A BILL |
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18 | 18 | | To require a full review of the bilateral relationship between |
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19 | 19 | | the United States and South Africa and identify South |
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20 | 20 | | African government officials and ANC leaders eligible |
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21 | 21 | | for the imposition of sanctions, and for other purposes. |
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22 | 22 | | Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1 |
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23 | 23 | | tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 2 |
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24 | 24 | | SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 3 |
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25 | 25 | | This Act may be cited as the ‘‘U.S.-South Africa Bi-4 |
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26 | 26 | | lateral Relations Review Act of 2025’’. 5 |
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28 | 28 | | mprince on LAP1J3WLY3PROD with $$_JOB 2 |
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29 | 29 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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30 | 30 | | SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 1 |
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31 | 31 | | Congress finds the following: 2 |
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32 | 32 | | (1) The actions of factions within the African 3 |
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33 | 33 | | National Congress (ANC), the political party that 4 |
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34 | 34 | | since 1994 has held a governing majority and con-5 |
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35 | 35 | | trolled South Africa’s executive branch, are incon-6 |
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36 | 36 | | sistent with the South African Government’s publicly 7 |
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37 | 37 | | stated policy of nonalignment in international af-8 |
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38 | 38 | | fairs. 9 |
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39 | 39 | | (2) The South African Government has a his-10 |
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40 | 40 | | tory of siding with malign actors, including Hamas, 11 |
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41 | 41 | | a United States designated Foreign Terrorist Orga-12 |
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42 | 42 | | nization and a proxy of the Iranian regime, and con-13 |
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43 | 43 | | tinues to pursue closer ties with the People’s Repub-14 |
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44 | 44 | | lic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. 15 |
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45 | 45 | | (3) The South African Government’s support of 16 |
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46 | 46 | | Hamas dates back to 1994, when the ANC first 17 |
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47 | 47 | | came into power, taking a hardline stance of consist-18 |
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48 | 48 | | ently accusing Israel of practicing apartheid. 19 |
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49 | 49 | | (4) Following the unprovoked and unprece-20 |
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50 | 50 | | dented horrendous attack by Hamas on Israel on 21 |
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51 | 51 | | October 7, 2023, where Hamas terrorists killed and 22 |
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52 | 52 | | kidnapped hundreds of Israelis, members of the 23 |
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53 | 53 | | South African Government and leaders of the ANC 24 |
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54 | 54 | | have delivered a variety of antisemitic and anti- 25 |
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55 | 55 | | Israel-related statements and actions, including— 26 |
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58 | 58 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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59 | 59 | | (A) on October 7, 2023, South Africa’s 1 |
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60 | 60 | | Foreign Ministry released a statement express-2 |
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61 | 61 | | ing concern of ‘‘escalating violence’’, urging 3 |
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62 | 62 | | Israel’s restraint in response, and implicitly 4 |
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63 | 63 | | blaming Israel for provoking the attack through 5 |
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64 | 64 | | ‘‘continued illegal occupation of Palestine land, 6 |
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65 | 65 | | continued settlement expansion, desecration of 7 |
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66 | 66 | | the Al Aqsa Mosque and Christian holy sites, 8 |
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67 | 67 | | and ongoing oppression of the Palestinian peo-9 |
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68 | 68 | | ple’’; 10 |
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69 | 69 | | (B) on October 8, 2023, the ANC’s na-11 |
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70 | 70 | | tional spokesperson, Mahlengi Bhengu-Motsiri, 12 |
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71 | 71 | | said of the devastating Hamas attack, ‘‘the de-13 |
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72 | 72 | | cision by Palestinians to respond to the bru-14 |
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73 | 73 | | tality of the settler Israeli apartheid regime is 15 |
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74 | 74 | | unsurprising’’; 16 |
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75 | 75 | | (C) on October 14, 2023, President Cyril 17 |
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76 | 76 | | Ramaphosa of South Africa, accused Israel of 18 |
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77 | 77 | | ‘‘genocide’’ in statements during a pro-Pales-19 |
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78 | 78 | | tinian rally; 20 |
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79 | 79 | | (D) on October 17, 2023, South African 21 |
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80 | 80 | | Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor accepted a call 22 |
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81 | 81 | | with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh; 23 |
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82 | 82 | | (E) on October 22, 2023, South African 24 |
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83 | 83 | | Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor visited Tehran 25 |
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86 | 86 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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87 | 87 | | and met with President Raisi of the Islamic Re-1 |
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88 | 88 | | public of Iran, which is actively funding Hamas; 2 |
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89 | 89 | | (F) on November 7, 2023, in a parliamen-3 |
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90 | 90 | | tary address, Foreign Minister Pandor called 4 |
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91 | 91 | | for the International Criminal Court to issue an 5 |
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92 | 92 | | immediate arrest warrant charging Israeli 6 |
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93 | 93 | | Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with vio-7 |
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94 | 94 | | lations of international criminal law; 8 |
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95 | 95 | | (G) on November 17, 2023, South Africa, 9 |
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96 | 96 | | along with 4 other countries, submitted a joint 10 |
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97 | 97 | | request to the International Criminal Court for 11 |
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98 | 98 | | an investigation into alleged war crimes being 12 |
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99 | 99 | | committed in the Palestinian territories; 13 |
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100 | 100 | | (H) on December 5, 2023, the ANC hosted 14 |
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101 | 101 | | 3 members of Hamas in Pretoria, including 15 |
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102 | 102 | | Khaled Qaddoumi, Hamas’s representative to 16 |
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103 | 103 | | Iran, and Bassem Naim, a member of Hamas’s 17 |
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104 | 104 | | political bureau in Gaza; 18 |
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105 | 105 | | (I) on December 29, 2023, South Africa 19 |
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106 | 106 | | filed a politically motivated suit in the Inter-20 |
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107 | 107 | | national Court of Justice wrongfully accusing 21 |
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108 | 108 | | Israel of committing genocide; 22 |
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109 | 109 | | (J) in March 2024, South African Foreign 23 |
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110 | 110 | | Minister Pandor was quoted saying South Afri-24 |
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111 | 111 | | ca will arrest Israeli-South Africans who are 25 |
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114 | 114 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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115 | 115 | | fighting in the Israeli Defense Forces upon 1 |
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116 | 116 | | their return home and could strip them of their 2 |
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117 | 117 | | South African citizenship. Minister Pandor also 3 |
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118 | 118 | | implicitly encouraged protests outside of the 4 |
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119 | 119 | | United States Embassy; 5 |
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120 | 120 | | (K) on October 7, 2024, the ANC com-6 |
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121 | 121 | | memorated only the Palestinian lives lost to 7 |
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122 | 122 | | Israel, while accusing Israel of genocide; 8 |
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123 | 123 | | (L) in October 2024, South Africa filed its 9 |
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124 | 124 | | Memorial to the International Court of Justice, 10 |
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125 | 125 | | accusing Israel of genocidal actions to depopu-11 |
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126 | 126 | | late Gaza through mass death and displace-12 |
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127 | 127 | | ment; 13 |
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128 | 128 | | (M) in November 2024, South Africa ap-14 |
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129 | 129 | | pointed Ebrahim Rasool as their Ambassador to 15 |
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130 | 130 | | the United States, who previously hosted senior 16 |
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131 | 131 | | Hamas officials to South Africa when he was 17 |
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132 | 132 | | the Premier of the Western Cape and, in 2020, 18 |
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133 | 133 | | was a speaker at an annual event hosted by the 19 |
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134 | 134 | | Iranian regime to celebrate Hezbollah’s resist-20 |
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135 | 135 | | ance against Israel; and 21 |
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136 | 136 | | (N) the ANC’s ongoing attempt to rename 22 |
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137 | 137 | | the street that the United States Consulate in 23 |
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138 | 138 | | Johannesburg is located on as ‘‘Leila Khaled 24 |
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139 | 139 | | Drive’’, including a quote from ANC first Dep-25 |
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142 | 142 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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143 | 143 | | uty Secretary General Nomvula Mokonyane 1 |
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144 | 144 | | saying ‘‘we want the United States of America 2 |
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145 | 145 | | embassy to change their letterhead to Number 3 |
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146 | 146 | | 1 Leila Khaled Drive’’. 4 |
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147 | 147 | | (5) The South African Government and the 5 |
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148 | 148 | | ANC have maintained close relations with the Rus-6 |
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149 | 149 | | sian Federation, which has been accused of perpe-7 |
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150 | 150 | | trating war crimes in Ukraine and indiscriminately 8 |
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151 | 151 | | undermines human rights. South Africa’s robust re-9 |
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152 | 152 | | lationship with Russia spans the military and polit-10 |
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153 | 153 | | ical space, including— 11 |
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154 | 154 | | (A) allowing a United States-sanctioned 12 |
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155 | 155 | | Russian cargo ship, the Lady R, to dock and 13 |
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156 | 156 | | transfer arms at a South African naval base in 14 |
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157 | 157 | | December 2022; 15 |
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158 | 158 | | (B) hosting offshore naval exercises, enti-16 |
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159 | 159 | | tled ‘‘Operation Mosi II’’, carried out jointly 17 |
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160 | 160 | | with the PRC and Russia, between February 17 18 |
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161 | 161 | | and 27, 2023, corresponding with the 1-year 19 |
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162 | 162 | | anniversary of Russia’s unjustified and 20 |
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163 | 163 | | unprovoked invasion of Ukraine; 21 |
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164 | 164 | | (C) authorizing a United States-sanctioned 22 |
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165 | 165 | | Russian military cargo airplane to land at a 23 |
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166 | 166 | | South African Air Force Base; 24 |
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169 | 169 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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170 | 170 | | (D) reneging on its initial call for the Rus-1 |
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171 | 171 | | sian Federation to immediately withdraw its 2 |
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172 | 172 | | forces from Ukraine and actively seeking im-3 |
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173 | 173 | | proved relations with Moscow since February 4 |
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174 | 174 | | 2022; 5 |
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175 | 175 | | (E) dispatching multiple high-level official 6 |
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176 | 176 | | delegations to Russia to further political, intel-7 |
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177 | 177 | | ligence, and military cooperation; 8 |
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178 | 178 | | (F) United States sanctioned oligarch 9 |
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179 | 179 | | Viktor Vekselberg donating $826,000 to the 10 |
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180 | 180 | | ANC in 2022; and 11 |
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181 | 181 | | (G) the ANC publishing an article in their 12 |
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182 | 182 | | newspaper, ANC Today, in October 2024 pro-13 |
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183 | 183 | | moting Russian propaganda about the war in 14 |
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184 | 184 | | Ukraine. 15 |
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185 | 185 | | (6) South African Government interactions with 16 |
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186 | 186 | | the PRC Government and ANC interactions with the 17 |
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187 | 187 | | Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who are commit-18 |
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188 | 188 | | ting gross violations of human rights in the Xinjiang 19 |
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189 | 189 | | province and implement economically coercive tactics 20 |
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190 | 190 | | around the globe, undermine South Africa’s demo-21 |
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191 | 191 | | cratic constitutional system of governance, as exem-22 |
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192 | 192 | | plified in— 23 |
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193 | 193 | | (A) ongoing ANC and CCP inter-party co-24 |
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194 | 194 | | operation, especially with the fundamental in-25 |
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197 | 197 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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198 | 198 | | compatibility between the civil and democratic 1 |
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199 | 199 | | rights guaranteed in South Africa’s Constitu-2 |
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200 | 200 | | tion and the CCP’s routine suppression of free 3 |
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201 | 201 | | expression and individual rights; 4 |
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202 | 202 | | (B) allowing the private Test Flying Acad-5 |
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203 | 203 | | emy of South Africa, which the Department of 6 |
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204 | 204 | | Commerce added to the Entity List on June 7 |
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205 | 205 | | 12, 2023, to recruit former United States and 8 |
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206 | 206 | | NATO fighter pilots to train Chinese People’s 9 |
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207 | 207 | | Liberation Army pilots; 10 |
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208 | 208 | | (C) South Africa’s hosting of 6 PRC Gov-11 |
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209 | 209 | | ernment-backed and CCP-linked Confucius In-12 |
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210 | 210 | | stitutes, a type of entity that a CCP official 13 |
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211 | 211 | | characterized as an ‘‘important part of the 14 |
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212 | 212 | | CCP’s external propaganda structure’’, the 15 |
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213 | 213 | | most of any country in Africa; 16 |
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214 | 214 | | (D) South African Government support 17 |
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215 | 215 | | for, and ANC participation in, a political train-18 |
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216 | 216 | | ing school opened in Tanzania funded by the 19 |
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217 | 217 | | Chinese Communist Party where it trains polit-20 |
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218 | 218 | | ical members of the ruling liberation movements 21 |
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219 | 219 | | in 6 Southern African countries. The school in-22 |
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220 | 220 | | stills CCP ideology into the next-generation of 23 |
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221 | 221 | | African leaders and attempts to export the 24 |
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224 | 224 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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225 | 225 | | CCP’s system of party-run authoritarian gov-1 |
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226 | 226 | | ernance to the African continent; 2 |
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227 | 227 | | (E) cooperation with the PRC under the 3 |
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228 | 228 | | PRC’s global Belt and Road Initiative which, 4 |
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229 | 229 | | while trade and infrastructure-focused, is de-5 |
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230 | 230 | | signed to expand PRC global economic, polit-6 |
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231 | 231 | | ical, and security sector-related influence; 7 |
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232 | 232 | | (F) the widespread presence in South Afri-8 |
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233 | 233 | | ca’s media and technology sectors of PRC state 9 |
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234 | 234 | | linked firms that the United States has re-10 |
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235 | 235 | | stricted due to threats to national security, in-11 |
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236 | 236 | | cluding Huawei Technologies, ZTE and 12 |
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237 | 237 | | Hikvision, which place South African sov-13 |
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238 | 238 | | ereignty at risk and facilitate the CCP’s export 14 |
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239 | 239 | | of its model of digitally aided authoritarian gov-15 |
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240 | 240 | | ernance underpinned by cyber controls, social 16 |
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241 | 241 | | monitoring, propaganda, and surveillance; and 17 |
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242 | 242 | | (G) the South African government’s clear 18 |
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243 | 243 | | appeasement to the CCP in demanding that 19 |
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244 | 244 | | Taiwan relocate its representative office out of 20 |
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245 | 245 | | Pretoria and downgrade its status to that of a 21 |
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246 | 246 | | trade office. 22 |
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247 | 247 | | (7) The ANC-led South African Government 23 |
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248 | 248 | | has a history of substantially mismanaging a range 24 |
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249 | 249 | | of state resources and has often proven incapable of 25 |
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252 | 252 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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253 | 253 | | effectively delivering public services, threatening the 1 |
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254 | 254 | | South African people and the South African econ-2 |
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255 | 255 | | omy, as illustrated by— 3 |
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256 | 256 | | (A) President Cyril Ramaphosa’s February 4 |
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257 | 257 | | 9, 2023, declaration of a national state of dis-5 |
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258 | 258 | | aster over the worsening, multi-year power cri-6 |
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259 | 259 | | sis caused by the ANC’s chronic mismanage-7 |
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260 | 260 | | ment of the state-owned power company 8 |
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261 | 261 | | Eskom, resulting from endemic, high-level cor-9 |
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262 | 262 | | ruption; 10 |
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263 | 263 | | (B) the persistence of South African state- 11 |
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264 | 264 | | owned railway company Transnet’s insufficient 12 |
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265 | 265 | | capacity, which has disrupted rail operations 13 |
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266 | 266 | | and hindered mining companies’ export of iron 14 |
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267 | 267 | | ore, coal, and other commodities, in part due to 15 |
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268 | 268 | | malfeasance and corruption by former Transnet 16 |
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269 | 269 | | officials; 17 |
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270 | 270 | | (C) outbreaks of cholera in 2023 and 18 |
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271 | 271 | | 2024, the worst in 15 years, which were due in 19 |
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272 | 272 | | part to the South African Government’s disease 20 |
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273 | 273 | | prevention failures, as President Ramaphosa 21 |
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274 | 274 | | admitted on June 9, 2023, including a failure 22 |
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275 | 275 | | to provide clean water to households; and 23 |
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276 | 276 | | (D) rampant state capture, that emerged 24 |
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277 | 277 | | and grew during the administration of former 25 |
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280 | 280 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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281 | 281 | | President Jacob Zuma and has damaged South 1 |
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282 | 282 | | Africa’s international standing and profoundly 2 |
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283 | 283 | | undermined the rule of law, continues to nega-3 |
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284 | 284 | | tively impact the economic development pros-4 |
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285 | 285 | | pects and living standards of the South African 5 |
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286 | 286 | | people while deeply damaging public trust in 6 |
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287 | 287 | | state governance. 7 |
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288 | 288 | | (8) In November 2024, South Africa appointed 8 |
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289 | 289 | | Ebrahim Rasool as Ambassador to the United 9 |
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290 | 290 | | States. Rasool had previously made public comments 10 |
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291 | 291 | | describing President Trump as ‘‘extreme’’ and in 11 |
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292 | 292 | | March 2025, Rasool characterized President Trump 12 |
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293 | 293 | | as ‘‘a white supremacist’’. Secretary of State Marco 13 |
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294 | 294 | | Rubio subsequently declared Rasool as persona non 14 |
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295 | 295 | | grata in the United States. 15 |
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296 | 296 | | SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 16 |
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297 | 297 | | It is the sense of Congress that— 17 |
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298 | 298 | | (1) it is in the national security interest of the 18 |
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299 | 299 | | United States to deter strategic political and secu-19 |
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300 | 300 | | rity cooperation and information sharing with the 20 |
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301 | 301 | | PRC and the Russian Federation, particularly any 21 |
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302 | 302 | | form of cooperation that may aid or abet Russia’s 22 |
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303 | 303 | | war of aggression on Ukraine or its international 23 |
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304 | 304 | | standing or influence; and 24 |
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307 | 307 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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308 | 308 | | (2) the South African Government’s foreign pol-1 |
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309 | 309 | | icy actions have long ceased to reflect its stated 2 |
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310 | 310 | | stance of nonalignment, and now directly favor the 3 |
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311 | 311 | | PRC, the Russian Federation, and Hamas, a known 4 |
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312 | 312 | | proxy of Iran, and thereby undermine United States 5 |
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313 | 313 | | national security and foreign policy interests. 6 |
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314 | 314 | | SEC. 4. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION OF DETERMINA-7 |
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315 | 315 | | TION WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH AFRICA. 8 |
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316 | 316 | | (a) I |
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317 | 317 | | NGENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the 9 |
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318 | 318 | | date of enactment of this Act, the President, in consulta-10 |
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319 | 319 | | tion with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of De-11 |
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320 | 320 | | fense, shall certify to the appropriate congressional com-12 |
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321 | 321 | | mittees and release publicly an unclassified determination 13 |
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322 | 322 | | explicitly stating whether South Africa has engaged in ac-14 |
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323 | 323 | | tivities that undermine United States national security or 15 |
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324 | 324 | | foreign policy interests. 16 |
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325 | 325 | | (b) A |
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326 | 326 | | CCOMPANYINGREPORT.—The certification re-17 |
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327 | 327 | | quired by subsection (a) shall be accompanied by an un-18 |
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328 | 328 | | classified report submitted to the appropriate congres-19 |
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329 | 329 | | sional committees, with a classified annex if necessary, 20 |
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330 | 330 | | providing the justification for the determination. 21 |
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331 | 331 | | SEC. 5. FULL REVIEW OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. 22 |
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332 | 332 | | (a) B |
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333 | 333 | | ILATERALRELATIONSHIPREVIEW.—The Presi-23 |
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334 | 334 | | dent, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Sec-24 |
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335 | 335 | | retary of Defense, the United States Trade Representa-25 |
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338 | 338 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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339 | 339 | | tive, and the heads of other Federal departments and 1 |
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340 | 340 | | agencies that play a substantial role in United States rela-2 |
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341 | 341 | | tions with South Africa, shall conduct a comprehensive re-3 |
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342 | 342 | | view of the bilateral relationship between the United 4 |
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343 | 343 | | States and South Africa. 5 |
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344 | 344 | | (b) R |
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345 | 345 | | EPORT ONFINDINGS.—Not later than 120 days 6 |
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346 | 346 | | after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall 7 |
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347 | 347 | | submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-8 |
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348 | 348 | | port that includes the findings of the review required by 9 |
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349 | 349 | | subsection (a). 10 |
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350 | 350 | | SEC. 6. REPORT ON SANCTIONABLE PERSONS. 11 |
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351 | 351 | | Not later than 120 days after the date of the enact-12 |
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352 | 352 | | ment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the 13 |
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353 | 353 | | Secretary of State and the Secretary of Treasury, shall 14 |
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354 | 354 | | submit to the appropriate congressional committees a clas-15 |
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355 | 355 | | sified report that includes— 16 |
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356 | 356 | | (1) a list of senior South African government 17 |
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357 | 357 | | officials and ANC leaders the President determines 18 |
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358 | 358 | | have engaged in corruption or human rights abuses 19 |
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359 | 359 | | that would be sufficient, based on credible evidence, 20 |
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360 | 360 | | to meet the criteria for the imposition of sanctions 21 |
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361 | 361 | | pursuant to the authorities provided by the Global 22 |
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362 | 362 | | Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 23 |
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363 | 363 | | U.S.C. 10101 et seq.); and 24 |
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365 | 365 | | mprince on LAP1J3WLY3PROD with $$_JOB 14 |
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366 | 366 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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367 | 367 | | (2) with respect to each person identified pur-1 |
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368 | 368 | | suant to paragraph (1)— 2 |
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369 | 369 | | (A) a detailed explanation describing the 3 |
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370 | 370 | | conduct forming the basis of the person’s inclu-4 |
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371 | 371 | | sion on the list; and 5 |
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372 | 372 | | (B)(i) the expected timeline for sanctions 6 |
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373 | 373 | | described in paragraph (1) to be imposed with 7 |
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374 | 374 | | respect to such person; or 8 |
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375 | 375 | | (ii) if the President does not intend to 9 |
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376 | 376 | | impose sanctions with respect to such per-10 |
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377 | 377 | | son, a detailed justification describing the 11 |
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378 | 378 | | rationale and legal authorities underlying 12 |
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379 | 379 | | such negative determination. 13 |
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380 | 380 | | SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS. 14 |
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381 | 381 | | (a) ANC.—The term ‘‘ANC’’ means the African Na-15 |
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382 | 382 | | tional Congress. 16 |
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383 | 383 | | (b) A |
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384 | 384 | | PPROPRIATECONGRESSIONALCOMMITTEES.— 17 |
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385 | 385 | | The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 18 |
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386 | 386 | | means— 19 |
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387 | 387 | | (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 20 |
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388 | 388 | | House of Representatives; and 21 |
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389 | 389 | | (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 22 |
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390 | 390 | | Senate. 23 |
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391 | 391 | | (c) CCP.—The term ‘‘CCP’’ means the Chinese Com-24 |
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392 | 392 | | munist Party. 25 |
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394 | 394 | | mprince on LAP1J3WLY3PROD with $$_JOB 15 |
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395 | 395 | | •HR 2633 IH |
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396 | 396 | | (d) PRC.—The term ‘‘PRC’’ means the People’s Re-1 |
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397 | 397 | | public of China. 2 |
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398 | 398 | | Æ |
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400 | 400 | | mprince on LAP1J3WLY3PROD with $$_JOB |
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