Us Congress 2025-2026 Regular Session

Us Congress House Bill HR105 Compare Versions

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Old	New	Differences
1	1	IV
2	2	119THCONGRESS
3	3	1
4	4	STSESSION H. RES. 105
5	5	Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear weapons-capable
6	6	Islamic Republic of Iran.
7	7	IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
8	8	FEBRUARY4, 2025
9	9	Mr. M
10	10	OSKOWITZ(for himself and Mr. LAWLER) submitted the following
11	11	resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
12	12	RESOLUTION
13	13	Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear
14	14	weapons-capable Islamic Republic of Iran.
15	15	Whereas numerous officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran
16	16	have repeatedly made statements against the United
17	17	States, Israel, and their allies and partners, including—
18	18	(1) the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of
19	19	Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who stated—
20	20	(A) ‘‘As long as America continues its wicked-
21	21	ness, interference, and savagery, the Iranian nation
22	22	will not abandon ‘Death to America’’’;
23	23	(B) ‘‘The Zionist regime is a deadly, cancerous
24	24	growth and a detriment to this region. It will un-
25	25	doubtedly be uprooted and destroyed’’;
26	26	(C) ‘‘We will definitely do everything necessary
27	27	to prepare the Iranian nation for confronting the Ar-
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30	30	•HRES 105 IH
31	31	rogant Powers, whether militarily, in terms of arma-
32	32	ment, or politically. Our officials are already working
33	33	on this’’; and
34	34	(D) ‘‘The United States of America and the Zi-
35	35	onist regime will definitely receive a crushing re-
36	36	sponse for what they do against Iran and the Resist-
37	37	ance Front’’;
38	38	(2) an adviser to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic
39	39	Republic of Iran, Kamal Kharrazi, who stated, ‘‘We have
40	40	no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s ex-
41	41	istence be threatened, there will be no choice but to
42	42	change our military doctrine’’; and
43	43	(3) former foreign ministry spokesperson of the Is-
44	44	lamic Republic of Iran, Nasser Kanani, who stated, ‘‘This
45	45	action of the three European countries [France, Germany
46	46	and the United Kingdom] is the continuation of the hos-
47	47	tile policy of the West and economic terrorism against
48	48	the people of Iran, which will face the appropriate and
49	49	proportionate action of the Islamic Republic of Iran’’;
50	50	Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran is directly responsible
51	51	for the death and injury of United States
52	52	servicemembers, including—
53	53	(1) between 2005 and 2011, when the Quds Force,
54	54	a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
55	55	provided explosively formed penetrators to Iranian-backed
56	56	fighters in Iraq and killed 195 United States troops and
57	57	wounded nearly another 900 United States troops;
58	58	(2) since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel,
59	59	where Iranian-backed proxies have attacked United
60	60	States troops in the region more than 170 times; and
61	61	(3) on January 28, 2024, when an Iranian-backed
62	62	proxy launched a drone that killed 3 United States troops
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66	66	and wounded nearly another 40 United States troops sta-
67	67	tioned at Tower 22 in Jordan;
68	68	Whereas the United States Government has reported—
69	69	(1) ‘‘Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah—
70	70	which in recent years has been estimated at
71	71	[$700,000,000]—accounts for the overwhelming majority
72	72	of [Hizballah’s] annual budget’’;
73	73	(2) ‘‘Hamas has received funding, weapons, and
74	74	training from Iran’’; and
75	75	(3) ‘‘Iran also provides up to [$100,000,000] annu-
76	76	ally in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups,
77	77	including Hamas’’;
78	78	Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran’s support to the
79	79	Houthis, including through the provision of ballistic and
80	80	cruise missiles and unmanned weapons systems, has al-
81	81	lowed the Houthis to carry out attacks against United
82	82	States partners;
83	83	Whereas, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic
84	84	Republic of Iran has engaged in acts of international ter-
85	85	rorism and continuously threatened the United States,
86	86	Israel, and their partners and allies;
87	87	Whereas, on January 19, 1984, the United States designated
88	88	the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of ter-
89	89	rorism for repeatedly providing support for acts of inter-
90	90	national terrorism;
91	91	Whereas, on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran an-
92	92	nounced that it had enriched uranium for the first time
93	93	to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrich-
94	94	ment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
95	95	Whereas, on December 23, 2006, the United Nations Secu-
96	96	rity Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which im-
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100	100	posed sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of
101	101	Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment activities;
102	102	Whereas the United Nations Security Council subsequently
103	103	adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and
104	104	1929 (2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program
105	105	of, and imposed additional sanctions with respect to, the
106	106	Islamic Republic of Iran;
107	107	Whereas, on February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran
108	108	announced that it had launched its first satellite, which
109	109	raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the
110	110	ballistic missile program;
111	111	Whereas, in September 2009, the United States, the United
112	112	Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clan-
113	113	destine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in the Islamic
114	114	Republic of Iran, years after construction started on the
115	115	plant;
116	116	Whereas, on January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran
117	117	conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile,
118	118	which traveled an estimated 600 miles and provides the
119	119	Islamic Republic of Iran the capability to threaten United
120	120	States military installations in the Middle East;
121	121	Whereas, in 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the
122	122	nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
123	123	contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs re-
124	124	lating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, develop-
125	125	ment, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of
126	126	Iran;
127	127	Whereas, on September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the exist-
128	128	ence of a secret warehouse housing radioactive material
129	129	in the Turquz Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection
130	130	of the warehouse by the International Atomic Energy
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133	133	•HRES 105 IH
134	134	Agency (referred to in this preamble as the ‘‘IAEA’’) de-
135	135	tected radioactive particles, which the Government of
136	136	Iran failed to adequately explain;
137	137	Whereas, on June 19, 2020, the IAEA adopted Resolution
138	138	GOV/2020/34, which expressed ‘‘serious concern . . .
139	139	that Iran has not provided access to the Agency under
140	140	the Additional Protocol to two locations’’;
141	141	Whereas, on April 17, 2021, the IAEA verified that the Is-
142	142	lamic Republic of Iran had begun to enrich uranium to
143	143	60 percent purity;
144	144	Whereas, on August 14, 2021, the former President of the
145	145	Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, stated,
146	146	‘‘Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization can enrich uranium
147	147	by 20 percent and 60 percent and if . . . our reactors
148	148	need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity’’;
149	149	Whereas, on April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
150	150	confirmed the relocation of a production facility for ad-
151	151	vanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj,
152	152	Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment
153	153	Complex;
154	154	Whereas, on April 19, 2022, the Department of State re-
155	155	leased a report stating there are ‘‘serious concerns’’
156	156	about ‘‘possible undeclared nuclear material and activities
157	157	in Iran’’;
158	158	Whereas, on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Is-
159	159	lamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3
160	160	kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent highly enriched
161	161	uranium, roughly enough material for a nuclear weapon;
162	162	Whereas, on June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
163	163	turned off surveillance cameras installed by the IAEA to
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166	166	•HRES 105 IH
167	167	monitor uranium enrichment activities at nuclear sites in
168	168	the country;
169	169	Whereas, on July 14, 2022, in The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel
170	170	Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which was
171	171	signed between President Biden and Israel, the United
172	172	States stressed its commitment ‘‘never to allow Iran to
173	173	acquire a nuclear weapon, and that [the United States]
174	174	is prepared to use all elements of its national power to
175	175	ensure that outcome’’;
176	176	Whereas, on July 27, 2022, the head of the Atomic Energy
177	177	Organization of Iran, Mohammad Eslami, announced
178	178	that the Islamic Republic of Iran is building a new nu-
179	179	clear reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center,
180	180	which will be one of the largest nuclear facilities in Iran;
181	181	Whereas, on December 2, 2022, IAEA Director General
182	182	Rafael Mariano Grossi stated, ‘‘Iran informed us they
183	183	were tripling . . . their capacity to enrich uranium at 60
184	184	percent, which is very close to military level, which is 90
185	185	percent’’;
186	186	Whereas, on January 25, 2023, Director General Grossi stat-
187	187	ed, ‘‘One thing is true: [the Islamic Republic of Iran has]
188	188	amassed enough nuclear material for several nuclear
189	189	weapons’’;
190	190	Whereas, on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the
191	191	Islamic Republic of Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7
192	192	percent, which is just short of the 90 percent threshold
193	193	for weapons-grade fissile material;
194	194	Whereas, on September 4, 2023, an IAEA report estimated
195	195	the total uranium stockpile of the Islamic Republic of
196	196	Iran to be 3795.5 kilograms (8367.65 pounds) and that
197	197	the Islamic Republic of Iran has enough fissile material,
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201	201	that if further enriched, would be sufficient to produce
202	202	several nuclear weapons;
203	203	Whereas, on October 18, 2023, United Nations Security
204	204	Council Resolution 2231 (2015) lapsed and many pro-
205	205	liferation-related penalties and restrictions were lifted, al-
206	206	lowing the Islamic Republic of Iran to test or transfer
207	207	ballistic missiles, which may contribute to the further de-
208	208	velopment of a nuclear weapon delivery system;
209	209	Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the
210	210	United States, France, Germany, and the United King-
211	211	dom jointly declared, ‘‘The production of high-enriched
212	212	uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification.
213	213	These decisions demonstrate Iran’s lack of good will to-
214	214	wards de-escalation and represent reckless behavior in a
215	215	tense regional context . . . Iran must fully cooperate
216	216	with the IAEA to enable it to provide assurances that its
217	217	nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.’’;
218	218	Whereas, on February 27, 2024, a spokesperson for the De-
219	219	partment of State stated, ‘‘We remain seriously con-
220	220	cerned about Iran’s continued expansion of its nuclear
221	221	program in ways that have no credible civilian purpose,
222	222	including its continued production of highly enriched ura-
223	223	nium’’;
224	224	Whereas, on June 3, 2024, Director General Grossi stated,
225	225	‘‘Many countries have said if Iran gets nuclear weapons,
226	226	they will do the same. Adding nuclear weapons to the
227	227	cauldron of the Middle East is a very bad idea.’’;
228	228	Whereas, on June 5, 2024, by a vote of 20 to 2, the United
229	229	States joined other nations in formally censuring the Is-
230	230	lamic Republic of Iran for advances in their nuclear pro-
231	231	gram and failure to cooperate with the IAEA;
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235	235	Whereas, on June 18, 2024, it was reported that intelligence
236	236	agencies of the United States and Israel were looking
237	237	into information that the Islamic Republic of Iran may
238	238	have developed a computer model that could be used for
239	239	research and development of nuclear weapons;
240	240	Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of Na-
241	241	tional Intelligence published an assessment, in accordance
242	242	with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism
243	243	Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; Public
244	244	Law 117–263), which stated, ‘‘Iran continues to increase
245	245	the size of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment
246	246	capacity, and develop, manufacture, and operate ad-
247	247	vanced centrifuges. Tehran has the infrastructure and ex-
248	248	perience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, at
249	249	multiple facilities’’;
250	250	Whereas, on November 28, 2024, the Islamic Republic of
251	251	Iran informed the IAEA that it planned to start enrich-
252	252	ing uranium with thousands of advanced centrifuges at
253	253	its Fordow and Natanz plants, while also installing more
254	254	uranium-enriching centrifuges at those locations;
255	255	Whereas, on December 5, 2024, the Office of the Director of
256	256	National Intelligence published another assessment, in
257	257	accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and
258	258	Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note;
259	259	Public Law 117–263), which stated—
260	260	(1) ‘‘Iran’s 20-percent and 60-percent enriched ura-
261	261	nium stockpiles are far greater than needed for what it
262	262	claims it will use the uranium for and Iran could produce
263	263	more than a dozen nuclear weapons if its total uranium
264	264	stockpile were further enriched’’; and
265	265	(2) ‘‘Iran probably will consider installing or oper-
266	266	ating more advanced centrifuges, further increasing its
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270	270	enriched uranium stockpile, enriching uranium up to 90
271	271	percent, or threatening to withdraw from the Treaty on
272	272	the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons’’; and
273	273	Whereas, on December 9, 2024, France, Germany, and the
274	274	United Kingdom released a joint statement that—
275	275	(1) condemns ‘‘Iran’s latest steps . . . to expand its
276	276	nuclear programme to significantly increase the rate of
277	277	production of uranium enriched up to 60 percent’’;
278	278	(2) expresses extreme concern ‘‘to learn that Iran
279	279	has increased the number of centrifuges in use and start-
280	280	ed preparations to install additional enrichment infra-
281	281	structure’’; and
282	282	(3) ‘‘strongly urge[s] Iran to reverse these steps,
283	283	and to immediately halt its nuclear escalation’’: Now,
284	284	therefore, be it
285	285	Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 1
286	286	(1) affirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 2
287	287	continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability 3
288	288	is— 4
289	289	(A) a credible threat to the United States; 5
290	290	and 6
291	291	(B) an existential threat to Israel and 7
292	292	other allies and partners in the Middle East; 8
293	293	(2) asserts all options should be considered to 9
294	294	address the nuclear threat the Islamic Republic of 10
295	295	Iran poses to the United States, Israel, and our al-11
296	296	lies and partners; and 12
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299	299	•HRES 105 IH
300	300	(3) demands the Islamic Republic of Iran to im-1
301	301	mediately cease engaging in any and all activities 2
302	302	that threaten the national security interests of the 3
303	303	United States, Israel, and our allies and partners, 4
304	304	including— 5
305	305	(A) enriching uranium; 6
306	306	(B) developing or possessing delivery vehi-7
307	307	cles capable of carrying nuclear warheads; and 8
308	308	(C) developing or possessing a nuclear 9
309	309	warhead. 10
310	310	SECTION 1. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 11
311	311	Nothing in this resolution may be construed to au-12
312	312	thorize the use of military force or the introduction of 13
313	313	United States Armed Forces into hostilities. 14
314	314	Æ
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