III
119THCONGRESS
1
STSESSION S. RES. 101
Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear weapons-capable
Islamic Republic of Iran.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
FEBRUARY27, 2025
Mr. G
RAHAM(for himself, Mr. FETTERMAN, and Mrs. BRITT) submitted the
following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations
RESOLUTION
Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear
weapons-capable Islamic Republic of Iran.
Whereas numerous officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran
have repeatedly made statements against the United
States, Israel, and their allies and partners, including—
(1) the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who stated—
(A) ‘‘As long as America continues its wicked-
ness, interference, and savagery, the Iranian nation
will not abandon ‘Death to America’.’’;
(B) ‘‘The Zionist regime is a deadly, cancerous
growth and a detriment to this region. It will un-
doubtedly be uprooted and destroyed’’;
(C) ‘‘We will definitely do everything necessary
to prepare the Iranian nation for confronting the Ar-
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•SRES 101 IS
rogant Powers, whether militarily, in terms of arma-
ment, or politically. Our officials are already working
on this’’; and
(D) ‘‘The United States of America and the Zi-
onist regime will definitely receive a crushing re-
sponse for what they do against Iran and the Resist-
ance Front’’;
(2) an adviser to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Kamal Kharrazi, who stated, ‘‘We have
no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s ex-
istence be threatened, there will be no choice but to
change our military doctrine’’; and
(3) former foreign ministry spokesperson of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, Nasser Kanani, who stated, ‘‘This
action of the three European countries [France, Germany
and the United Kingdom] is the continuation of the hos-
tile policy of the West and economic terrorism against
the people of Iran, which will face the appropriate and
proportionate action of the Islamic Republic of Iran’’;
Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran is directly responsible
for the death and injury of United States
servicemembers, including—
(1) between 2005 and 2011, when the Quds Force,
a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
provided explosively formed penetrators to Iranian-backed
fighters in Iraq and killed 195 United States troops and
wounded nearly another 900 United States troops;
(2) since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel,
where Iranian-backed proxies have attacked United
States troops in the region more than 170 times; and
(3) on January 28, 2024, when an Iranian-backed
proxy launched a drone that killed 3 United States troops
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and wounded nearly another 40 United States troops sta-
tioned at Tower 22 in Jordan;
Whereas the United States Government has reported—
(1) ‘‘Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah—
which in recent years has been estimated at $700 mil-
lion—accounts for the overwhelming majority of
[Hizballah’s] annual budget’’;
(2) ‘‘Hamas has received funding, weapons, and
training from Iran’’; and
(3) ‘‘Iran also provides up to $100 million annually
in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, in-
cluding Hamas’’;
Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran’s support to the
Houthis, including through the provision of ballistic and
cruise missiles and unmanned weapons systems, has al-
lowed the Houthis to carry out attacks against United
States partners;
Whereas, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic
Republic of Iran has engaged in acts of international ter-
rorism and continuously threatened the United States,
Israel, and their partners and allies;
Whereas, on January 19, 1984, the United States designated
the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of ter-
rorism for repeatedly providing support for acts of inter-
national terrorism;
Whereas, on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran an-
nounced that it had enriched uranium for the first time
to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrich-
ment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas, on December 23, 2006, the United Nations Secu-
rity Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which im-
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posed sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of
Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment activities;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council subsequently
adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and
1929 (2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program
of, and imposed additional sanctions with respect to, the
Islamic Republic of Iran;
Whereas, on February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran
announced that it had launched its first satellite, which
raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the
ballistic missile program;
Whereas, in September 2009, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clan-
destine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, years after construction started on the
plant;
Whereas, on January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran
conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile,
which traveled an estimated 600 miles and provides the
Islamic Republic of Iran the capability to threaten United
States military installations in the Middle East;
Whereas, in 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the
nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs re-
lating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, develop-
ment, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of
Iran;
Whereas, on September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the exist-
ence of a secret warehouse housing radioactive material
in the Turquz Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection
of the warehouse by the International Atomic Energy
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Agency (referred to in this preamble as the ‘‘IAEA’’) de-
tected radioactive particles, which the Government of
Iran failed to adequately explain;
Whereas, on June 19, 2020, the IAEA adopted Resolution
GOV/2020/34, which expressed ‘‘serious concern . . .
that Iran has not provided access to the Agency under
the Additional Protocol to two locations’’;
Whereas, on April 17, 2021, the IAEA verified that the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran had begun to enrich uranium to
60 percent purity;
Whereas, on August 14, 2021, the former President of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, stated,
‘‘Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization can enrich uranium
by 20 percent and 60 percent and if . . . our reactors
need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity’’;
Whereas, on April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
confirmed the relocation of a production facility for ad-
vanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj,
Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment
Complex;
Whereas, on April 19, 2022, the Department of State re-
leased a report stating there are ‘‘serious concerns’’
about ‘‘possible undeclared nuclear material and activities
in Iran’’;
Whereas, on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3
kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent highly enriched
uranium, roughly enough material for a nuclear weapon;
Whereas, on June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
turned off surveillance cameras installed by the IAEA to
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monitor uranium enrichment activities at nuclear sites in
the country;
Whereas, on July 14, 2022, in The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel
Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which was
signed between President Biden and Israel, the United
States stressed its commitment ‘‘never to allow Iran to
acquire a nuclear weapon, and that [the United States]
is prepared to use all elements of its national power to
ensure that outcome’’;
Whereas, on July 27, 2022, the head of the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, Mohammad Eslami, announced
that the Islamic Republic of Iran is building a new nu-
clear reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center,
which will be one of the largest nuclear facilities in Iran;
Whereas, on December 2, 2022, IAEA Director General
Rafael Mariano Grossi stated, ‘‘Iran informed us they
were tripling . . . their capacity to enrich uranium at 60
percent, which is very close to military level, which is 90
percent’’;
Whereas, on January 25, 2023, Director General Grossi stat-
ed, ‘‘One thing is true: [the Islamic Republic of Iran has]
amassed enough nuclear material for several nuclear
weapons’’;
Whereas, on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the
Islamic Republic of Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7
percent, which is just short of the 90 percent threshold
for weapons-grade fissile material;
Whereas, on September 4, 2023, an IAEA report estimated
the total uranium stockpile of the Islamic Republic of
Iran to be 3795.5 kilograms (8367.65 pounds) and that
the Islamic Republic of Iran has enough fissile material,
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that if further enriched, would be sufficient to produce
several nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on October 18, 2023, United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2231 (2015) lapsed and many pro-
liferation-related penalties and restrictions were lifted, al-
lowing the Islamic Republic of Iran to test or transfer
ballistic missiles, which may contribute to the further de-
velopment of a nuclear weapon delivery system;
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the governments of the
United States, France, Germany, and the United King-
dom jointly declared, ‘‘The production of high-enriched
uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification.
These decisions demonstrate Iran’s lack of good will to-
wards de-escalation and represent reckless behavior in a
tense regional context . . . Iran must fully cooperate
with the IAEA to enable it to provide assurances that its
nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.’’;
Whereas, on February 27, 2024, a spokesperson for the De-
partment of State stated, ‘‘We remain seriously con-
cerned about Iran’s continued expansion of its nuclear
program in ways that have no credible civilian purpose,
including its continued production of highly enriched ura-
nium’’;
Whereas, on June 3, 2024, Director General Grossi stated,
‘‘Many countries have said if Iran gets nuclear weapons,
they will do the same. Adding nuclear weapons to the
cauldron of the Middle East is a very bad idea.’’;
Whereas, on June 5, 2024, by a vote of 20 to 2, the United
States joined other nations in formally censuring the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran for advances in their nuclear pro-
gram and failure to cooperate with the IAEA;
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Whereas, on June 18, 2024, it was reported that intelligence
agencies of the United States and Israel were looking
into information that the Islamic Republic of Iran may
have developed a computer model that could be used for
research and development of nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence published an assessment, in accordance
with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism
Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; Public
Law 117–263), which stated, ‘‘Iran continues to increase
the size of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment
capacity, and develop, manufacture, and operate ad-
vanced centrifuges. Tehran has the infrastructure and ex-
perience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, at
multiple facilities’’;
Whereas, on November 28, 2024, the Islamic Republic of
Iran informed the IAEA that it planned to start enrich-
ing uranium with thousands of advanced centrifuges at
its Fordow and Natanz plants, while also installing more
uranium-enriching centrifuges at those locations;
Whereas, on December 5, 2024, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence published another assessment, in
accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and
Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note;
Public Law 117–263), which stated—
(1) ‘‘Iran’s 20-percent and 60-percent enriched ura-
nium stockpiles are far greater than needed for what it
claims it will use the uranium for and Iran could produce
more than a dozen nuclear weapons if its total uranium
stockpile were further enriched’’; and
(2) ‘‘Iran probably will consider installing or oper-
ating more advanced centrifuges, further increasing its
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enriched uranium stockpile, enriching uranium up to 90
percent, or threatening to withdraw from the Treaty on
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons’’;
Whereas, on December 9, 2024, France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom released a joint statement that—
(1) condemns ‘‘Iran’s latest steps . . . to expand its
nuclear programme to significantly increase the rate of
production of uranium enriched up to 60 percent’’;
(2) expresses extreme concern ‘‘to learn that Iran
has increased the number of centrifuges in use and start-
ed preparations to install additional enrichment infra-
structure’’; and
(3) ‘‘strongly urge[s] Iran to reverse these steps,
and to immediately halt its nuclear escalation’’; and
Whereas, on February 26, 2025, the IAEA reported that the
Islamic Republic of Iran had increased its total stockpile
of 60 percent highly enriched uranium to 274.8 kilo-
grams (605.83 pounds), which, if further enriched, would
be sufficient to produce 6 nuclear weapons: Now, there-
fore, be it
Resolved, That the Senate— 1
(1) affirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 2
continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability 3
is— 4
(A) a credible threat to the United States; 5
and 6
(B) an existential threat to Israel and 7
other allies and partners in the Middle East; 8
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(2) asserts all options should be considered to 1
address the nuclear threat the Islamic Republic of 2
Iran poses to the United States, Israel, and our al-3
lies and partners; and 4
(3) demands the Islamic Republic of Iran to im-5
mediately cease engaging in any and all activities 6
that threaten the national security interests of the 7
United States, Israel, and our allies and partners, 8
including— 9
(A) enriching uranium; 10
(B) developing or possessing delivery vehi-11
cles capable of carrying nuclear warheads; and 12
(C) developing or possessing a nuclear 13
warhead. 14
SEC. 2. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 15
Nothing in this resolution may be construed to au-16
thorize the use of military force or the introduction of 17
United States Armed Forces into hostilities. 18
Æ
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