III
119THCONGRESS
1
STSESSION S. RES. 212
Affirming the acceptable outcome of any nuclear deal between the United
States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MAY8, 2025
Mr. G
RAHAM(for himself, Mr. COTTON, and Mrs. BRITT) submitted the fol-
lowing resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions
RESOLUTION
Affirming the acceptable outcome of any nuclear deal be-
tween the United States and the Islamic Republic of
Iran, and for other purposes.
Whereas the acceptable outcome of any negotiations between
the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran re-
lated to Iran’s nuclear program is—
(1) the complete dismantlement and destruction of
its entire nuclear program; and then
(2) an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
(commonly known as a ‘‘123 Agreement’’) between the
United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, pursuant
to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2153) that also requires the Islamic Republic of
Iran to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s
(referred to in this preamble as the ‘‘IAEA’’) additional
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•SRES 212 IS
protocols for the verification of nuclear safeguards and
forgo domestic uranium enrichment, the reprocessing of
spent fuel, and the development or possession of any en-
richment or reprocessing infrastructure or capacity;
Whereas the complete dismantlement and destruction of the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program should in-
clude, at a minimum—
(1) disclosing and dismantling all of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
programs, including the removal of any previously en-
riched uranium;
(2) allowing international inspectors unconditional
access to monitor and verify compliance, including allow-
ing short-notice inspections of all buildings in all of its
nuclear sites by the IAEA;
(3) providing information to the IAEA about all
parts of its nuclear fuel-cycle;
(4) allowing the IAEA to freely collect environmental
samples at locations beyond the stated sites whenever the
IAEA deems such collection is necessary;
(5) providing the IAEA the right to monitor commu-
nications by receiving unimpeded access to all satellite
systems and other forms of telecommunications;
(6) providing designated IAEA inspectors of all na-
tionalities valid visas and unimpeded entry into the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran;
(7) providing information on any research and devel-
opment activities relating to the Islamic Republic of
Iran’s nuclear program;
(8) providing the IAEA with information about the
manufacturing and export of sensitive nuclear-related
technologies;
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•SRES 212 IS
(9) permitting the establishment of IAEA
verification mechanisms at manufacturing and export-im-
port locations; and
(10) signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol as
part of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas more than 20 countries have a peaceful nuclear
power capability without the ability to domestically enrich
uranium or reprocess spent fuel;
Whereas in August 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s se-
cret nuclear program was revealed, including the exist-
ence of a fuel enrichment plant in Natanz, Iran and the
heavy-water plant in Arak, Iran;
Whereas on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran an-
nounced that it had enriched uranium for the first time
to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrich-
ment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas on May 31, 2021, it was reported that the Islamic
Republic of Iran failed to provide any explanation for the
uranium remnants found at undeclared sites in Iran, and
such an explanation had not been provided as of the date
of the enactment of this Resolution;
Whereas on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3
kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent highly enriched
uranium, which is roughly enough material to construct
a nuclear weapon;
Whereas on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the
Islamic Republic of Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7
percent, which is just short of the 90 percent threshold
for weapons-grade fissile material;
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Whereas on September 16, 2023, the IAEA reported that the
Islamic Republic of Iran banned the activities of nearly
1
⁄3of the IAEA’s most experienced nuclear inspectors in
Iran, a decision that, according to IAEA Director-Gen-
eral Rafael Grossi, harmed the IAEA’s ability to monitor
Iran’s nuclear program;
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the
United States, France, Germany, and the United King-
dom jointly declared, ‘‘The production of high-enriched
uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification’’;
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence published an assessment, in accordance
with the Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism
Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; Public
Law 117–263), which stated, the Islamic Republic of
Iran has ‘‘undertaken activities that better position it to
produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so’’;
Whereas, on November 15, 2024, the IAEA reported that the
Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to expand its en-
richment facilities and install additional advanced cen-
trifuges, including at the Natanz Nuclear Facility, where
there are 15 cascades of advanced centrifuges, and the
Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, where there are ad-
vanced preparations for the expansion of the facility;
Whereas, on February 26, 2025, the IAEA reported that the
Islamic Republic of Iran has between 5 and 7 metric tons
of enriched uranium, and had increased its total stockpile
of 60 percent highly enriched uranium to 274.8 kilo-
grams (605.83 pounds), which, if further enriched, could
be sufficient to produce 6 nuclear weapons;
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Whereas, on April 7, 2025, the Prime Minister of Israel,
Benjamin Netanyahu, stated that the United States and
Israel are ‘‘both united in the goal that Iran does not
ever get nuclear weapons. If it can be done diplomati-
cally, ... I think that would be a good thing. But what-
ever happens, we have to make sure that Iran does not
have nuclear weapons’’;
Whereas, on April 7, 2025, President of the United States
Donald Trump echoed that position, stating, ‘‘You know,
it’s not a complicated formula. Iran cannot have a nu-
clear weapon. That’s all there is.’’;
Whereas, on April 8, 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran re-
jected the dismantlement of its nuclear program, stating,
‘‘Trump wants a new deal: end Iran’s regional influence,
dismantle its nuclear program, and halt its missile work.
These are unacceptable to Tehran. Our nuclear program
cannot be dismantled’’; and
Whereas the United States must never allow the Islamic Re-
public of Iran to obtain a nuclear weapons capability that
threatens the United States or its allies or partners;
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Senate— 1
(1) commends the Trump administration for 2
engaging in direct talks with the Islamic Republic of 3
Iran regarding its nuclear program; 4
(2) recognizes the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 5
decades of cheating, the regime’s barbaric nature, 6
and its open commitment to destroying the State of 7
Israel must be addressed in any negotiations; and 8
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(3) affirms support for— 1
(A) the complete dismantlement and de-2
struction of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s en-3
tire nuclear program; and then 4
(B) an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear 5
Cooperation (commonly known as a ‘‘123 6
Agreement’’) between the United States and the 7
Islamic Republic of Iran, pursuant to section 8
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 9
U.S.C. 2153) that also requires the Islamic Re-10
public of Iran— 11
(i) to adopt the IAEA additional pro-12
tocols for verification of nuclear safe-13
guards; and 14
(ii) to forgo domestic uranium enrich-15
ment, the reprocessing of spent fuel, and 16
the development or possession of any en-17
richment or reprocessing infrastructure or 18
capacity. 19
Æ
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