Us Congress 2025-2026 Regular Session

Us Congress Senate Bill SR212 Compare Versions

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Old	New	Differences
1	1	III
2	2	119THCONGRESS
3	3	1
4	4	STSESSION S. RES. 212
5	5	Affirming the acceptable outcome of any nuclear deal between the United
6	6	States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for other purposes.
7	7	IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
8	8	MAY8, 2025
9	9	Mr. G
10	10	RAHAM(for himself, Mr. COTTON, and Mrs. BRITT) submitted the fol-
11	11	lowing resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
12	12	tions
13	13	RESOLUTION
14	14	Affirming the acceptable outcome of any nuclear deal be-
15	15	tween the United States and the Islamic Republic of
16	16	Iran, and for other purposes.
17	17	Whereas the acceptable outcome of any negotiations between
18	18	the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran re-
19	19	lated to Iran’s nuclear program is—
20	20	(1) the complete dismantlement and destruction of
21	21	its entire nuclear program; and then
22	22	(2) an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
23	23	(commonly known as a ‘‘123 Agreement’’) between the
24	24	United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, pursuant
25	25	to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
26	26	U.S.C. 2153) that also requires the Islamic Republic of
27	27	Iran to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s
28	28	(referred to in this preamble as the ‘‘IAEA’’) additional
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31	31	•SRES 212 IS
32	32	protocols for the verification of nuclear safeguards and
33	33	forgo domestic uranium enrichment, the reprocessing of
34	34	spent fuel, and the development or possession of any en-
35	35	richment or reprocessing infrastructure or capacity;
36	36	Whereas the complete dismantlement and destruction of the
37	37	Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program should in-
38	38	clude, at a minimum—
39	39	(1) disclosing and dismantling all of the Islamic Re-
40	40	public of Iran’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
41	41	programs, including the removal of any previously en-
42	42	riched uranium;
43	43	(2) allowing international inspectors unconditional
44	44	access to monitor and verify compliance, including allow-
45	45	ing short-notice inspections of all buildings in all of its
46	46	nuclear sites by the IAEA;
47	47	(3) providing information to the IAEA about all
48	48	parts of its nuclear fuel-cycle;
49	49	(4) allowing the IAEA to freely collect environmental
50	50	samples at locations beyond the stated sites whenever the
51	51	IAEA deems such collection is necessary;
52	52	(5) providing the IAEA the right to monitor commu-
53	53	nications by receiving unimpeded access to all satellite
54	54	systems and other forms of telecommunications;
55	55	(6) providing designated IAEA inspectors of all na-
56	56	tionalities valid visas and unimpeded entry into the Is-
57	57	lamic Republic of Iran;
58	58	(7) providing information on any research and devel-
59	59	opment activities relating to the Islamic Republic of
60	60	Iran’s nuclear program;
61	61	(8) providing the IAEA with information about the
62	62	manufacturing and export of sensitive nuclear-related
63	63	technologies;
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66	66	•SRES 212 IS
67	67	(9) permitting the establishment of IAEA
68	68	verification mechanisms at manufacturing and export-im-
69	69	port locations; and
70	70	(10) signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol as
71	71	part of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;
72	72	Whereas more than 20 countries have a peaceful nuclear
73	73	power capability without the ability to domestically enrich
74	74	uranium or reprocess spent fuel;
75	75	Whereas in August 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s se-
76	76	cret nuclear program was revealed, including the exist-
77	77	ence of a fuel enrichment plant in Natanz, Iran and the
78	78	heavy-water plant in Arak, Iran;
79	79	Whereas on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran an-
80	80	nounced that it had enriched uranium for the first time
81	81	to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrich-
82	82	ment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
83	83	Whereas on May 31, 2021, it was reported that the Islamic
84	84	Republic of Iran failed to provide any explanation for the
85	85	uranium remnants found at undeclared sites in Iran, and
86	86	such an explanation had not been provided as of the date
87	87	of the enactment of this Resolution;
88	88	Whereas on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Is-
89	89	lamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3
90	90	kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent highly enriched
91	91	uranium, which is roughly enough material to construct
92	92	a nuclear weapon;
93	93	Whereas on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the
94	94	Islamic Republic of Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7
95	95	percent, which is just short of the 90 percent threshold
96	96	for weapons-grade fissile material;
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99	99	•SRES 212 IS
100	100	Whereas on September 16, 2023, the IAEA reported that the
101	101	Islamic Republic of Iran banned the activities of nearly
102	102	1
103	103	⁄3of the IAEA’s most experienced nuclear inspectors in
104	104	Iran, a decision that, according to IAEA Director-Gen-
105	105	eral Rafael Grossi, harmed the IAEA’s ability to monitor
106	106	Iran’s nuclear program;
107	107	Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the
108	108	United States, France, Germany, and the United King-
109	109	dom jointly declared, ‘‘The production of high-enriched
110	110	uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification’’;
111	111	Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of Na-
112	112	tional Intelligence published an assessment, in accordance
113	113	with the Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism
114	114	Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; Public
115	115	Law 117–263), which stated, the Islamic Republic of
116	116	Iran has ‘‘undertaken activities that better position it to
117	117	produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so’’;
118	118	Whereas, on November 15, 2024, the IAEA reported that the
119	119	Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to expand its en-
120	120	richment facilities and install additional advanced cen-
121	121	trifuges, including at the Natanz Nuclear Facility, where
122	122	there are 15 cascades of advanced centrifuges, and the
123	123	Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, where there are ad-
124	124	vanced preparations for the expansion of the facility;
125	125	Whereas, on February 26, 2025, the IAEA reported that the
126	126	Islamic Republic of Iran has between 5 and 7 metric tons
127	127	of enriched uranium, and had increased its total stockpile
128	128	of 60 percent highly enriched uranium to 274.8 kilo-
129	129	grams (605.83 pounds), which, if further enriched, could
130	130	be sufficient to produce 6 nuclear weapons;
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133	133	•SRES 212 IS
134	134	Whereas, on April 7, 2025, the Prime Minister of Israel,
135	135	Benjamin Netanyahu, stated that the United States and
136	136	Israel are ‘‘both united in the goal that Iran does not
137	137	ever get nuclear weapons. If it can be done diplomati-
138	138	cally, ... I think that would be a good thing. But what-
139	139	ever happens, we have to make sure that Iran does not
140	140	have nuclear weapons’’;
141	141	Whereas, on April 7, 2025, President of the United States
142	142	Donald Trump echoed that position, stating, ‘‘You know,
143	143	it’s not a complicated formula. Iran cannot have a nu-
144	144	clear weapon. That’s all there is.’’;
145	145	Whereas, on April 8, 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran re-
146	146	jected the dismantlement of its nuclear program, stating,
147	147	‘‘Trump wants a new deal: end Iran’s regional influence,
148	148	dismantle its nuclear program, and halt its missile work.
149	149	These are unacceptable to Tehran. Our nuclear program
150	150	cannot be dismantled’’; and
151	151	Whereas the United States must never allow the Islamic Re-
152	152	public of Iran to obtain a nuclear weapons capability that
153	153	threatens the United States or its allies or partners;
154	154	Now, therefore, be it
155	155	Resolved, That the Senate— 1
156	156	(1) commends the Trump administration for 2
157	157	engaging in direct talks with the Islamic Republic of 3
158	158	Iran regarding its nuclear program; 4
159	159	(2) recognizes the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 5
160	160	decades of cheating, the regime’s barbaric nature, 6
161	161	and its open commitment to destroying the State of 7
162	162	Israel must be addressed in any negotiations; and 8
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165	165	•SRES 212 IS
166	166	(3) affirms support for— 1
167	167	(A) the complete dismantlement and de-2
168	168	struction of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s en-3
169	169	tire nuclear program; and then 4
170	170	(B) an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear 5
171	171	Cooperation (commonly known as a ‘‘123 6
172	172	Agreement’’) between the United States and the 7
173	173	Islamic Republic of Iran, pursuant to section 8
174	174	123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 9
175	175	U.S.C. 2153) that also requires the Islamic Re-10
176	176	public of Iran— 11
177	177	(i) to adopt the IAEA additional pro-12
178	178	tocols for verification of nuclear safe-13
179	179	guards; and 14
180	180	(ii) to forgo domestic uranium enrich-15
181	181	ment, the reprocessing of spent fuel, and 16
182	182	the development or possession of any en-17
183	183	richment or reprocessing infrastructure or 18
184	184	capacity. 19
185	185	Æ
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