Us Congress 2025-2026 Regular Session

Us Congress Senate Bill SR43 Compare Versions

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Old	New	Differences
1	1	III
2	2	119THCONGRESS
3	3	1
4	4	STSESSION S. RES. 43
5	5	Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear weapons-capable
6	6	Islamic Republic of Iran.
7	7	IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
8	8	JANUARY29, 2025
9	9	Mr. G
10	10	RAHAM(for himself, Mr. FETTERMAN, and Mrs. BRITT) submitted the
11	11	following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Re-
12	12	lations
13	13	RESOLUTION
14	14	Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear
15	15	weapons-capable Islamic Republic of Iran.
16	16	Whereas numerous officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran
17	17	have repeatedly made statements against the United
18	18	States, Israel, and their allies and partners, including—
19	19	(1) the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of
20	20	Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who stated—
21	21	(A) ‘‘As long as America continues its wicked-
22	22	ness, interference, and savagery, the Iranian nation
23	23	will not abandon ‘Death to America’.’’;
24	24	(B) ‘‘The Zionist regime is a deadly, cancerous
25	25	growth and a detriment to this region. It will un-
26	26	doubtedly be uprooted and destroyed’’;
27	27	(C) ‘‘We will definitely do everything necessary
28	28	to prepare the Iranian nation for confronting the Ar-
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32	32	rogant Powers, whether militarily, in terms of arma-
33	33	ment, or politically. Our officials are already working
34	34	on this’’; and
35	35	(D) ‘‘The United States of America and the Zi-
36	36	onist regime will definitely receive a crushing re-
37	37	sponse for what they do against Iran and the Resist-
38	38	ance Front’’;
39	39	(2) an adviser to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic
40	40	Republic of Iran, Kamal Kharrazi, who stated, ‘‘We have
41	41	no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s ex-
42	42	istence be threatened, there will be no choice but to
43	43	change our military doctrine’’; and
44	44	(3) former foreign ministry spokesperson of the Is-
45	45	lamic Republic of Iran, Nasser Kanani, who stated, ‘‘This
46	46	action of the three European countries [France, Germany
47	47	and the United Kingdom] is the continuation of the hos-
48	48	tile policy of the West and economic terrorism against
49	49	the people of Iran, which will face the appropriate and
50	50	proportionate action of the Islamic Republic of Iran’’;
51	51	Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran is directly responsible
52	52	for the death and injury of United States
53	53	servicemembers, including—
54	54	(1) between 2005 and 2011, when the Quds Force,
55	55	a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
56	56	provided explosively formed penetrators to Iranian-backed
57	57	fighters in Iraq and killed 195 United States troops and
58	58	wounded nearly another 900 United States troops;
59	59	(2) since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel,
60	60	where Iranian-backed proxies have attacked United
61	61	States troops in the region more than 170 times; and
62	62	(3) on January 28, 2024, when an Iranian-backed
63	63	proxy launched a drone that killed 3 United States troops
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67	67	and wounded nearly another 40 United States troops sta-
68	68	tioned at Tower 22 in Jordan;
69	69	Whereas the United States Government has reported—
70	70	(1) ‘‘Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah—
71	71	which in recent years has been estimated at $700 mil-
72	72	lion—accounts for the overwhelming majority of
73	73	[Hizballah’s] annual budget’’;
74	74	(2) ‘‘Hamas has received funding, weapons, and
75	75	training from Iran’’; and
76	76	(3) ‘‘Iran also provides up to $100 million annually
77	77	in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, in-
78	78	cluding Hamas’’;
79	79	Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran’s support to the
80	80	Houthis, including through the provision of ballistic and
81	81	cruise missiles and unmanned weapons systems, has al-
82	82	lowed the Houthis to carry out attacks against United
83	83	States partners;
84	84	Whereas, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic
85	85	Republic of Iran has engaged in acts of international ter-
86	86	rorism and continuously threatened the United States,
87	87	Israel, and their partners and allies;
88	88	Whereas, on January 19, 1984, the United States designated
89	89	the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of ter-
90	90	rorism for repeatedly providing support for acts of inter-
91	91	national terrorism;
92	92	Whereas, on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran an-
93	93	nounced that it had enriched uranium for the first time
94	94	to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrich-
95	95	ment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
96	96	Whereas, on December 23, 2006, the United Nations Secu-
97	97	rity Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which im-
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101	101	posed sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of
102	102	Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment activities;
103	103	Whereas the United Nations Security Council subsequently
104	104	adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and
105	105	1929 (2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program
106	106	of, and imposed additional sanctions with respect to, the
107	107	Islamic Republic of Iran;
108	108	Whereas, on February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran
109	109	announced that it had launched its first satellite, which
110	110	raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the
111	111	ballistic missile program;
112	112	Whereas, in September 2009, the United States, the United
113	113	Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clan-
114	114	destine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in the Islamic
115	115	Republic of Iran, years after construction started on the
116	116	plant;
117	117	Whereas, on January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran
118	118	conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile,
119	119	which traveled an estimated 600 miles and provides the
120	120	Islamic Republic of Iran the capability to threaten United
121	121	States military installations in the Middle East;
122	122	Whereas, in 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the
123	123	nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
124	124	contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs re-
125	125	lating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, develop-
126	126	ment, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of
127	127	Iran;
128	128	Whereas, on September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the exist-
129	129	ence of a secret warehouse housing radioactive material
130	130	in the Turquz Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection
131	131	of the warehouse by the International Atomic Energy
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135	135	Agency (referred to in this preamble as the ‘‘IAEA’’) de-
136	136	tected radioactive particles, which the Government of
137	137	Iran failed to adequately explain;
138	138	Whereas, on June 19, 2020, the IAEA adopted Resolution
139	139	GOV/2020/34, which expressed ‘‘serious concern . . .
140	140	that Iran has not provided access to the Agency under
141	141	the Additional Protocol to two locations’’;
142	142	Whereas, on April 17, 2021, the IAEA verified that the Is-
143	143	lamic Republic of Iran had begun to enrich uranium to
144	144	60 percent purity;
145	145	Whereas, on August 14, 2021, the former President of the
146	146	Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, stated,
147	147	‘‘Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization can enrich uranium
148	148	by 20 percent and 60 percent and if . . . our reactors
149	149	need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity’’;
150	150	Whereas, on April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
151	151	confirmed the relocation of a production facility for ad-
152	152	vanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj,
153	153	Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment
154	154	Complex;
155	155	Whereas, on April 19, 2022, the Department of State re-
156	156	leased a report stating there are ‘‘serious concerns’’
157	157	about ‘‘possible undeclared nuclear material and activities
158	158	in Iran’’;
159	159	Whereas, on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Is-
160	160	lamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3
161	161	kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent highly enriched
162	162	uranium, roughly enough material for a nuclear weapon;
163	163	Whereas, on June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
164	164	turned off surveillance cameras installed by the IAEA to
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168	168	monitor uranium enrichment activities at nuclear sites in
169	169	the country;
170	170	Whereas, on July 14, 2022, in The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel
171	171	Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which was
172	172	signed between President Biden and Israel, the United
173	173	States stressed its commitment ‘‘never to allow Iran to
174	174	acquire a nuclear weapon, and that [the United States]
175	175	is prepared to use all elements of its national power to
176	176	ensure that outcome’’;
177	177	Whereas, on July 27, 2022, the head of the Atomic Energy
178	178	Organization of Iran, Mohammad Eslami, announced
179	179	that the Islamic Republic of Iran is building a new nu-
180	180	clear reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center,
181	181	which will be one of the largest nuclear facilities in Iran;
182	182	Whereas, on December 2, 2022, IAEA Director General
183	183	Rafael Mariano Grossi stated, ‘‘Iran informed us they
184	184	were tripling . . . their capacity to enrich uranium at 60
185	185	percent, which is very close to military level, which is 90
186	186	percent’’;
187	187	Whereas, on January 25, 2023, Director General Grossi stat-
188	188	ed, ‘‘One thing is true: [the Islamic Republic of Iran has]
189	189	amassed enough nuclear material for several nuclear
190	190	weapons’’;
191	191	Whereas, on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the
192	192	Islamic Republic of Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7
193	193	percent, which is just short of the 90 percent threshold
194	194	for weapons-grade fissile material;
195	195	Whereas, on September 4, 2023, an IAEA report estimated
196	196	the total uranium stockpile of the Islamic Republic of
197	197	Iran to be 3795.5 kilograms (8367.65 pounds) and that
198	198	the Islamic Republic of Iran has enough fissile material,
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202	202	that if further enriched, would be sufficient to produce
203	203	several nuclear weapons;
204	204	Whereas, on October 18, 2023, United Nations Security
205	205	Council Resolution 2231 (2015) lapsed and many pro-
206	206	liferation-related penalties and restrictions were lifted, al-
207	207	lowing the Islamic Republic of Iran to test or transfer
208	208	ballistic missiles, which may contribute to the further de-
209	209	velopment of a nuclear weapon delivery system;
210	210	Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the
211	211	United States, France, Germany, and the United King-
212	212	dom jointly declared, ‘‘The production of high-enriched
213	213	uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification.
214	214	These decisions demonstrate Iran’s lack of good will to-
215	215	wards de-escalation and represent reckless behavior in a
216	216	tense regional context . . . Iran must fully cooperate
217	217	with the IAEA to enable it to provide assurances that its
218	218	nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.’’;
219	219	Whereas, on February 27, 2024, a spokesperson for the De-
220	220	partment of State stated, ‘‘We remain seriously con-
221	221	cerned about Iran’s continued expansion of its nuclear
222	222	program in ways that have no credible civilian purpose,
223	223	including its continued production of highly enriched ura-
224	224	nium’’;
225	225	Whereas, on June 3, 2024, Director General Grossi stated,
226	226	‘‘Many countries have said if Iran gets nuclear weapons,
227	227	they will do the same. Adding nuclear weapons to the
228	228	cauldron of the Middle East is a very bad idea.’’;
229	229	Whereas, on June 5, 2024, by a vote of 20 to 2, the United
230	230	States joined other nations in formally censuring the Is-
231	231	lamic Republic of Iran for advances in their nuclear pro-
232	232	gram and failure to cooperate with the IAEA;
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236	236	Whereas, on June 18, 2024, it was reported that intelligence
237	237	agencies of the United States and Israel were looking
238	238	into information that the Islamic Republic of Iran may
239	239	have developed a computer model that could be used for
240	240	research and development of nuclear weapons;
241	241	Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of Na-
242	242	tional Intelligence published an assessment, in accordance
243	243	with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism
244	244	Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; Public
245	245	Law 117–263), which stated, ‘‘Iran continues to increase
246	246	the size of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment
247	247	capacity, and develop, manufacture, and operate ad-
248	248	vanced centrifuges. Tehran has the infrastructure and ex-
249	249	perience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, at
250	250	multiple facilities’’;
251	251	Whereas, on November 28, 2024, the Islamic Republic of
252	252	Iran informed the IAEA that it planned to start enrich-
253	253	ing uranium with thousands of advanced centrifuges at
254	254	its Fordow and Natanz plants, while also installing more
255	255	uranium-enriching centrifuges at those locations;
256	256	Whereas, on December 5, 2024, the Office of the Director of
257	257	National Intelligence published another assessment, in
258	258	accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and
259	259	Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note;
260	260	Public Law 117–263), which stated—
261	261	(1) ‘‘Iran’s 20-percent and 60-percent enriched ura-
262	262	nium stockpiles are far greater than needed for what it
263	263	claims it will use the uranium for and Iran could produce
264	264	more than a dozen nuclear weapons if its total uranium
265	265	stockpile were further enriched’’; and
266	266	(2) ‘‘Iran probably will consider installing or oper-
267	267	ating more advanced centrifuges, further increasing its
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271	271	enriched uranium stockpile, enriching uranium up to 90
272	272	percent, or threatening to withdraw from the Treaty on
273	273	the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons’’; and
274	274	Whereas, on December 9, 2024, France, Germany, and the
275	275	United Kingdom released a joint statement that—
276	276	(1) condemns ‘‘Iran’s latest steps . . . to expand its
277	277	nuclear programme to significantly increase the rate of
278	278	production of uranium enriched up to 60 percent’’;
279	279	(2) expresses extreme concern ‘‘to learn that Iran
280	280	has increased the number of centrifuges in use and start-
281	281	ed preparations to install additional enrichment infra-
282	282	structure’’; and
283	283	(3) ‘‘strongly urge[s] Iran to reverse these steps,
284	284	and to immediately halt its nuclear escalation’’: Now,
285	285	therefore, be it
286	286	Resolved, That the Senate— 1
287	287	(1) affirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 2
288	288	continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability 3
289	289	is— 4
290	290	(A) a credible threat to the United States; 5
291	291	and 6
292	292	(B) an existential threat to Israel and 7
293	293	other allies and partners in the Middle East; 8
294	294	(2) asserts all options should be considered to 9
295	295	address the nuclear threat the Islamic Republic of 10
296	296	Iran poses to the United States, Israel, and our al-11
297	297	lies and partners; 12
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301	301	(3) demands the Islamic Republic of Iran to im-1
302	302	mediately cease engaging in any and all activities 2
303	303	that threaten the national security interests of the 3
304	304	United States, Israel, and our allies and partners, 4
305	305	including— 5
306	306	(A) enriching uranium; 6
307	307	(B) developing or possessing delivery vehi-7
308	308	cles capable of carrying nuclear warheads; and 8
309	309	(C) developing or possessing a nuclear 9
310	310	warhead. 10
311	311	SECTION 1. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 11
312	312	Nothing in this resolution may be construed to au-12
313	313	thorize the use of military force or the introduction of 13
314	314	United States Armed Forces into hostilities. 14
315	315	Æ
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