1 | 1 | | III |
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2 | 2 | | 119THCONGRESS |
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3 | 3 | | 1 |
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4 | 4 | | STSESSION S. RES. 81 |
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5 | 5 | | Calling on the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (E3) to initiate the |
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6 | 6 | | snapback of sanctions on Iran under United Nations Security Council |
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7 | 7 | | Resolution 2231 (2015). |
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8 | 8 | | IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES |
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9 | 9 | | FEBRUARY13, 2025 |
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10 | 10 | | Mr. R |
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11 | 11 | | ICKETTS(for himself, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. BARRASSO, Mrs. CAPITO, Mrs. |
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12 | 12 | | B |
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13 | 13 | | LACKBURN, Mr. JUSTICE, Mr. HAGERTY, Mr. SHEEHY, Mr. SULLIVAN, |
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14 | 14 | | Ms. L |
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15 | 15 | | UMMIS, Mr. CRAPO, Mrs. FISCHER, Mr. CRUZ, and Mr. YOUNG) |
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16 | 16 | | submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee |
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17 | 17 | | on Foreign Relations |
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18 | 18 | | RESOLUTION |
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19 | 19 | | Calling on the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (E3) |
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20 | 20 | | to initiate the snapback of sanctions on Iran under |
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21 | 21 | | United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). |
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22 | 22 | | Whereas, on July 15, 2015, the P5+1 (the United States, |
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23 | 23 | | the United Kingdom, France, the People’s Republic of |
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24 | 24 | | China, the Russian Federation, and Germany), the Euro- |
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25 | 25 | | pean Union, and the Islamic Republic of Iran finalized |
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26 | 26 | | the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); |
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27 | 27 | | Whereas the JCPOA required the Government of Iran to im- |
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28 | 28 | | plement constraints on its uranium enrichment and heavy |
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29 | 29 | | water nuclear reactor programs, as well as allow the |
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32 | 32 | | •SRES 81 IS |
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33 | 33 | | International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor |
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34 | 34 | | compliance with the agreement; |
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35 | 35 | | Whereas, on July 20, 2015, the United Nations Security |
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36 | 36 | | Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2231 (UNSCR |
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37 | 37 | | 2231), which endorsed the JCPOA and provided for the |
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38 | 38 | | termination of all previous UNSC resolutions targeting |
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39 | 39 | | Iran’s nuclear program (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803 1835, |
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40 | 40 | | and 1929), while maintaining United Nation’s arms re- |
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41 | 41 | | strictions on Iran for 5 years and United Nation’s prohi- |
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42 | 42 | | bitions on Iran’s missile and drone activity for 8 years; |
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43 | 43 | | Whereas, pursuant to the JCPOA, Iran received significant |
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44 | 44 | | sanctions relief from the previous sanctions imposed by |
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45 | 45 | | the European Union, the United States, and previous |
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46 | 46 | | UNSC resolutions; |
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47 | 47 | | Whereas Iran used this sanctions relief to fund its terrorist |
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48 | 48 | | proxies, regional aggression, and its expansion of its bal- |
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49 | 49 | | listic missile program; |
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50 | 50 | | Whereas, on May 8, 2018, President Donald J. Trump an- |
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51 | 51 | | nounced the United States was ceasing its participation |
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52 | 52 | | in the JCPOA and reimposing sanctions against Iran |
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53 | 53 | | that had been previously waived; |
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54 | 54 | | Whereas President Trump’s successful maximum pressure |
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55 | 55 | | campaign imposed significant financial costs on Iran’s re- |
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56 | 56 | | gime ‘‘to alter its course of malign activities and ensure |
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57 | 57 | | that Iranian bad acts are no longer rewarded’’; |
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58 | 58 | | Whereas, Iran has repeatedly violated the terms of the |
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59 | 59 | | JCPOA and UNSCR 2231, including by— |
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60 | 60 | | (1) lifting the cap on its stockpile of uranium; |
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61 | 61 | | (2) increasing its enrichment activities to 60 percent |
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62 | 62 | | purity, expanding its enrichment capabilities; |
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65 | 65 | | •SRES 81 IS |
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66 | 66 | | (3) resuming its activity at prohibited nuclear facili- |
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67 | 67 | | ties; and |
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68 | 68 | | (4) preventing the International Atomic Energy |
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69 | 69 | | Agency (IAEA) from being able to effectively monitor its |
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70 | 70 | | nuclear activities; |
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71 | 71 | | Whereas, Iran repeatedly violated UNSCR 2231’s restrictions |
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72 | 72 | | on ballistic missile testing and development, as well as |
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73 | 73 | | United Nations-imposed and internationally binding arms |
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74 | 74 | | export and import embargoes; |
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75 | 75 | | Whereas UNSCR 2231 includes a formal mechanism for a |
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76 | 76 | | participant state of the JCPOA, if it believes there has |
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77 | 77 | | been significant non-performance of commitments under |
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78 | 78 | | the JCPOA by Iran, to trigger a process that would re- |
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79 | 79 | | quire the UNSC to ‘‘snapback’’ all United Nation sanc- |
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80 | 80 | | tions on Iran that has been lifted pursuant to UNSCR |
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81 | 81 | | 2231; |
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82 | 82 | | Whereas, on September 14, 2024, in a joint statement, the |
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83 | 83 | | United States and United Kingdom acknowledged pub- |
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84 | 84 | | licly that Iran’s nuclear program ‘‘has never been more |
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85 | 85 | | advanced and posed a clear threat to regional and global |
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86 | 86 | | peace and security’’; |
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87 | 87 | | Whereas, in June and November of 2024, in efforts led by |
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88 | 88 | | France, Germany, the United Kingdom (E3), and the |
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89 | 89 | | United States, the IAEA’s Board of Governors voted to |
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90 | 90 | | censure Iran for non-compliance with its obligations |
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91 | 91 | | under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear |
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92 | 92 | | Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July |
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93 | 93 | | 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non- |
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94 | 94 | | proliferation Treaty’’ or ‘‘NPT’’); |
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95 | 95 | | Whereas, on December 9, 2024, the E3 sent a letter to the |
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96 | 96 | | United Nations Security Council stating, ‘‘We reiterate |
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99 | 99 | | •SRES 81 IS |
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100 | 100 | | our determination to use all diplomatic tools to prevent |
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101 | 101 | | Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including using |
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102 | 102 | | snapback if necessary.’’; |
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103 | 103 | | Whereas, on January 6, 2025, President of France Emman- |
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104 | 104 | | uel Macron said the acceleration of Iran’s nuclear pro- |
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105 | 105 | | gram was ‘‘bringing us very close to the breaking point’’ |
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106 | 106 | | and said, ‘‘We will have to ask ourselves whether to use |
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107 | 107 | | the mechanism for re-establishing sanctions. We are |
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108 | 108 | | ready to do so if the question arises.’’; |
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109 | 109 | | Whereas, on January 23, 2025, the Director General of the |
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110 | 110 | | IAEA, Rafael Grossi, said that Iran has increased pro- |
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111 | 111 | | duction of 60 percent enriched uranium from 7 kilograms |
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112 | 112 | | to over 30 kilograms per month, and currently possess |
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113 | 113 | | about 200 kilograms, which if enriched to 90 percent |
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114 | 114 | | would amount to at least 5 nuclear weapons; and |
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115 | 115 | | Whereas, under UNSCR 2231, the resolution, including the |
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116 | 116 | | ‘‘snapback’’ mechanism, terminates 10 years after Adop- |
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117 | 117 | | tion Day for the JCPOA, which will be October 18, 2025: |
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118 | 118 | | Now, therefore, be it |
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119 | 119 | | Resolved, That the Senate— 1 |
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120 | 120 | | (1) recognizes that Iran’s possession of a nu-2 |
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121 | 121 | | clear weapon would threaten not only the security of 3 |
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122 | 122 | | the United States, but global security at large, in-4 |
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123 | 123 | | cluding United States allies and partners in Europe 5 |
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124 | 124 | | and the Middle East; 6 |
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125 | 125 | | (2) condemns the Government of Iran’s flagrant 7 |
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126 | 126 | | and repeated violations of commitments it made 8 |
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127 | 127 | | under the JCPOA and its international obligations 9 |
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128 | 128 | | under UNSCR 2231; 10 |
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131 | 131 | | •SRES 81 IS |
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132 | 132 | | (3) condemns the Russian Federation and the 1 |
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133 | 133 | | People’s Republic of China, who remain participants 2 |
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134 | 134 | | in the JCPOA, for their role in supporting Iran’s 3 |
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135 | 135 | | malign activities; 4 |
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136 | 136 | | (4) reaffirms that the United States Govern-5 |
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137 | 137 | | ment maintains the right to take any necessary 6 |
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138 | 138 | | measures to prevent the Government of Iran from 7 |
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139 | 139 | | acquiring nuclear weapons; 8 |
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140 | 140 | | (5) supports the imposition and enforcement of 9 |
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141 | 141 | | robust sanctions on Iran for its nuclear and missile 10 |
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142 | 142 | | programs and on entities and individuals involved in 11 |
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143 | 143 | | these programs to deter further proliferation efforts; 12 |
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144 | 144 | | and 13 |
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145 | 145 | | (6) urges the E3 to invoke the ‘‘snapback’’ of 14 |
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146 | 146 | | United Nations sanctions against Iran under 15 |
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147 | 147 | | UNSCR 2231 as soon as possible before the option 16 |
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148 | 148 | | expires on October 18, 2025. 17 |
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149 | 149 | | Æ |
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