California 2023-2024 Regular Session

California Assembly Bill AJR8 Compare Versions

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1-Amended IN Senate April 03, 2024 Amended IN Assembly August 14, 2023 Amended IN Assembly June 30, 2023 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20232024 REGULAR SESSION Assembly Joint Resolution No. 8Introduced by Assembly Member Essayli(Principal coauthor: Senator Wahab)(Coauthors: Assembly Members Alanis and Flora)June 20, 2023Relative to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGESTAJR 8, as amended, Essayli. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.This measure would urge the United States Congress to refrain from reauthorizing Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act absent fundamental reform of the program, which must include requiring agencies to obtain a warrant before searching Section 702-acquired information from Americans communications.Digest Key Fiscal Committee: NO Bill TextWHEREAS, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) allows the United States government to engage in mass, warrantless surveillance of Americans and foreigners phone calls, text messages, emails, and other electronic communications; andWHEREAS, Information collected under the law without a warrant has been used to prosecute and imprison people, even for crimes unrelated to national security; andWHEREAS, Due to the secrecy surrounding the program, there is concern that Section 702 is and will be used to disproportionately target disfavored groups, whether minority communities, political activists, or even journalists; andWHEREAS, Section 702 allows the government to target foreigners abroad if it believes they possess foreign intelligence information, which is a term so broadly defined that it allows the government to cast a wide net that ensnares the communications of ordinary Americans on a massive scale; andWHEREAS, Targets of surveillance could include human rights defenders, journalists, whistleblowers, or business owners; andWHEREAS, The government collects the personal information of these individuals, including any emails, text messages, and other communications they may have with people in the United States, and stores it in databases for years, and in some cases, indefinitely; andWHEREAS, Once the government collects vast amounts of information, including emails, text messages, and other communications, under Section 702, that content is stored in databases for years at a time, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Security Agency (NSA) officials routinely search through this vast trove of data for information specifically about Americans despite the fact that these communications were all collected without a warrant and despite legal requirements that prevent reverse targeting of Americans through Section 702 collection; andWHEREAS, The FBI exploited backdoor searches to warrantlessly search Americans communications 204,090 times in 2022 alone; andWHEREAS, Information found through these backdoor searches can be used to prosecute Americans for crimes that are not related to national security; andWHEREAS, The government can use information collected under Section 702 in a wide variety of contexts, from criminal cases to immigration proceedings, and despite the fact that the government is legally required to provide notice to defendants when information collected under Section 702 is to be used against them, in only a handful of cases has this notification ever been provided; andWHEREAS, The government has a history of using surveillance to target activists, government critics, political candidates, and minority communities; andWHEREAS, The American Muslim community has long been the target of discriminatory government surveillance, including the surveillance of Muslim leaders, mosques, and Muslim student associations and organizations; andWHEREAS, In the past, prominent civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Cesar Chavez were labeled national security threats and targeted for surveillance by the FBI; andWHEREAS, More recently, FBI agents have searched the communications of a United States congressman, a local political party, multiple current and former United States government officials, journalists, political commentators, two Middle Eastern men flagged by a witness because they were loading boxes of cleaning supplies into a vehicle, business, religious, and community leaders who applied to participate in the FBIs Citizens Academy, and colleagues and relatives of the FBI agent performing the search; andWHEREAS, Recent declassified information revealed 278,000 instances of FBI misusing Section 702, including to investigate protestors involved in the Black Lives Matter movement, individuals suspected of involvement in the January 6 Capitol breach, and more than 19,000 donors to a congressional campaign; andWHEREAS, As written, Section 702 contains minimal protections to prevent these types of surveillance abuses, and the FBI and other federal agencies routinely search through the Section 702 database without a warrant in cases unrelated to national security, which results in that authority being used to support government selectively targeting certain communities without cause; andWHEREAS, This broad, warrantless collection of data under Section 702 violates Americans constitutional rights; andWHEREAS, Section 702 has become a domestic spying tool, which is something Congress never intended; andWHEREAS, Section 702 is set to expire at the end of 2023; on April 19, 2024; now, therefore, be itResolved by the Assembly and the Senate of the State of California, jointly, That the Legislature of the State of California urges the United States Congress to refrain from reauthorizing Section 702 absent fundamental reform of the program, which must include requiring agencies to obtain a warrant before searching Section 702-acquired information from Americans communications; and be it furtherResolved,That the Chief Clerk of the Assembly transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to the Majority Leader of the Senate, to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States, and to the author for appropriate distribution.
1+Amended IN Assembly August 14, 2023 Amended IN Assembly June 30, 2023 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20232024 REGULAR SESSION Assembly Joint Resolution No. 8Introduced by Assembly Member Essayli(Principal coauthor: Senator Wahab)(Coauthors: Assembly Members Alanis and Flora)June 20, 2023Relative to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGESTAJR 8, as amended, Essayli. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.This measure would urge the United States Congress to refrain from reauthorizing Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act absent fundamental reform of the program, which must include requiring agencies to obtain a warrant before searching Section 702-acquired information from Americans communications.Digest Key Fiscal Committee: NO Bill TextWHEREAS, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) allows the United States government to engage in mass, warrantless surveillance of Americans and foreigners phone calls, text messages, emails, and other electronic communications; andWHEREAS, Information collected under the law without a warrant has been used to prosecute and imprison people, even for crimes unrelated to national security; andWHEREAS, Due to the secrecy surrounding the program, there is concern that Section 702 is and will be used to disproportionately target disfavored groups, whether minority communities, political activists, or even journalists; andWHEREAS, Section 702 allows the government to target foreigners abroad if it believes they possess foreign intelligence information, which is a term so broadly defined that it allows the government to cast a wide net that ensnares the communications of ordinary Americans on a massive scale; andWHEREAS, Targets of surveillance could include human rights defenders, journalists, whistleblowers, or business owners; andWHEREAS, The government collects the personal information of these individuals, including any emails, text messages, and other communications they may have with people in the United States, and stores it in databases for years, and in some cases, indefinitely; andWHEREAS, Once the government collects vast amounts of information, including emails, text messages, and other communications, under Section 702, that content is stored in databases for years at a time, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Security Agency (NSA) officials routinely search through this vast trove of data for information specifically about Americans despite the fact that these communications were all collected without a warrant and despite legal requirements that prevent reverse targeting of Americans through Section 702 collection; andWHEREAS, The FBI exploited backdoor searches to warrantlessly search Americans communications 204,090 times in 2022 alone; andWHEREAS, Information found through these backdoor searches can be used to prosecute Americans for crimes that are not related to national security; andWHEREAS, The government can use information collected under Section 702 in a wide variety of contexts, from criminal cases to immigration proceedings, and despite the fact that the government is legally required to provide notice to defendants when information collected under Section 702 is to be used against them, in only a handful of cases has this notification ever been provided; andWHEREAS, The government has a history of using surveillance to target activists, government critics, political candidates, and minority communities; andWHEREAS, The American Muslim community has long been the target of discriminatory government surveillance, including the surveillance of Muslim leaders, mosques, and Muslim student associations and organizations; andWHEREAS, In the past, prominent civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Cesar Chavez were labeled national security threats and targeted for surveillance by the FBI; andWHEREAS, More recently, FBI agents have searched the communications of a United States congressman, a local political party, multiple current and former United States government officials, journalists, political commentators, two Middle Eastern men flagged by a witness because they were loading boxes of cleaning supplies into a vehicle, business, religious, and community leaders who applied to participate in the FBIs Citizens Academy, and colleagues and relatives of the FBI agent performing the search; andWHEREAS, Recent declassified information revealed 278,000 instances of FBI misusing Section 702, including to investigate protestors involved in the Black Lives Matter movement, individuals suspected of involvement in the January 6 Capitol breach, and more than 19,000 donors to a congressional campaign; andWHEREAS, As written, Section 702 contains minimal protections to prevent these types of surveillance abuses, and the FBI and other federal agencies routinely search through the Section 702 database without a warrant in cases unrelated to national security, which results in that authority being used to support government selectively targeting certain communities without cause; andWHEREAS, This broad, warrantless collection of data under Section 702 violates Americans constitutional rights; andWHEREAS, Section 702 has become a domestic spying tool, which is something Congress never intended; andWHEREAS, Section 702 is set to expire at the end of 2023; now, therefore, be itResolved by the Assembly and the Senate of the State of California, jointly, That the Legislature of the State of California urges the United States Congress to refrain from reauthorizing Section 702 absent fundamental reform of the program, which must include requiring agencies to obtain a warrant before searching Section 702-acquired information from Americans communications; and be it furtherResolved,That the Chief Clerk of the Assembly transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to the Majority Leader of the Senate, to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States, and to the author for appropriate distribution.
22
3- Amended IN Senate April 03, 2024 Amended IN Assembly August 14, 2023 Amended IN Assembly June 30, 2023 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20232024 REGULAR SESSION Assembly Joint Resolution No. 8Introduced by Assembly Member Essayli(Principal coauthor: Senator Wahab)(Coauthors: Assembly Members Alanis and Flora)June 20, 2023Relative to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGESTAJR 8, as amended, Essayli. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.This measure would urge the United States Congress to refrain from reauthorizing Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act absent fundamental reform of the program, which must include requiring agencies to obtain a warrant before searching Section 702-acquired information from Americans communications.Digest Key Fiscal Committee: NO
3+ Amended IN Assembly August 14, 2023 Amended IN Assembly June 30, 2023 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20232024 REGULAR SESSION Assembly Joint Resolution No. 8Introduced by Assembly Member Essayli(Principal coauthor: Senator Wahab)(Coauthors: Assembly Members Alanis and Flora)June 20, 2023Relative to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGESTAJR 8, as amended, Essayli. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.This measure would urge the United States Congress to refrain from reauthorizing Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act absent fundamental reform of the program, which must include requiring agencies to obtain a warrant before searching Section 702-acquired information from Americans communications.Digest Key Fiscal Committee: NO
44
5- Amended IN Senate April 03, 2024 Amended IN Assembly August 14, 2023 Amended IN Assembly June 30, 2023
5+ Amended IN Assembly August 14, 2023 Amended IN Assembly June 30, 2023
66
7-Amended IN Senate April 03, 2024
87 Amended IN Assembly August 14, 2023
98 Amended IN Assembly June 30, 2023
109
1110 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 20232024 REGULAR SESSION
1211
1312 Assembly Joint Resolution
1413
1514 No. 8
1615
1716 Introduced by Assembly Member Essayli(Principal coauthor: Senator Wahab)(Coauthors: Assembly Members Alanis and Flora)June 20, 2023
1817
1918 Introduced by Assembly Member Essayli(Principal coauthor: Senator Wahab)(Coauthors: Assembly Members Alanis and Flora)
2019 June 20, 2023
2120
2221 Relative to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
2322
2423 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
2524
2625 ## LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
2726
2827 AJR 8, as amended, Essayli. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
2928
3029 This measure would urge the United States Congress to refrain from reauthorizing Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act absent fundamental reform of the program, which must include requiring agencies to obtain a warrant before searching Section 702-acquired information from Americans communications.
3130
3231 This measure would urge the United States Congress to refrain from reauthorizing Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act absent fundamental reform of the program, which must include requiring agencies to obtain a warrant before searching Section 702-acquired information from Americans communications.
3332
3433 ## Digest Key
3534
3635 ## Bill Text
3736
3837 WHEREAS, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) allows the United States government to engage in mass, warrantless surveillance of Americans and foreigners phone calls, text messages, emails, and other electronic communications; and
3938
4039 WHEREAS, Information collected under the law without a warrant has been used to prosecute and imprison people, even for crimes unrelated to national security; and
4140
4241 WHEREAS, Due to the secrecy surrounding the program, there is concern that Section 702 is and will be used to disproportionately target disfavored groups, whether minority communities, political activists, or even journalists; and
4342
4443 WHEREAS, Section 702 allows the government to target foreigners abroad if it believes they possess foreign intelligence information, which is a term so broadly defined that it allows the government to cast a wide net that ensnares the communications of ordinary Americans on a massive scale; and
4544
4645 WHEREAS, Targets of surveillance could include human rights defenders, journalists, whistleblowers, or business owners; and
4746
4847 WHEREAS, The government collects the personal information of these individuals, including any emails, text messages, and other communications they may have with people in the United States, and stores it in databases for years, and in some cases, indefinitely; and
4948
5049 WHEREAS, Once the government collects vast amounts of information, including emails, text messages, and other communications, under Section 702, that content is stored in databases for years at a time, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Security Agency (NSA) officials routinely search through this vast trove of data for information specifically about Americans despite the fact that these communications were all collected without a warrant and despite legal requirements that prevent reverse targeting of Americans through Section 702 collection; and
5150
5251 WHEREAS, The FBI exploited backdoor searches to warrantlessly search Americans communications 204,090 times in 2022 alone; and
5352
5453 WHEREAS, Information found through these backdoor searches can be used to prosecute Americans for crimes that are not related to national security; and
5554
5655 WHEREAS, The government can use information collected under Section 702 in a wide variety of contexts, from criminal cases to immigration proceedings, and despite the fact that the government is legally required to provide notice to defendants when information collected under Section 702 is to be used against them, in only a handful of cases has this notification ever been provided; and
5756
5857 WHEREAS, The government has a history of using surveillance to target activists, government critics, political candidates, and minority communities; and
5958
6059 WHEREAS, The American Muslim community has long been the target of discriminatory government surveillance, including the surveillance of Muslim leaders, mosques, and Muslim student associations and organizations; and
6160
6261 WHEREAS, In the past, prominent civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Cesar Chavez were labeled national security threats and targeted for surveillance by the FBI; and
6362
6463 WHEREAS, More recently, FBI agents have searched the communications of a United States congressman, a local political party, multiple current and former United States government officials, journalists, political commentators, two Middle Eastern men flagged by a witness because they were loading boxes of cleaning supplies into a vehicle, business, religious, and community leaders who applied to participate in the FBIs Citizens Academy, and colleagues and relatives of the FBI agent performing the search; and
6564
6665 WHEREAS, Recent declassified information revealed 278,000 instances of FBI misusing Section 702, including to investigate protestors involved in the Black Lives Matter movement, individuals suspected of involvement in the January 6 Capitol breach, and more than 19,000 donors to a congressional campaign; and
6766
6867 WHEREAS, As written, Section 702 contains minimal protections to prevent these types of surveillance abuses, and the FBI and other federal agencies routinely search through the Section 702 database without a warrant in cases unrelated to national security, which results in that authority being used to support government selectively targeting certain communities without cause; and
6968
7069 WHEREAS, This broad, warrantless collection of data under Section 702 violates Americans constitutional rights; and
7170
7271 WHEREAS, Section 702 has become a domestic spying tool, which is something Congress never intended; and
7372
74-WHEREAS, Section 702 is set to expire at the end of 2023; on April 19, 2024; now, therefore, be it
73+WHEREAS, Section 702 is set to expire at the end of 2023; now, therefore, be it
7574
7675 Resolved by the Assembly and the Senate of the State of California, jointly, That the Legislature of the State of California urges the United States Congress to refrain from reauthorizing Section 702 absent fundamental reform of the program, which must include requiring agencies to obtain a warrant before searching Section 702-acquired information from Americans communications; and be it further
7776
7877 Resolved,That the Chief Clerk of the Assembly transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to the Majority Leader of the Senate, to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States, and to the author for appropriate distribution.