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OLR Bill Analysis
SB 952 (File 508, as amended by House "A" and Senate "A")*
AN ACT CONCERNING PAROLE ELIGIBILITY FOR AN INDIVIDUAL
SERVING A LENGTHY SENTENCE FOR A CRIME COMMITTED
BEFORE THE INDIVIDUAL REACHED THE AGE OF TWENTY -FIVE.
SUMMARY
This bill makes unrelated changes to laws on eligibility for (1) parole
and (2) criminal record erasure for driving under the influence (DUI).
It broadens parole eligibility for certain offenders who were under
age 21 when they committed the crime.
Under current law, an offender sentenced on or after October 1, 2015,
and serving a definite or total effective sentence of more than 10 years
for crimes committed before, on, or after October 1, 2015, when the
person was under age 18 is eligible for parole under certain
circumstances. The bill extends parole eligibility to offenders who (1)
were under age 21 when the crime was committed; (2) are serving a
definite or total effective sentence of more than 10 years for crimes
committed on or before October 1, 2005; and (3) were sentenced on or
before October 1, 2005.
It correspondingly applies to this new age group existing law’s parole
eligibility rules and requirements on parole hearing and release
decisions.
The bill also (1) specifies that DUI is not eligible for automatic
criminal record erasure until 10 years after the person’s most recent
conviction and (2) makes DUI convictions ineligible for erasure if the
person has a second DUI conviction within 10 years.
It also makes technical and conforming changes.
*Senate Amendment “A” reduces, from 25 to 21 years, the age up to 2023SB-00952-R02-BA.DOCX
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which the underlying bill would have broadened parole eligibility for
certain offenders.
*House Amendment “A” (1) limits the underlying bill’s parole
eligibility for offenders under age 21 to crimes committed and sentences
imposed on or before October 1, 2005, and (2) adds provisions on DUI
and criminal record erasure.
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 1, 2023, except the DUI record erasure
provision is effective July 1, 2023.
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY
Alternate Parole Rules
Current law sets parole eligibility rules specifically for someone who
commits a crime while under age 18 and is sentenced to more than 10
years in prison. The bill extends parole eligibility to offenders who (1)
were under age 21 when the crime was committed; (2) are serving a
definite or total effective sentence of more than 10 years for crimes
committed on or before October 1, 2005; and (3) were sentenced on or
before October 1, 2005.
As under existing law, the bill applies these rules if they make
someone eligible for parole sooner than under existing law, including
someone who would otherwise be ineligible for parole. Under these
rules, someone sentenced to:
1. 10 to 50 years in prison is eligible for parole after serving the
greater of 12 years or 60% of his or her sentence or
2. more than 50 years in prison is eligible for parole after serving 30
years.
Under existing law, these rules apply to offenders incarcerated on
and after October 1, 2015, regardless of when the crime was committed,
or the offender was sentenced. Under current law, the eligibility rules
do not apply to any portion of a sentence imposed for a crime committed
when the person was age 18 or older. The bill extends this limitation to
any portion of a sentence imposed for a crime committed when the 2023SB-00952-R02-BA.DOCX
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person was age 21 or older.
Required Hearing
As is the case under existing law for offenders who were under age
18, in cases involving offenders under age 21, the bill requires (1) a
parole hearing when someone becomes parole-eligible and (2) the Board
of Pardons and Paroles to notify, at least 12 months before the hearing,
the Chief Public Defender’s Office, appropriate state’s attorney,
Department of Correction’s (DOC) Victim Services Unit, Office of the
Victim Advocate, and Judicial Branch’s Office of Victim Services. The
Chief Public Defender’s Office must provide counsel for an indigent
inmate.
At the hearing, the law requires the board to allow:
1. the inmate to make a statement;
2. the inmate’s counsel and state’s attorney to submit reports and
documents; and
3. any victim of the person’s crime to make a statement, as with
other parole hearings.
The board may also request (1) testimony from mental health
professionals and relevant witnesses and (2) reports from DOC or
others. The board must use validated risk and needs assessment tools
and risk-based structured decision making and release criteria.
Release Decisions
After the hearing, the law allows the board to release the inmate on
parole if:
1. the release (a) holds the offender accountable to the community
without compromising public safety; (b) reflects the offense’s
seriousness and makes the sentence proportional to the harm to
victims and the community; (c) uses the most appropriate
sanctions available, including prison, community punishment,
and supervision; (d) could reduce criminal activity, impose just 2023SB-00952-R02-BA.DOCX
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punishment, and provide the offender with meaningful and
effective rehabilitation and reintegration; and (e) is fair and
promotes respect for the law;
2. it appears from all available information, including DOC reports,
that (a) there is a reasonable probability the offender will not
violate the law again and (b) the benefits of release to the offender
and society substantially outweigh the benefits from continued
confinement; and
3. it appears from all available information, including DOC reports,
that the offender is substantially rehabilitated, considering his or
her character, background, and history, including (a) the
offender’s prison record, age, and circumstances at the time of
committing the crime; (b) whether he or she has shown remorse
and increased maturity since committing the crime; (c) his or her
contributions to others’ welfare through service; (d) the
opportunities for rehabilitation in prison; (e) the overall degree
of his or her rehabilitation considering the nature and
circumstances of the crime; and (f) his or her efforts to overcome
substance abuse, addiction, trauma, lack of education, or
obstacles he or she faced.
The bill specifies that in release decisions for offenders under age 18
under current law, and those under age 21 under the bill, the
consideration given to whether the person rehabilitated in adult prison
applies even if he or she also applied for or received a sentence
modification.
As under existing law for offenders who were under age 18, the board
must articulate reasons for its decision on the record. If the board denies
parole, it may reassess the person’s suitability for a hearing at a later
time it determines but no sooner than two years after the denial. The
board’s decisions under these provisions are not appealable.
DUI AND CRIMINAL RECORD ERASURE
Existing law provides a process, not yet fully operational, to erase 2023SB-00952-R02-BA.DOCX
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records of most misdemeanor convictions and certain felo ny
convictions after a specified period following the person’s most recent
conviction. sHB 6918 of the current session, as amended and passed by
the House, specifies that motor vehicle violations are generally covered
by the law in the same way as misdemeanors or felonies (i.e., either
seven or 10 years after the person’s most recent conviction).
This bill creates an exception, making driving under the influence
(DUI) ineligible for erasure until 10 years after the person’s most recent
conviction. Under sHB 6918 as amended, a first conviction for DUI is
eligible seven years after the person’s most recent conviction.
The bill also makes a DUI conviction ineligible for erasure if the
defendant has a second DUI within the following 10 years. It replaces a
provision in sHB 6918, as amended, that instead makes a DUI conviction
ineligible for erasure if it occurred within 10 years before any additional
DUI arrest.
BACKGROUND
Related Cases
A series of U.S. and Connecticut Supreme Court decisions were the
impetus to changing the law in 2015 to establish the alternate parole
eligibility rules for offenders who were under age 18 when the crime
was committed.
U.S. Supreme Court. In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment prohibits states from sentencing defendants under
age 18 to life without parole for non-homicide crimes. The Court stated
that there must be “some meaningful opportunity” for release based on
a defendant’s demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. It said that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a juvenile who commits a non-
homicide crime from being kept in prison for life, but it prohibits
making the judgment “at the outset that those offenders never will be fit
to re-enter society” (130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)).
In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth 2023SB-00952-R02-BA.DOCX
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Amendment prohibits courts from automatically imposing life without
parole sentences on offenders who committed homicides while they
were juveniles (under age 18). The Court did not categorically bar life
without parole sentences for juveniles but stated that a court must “take
into account how children are different, and how those differences
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison” (132
S. Ct. 2455 (2012)).
Connecticut Supreme Court. In State v. Riley, the Connecticut
Supreme Court considered how the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings
applied to someone convicted of committing homicide and non-
homicide crimes while a juvenile. The juvenile in this case received a
cumulative 100-year prison sentence. The court ruled that even when a
court has discretion in sentencing, as it did in this case, Miller requires
consideration of the juvenile’s youth as mitigation before sentencing the
juvenile to the functional equivalent of a life sentence without the
possibility of release. Because the sentencing court did not consider the
factors of youth, the court ordered a new sentencing hearing.
In deference to the legislature and because the new sentence the
defendant would receive was uncertain, the court did not consider
whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham would require an
opportunity for release when a juvenile is sentenced to the functional
equivalent of life in prison (315 Conn. 637 (2015)).
In Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, the Connecticut Supreme
Court ruled that Miller’s requirements to consider certain factors of
youth at sentencing apply (1) retroactively to juvenile offenders seeking
collateral review of sentences imposed before the U.S. Supreme Court
issued its ruling in Miller and (2) to a juvenile who received a total
effective sentence of 50 years in prison without eligibility for parole (317
Conn. 52 (2015)).
COMMITTEE ACTION
Judiciary Committee
Joint Favorable
Yea 25 Nay 12 (03/27/2023) 2023SB-00952-R02-BA.DOCX
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