District Of Columbia 2025-2026 Regular Session

District Of Columbia Council Bill B26-0203 Compare Versions

Only one version of the bill is available at this time.

Old	New	Differences
1	1
2	2
3	3	COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
4	4	OFFICE OF COUNCILMEMBER BROOKE PINTO
5	5	THE JOHN A. WILSON BUILDING
6	6	1350 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W. , SUITE 106
7	7	WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004
8	8
9	9
10	10
11	11
12	12	March 24, 2025
13	13
14	14	Nyasha Howard, Secretary
15	15	Council of the District of Columbia
16	16	1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
17	17	Washington, DC 20004
18	18
19	19	Dear Secretary Howard,
20	20
21	21	Today, along with Councilmember Anita Bonds, I am introducing the “Kidnapping Amendment
22	22	Act of 2025.” This legislation addresses critical gaps in our kidnapping statute that emerged
23	23	following the D.C. Court of Appeals' en banc decision in Cardozo v. United States (2024).
24	24
25	25	In this watershed ruling, the Court interpreted the District's kidnapping statute, to conclude that
26	26	kidnapping requires detaining someone "for a substantial period of time" comparable to holding
27	27	them "like a hostage or a prisoner."
28	28	1
29	29	Moreover, the Court suggested that detentions lasting less
30	30	than thirty minutes would rarely qualify as kidnapping under current law.
31	31	2
32	32	But the Cardozo
33	33	decision has opened up potential loopholes and public safety gaps in its wake. Consider recent
34	34	cases where individuals were forcibly transported in vehicles for 20 minutes against their will, or
35	35	hypothetical scenarios where a child is snatched from their yard and driven away for a similar
36	36	timeframe. Under the Court's new interpretation, these scenarios might not constitute kidnapping,
37	37	despite clearly being conduct our community would expect to be prosecuted as such.
38	38
39	39	This legislation would address these concerns through six modifications to existing law by:
40	40
41	41	• Establishing clear statutory parameters for what it means to “substantially confine or
42	42	move,” specifically defining it as moving someone at least 20 feet from their original
43	43	location or confining/moving them for at least 10 minutes. This precise definition resolves
44	44	ambiguity created by the Court's interpretation and ensures protection for victims in
45	45	scenarios that do not meet the Court's restrictive "hostage or prisoner" standard but clearly
46	46	constitute serious criminal conduct.
47	47	3
48	48
49	49
50	50
51	51	1
52	52	Cardozo v. United States, 315 A.3d 658, 676 (D.C. 2024)
53	53	2
54	54	Id. at 678.
55	55	3
56	56	Id. at 676.
57	57	2
58	58
59	59	• Deliberately omitting provisions that would have required kidnapping to merge with other
60	60	offenses when the confinement was merely “incidental” to committing another crime.
61	61	4
62	62	The
63	63	Court itself recognized the impracticality of the “incidental” test, noting that even
64	64	prolonged detentions designed to facilitate heinous crimes are no less deserving of
65	65	kidnapping charges. For instance, determining whether forcibly moving a victim to a
66	66	secluded location to commit assault was “incidental” creates unnecessary uncertainty in
67	67	prosecuting what should clearly be two distinct crimes.
68	68
69	69	• Including important clarifications on fact-finder unanimity requirements. A fact-finder is
70	70	an individual or entity, such as a jury or judge, responsible for determining the facts of a
71	71	case, including assessing the credibility of evidence and witness testimony.
72	72	5
73	73	For example,
74	74	under this legislation, when a jury is the fact-finder tasked with determining a defendant's
75	75	intent - a crucial element in distinguishing between first and second-degree kidnapping –
76	76	the jurors must unanimously agree that the defendant acted with at least one prohibited
77	77	purpose, but need not agree on which specific purpose motivated the conduct. This
78	78	practical, common-sense approach recognizes that in many kidnapping scenarios, a
79	79	perpetrator's precise intentions may remain unclear, even when their criminal purpose is
80	80	evident.
81	81
82	82	• Expanding second-degree kidnapping to include cases where defendants act with intent to
83	83	commit any criminal offense, not just felonies. This ensures appropriate liability for serious
84	84	restraints of liberty while maintaining proportional penalties based on the severity of the
85	85	associated conduct and intent.
86	86
87	87	• Establishing penalties that align with both the gravity of these offenses and current
88	88	statutory frameworks. First-degree kidnapping maintains the existing 30-year maximum
89	89	sentence, while second-degree kidnapping carries a 15-year maximum. The new criminal
90	90	restraint offense, addressing less severe scenarios, carries a misdemeanor penalty of up to
91	91	180 days. This graduated approach ensures proportional consequences based on the
92	92	severity of the conduct.
93	93
94	94	• Incorporating technical improvements that close potential loopholes. The bill ensures
95	95	liability attaches whether a defendant personally restrains a victim or causes them to be
96	96	restrained by another; when someone blocks exits or passageways; when a vulnerable
97	97	victim provides implicit rather than explicit acquiescence; and when a perpetrator intends
98	98	to hold someone for 24 hours or more (rather than the previously proposed 72-hour
99	99	threshold).
100	100
101	101
102	102	In short, these changes will modernize the District’s kidnapping statute and maintain appropriate
103	103	penalties that reflect the serious nature of kidnapping while creating clear distinctions between
104	104
105	105	4
106	106	Id. at 675.
107	107	5
108	108	See Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357
109	109	3
110	110
111	111	offense levels. The bill aims to enhance the prosecution of these crimes when District residents are
112	112	forcibly confined or moved.
113	113
114	114	Should you have any questions about this legislation, please contact Linn Groft, Committee and
115	115	Legislative Director at lgroft@dccouncil.gov.
116	116
117	117	Thank you,
118	118
119	119
120	120	Brooke Pinto
121	121	Councilmember, Ward 2
122	122	Chairwoman, Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety
123	123	Council of the District of Columbia
124	124
125	125
126	126
127	127	_____________________________ _____________________________ 1
128	128	Councilmember Anita Bonds Councilmember Brooke Pinto 2
129	129	3
130	130	4
131	131	5
132	132	6
133	133	A BILL 7
134	134	8
135	135	_________________________ 9
136	136	10
137	137	IN THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 11
138	138	12
139	139	_________________________ 13
140	140	14
141	141	15
142	142	To amend the District of Columbia Code Section 22-2001 to revise the kidnapping statute by 16
143	143	establishing definitions for key terms; to create a two-tiered offense structure for 17
144	144	kidnapping with first degree and second degree classifications based on specific intents 18
145	145	and methods; to establish a new offense of criminal restraint for knowingly and 19
146	146	substantially confining or moving a person without proper consent; to provide defenses 20
147	147	and affirmative defenses for certain circumstances involving minors, transportation 21
148	148	workers, and commercial activities; and to specify penalties for violations of these 22
149	149	provisions. 23
150	150	24
151	151	BE IT ENACTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, That this act may 25
152	152	be cited as the “Kidnapping Amendment Act of 2025”. 26
153	153	Sec. 2. Title 22 is amended as follows: 27
154	154	(a) Chapter 20 is amended to read as follows: 28
155	155	“Title 22, Chapter 20. Kidnapping. 29
156	156	“§ 22-2001. Definitions. 30
157	157	“For the purposes of this chapter: 31
158	158	“(1) “Block”, and other parts of speech, including “blocks” and “blocking”, mean 32
159	159	“to render safe passage through a space difficult or impossible. 33
160	160	“(2) “Bodily injury” means physical pain, physical injury, illness, or impairment 34
161	161	of physical condition. 35
162	162
163	163
164	164
165	165	“(3) “Coercive threat” means a communication that, unless the complainant 36
166	166	complies, any person will do any of the following: 37
167	167	“(A) Engage in conduct that, in fact, constitutes: 38
168	168	“(i) An offense against persons; or 39
169	169	“(ii) A property offense; 40
170	170	“(B) Take or withhold action as a public official, or cause a public official 41
171	171	to take or withhold action; 42
172	172	“(C) Accuse a person of a crime; 43
173	173	“(D) Expose a secret, publicize an asserted fact, or distribute a photograph, 44
174	174	video or audio recording, regardless of the truth or authenticity of the secret, fact, or item, 45
175	175	that tends to subject another person to, or perpetuate: 46
176	176	“(i) Hatred, contempt, ridicule, or other significant injury to 47
177	177	personal reputation; or 48
178	178	“(ii) Significant injury to credit or business reputation; 49
179	179	“(E) Notify a federal, state, or local government agency or official of, or 50
180	180	publicize, another person’s immigration or citizenship status; 51
181	181	“(F) Facilitate or control a person’s access to an addictive or controlled 52
182	182	substance, or a prescription medication; 53
183	183	“(G) Engage in fraud or deception; 54
184	184	“(H) Cause any harm that is sufficiently serious, under all the 55
185	185	circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same 56
186	186	circumstances as the complainant to comply; or 57
187	187	“(I) Knowingly participate in conduct with the intent to cause a person to 58
188	188	believe that they are the property of a person or business and that would cause a 59
189	189
190	190
191	191
192	192	reasonable person in that person’s circumstances to believe that they are the property of a 60
193	193	person or business. 61
194	194	‘(4) (A) “Deceive”, and other parts of speech, including “deception”, mean: 62
195	195	“(i) Creating or reinforcing a false impression as to a material fact, 63
196	196	including a false impression as to an intention to perform future actions; 64
197	197	“(ii) Preventing another person from acquiring material 65
198	198	information; 66
199	199	“(iii) Failing to correct a false impression as to a material fact, 67
200	200	including false impressions as to intention, which the person previously created or 68
201	201	reinforced, or which influences another to whom they stand in a fiduciary or confidential 69
202	202	relationship; or 70
203	203	“(iv) For property offenses, failing to disclose a lien, adverse 71
204	204	claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of property which they transfer or 72
205	205	encumber in consideration for property, whether or not it is a matter of official record. 73
206	206	“(B) The term “deceive” does not include puffing statements that are 74
207	207	unlikely to deceive ordinary persons. 75
208	208	“(C) Deception as to a person’s intention to perform a future act shall not 76
209	209	be inferred from the fact alone that they did not subsequently perform the act. 77
210	210	“(5) “Effective consent” means consent other than consent induced by physical 78
211	211	force, an explicit or implicit coercive threat, or deception. 79
212	212	“(6) “Incapacitated individual” shall have the same meaning as provided in § 21-80
213	213	2011(11). 81
214	214	“(7) “Person with legal authority over the complainant” means: 82
215	215	“(A) When the complainant is a person under 18 years of age: 83
216	216
217	217
218	218
219	219	“(i) A parent, or a person acting in the place of a parent under civil 84
220	220	law, who is responsible for the health, welfare, or supervision of the complainant; or 85
221	221	“(ii) Someone who is acting with the effective consent of such a 86
222	222	parent or such a person; or 87
223	223	“(B) When the complainant is an incapacitated individual: 88
224	224	“(i) A court-appointed guardian to the complainant; or 89
225	225	“(ii) Someone who is acting with the effective consent of such a 90
226	226	guardian. 91
227	227	“(8) “Serious bodily injury” shall have the same meaning as provided in § 22-92
228	228	404.01(d). 93
229	229	“(9) “Substantially confines or moves” means that the complainant was either: 94
230	230	“(A) Moved at least 20 feet away from the complainant’s original 95
231	231	location; or 96
232	232	“(B) Confined or moved for at least 10 minutes.”. 97
233	233	(b) Chapter 22 is amended to read as follows: 98
234	234	“§ 22-2002. Kidnapping. 99
235	235	“(a) First degree. An actor commits first degree kidnapping when the actor: 100
236	236	“(1) Knowingly and substantially confines or moves the complainant, or 101
237	237	causes the complainant to be substantially confined or moved; 102
238	238	“(2) By means of: 103
239	239	“(A) Causing bodily injury to the complainant or by using physical 104
240	240	force; 105
241	241	“(B) Making an explicit or implicit coercive threat; 106
242	242	“(C) Deception; 107
243	243
244	244
245	245
246	246	“(D) Securing, locking, or blocking any door, passageway, or other 108
247	247	means of egress; or 109
248	248	“(E) With explicit or implicit acquiescence of the complainant, 110
249	249	when the actor is: 111
250	250	“(i) Reckless as to the facts that: 112
251	251	“(I) The complainant is an incapacitated individual; 113
252	252	and 114
253	253	“(II) A person with legal authority over the 115
254	254	complainant who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent 116
255	255	to the confinement or movement; or 117
256	256	“(ii) In fact, 18 years of age or older and reckless as to the 118
257	257	facts that: 119
258	258	“(I) The complainant is under 16 years of age and 4 120
259	259	years younger than the actor; and 121
260	260	“(II) A person with legal authority over the 122
261	261	complainant who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent 123
262	262	to the confinement or movement; and 124
263	263	“(3) With intent to: 125
264	264	“(A) Hold the complainant for ransom or reward; 126
265	265	“(B) Use the complainant as a shield or hostage; 127
266	266	“(C) Facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter; 128
267	267	“(D) Inflict death or serious bodily injury upon the complainant; 129
268	268	“(E) Commit a sexual offense defined in Chapter 30 of Title 22 130
269	269	against the complainant; 131
270	270
271	271
272	272
273	273	“(F) Cause any person to believe that the complainant will not be 132
274	274	released without suffering death, serious bodily injury, or a sex offense defined in 133
275	275	Chapter 30 of Title 22; 134
276	276	“(G) Permanently leave a person with legal authority over the 135
277	277	complainant without custody of the complainant; or 136
278	278	“(H) Confine or move the complainant for 24 hours or more. 137
279	279	“(b) Second degree. An actor commits second degree kidnapping when the actor: 138
280	280	“(1) Knowingly and substantially confines or moves the complainant, or 139
281	281	causes the complainant to be substantially confined or moved; 140
282	282	“(2) By means of: 141
283	283	“(A) Causing bodily injury to the complainant or by using physical 142
284	284	force; 143
285	285	“(B) Making an explicit or implicit coercive threat; 144
286	286	“(C) Deception; 145
287	287	“(D) Securing, locking, or blocking any door, passageway, or other 146
288	288	means of egress; or 147
289	289	“(E) With explicit or implicit acquiescence of the complainant, 148
290	290	when the actor is: 149
291	291	“(i) Reckless as to the facts that: 150
292	292	“(I) The complainant is an incapacitated individual; 151
293	293	and 152
294	294	“(II) A person with legal authority over the 153
295	295	complainant who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent 154
296	296	to the confinement or movement; or 155
297	297
298	298
299	299
300	300	“(ii) In fact, 18 years of age or older and reckless as to the 156
301	301	facts that: 157
302	302	“(I) The complainant is under 16 years of age and 4 158
303	303	years younger than the actor; and 159
304	304	“(II) A person with legal authority over the 160
305	305	complainant who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent 161
306	306	to the confinement or movement; and 162
307	307	“(3) With intent to: 163
308	308	“(A) Inflict bodily injury upon the complainant; 164
309	309	“(B) Cause any person to believe that the complainant will not be 165
310	310	released without suffering bodily injury; 166
311	311	“(C) Commit any criminal offense; or 167
312	312	“(D) Facilitate the commission of any criminal offense or flight 168
313	313	thereafter. 169
314	314	“(c) Defense. It is a defense to liability under subsection (a)(3)(G) and (H) of this 170
315	315	section when the complainant is, in fact, under 18 years of age and the actor is either: 171
316	316	“(1) A close relative or a former legal guardian who had authority to 172
317	317	control the complainant’s freedom of movement who: 173
318	318	“(A) Acts with intent to assume full responsibility for the care and 174
319	319	supervision of the complainant; and 175
320	320	“(B) Does not cause bodily injury or use an explicit or implicit 176
321	321	coercive threat to cause the confinement or movement; or 177
322	322	“(2) A person who reasonably believes they are acting at the direction of a 178
323	323	close relative who: 179
324	324
325	325
326	326
327	327	“(A) Acts with intent that the close relative will assume full 180
328	328	responsibility for the care and supervision of the complainant; and 181
329	329	“(B) Does not cause bodily injury, commit a sexual offense as 182
330	330	defined in Chapter 30 of Title 22, or use an explicit or implicit coercive threat to cause 183
331	331	the confinement or movement. 184
332	332	“(d) Penalties. 185
333	333	“(1) Any person convicted of first degree kidnapping shall be fined not 186
334	334	more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or be imprisoned for not more than 30 187
335	335	years, or both. 188
336	336	“(2) Any person convicted of second degree kidnapping shall be fined not 189
337	337	more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or be imprisoned for not more than 15 190
338	338	years, or both. 191
339	339	“(e) Multiple convictions for related offenses. Where multiple convictions for first 192
340	340	degree kidnapping or second degree kidnapping and another offense arise from the same 193
341	341	act or course of conduct, the sentencing court shall follow the procedures specified in § 194
342	342	23-112. 195
343	343	“(f) Unanimity. Although there must be sufficient proof that an actor acted either 196
344	344	with the intent delineated in subsection (a)(3) of this section to sustain liability for first 197
345	345	degree kidnapping, or with the intent delineated in subsection (b)(3) of this section to 198
346	346	sustain liability for second degree kidnapping, there is no requirement that the factfinder 199
347	347	determine which specific purpose described in either subsection (a)(3)(A)-(H), or 200
348	348	subsection (b)(3)(A)-(D), was intended by the actor, provided that the factfinder 201
349	349	determines that the actor acted with at least one of the applicable specific purposes. If a 202
350	350	jury is the trier of fact, members of the jury are not required to agree unanimously on 203
351	351
352	352
353	353
354	354	which specific purpose was intended by the actor, provided that the members of the jury 204
355	355	agree unanimously that the actor acted with at least one specific purpose described in 205
356	356	either subsection (a)(3)(A)-(H), or subsection (b)(3)(A)-(D), as applicable. 206
357	357	“§ 22-2003. Criminal restraint. 207
358	358	“(a) Offense. An actor commits criminal restraint when the actor knowingly and 208
359	359	substantially confines or moves the complainant, or causes the complainant to be 209
360	360	substantially confined or moved: 210
361	361	(1) By means of: 211
362	362	“(A) Causing bodily injury to the complainant or by using physical 212
363	363	force; 213
364	364	“(B) Making an explicit or implicit coercive threat; or 214
365	365	“(C) Deception; or 215
366	366	“(D) Securing, locking, or blocking any door, passageway, or other 216
367	367	means of egress; or 217
368	368	“(2) By any means, including with acquiescence of the complainant, when 218
369	369	the actor is: 219
370	370	“(A) Reckless as to the facts that: 220
371	371	“(i) The complainant is an incapacitated individual; and 221
372	372	“(ii) A person with legal authority over the complainant 222
373	373	who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent to the 223
374	374	confinement or movement; or 224
375	375	“(B) In fact, 18 years of age or older and reckless as to the facts 225
376	376	that: 226
377	377
378	378
379	379
380	380	“(i) The complainant is under 16 years of age and 4 years 227
381	381	younger than the actor; and 228
382	382	“(ii) A person with legal authority over the complainant 229
383	383	who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent to the 230
384	384	confinement or movement. 231
385	385	“(b) Defenses. 232
386	386	“(1) It is a defense that the complainant is, in fact, under 18 years of age, 233
387	387	and the actor is: 234
388	388	“(A) A close relative or a former legal guardian who had authority 235
389	389	to control the complainant’s freedom of movement who: 236
390	390	“(i) Acts with intent to assume full responsibility for the 237
391	391	care and supervision of the complainant; and 238
392	392	“(ii) Does not cause bodily injury or use an explicit or 239
393	393	implicit coercive threat to cause the confinement or movement; or 240
394	394	“(B) A person who reasonably believes they are acting at the 241
395	395	direction of a close relative who: 242
396	396	“(i) Acts with intent that the close relative will assume full 243
397	397	responsibility for the care and supervision of the complainant; and 244
398	398	“(ii) Does not cause bodily injury or use an explicit or 245
399	399	implicit coercive threat to cause the confinement or movement. 246
400	400	“(2) It is a defense to liability under subsection (a)(2) of this section that, 247
401	401	in fact, the actor: 248
402	402	“(A) Is a transportation worker who moves the complainant while 249
403	403	in the course of the worker’s official duties; or 250
404	404
405	405
406	406
407	407	“(B) Is a person who moves the complainant solely by persuading 251
408	408	the complainant to go to a location open to the general public to engage in a commercial 252
409	409	or other legal activity. 253
410	410	“(c) Affirmative defenses. 254
411	411	“(1) It is an affirmative defense to liability under subsection (a)(1)(C) of 255
412	412	this section that the actor, in fact: 256
413	413	“(A) Lacks the complainant’s effective consent solely because of 257
414	414	deception by the actor; and 258
415	415	“(B) Does not confine or move the complainant with intent to use 259
416	416	bodily injury or an explicit or implicit coercive threat if the deception should fail. 260
417	417	“(2) It is an affirmative defense to liability under subsection (a)(2) of this 261
418	418	section that the actor, in fact, reasonably believes that a person with legal authority over 262
419	419	the complainant would have given effective consent to the conduct constituting the 263
420	420	offense. 264
421	421	“(d) Penalty. Any person convicted of criminal restraint shall be fined not more 265
422	422	than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or be imprisoned not more than 180 days, or 266
423	423	both.. 267
424	424	“(e) Multiple convictions for related offenses. Where multiple convictions for 268
425	425	criminal restraint and another offense arise from the same act or course of conduct, the 269
426	426	sentencing court shall follow the procedures specified in § 23-112. 270
427	427	“ § 22–2004. Attempts. 271
428	428	“Any person who attempts to commit an offense under this subchapter shall be 272
429	429	imprisoned for not more than 1/2 of the maximum prison sentence authorized for the offense 273
430	430	and, in addition, may be fined an amount not to exceed 1/2 of the maximum fine authorized for 274
431	431
432	432
433	433
434	434	the offense.”. 275
435	435	` Sec. 3. Fiscal impact statement. 276
436	436	The Council adopts the fiscal impact statement in the committee report as the fiscal 277
437	437	impact statement required by section 4a of the General Legislative Procedures Act of 1975, 278
438	438	approved October 16, 2006 (120 Stat. 2038; D.C. Official Code § 1-301.47a). 279
439	439	Sec. 4. Effective date. 280
440	440	This act shall take effect after approval by the Mayor (or in the event of veto by the 281
441	441	Mayor, action by the Council to override the veto), a 60-day period of congressional review as 282
442	442	provided in section 602(c)(2) of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, approved December 283
443	443	24, 1973 (87 Stat. 813; D.C. Official Code § 1-206.02(c)(2)), and publication in the District of 284
444	444	Columbia Register. 285