COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OFFICE OF COUNCILMEMBER BROOKE PINTO
THE JOHN A. WILSON BUILDING
1350 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W. , SUITE 106
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004
March 24, 2025
Nyasha Howard, Secretary
Council of the District of Columbia
1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
Dear Secretary Howard,
Today, along with Councilmember Anita Bonds, I am introducing the “Kidnapping Amendment
Act of 2025.” This legislation addresses critical gaps in our kidnapping statute that emerged
following the D.C. Court of Appeals' en banc decision in Cardozo v. United States (2024).
In this watershed ruling, the Court interpreted the District's kidnapping statute, to conclude that
kidnapping requires detaining someone "for a substantial period of time" comparable to holding
them "like a hostage or a prisoner."
1
Moreover, the Court suggested that detentions lasting less
than thirty minutes would rarely qualify as kidnapping under current law.
2
But the Cardozo
decision has opened up potential loopholes and public safety gaps in its wake. Consider recent
cases where individuals were forcibly transported in vehicles for 20 minutes against their will, or
hypothetical scenarios where a child is snatched from their yard and driven away for a similar
timeframe. Under the Court's new interpretation, these scenarios might not constitute kidnapping,
despite clearly being conduct our community would expect to be prosecuted as such.
This legislation would address these concerns through six modifications to existing law by:
• Establishing clear statutory parameters for what it means to “substantially confine or
move,” specifically defining it as moving someone at least 20 feet from their original
location or confining/moving them for at least 10 minutes. This precise definition resolves
ambiguity created by the Court's interpretation and ensures protection for victims in
scenarios that do not meet the Court's restrictive "hostage or prisoner" standard but clearly
constitute serious criminal conduct.
3
1
Cardozo v. United States, 315 A.3d 658, 676 (D.C. 2024)
2
Id. at 678.
3
Id. at 676.
2
• Deliberately omitting provisions that would have required kidnapping to merge with other
offenses when the confinement was merely “incidental” to committing another crime.
4
The
Court itself recognized the impracticality of the “incidental” test, noting that even
prolonged detentions designed to facilitate heinous crimes are no less deserving of
kidnapping charges. For instance, determining whether forcibly moving a victim to a
secluded location to commit assault was “incidental” creates unnecessary uncertainty in
prosecuting what should clearly be two distinct crimes.
• Including important clarifications on fact-finder unanimity requirements. A fact-finder is
an individual or entity, such as a jury or judge, responsible for determining the facts of a
case, including assessing the credibility of evidence and witness testimony.
5
For example,
under this legislation, when a jury is the fact-finder tasked with determining a defendant's
intent - a crucial element in distinguishing between first and second-degree kidnapping –
the jurors must unanimously agree that the defendant acted with at least one prohibited
purpose, but need not agree on which specific purpose motivated the conduct. This
practical, common-sense approach recognizes that in many kidnapping scenarios, a
perpetrator's precise intentions may remain unclear, even when their criminal purpose is
evident.
• Expanding second-degree kidnapping to include cases where defendants act with intent to
commit any criminal offense, not just felonies. This ensures appropriate liability for serious
restraints of liberty while maintaining proportional penalties based on the severity of the
associated conduct and intent.
• Establishing penalties that align with both the gravity of these offenses and current
statutory frameworks. First-degree kidnapping maintains the existing 30-year maximum
sentence, while second-degree kidnapping carries a 15-year maximum. The new criminal
restraint offense, addressing less severe scenarios, carries a misdemeanor penalty of up to
180 days. This graduated approach ensures proportional consequences based on the
severity of the conduct.
• Incorporating technical improvements that close potential loopholes. The bill ensures
liability attaches whether a defendant personally restrains a victim or causes them to be
restrained by another; when someone blocks exits or passageways; when a vulnerable
victim provides implicit rather than explicit acquiescence; and when a perpetrator intends
to hold someone for 24 hours or more (rather than the previously proposed 72-hour
threshold).
In short, these changes will modernize the District’s kidnapping statute and maintain appropriate
penalties that reflect the serious nature of kidnapping while creating clear distinctions between
4
Id. at 675.
5
See Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357
3
offense levels. The bill aims to enhance the prosecution of these crimes when District residents are
forcibly confined or moved.
Should you have any questions about this legislation, please contact Linn Groft, Committee and
Legislative Director at lgroft@dccouncil.gov.
Thank you,
Brooke Pinto
Councilmember, Ward 2
Chairwoman, Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety
Council of the District of Columbia
_____________________________ _____________________________ 1
Councilmember Anita Bonds Councilmember Brooke Pinto 2
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A BILL 7
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_________________________ 9
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IN THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 11
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_________________________ 13
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To amend the District of Columbia Code Section 22-2001 to revise the kidnapping statute by 16
establishing definitions for key terms; to create a two-tiered offense structure for 17
kidnapping with first degree and second degree classifications based on specific intents 18
and methods; to establish a new offense of criminal restraint for knowingly and 19
substantially confining or moving a person without proper consent; to provide defenses 20
and affirmative defenses for certain circumstances involving minors, transportation 21
workers, and commercial activities; and to specify penalties for violations of these 22
provisions. 23
24
BE IT ENACTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, That this act may 25
be cited as the “Kidnapping Amendment Act of 2025”. 26
Sec. 2. Title 22 is amended as follows: 27
(a) Chapter 20 is amended to read as follows: 28
“Title 22, Chapter 20. Kidnapping. 29
Ҥ 22-2001. Definitions. 30
“For the purposes of this chapter: 31
“(1) “Block”, and other parts of speech, including “blocks” and “blocking”, mean 32
“to render safe passage through a space difficult or impossible. 33
“(2) “Bodily injury” means physical pain, physical injury, illness, or impairment 34
of physical condition. 35
“(3) “Coercive threat” means a communication that, unless the complainant 36
complies, any person will do any of the following: 37
“(A) Engage in conduct that, in fact, constitutes: 38
“(i) An offense against persons; or 39
“(ii) A property offense; 40
“(B) Take or withhold action as a public official, or cause a public official 41
to take or withhold action; 42
“(C) Accuse a person of a crime; 43
“(D) Expose a secret, publicize an asserted fact, or distribute a photograph, 44
video or audio recording, regardless of the truth or authenticity of the secret, fact, or item, 45
that tends to subject another person to, or perpetuate: 46
“(i) Hatred, contempt, ridicule, or other significant injury to 47
personal reputation; or 48
“(ii) Significant injury to credit or business reputation; 49
“(E) Notify a federal, state, or local government agency or official of, or 50
publicize, another person’s immigration or citizenship status; 51
“(F) Facilitate or control a person’s access to an addictive or controlled 52
substance, or a prescription medication; 53
“(G) Engage in fraud or deception; 54
“(H) Cause any harm that is sufficiently serious, under all the 55
circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same 56
circumstances as the complainant to comply; or 57
“(I) Knowingly participate in conduct with the intent to cause a person to 58
believe that they are the property of a person or business and that would cause a 59
reasonable person in that person’s circumstances to believe that they are the property of a 60
person or business. 61
‘(4) (A) “Deceive”, and other parts of speech, including “deception”, mean: 62
“(i) Creating or reinforcing a false impression as to a material fact, 63
including a false impression as to an intention to perform future actions; 64
“(ii) Preventing another person from acquiring material 65
information; 66
“(iii) Failing to correct a false impression as to a material fact, 67
including false impressions as to intention, which the person previously created or 68
reinforced, or which influences another to whom they stand in a fiduciary or confidential 69
relationship; or 70
“(iv) For property offenses, failing to disclose a lien, adverse 71
claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of property which they transfer or 72
encumber in consideration for property, whether or not it is a matter of official record. 73
“(B) The term “deceive” does not include puffing statements that are 74
unlikely to deceive ordinary persons. 75
“(C) Deception as to a person’s intention to perform a future act shall not 76
be inferred from the fact alone that they did not subsequently perform the act. 77
“(5) “Effective consent” means consent other than consent induced by physical 78
force, an explicit or implicit coercive threat, or deception. 79
“(6) “Incapacitated individual” shall have the same meaning as provided in § 21-80
2011(11). 81
“(7) “Person with legal authority over the complainant” means: 82
“(A) When the complainant is a person under 18 years of age: 83
“(i) A parent, or a person acting in the place of a parent under civil 84
law, who is responsible for the health, welfare, or supervision of the complainant; or 85
“(ii) Someone who is acting with the effective consent of such a 86
parent or such a person; or 87
“(B) When the complainant is an incapacitated individual: 88
“(i) A court-appointed guardian to the complainant; or 89
“(ii) Someone who is acting with the effective consent of such a 90
guardian. 91
“(8) “Serious bodily injury” shall have the same meaning as provided in § 22-92
404.01(d). 93
“(9) “Substantially confines or moves” means that the complainant was either: 94
“(A) Moved at least 20 feet away from the complainant’s original 95
location; or 96
“(B) Confined or moved for at least 10 minutes.”. 97
(b) Chapter 22 is amended to read as follows: 98
Ҥ 22-2002. Kidnapping. 99
“(a) First degree. An actor commits first degree kidnapping when the actor: 100
“(1) Knowingly and substantially confines or moves the complainant, or 101
causes the complainant to be substantially confined or moved; 102
“(2) By means of: 103
“(A) Causing bodily injury to the complainant or by using physical 104
force; 105
“(B) Making an explicit or implicit coercive threat; 106
“(C) Deception; 107
“(D) Securing, locking, or blocking any door, passageway, or other 108
means of egress; or 109
“(E) With explicit or implicit acquiescence of the complainant, 110
when the actor is: 111
“(i) Reckless as to the facts that: 112
“(I) The complainant is an incapacitated individual; 113
and 114
“(II) A person with legal authority over the 115
complainant who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent 116
to the confinement or movement; or 117
“(ii) In fact, 18 years of age or older and reckless as to the 118
facts that: 119
“(I) The complainant is under 16 years of age and 4 120
years younger than the actor; and 121
“(II) A person with legal authority over the 122
complainant who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent 123
to the confinement or movement; and 124
“(3) With intent to: 125
“(A) Hold the complainant for ransom or reward; 126
“(B) Use the complainant as a shield or hostage; 127
“(C) Facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter; 128
“(D) Inflict death or serious bodily injury upon the complainant; 129
“(E) Commit a sexual offense defined in Chapter 30 of Title 22 130
against the complainant; 131
“(F) Cause any person to believe that the complainant will not be 132
released without suffering death, serious bodily injury, or a sex offense defined in 133
Chapter 30 of Title 22; 134
“(G) Permanently leave a person with legal authority over the 135
complainant without custody of the complainant; or 136
“(H) Confine or move the complainant for 24 hours or more. 137
“(b) Second degree. An actor commits second degree kidnapping when the actor: 138
“(1) Knowingly and substantially confines or moves the complainant, or 139
causes the complainant to be substantially confined or moved; 140
“(2) By means of: 141
“(A) Causing bodily injury to the complainant or by using physical 142
force; 143
“(B) Making an explicit or implicit coercive threat; 144
“(C) Deception; 145
“(D) Securing, locking, or blocking any door, passageway, or other 146
means of egress; or 147
“(E) With explicit or implicit acquiescence of the complainant, 148
when the actor is: 149
“(i) Reckless as to the facts that: 150
“(I) The complainant is an incapacitated individual; 151
and 152
“(II) A person with legal authority over the 153
complainant who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent 154
to the confinement or movement; or 155
“(ii) In fact, 18 years of age or older and reckless as to the 156
facts that: 157
“(I) The complainant is under 16 years of age and 4 158
years younger than the actor; and 159
“(II) A person with legal authority over the 160
complainant who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent 161
to the confinement or movement; and 162
“(3) With intent to: 163
“(A) Inflict bodily injury upon the complainant; 164
“(B) Cause any person to believe that the complainant will not be 165
released without suffering bodily injury; 166
“(C) Commit any criminal offense; or 167
“(D) Facilitate the commission of any criminal offense or flight 168
thereafter. 169
“(c) Defense. It is a defense to liability under subsection (a)(3)(G) and (H) of this 170
section when the complainant is, in fact, under 18 years of age and the actor is either: 171
“(1) A close relative or a former legal guardian who had authority to 172
control the complainant’s freedom of movement who: 173
“(A) Acts with intent to assume full responsibility for the care and 174
supervision of the complainant; and 175
“(B) Does not cause bodily injury or use an explicit or implicit 176
coercive threat to cause the confinement or movement; or 177
“(2) A person who reasonably believes they are acting at the direction of a 178
close relative who: 179
“(A) Acts with intent that the close relative will assume full 180
responsibility for the care and supervision of the complainant; and 181
“(B) Does not cause bodily injury, commit a sexual offense as 182
defined in Chapter 30 of Title 22, or use an explicit or implicit coercive threat to cause 183
the confinement or movement. 184
“(d) Penalties. 185
“(1) Any person convicted of first degree kidnapping shall be fined not 186
more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or be imprisoned for not more than 30 187
years, or both. 188
“(2) Any person convicted of second degree kidnapping shall be fined not 189
more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or be imprisoned for not more than 15 190
years, or both. 191
“(e) Multiple convictions for related offenses. Where multiple convictions for first 192
degree kidnapping or second degree kidnapping and another offense arise from the same 193
act or course of conduct, the sentencing court shall follow the procedures specified in § 194
23-112. 195
“(f) Unanimity. Although there must be sufficient proof that an actor acted either 196
with the intent delineated in subsection (a)(3) of this section to sustain liability for first 197
degree kidnapping, or with the intent delineated in subsection (b)(3) of this section to 198
sustain liability for second degree kidnapping, there is no requirement that the factfinder 199
determine which specific purpose described in either subsection (a)(3)(A)-(H), or 200
subsection (b)(3)(A)-(D), was intended by the actor, provided that the factfinder 201
determines that the actor acted with at least one of the applicable specific purposes. If a 202
jury is the trier of fact, members of the jury are not required to agree unanimously on 203
which specific purpose was intended by the actor, provided that the members of the jury 204
agree unanimously that the actor acted with at least one specific purpose described in 205
either subsection (a)(3)(A)-(H), or subsection (b)(3)(A)-(D), as applicable. 206
Ҥ 22-2003. Criminal restraint. 207
“(a) Offense. An actor commits criminal restraint when the actor knowingly and 208
substantially confines or moves the complainant, or causes the complainant to be 209
substantially confined or moved: 210
(1) By means of: 211
“(A) Causing bodily injury to the complainant or by using physical 212
force; 213
“(B) Making an explicit or implicit coercive threat; or 214
“(C) Deception; or 215
“(D) Securing, locking, or blocking any door, passageway, or other 216
means of egress; or 217
“(2) By any means, including with acquiescence of the complainant, when 218
the actor is: 219
“(A) Reckless as to the facts that: 220
“(i) The complainant is an incapacitated individual; and 221
“(ii) A person with legal authority over the complainant 222
who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent to the 223
confinement or movement; or 224
“(B) In fact, 18 years of age or older and reckless as to the facts 225
that: 226
“(i) The complainant is under 16 years of age and 4 years 227
younger than the actor; and 228
“(ii) A person with legal authority over the complainant 229
who is acting consistent with that authority has not given effective consent to the 230
confinement or movement. 231
“(b) Defenses. 232
“(1) It is a defense that the complainant is, in fact, under 18 years of age, 233
and the actor is: 234
“(A) A close relative or a former legal guardian who had authority 235
to control the complainant’s freedom of movement who: 236
“(i) Acts with intent to assume full responsibility for the 237
care and supervision of the complainant; and 238
“(ii) Does not cause bodily injury or use an explicit or 239
implicit coercive threat to cause the confinement or movement; or 240
“(B) A person who reasonably believes they are acting at the 241
direction of a close relative who: 242
“(i) Acts with intent that the close relative will assume full 243
responsibility for the care and supervision of the complainant; and 244
“(ii) Does not cause bodily injury or use an explicit or 245
implicit coercive threat to cause the confinement or movement. 246
“(2) It is a defense to liability under subsection (a)(2) of this section that, 247
in fact, the actor: 248
“(A) Is a transportation worker who moves the complainant while 249
in the course of the worker’s official duties; or 250
“(B) Is a person who moves the complainant solely by persuading 251
the complainant to go to a location open to the general public to engage in a commercial 252
or other legal activity. 253
“(c) Affirmative defenses. 254
“(1) It is an affirmative defense to liability under subsection (a)(1)(C) of 255
this section that the actor, in fact: 256
“(A) Lacks the complainant’s effective consent solely because of 257
deception by the actor; and 258
“(B) Does not confine or move the complainant with intent to use 259
bodily injury or an explicit or implicit coercive threat if the deception should fail. 260
“(2) It is an affirmative defense to liability under subsection (a)(2) of this 261
section that the actor, in fact, reasonably believes that a person with legal authority over 262
the complainant would have given effective consent to the conduct constituting the 263
offense. 264
“(d) Penalty. Any person convicted of criminal restraint shall be fined not more 265
than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01 or be imprisoned not more than 180 days, or 266
both.. 267
“(e) Multiple convictions for related offenses. Where multiple convictions for 268
criminal restraint and another offense arise from the same act or course of conduct, the 269
sentencing court shall follow the procedures specified in § 23-112. 270
“ § 22–2004. Attempts. 271
“Any person who attempts to commit an offense under this subchapter shall be 272
imprisoned for not more than 1/2 of the maximum prison sentence authorized for the offense 273
and, in addition, may be fined an amount not to exceed 1/2 of the maximum fine authorized for 274
the offense.”. 275
` Sec. 3. Fiscal impact statement. 276
The Council adopts the fiscal impact statement in the committee report as the fiscal 277
impact statement required by section 4a of the General Legislative Procedures Act of 1975, 278
approved October 16, 2006 (120 Stat. 2038; D.C. Official Code § 1-301.47a). 279
Sec. 4. Effective date. 280
This act shall take effect after approval by the Mayor (or in the event of veto by the 281
Mayor, action by the Council to override the veto), a 60-day period of congressional review as 282
provided in section 602(c)(2) of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, approved December 283
24, 1973 (87 Stat. 813; D.C. Official Code § 1-206.02(c)(2)), and publication in the District of 284
Columbia Register. 285