Provides for the suspension and extension of prescription and peremption due to 2016 flooding disaster. (gov sig)
By enacting this legislation, it establishes a clear legal framework for how prescriptive and peremptive periods are calculated in the aftermath of extended suspensions. This ensures that any claims or legal actions that might have been paused due to the flooding are addressed in a timely manner following the re-establishment of typical legal processes. It sets specific end dates for the extensions that were previously granted, thereby restoring the normal operation of laws governing timelines for legal claims.
Senate Bill 109 addresses the legislative response to the 2016 flooding disaster in Louisiana, specifically regarding the suspension and extension of certain legal deadlines known as prescriptive and peremptive periods. The bill formalizes the termination of the temporary extensions put in place by Executive Orders JBE 2016-53, 57, and 66, which were intended to alleviate hardships for individuals and entities affected by the flooding. The bill aims to create clarity in how these legal timelines are handled post-disaster, ensuring that deadlines are reset appropriately and consistently across the board.
The bill received unanimous support in the Senate with a vote of 37 to 0. This suggests a general consensus among lawmakers regarding the necessity of providing clarity and fairness after the natural disaster impact on citizens' ability to pursue legal rights. Lawmakers recognized the importance of ensuring that citizens were not indefinitely left in limbo regarding legal timelines due to the extraordinary circumstances brought about by the flooding.
While the bill passed without opposition, discussions around similar measures often raise concerns regarding the balance between necessary emergency actions and the rights of individuals. While this specific bill seemed to find clear support, it highlights the need to maintain a vigilant approach as the legislature navigates future crises, ensuring that emergency measures do not set problematic precedents for legal processes.