Proposing a constitutional amendment to allow the legislature to override a veto of the governor following a legislative session.
If enacted, SJR14 would provide a mechanism for the Texas legislature to exert more influence over the law-making process by enabling it to counteract gubernatorial vetoes. This change could shift the balance of power within Texas's political landscape, allowing for a legislative body that can act independently of the executive branch under specific circumstances. Implementing this resolution may lead to greater legislative empowerment, ultimately affecting how laws are developed and passed within the state.
SJR14, a joint resolution proposed in Texas, aims to amend the state constitution to allow the legislature to override a governor's veto after the conclusion of a legislative session. The amendment would modify Section 14 of Article IV of the Texas Constitution, outlining the processes by which the legislature is empowered to act on bills that have been disapproved by the governor. Under the current provisions, a veto can be overwritten by a two-thirds majority in both houses, but this amendment seeks to streamline that process for certain situations, particularly after adjournment of a session.
The proposed amendment has sparked debate regarding the implications it may have on governance. Proponents argue that it enhances democratic processes by empowering the legislature and ensuring that the voices of elected representatives are not dismissed by the governor's veto. Conversely, opponents may view this as a potential overreach that could disrupt the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches. The ability to override a veto could lead to frequent clashes and heightened political tensions, especially in a divided government scenario.