Proposing a constitutional amendment to allow the legislature to override a veto of the governor following a legislative session.
If HJR29 is enacted, it could significantly alter the balance of power between the Texas Legislature and the governor by providing the legislature with a direct mechanism to push back against gubernatorial vetoes. This change might embolden lawmakers to pass legislation that has a higher chance of facing gubernatorial disapproval, thereby increasing legislative independence. Additionally, it could lead to a more dynamic interaction between the legislative and executive branches, possibly fostering heightened political conflict over contentious issues.
HJR29 is a joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment that would allow the Texas Legislature to override a veto from the governor following a legislative session. The proposed amendment aims to adjust the existing Section 14 of Article IV of the Texas Constitution, which outlines the current process for legislative bills that the governor disapproves. Under the current law, a bill that the governor returns with objections can only become law if two-thirds of the legislature approves it again. HJR29 expands this by enabling the legislature to potentially override a veto after the session has concluded.
Notable points of contention around HJR29 may center on the implications of giving the legislature the power to override vetoes after sessions end. Critics may argue that this amendment undermines the governor's authority and disrupts the intended checks and balances within the state government. Supporters, on the other hand, might view it as a necessary modernization of legislative power that reflects the will of the electorate. The debate could also invoke broader discussions about partisanship and governance, particularly in an increasingly polarized political environment.