Restricting the governor’s partial veto authority to only rejecting entire bill sections of an appropriation bill that are capable of separate enactment and reducing appropriations in a bill (first consideration).
Impact
If passed, AJR8 will amend Article V, Section 10(1)(c) of the Wisconsin Constitution. The intended impact is to restrict the governor's ability to partially veto portions of appropriation bills, effectively centralizing more legislative control over financial appropriations. Interestingly, the bill implies significant consequences for the balance of power in the state government, particularly how budgetary power is exercised and overseen, resulting in a more transparent and accountable process regarding state funds.
Summary
AJR8 is a proposed amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution that seeks to limit the governor's partial veto authority specifically regarding appropriation bills. This amendment would allow the governor to only reject entire sections of an appropriation bill that are capable of separate enactment, thereby increasing adherence to legislative intent and reducing the scope for veto manipulation. This measure arises from previous instances where governors have made nuanced changes to planned appropriations, potentially leading to significant alterations in budgetary allocations without input from the legislature.
Contention
The bill has generated discussions among legislators regarding the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. Proponents argue that the governor’s current authority allows for excessive and undemocratic manipulation of budget proposals, which could easily lead to outcomes contrary to the legislature's expressed intentions. On the contrary, opponents might assert that the current system allows for necessary flexibility in governance, enabling governors to respond effectively to changing circumstances related to funding needs.
Notable_points
The amendment further clarifies existing limitations based on the 2020 Supreme Court decision in Bartlett v. Evers, which highlighted ambiguities related to the exercise of partial veto powers. AJR8 therefore serves not only as a legislative proposal but also as a direct response to legal interpretations of constitutionality surrounding governor's vetoes. Additionally, for AJR8 to become effective, it must pass two consecutive legislatures and subsequently be ratified by the electorate, which adds layers of scrutiny and public involvement in the governance process.
Reserving to the people the power of referendum to reject acts of the legislature and the power of initiative to propose and approve at an election laws and constitutional amendments (first consideration).